The Jesuits loyalty, manifested in three several treatises lately written by them against the oath of allegeance with a preface shewing the pernicious consequence of their principles as to civil government.

CHAP. II. Why it cannot be safe either to swear to the Deposing doctrine as true, or to abjure it as false.

SInce it is but even more undeniably evident then all good men have cause to wish, and that experience, the easiest and clearest of arguments, puts it but too sadly beyond dis∣pute, that this grand Controversy, (Whether the Pope hath any Power and authority to depose Princes for any cause pretence, or exigency whatsoever,) hath been for divers Ages from time to time disputed in the Schools by speculative men in their subtile and notionall way of reasoning: And what Trithe∣mius recorded to posterity above 500 years agoe, (that Scho∣lastici certant, & adhuc sub Iudice lis est, utrùm Papa posset Imperatorem deponere,) may, for ought we know, 500 years hence be as much a question, and as far from ending, as now it is; whereas even in our days the Controversy finds but too many stirr Champions and Abettors to maintain the quar∣rell, and keep life in the debate by their warm and smart contests▪ no clear and authoritative decision of the Point yet appearing to which both sides think themselves obliged to stand and acquiesce: Since likewise, when a Point is thus in dispute amongst Catholick Princes, (some of them perem∣ptorily denying and hotly opposing what others as positively assert and vigorously maintain, and this openly, avowedly, and in the face of the world,) no one can determinately swear to either side of the point in dispute as true, nor war∣rantably abjure the other as false; for this were to swear a thing as true, or to abjure it as false, which is confessedly in dispute whether it be so or no, which is never law∣full:

From hence I conceive, that for the deciding of our Que∣stion, (Whether a Catholick may lawfully abjure the Pope's De∣posing power and authority,) there needs no more then barely to

suppose, that it is a Question whether the Pope hath any such Power and Authority or no. For here one Question resolves the other: grant this second to be a Question, the first will be none. For if it be a Question whether the Pope hath any such Power and Authority or no, no man can safely swear, that without all question he hath none; I say, without all question, because what we swear as true ought to be unque∣stionably such, otherwise we fall under the guilt and sacri∣lege of Perjury.

For a more full evidence and farther clearing of this so important a Truth, (namely, That the swearing or abju∣ring a controverted doctrinall Point unavoidably draws up∣on us the execrable guilt of Perjury,) let us consider the difference of Oaths in generall, and the different parts of the Oath of Allegeance in particular. Of Oaths some are asser∣tory, others promissory. An assertory Oath is, when we po∣sitively say such or such a thing is true or false, and then bind this saying of ours with an Oath: A promissory Oath is that whereby we engage to doe what we promise, or to leave un∣done what we promise not to doe, and thereupon give our Oath as a bond of performance. The Oath of Allegeance is a mixt Oath, partly assertory, (as where it is affirmed that the Pope hath not any Power or Authority to depose the King, or to authorize any forrein Prince to invade or annoy him or his Countries, or to discharge any of his Subjects from their Allegeance, &c.) partly promissory, (as namely, where the Swearer engages that, notwithstanding any De∣claration, or Sentence of Excommunication, or Deprivation, made or to be made against the King, his Heirs or Succes∣sours, he will bear faith and true allegeance to them, he will defend them to the utmost of his power against all conspi∣racies or attempts whatsoever.)

That which here principally falls under consideration is the nature of an assertory Oath: in which Oath it is essential∣ly requisite, that what we do swear be undoubtedly and un∣questionably true; and all little enough for the securing us against God's and Truth's sworn enemy, Perjury, which

abominable sin is defined by the Schools to be a Lie confir∣med by Oath: And to lie, saith † St. Austin, is to speak a∣gainst that which a man thinks in his mind or conscience, or, as we usually express it, when a man speaks not as he thinks; viz. when there lies a secret check and contradiction in the breast to what is uttered by the mouth. Put these two together, and the case stands thus: To speak contrary to what a man thinks in his conscience, is, according to true morals, the definition of a Lie▪ and, to swear contrary to the inward dictates of his conscience, is that wherein consists the formall notion and malice of Perjury. Now this Swearing contra∣ry to what a man thinks in his conscience may happen two ways: not onely when he is conscious to himself, and knows that what he swears is not true; but also when he knows not, and therefore doubts, or hath just cause to doubt, whe∣ther it be true or no: in which case if he chance to swear, it is at the perill of his Soul, and contrary to the secret infor∣mation of his Conscience, which must needs check at the act, and inwardly protest against it. For it is a folly beyond dotage, and carries with it the prejudice of the highest self-condemnation imaginable, for a man to say, I will swear such a thing is true, and yet I know not, I doubt, or have just cause to doubt, whether it be so or no.

Notes

• Trithemius in Chron. hi∣storic. ad ann. 1106.
• Magister in 3. dist. 39. En. ann. 10. S. Thom.
• †

  S. Aug. lib. de Mendacio.