The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

a STrabo and Laertius affirm he was a Dialectick; The Dialecticks (saithb Cicero) teach in their Elements to judge whether a ••on∣nex (a proposition which hath the conjunction if) be true or false; as this, if it be day, it is light, how much is it controverted; Diodo∣rus is of one opinion, Philo of another, Chrysippus of a third, That Dio∣dorus laboured much herein, appears from an Epigram of Callima∣chus, cited and explained byc Sextus Empiricus.

Concerning these propositions, the Disagreement of Diodorus from Philo and Chrysippus (already mentioned by Cicero) is thus ex∣plained byd Sextus Empiricus; But when saith he, or how it followeth they disagree among themselves, and those things whereby they deter∣mine a consequence to be judged, oppugn one another•• as Philo said, it is a true Connex, when it beginneth not from true, and endeth ••n false. So that according to his opinion, a true Connex may be three severall wa••es, a false only one way. For when it beginneth from true, and endeth in true, it is true; as this, if it be day, it is light. Again, when it be∣ginneth from false, and endeth in false, it is true: as this, if the Earth flies, the Earth hath wings. Likewise that which beginneth from false, and endeth in true is true; as this, if the Earth flies it is Earth: that only is true which beginneth from true, and endeth in false. Such is this, if it be day it is night. For if it be day, that it is day is true, which is the Antecedent. But that it is night is false, which was the Consequent. Di∣odorus saith, that is a true Connex which is not contingent, beginning from true, and ending in false. This is contrary to the opinion of Philo, for such a Connex as this, if it be day I discourse, and if at present it be day, and I discourse is according to Philo's opinion a true Connex: for it begins from true, it is day, and ends in true, I discourse. But accor∣ding to the opinion of Diodorus it is false: for it may so happen, that though it begin from true, to wit, it is day, yet it may end in false, to wit, that I discourse when I am silent. Thus by Contingencie it may be∣gin in true, and end in false; for before I began to discourse it began from true, to wit, it is day: but ended in false, to wit, I dis∣course.

And again,e for that we examine not many opinions concerning a Connex, let us say that Connex is in it self right, which beginneth not from true, and endeth in false. This, if there be motion, there is Va••uity according to Epicures Opinion, beginning from true, to wit, there is motion, and ending in true, will be true. According to the Peripateticks, beginning from true, to wit, there is motion, and ending in false, to wit, there is Vacuity, will be false: according to Diodorus, beginning from

false; to wit, there is motion, and ending in false, to wit, there is vacuity, will be true, for the assumption, to wit, there is motion, he denies as false.

f Some affirme, he invented the vailed and horned arguments (of which already in the life of Eubulides)g Alexander Aphrodiseus, saith he, used 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the dominative argument: Of whose originall and efficacy thush Epictetus; The Dominative argument seemes to have been interrogated and collected upon such like occasions as these: for, there being a common ••ight amongst these three propositions to one another: The first, that every thing past is necessarily true. The second, that possibility followes not impossibility. The third, that what is not possible, neither is nor shall be true. This fight Diodorus observing, made use of the two first, to prove, that nothing is possible, which is not, nor shall be. Andi Alexander, For that I be at Corinth is possible, if that I have been, or ever shall be there; but, if neither, it is not possible. It is possible, that a child to be made a Grammarian, if he be made such, in confirmation hereof Diodorus interrogated by the Dominative ar∣gument.

He held, that nothing is moved,k arguing thus: If a thing be moved, it is either moved in the place wherein it is, or in the place wherein it is not: but not in that wherein it is; for it resteth in the place wherein it is: nor in that wherein it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither act nor suffer. Therefore nothing is moved: andl conse∣quently nothing is corrupted or perisheth.

m He asserted, that the principles of things are least indivisible bodies,n in number infinite, in magnitude finite.

Notes

• a

  Lib.
• b

  Lucul.
• c

  Advers. Gram.
• d

  Fyrrh. Hyp. 2.
• e

  Cap. codem:
• f

  Laert.
• g

  In lib. 1: Pri∣••r.
• h

  lib. 2. cap. 19.
• i

  In lib. ••. Prior.
• k

  Sext. Empir. ••yrrhon. hyp. 3. 8.
• l

  Sext. Empir. advers. Gram.
• m

  Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 4.
• n

  Stob. Eclog. ••bys. 13.