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He tells us, That the Human Nature of Christ may be Ignorant of some things, notwithstanding its personal Union to the Divine Word; because it is an Inferiour and Subject Nature, Page 270. Line 12, 13, 14.
Answer. These Words also are both absurd and false. And
First, They are Absurd, because no Rules of Speak∣ing, or Arguing, permit us to say of any Thing, or
Person, That it may be so, or so; when necessarily it is, and must be so. For the Term [may] imports an In∣difference, or at least, a possibility to both sides of the Contradiction: So that when a Man says, That a Thing [may be thus, or thus] he does by consequence say also, [That it may not be thus, or thus.] And there∣fore to say, That the Human Nature of Christ, notwith∣standing its personal Union to the Word, may be igno∣rant of some Things, when it cannot but be ignorant of some; nay, of very many Things, is Absurd.
And in the next place also, To make the Subjection of the Human Nature to the Divine, the proper Cause of this Ignorance is false, and the Assignation of a non causa pro causâ: It being all one, as if I should say, That such an one cannot be a good Disputant, because he has a blemish in his Eye. For it is not this Subjection of it to the Divine Nature, that makes it ignorant of many Things known by that Nature; but the vast disparity that is between these Two Natures, viz. That one of them is Infinite, the other Finite, which makes it impossible for the Infi∣nite to communicate its whole Knowledge to the Finite. Forasmuch as such a Knowledge exceeds its Capacity, and cannot be received into it, so as to exist, or abide in it, any more than Omnipotence, or Omnipresence, or any other Infinite Divine Perfection can be lodged in a Fi∣nite Being.
And besides this, this very Author, in the immediate∣ly foregoing Page, had not only allowed but affirmed, That the Body (which certainly is both united to the Soul, and of a Nature Subject and Inferiour to it) was yet conscious to the Dictates and Commands of the Soul. Wherefore where Two Natures are united, the bare Sub∣jection of one to the other, is not the proper Cause, that the Nature which is Subject, is ignorant of what is
known by the Nature which it is subject to. For if Subjection were the sole and proper Cause of this Igno∣rance, the Inferiour Nature would be equally ignorant of every Thing known by the Superiour; which yet, ac∣cording to this Man's own Doctrine of the Consciousness of the Body to the Soul, is not so. This Consideration I alledge only as an Argument ad hominem, having al∣ready, by the former Argument, sufficiently proved the falseness of his Assertion.
But I shall detain my Reader no longer upon this Sub∣ject; though I must assure him, that I have given him but a Modicum, and (as it were) an handful or two out of that full heap which I had before me; and from which I had actually collected several more Particulars, which I have not here presented him with, being un∣willing to swell my Work to too great a Bulk. Ne∣vertheless I look upon this Head of Discourse, as so very useful to place this Author in a true Light, that if I might be so bold with my Reader, I could wish, that he would vouchsafe this Chapter (of all the rest) a second Peru∣sal; upon which I dare undertake, that it will leave in him such Impressions concerning this Man's fitness to Write about the Trinity, as will not wear out of his Mind in haste. And yet after all this, I will not pre∣sume to derogate from this Author's Abilities, how inso∣lently soever he has trampled upon other Mens; but content my self, that I have fairly laid that before the Reader, by which he may take a just, and true measure of them. And so I shall conclude this Chapter with an Observation, which I have, upon several occasions, had cause to make, viz. That Divinity and Philosophy are certainly the worst Things in the World, for any One to be Magisterial in, who does not understand them.