distinction between eligere and instituere, destroys it, and the paternal Right, which he makes the foundation of his Doctrine. Heaps of Scripture are alledged, says he, concerning the solemn Coronation and In∣auguration of Saul, David, Solomon and others, by Nobles, Antients, and People of the Commonwealth of Israel: which is enough to prove that the whole work was theirs; that no other had any title more than what they bestowed upon him: They were set up by the No∣bles, Antients, and People: Even God did no otherwise intervene than by such a secret disposition of the Lots by his Providence, as is exercised in the Government of all the things in the World; and we cannot have a more certain evidence, that a paternal right to Domi∣nion is a meer Whimsy, than that God did not cause the Lot to fall upon the eldest, of the eldest Line, of the eldest Tribe; but upon Saul, a young man, of the youngest Tribe: and afterwards, tho he had designed David, Solomon, Jeroboam, and others, who had no pretence to the paternal Right to be Kings, he left both the e∣lection and institution of them to the Elders and People.
But Hooker being well examined, it will appear that his opinions were as contrary to the Doctrine of our Author, as those we have mentioned out of Plato and Aristotle. He plainly says, It is impossible that any should have a compleat lawful power over a multitude consisting of so many Families, as every politick Society doth, but by consent of Men, or immediate appointment from God: Because not having the natural Su∣periority of Fathers, their Power must needs be usurped, and then unlaw∣ful; or if lawful, then either granted or consented unto by them over whom they exercise the same, or else given extraordinarily by God. And tho he thinks Kings to have bin the first Governors so constituted, he adds, That this is not the only Regiment that hath bin received in the World. The inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry others to be devised. So that in a word, all publick Regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have risen from deliberate advice, consultation and composition between men, judging it convenient and behoofeful. And a little below, Man's Nature standing therefore as it doth, some kind of regiment the Law of Nature doth require; yet the kinds thereof being many, Nature tyeth not to any one, but leaveth the choice as a thing ar∣bitrary. And again, To live by one mans will, became all mens misery: This constrained them to come unto Laws, &c. But as those Laws do not only teach that which is good, but enjoin it, they have in them a constrain∣ing force. To constrain men to any thing inconvenient seemeth unreasonable: Most requisite therefore it is that to devise Laws, which all men should be forced to obey, none but wise men should be admitted. Moreover that which we say concerning the power of Government must here be applied unto the pow∣er of making Laws, whereby to govern; which Power God hath over all; and by the natural Law, whereunto he hath made all subject, the lawful power of making Laws to command whole politick Societies of men, belongeth so properly unto the same intire Societies, that for any Prince or Potentate, of what kind soever upon Earth, to exercise the same of himself, and not either by express commission immediately, from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose Laws, it is no better than meer Tyranny. Laws therefore they are not, which publick consent hath not made so. The humour of our Age con∣sidered,