Theses Sabbaticæ, or, The doctrine of the Sabbath wherein the Sabbaths I. Morality, II. Change, III. Beginning. IV. Sanctification, are clearly discussed, which were first handled more largely in sundry sermons in Cambridge in New-England in opening of the Fourth COmmandment : in unfolding whereof many scriptures are cleared, divers cases of conscience resolved, and the morall law as a rule of life to a believer, occasionally and distinctly handled / by Thomas Shepard ...

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Title
Theses Sabbaticæ, or, The doctrine of the Sabbath wherein the Sabbaths I. Morality, II. Change, III. Beginning. IV. Sanctification, are clearly discussed, which were first handled more largely in sundry sermons in Cambridge in New-England in opening of the Fourth COmmandment : in unfolding whereof many scriptures are cleared, divers cases of conscience resolved, and the morall law as a rule of life to a believer, occasionally and distinctly handled / by Thomas Shepard ...
Author
Shepard, Thomas, 1605-1649.
Publication
London :: Printed by T.R. and E.M. for John Rothwell ...,
1650.
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Subject terms
Sunday -- Sermons.
Sabbath.
Cite this Item
"Theses Sabbaticæ, or, The doctrine of the Sabbath wherein the Sabbaths I. Morality, II. Change, III. Beginning. IV. Sanctification, are clearly discussed, which were first handled more largely in sundry sermons in Cambridge in New-England in opening of the Fourth COmmandment : in unfolding whereof many scriptures are cleared, divers cases of conscience resolved, and the morall law as a rule of life to a believer, occasionally and distinctly handled / by Thomas Shepard ..." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A59693.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 14, 2024.

Pages

Thesis 21.

[ 21] If it be demanded therefore, What is that goodnesse in a

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morall law for which it is therefore commanded? The An∣swer is given by Vasques, Suarez, Smifinga, and most of the Schoolemen, and sundry of our owne Writers, that it is nothing else, but That comely sutablenesse and meetnesse in the thing commanded unto humane nature as rationall, or unto man as rationall, and consequently unto every man. When I say, as Rationall, I understand as Master Ironside doth, viz. as right reason neither blinded nor corrupted doth re∣quire. When I say as sutable to man, and consequently to every man, I hereby exclude all lawes meerely Judici∣all and Evangelicall from being morall, the first of which are sutable to some men onely, the other are not sutable to men as men, but to man as corrupt and fallen; and therefore binde not all men, but onely those among whom they are sufficiently and actually promulgated, as is evident, Rom. 10.14 Iohn. 15.22. But morall lawes are sutable to all men, and have an inward meetnesse and con∣gruity to be observed of all men: For look as when the Lord gives Laws to any particular nation, whether immedi∣ately by himself, or mediately by man, he ever makes them sutable to the peoples peace and good of that nation; so when he makes lawes binding all mankinde in all Nati∣ons, he makes them sutable to humane nature or all man∣kinde therein. And look as nationall Lawes binde not meerly by the meere will of the Law-giver, but from the goodnesse and sutablenesse in the thing unto their com∣mon good; so here morall lawes which concerne all Nati∣ons, bind not meerly because of the will of God (which of it selfe is sufficient to binde all men, if he had pleased to put no more in morall lawes) but also because of some goodnesse in the things commanded, which is nothing else but such sutablenes as is mentioned unto the common good of man. What this sutablenesse to humane nature is, we shall shew, in due place; meane while, I doe not under∣stand by sutablenesse to humane nature, the inclination of humane nature now corrupted by sinne; for infused and supernaturall vertues and graces (to which there∣fore humane nature is not inclined) are (as Vasquez truly and strongly maintaines) in some sense naturall and good in themselves, not because humane nature is inclined to them, but because they are very congruous and consen∣taneous thereunto, and perfecting humane nature, as such, and consequently sutable thereunto: A good is said to be utile & delectabile in respect of some profit or delight

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which comes to man by it, but bonum honestum in genere moris (as Suarez and his fellowes call it) consists in a kinde of decency, comlinesse and sweet proportion between such an act, and such a nature as acts by right reason; to which nature it is exceeding comely and suitable, whether any profit or delight come thereby yea or no. As now in the divine nature, it's exceeding beautifull and comely for it (and therefore good in it selfe) to bee bountifull and mercifull, and to doe good unto the creature, although no profit could come to him thereby: It is Gods nature, as I may so say, so to doe; so 'tis in humane nature, it's a comely thing to honour parents, reverence Gods Name, to bee loving and mercifull to all men, in heart, word and deed; to give God a fit and the most meet proportion of time for solemne service of him, who allowes us many dayes to serve our owne good; this is good nature, and being thus seemly and suitable to it, this and such like things are therefore good in themselves, though perhaps neither profit or pleasure should come unto man hereby: And hence it's well observed by some of the Schoolemen, that right reason doth not make a thing morall, but only judgeth and discerneth what is morall; for right reason doth not make a thing suitable, but onely seeth whether it be so or no, a thing may bee suitable before right rea∣son see it, yet when 'tis presented to reason it sees it suit∣able, as the wall is white before the eye see it, yet when the eye doth see it, it appeares white also: It may bee a meet and comely thing to give God a seventh part of our time, though no mans reason can of it selfe find out such a meet proportion, yet when reason sees it, it's forced to acknowledge a comlinesse of equity, and suitablenesse there∣in, as shall hereafter appeare.

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