The method to science by J.S.

LESSON III. How these Common Heads of Notions are to be Divided.

1. THE Differences that divide each Common Head must be Intrinsecal to it. For, since we cannot discourse of two Disparate No∣tions at once; and since were those Heads divi∣ded by Differences that are Extrinsecal to the Common Genus, (or taken from another Head) each Species of it would consist of two Disparate Notions; hence it is absolutely necessary to Science that the Differences which divide these Common Heads be such as belong to no other Common Head, but be within the Limits of that Head, or Intrinsecal to it. Again, since the Dif∣ference is most Formal in constituting the Species, and the Genus only Material; were the Differences Extrinsecal or Borrow'd from another Head, it would follow, that all the Species of the Head divided by such Differences would belong to ano∣ther Head, viz. to that Head whence those Dif∣ferences are taken: Which would put all our Notions into Confusion, and involve a direct Contradiction, as making Substances to be Quan∣tities, Qualities, &c.

2. Intrinsecal Differences can be no other but more and less of the Common Notion: For since, being Intrinsecal, † they cannot be taken from any other Head, it follows, that they must partake of

the Common Notion of their own respective Heads. Again, since, if they did partake of the Common Notion Equally, they would not differ in that Notion, and so would not be Differences of it; it follows, that they must partake of it Vnequally; that is, they must be more and less of the Common Notion.

3. Hence the Common Notion of Ens, Thing or Substence being that which is capable of Exi∣stence, is Immediately, Intrinsecally, or Essentially divided into what's more and less capable of Exi∣stence. Wherefore,

4. Divisible and Indivisible, which constitute Body and Spirit, are the proper and intrinsecal Differences of the Common Head of Substance: For, since Actual Division of the Entity makes the thing to be no longer indivisum in se; that is, to be unum; that is, to be Ens; that is, to be capable of Existence; it follows, that that Ens which is Divisible (or Body) is less capable of Existence, that is, has less of the nature of Ens or Substance; and the Ens that is Indivisible (or Spirit) has more. Again, since Things Divisible, or Bodies, can only have their own Being or Exi∣stence, whereas Things indivisible, or Spirits, are capable of being Other things also, or of having in them the Natures and Existences of all the things they know; hence they have a greater Ca∣pacity of Existence than Bodies have; since they have enough for themselves, and can impart it to Millions of Other things besides; and, con∣sequently, Body and Spirit are constituted by Divi∣sible and Indivisible, as by the proper, immediate, and Intrinsecal Differences that divide Substance or Ens.

5. The Divisibility and Indivisibility that are the Intrinsecal Differences of Ens, are not those of being Quantitative and not Quantitative. For, were it so, it would follow, that some Intrinse∣cal Differences of Ens in Common would be ta∣ken from some other Head, viz. that of Quantity, and so, the Differences being what's most For∣mal in the Species, hence those Species of Ens would rather be under that Head than its own. Again, that Divisibility, which is of Quantity, may oftentimes be put into Act, and yet the same Ens remain; v. g. a Man may lose the Quantity of an Arm; a Tree, of a Branch, &c. and yet remain still the same Things; whereas, if Quanti∣tative Divisibility were the Intrinsecal Difference which constituted it such an Ens, Quantitative Division must by consequence make it cease to be that Ens.

Moreover, since Quantity (as will be † short∣ly seen) is Divisibility, and Divisibility in Vnity, in case Quantity did Intrinsecally divide Ens, and constitute Body, where-ever there were Quantity there would be Vnity under that notion; and so all Quantitative things would be but one Ens or one Body; which is the highest absurdity. There∣fore the Divisibility and Indivisibility which are the intrinsecal Differences of Ens, are not those of being Quantitative and not Quantitative.

6. Therefore the Divisibility and Indivisibility which divide Ens Intrinsecally, must be the Di∣visibility and Indivisibility of the Constituents of Ens, as such; that is, the Divisibility of it into Matter and Form, and Indivisibility of it into such Constituent parts: Which differences do

Essentially divide the Genus of Ens, and constitute the species of Body and Spirit. For, since we see Bodies chang'd into one another, and therefore, the former Body had really somewhat in it de∣termining it to be actually what it was, which we call the Form; and somewhat by which it could be Another, which we call the Power to be another, or Matter: Again, since we see that the Form, which made the former Thing be what it was, is gone when 'tis made Another Thing, and a New Form succeeds into the same Matter; hence we can frame diverse Conceptions of Body, which belong to it as such an Ens, viz. Matter and Form; and have a Ground in Nature to say there is a Real divisibility between them. Wherefore since that Ens call'd Body, by being divisible into Matter and Form, becomes liable to have the Form, that constituted it such an Ens, separated from the Matter, and so to lose its being the same Ens it was, and incapable of existing any lon∣ger; and, for the same reason, a Spirit, by its not being divisible into Matter and Form, has not in its Essence any Principle giving it a Capacity not to Exist, as had the other; but has in its self, or rather is of its self a more simple and more perfect kind of Vnity, and consequently a more Noble kind of Entity or Capacity of exist∣ing, than is the other; Therefore the Divisibili∣ty and Indivisibility which divide Ens Intrinsecal∣ly, must be the Divisibility and Indivisibility of it into Matter and Form; which we call Metaphysi∣cal Divisibility, because it is the divisibility of the parts of Ens as such; that is, of Ens under the Notion of Ens.

7. For the same Reason given above, (Sect. 1, 2.) Mixt and Simple are the Intrinsecal Diffe∣rences of Body: For, since Simple Bodies, which we call Elements, have in them but the Nature or Essence of One kind of Body only, and Mixt Bodies have both the nature of That Kind, and of other Elements besides; it is manifest that they divide the Common Notion of Body by more and less, which are Intrinsecal Differences.

8. For the same reason Mixt Body is divided into Living Bodies, and not Living by Intrinsecal Differences; because Those are more mixt, These less.

9, For the same Reason, a Living Body, being that which has a Principle of Motion in it self, is divided, as by Intrinsecal Differences into A∣nimal, which is more Living, or more moving it self (viz. by every slight Impression on the Sen∣ses) and Plant, or Vegetable, which is less-moving it self.

10. For the same Reason, Animal, which is a Body moving it self by Impression on the Sen∣ses, is intrinsecally divided into Brutes, which do thus move themselves onely to a set Deter∣minate number of Actions, which is to be less moving it self by impressions on the Senses; and Man, who by his Reason and Knowledge is apt to move himself to a kind of Vniversality of Action, which is to be more moving himself by means of such impressions.

11. For the same Reason, Man, or Rational Animal, is divided intrinsecally and essentially in∣to those who have more and less the Faculty or Power of Reasoning; who are, therefore, pro∣perly and essentially more and less Men.

Note, That Common Logicians, because we cannot descend or reach to those particular intrinsecal Differences which constitute In∣dividuals, do therefore make [Man] the lowest species: But 'tis one thing what may serve for Logical Speculation; another, what the nature of the thing bears, and the right division of the Commoner Notion by Intrin∣secal differences requires: Wherefore, tho' not able to discern the intermediate Species, and (as far as I have observ'd) not re∣flecting that more and less of the common Notion do make the Intrinsecal and Essenti∣al Differences that constitute its Species, Common Logicians do content themselves to put Individuums immediately under Man, and thence mistake Man to have no Essen∣tial Differences at all, but Accidental ones only; yet 'tis manifest, that, since all In∣dividuums are diverse Entia or Things, and Essence does formally Constitute an Ens, the Differences that constitute diverse Entia must necessarily be Essential. So that a∣mongst Men there may be many Degrees of more or less Rational, constituting diverse under-Species of Man, could we have light to distinguish them; as well as there are di∣verse

species of Dogs, Horses, Trees, and Flowers.

12. Particular or Singular Things are properly call'd Individuums, because they cannot be divi∣ded into more of the same Notion, as all others in the same Line could. For Socrates cannot be divided into more that have the particular Na∣ture of Socrates in them, as Man could into more that have the Common Nature of Man.

13. Individuals only are properly and com∣pleatly Entia or Things, and capable of existing. For, since the Notion of Thing is [Capable of Existing] and all Notions that are superiour to the Individuum are Inadequate or Partial Notions of it, as is manifest; and the Individuum is the Whole, as comprizing all those Parts; and no Part can exist by its own Virtue, or out of the whole; in regard it would then be of it self a whole Ens and not a Part onely; it follows, that onely Individuals are properly and compleat∣ly Entia or capable of Existing.

14. Individuals are the proper Subject or Sup∣positum of all other Notions or Natures both of its own Line, and of all the rest. For, since Individuals onely are properly Things, or capa∣ble of Existing; it follows, that both all in its own Line, and much more in all the other Lines (which have not at all in their peculiar Noti∣ons any Order or Title to Existence) must e∣xist and subsist in Individuals, as in their supposi∣tum or subject; which lends them to be, and su∣stains them in Being.

COROLARIES.

1. Hence, 'tis Logically demonstrated that every individual Man is but One Ens or Thing; since he descends Lineally from that Common Head by intrinsecal Differences of more and less, which constitute him truly One in that Line; that is, one Ens, or one Thing. Whence the contrary Position ravels all the Well-Order'd Frame of Human Notions, and the Division of them by intrinsecal Differences; which (as has been shewn) must needs put all our thoughts in∣to Confusion, and wholly obstruct the Way to Science. Nor matters it that there are two con∣trary Natures in him, Corporeal and Spiritual; since the Notion of Ens is not the Notion of the Nature, but of the suppositum which has the na∣ture in it. Add, that the notion of Ens is in∣different to both Natures; and therefore, if they may be co-ordinate to one End, and that it wrong no other Principle, they may both club into one Thing, and compound one Ens: As appears in the Incarnation, in which the Second Person of the Trinity assum'd Human Nature, and joyn'd it to it self in the same suppositum.

2. The Notion of Rational (which is in some sort truly Spiritual) may be Co-ordinate to the Notion of some kind of Body. For, since Animal is directly subsum'd under the Notion of Body, and the Notion of Animal (or of a Thing moving it self by Impressions

on the Senses) is Intrinsecally divided by less-moving it self thus, which constitutes Brutes; and more-moving it self thus, which is manifest∣ly done by its being Rational, that is in part spi∣ritual; It follows, that the Notion of Rational or Spiritual may be Co-ordinate to some Body, (viz. to Animal) as one of the Proper and Intrin∣secal Differences of that Genus, as is shewn above.

3. Notwithstanding Man cannot be both Bo∣dy and Spirit formally. For, then he must ne∣cessarily be Two Entities in distinct Lines of Substance; the one under the Genus of Body, the other of Spirit. Whence, he would be Vnum and non-Vnum, in the same regard, or accor∣ding to the same Formal Notion; that is, he would be Ens and non Ens; and consist formal∣ly of two Things as perfectly distinct as an An∣gel and an Ape; and even be more monstrous than a Hircocervus or Chimaera; because he would be formally, that is essentially, made up of two more-generically-opposit Things than these are conceiv'd to be. Wherefore, the Notion of Man being deduced by Intrinsecal Differences from the Genus of Body, he is formally a Body, tho' his Soul be of a spiritual Nature, which makes him virtually a Spirit. Whence also, the manner of Existence following from what's For∣mal in the Thing, he has, in this State, a Cor∣poreal Manner of Existence; as appears by his gleaning Knowledge by the Senses; his being Measurable by Quantity, Alterable by Corpore∣al Qualities; nay, even his peculiar and pro∣per Action of Discourse attends the slow pace

of Fancy and Bodily Motion; none of which could be competent to a Pure Spirit that exists after a Spiritual and Indivisible manner. Nor does this more prejudice the Spiritual Nature of a Soul that it exists and works in some regards after the manner of a Body, than it does preju∣dice the Nature of a Body, (a Stone, for exam∣ple) that it exists in us spiritually; as it does when we know it, or have the Notion or Nature of it in our Understanding.

4. Hence is seen what Notions do formally belong to the Line of Substance, or to Ens as Ens, viz. the several species of it descending downwards from the Common Head, till we come to the I••dividuum; which therefore is a compleat Ens, as including all those Superiour or partial Notions; and * therefore it only is in proper speech, an Ens or Thing; in regard It onely being ultimately determin'd to be This or That, only It is, by consequence, capable of exist∣ing, which is the Definition of Ens. Whence all Potential or Indeterminate Notions of Ens, such as are Ens, Corpus, Vivens, or Animal in Com∣mon, are, for the same reason, incapable of Ex∣isting, otherwise than as they are Parts of the compleat Ens or Individuum; and therefore they are phras'd by the Schools, Substantiae Secundae, and the Individuum Substantia Prima. Lower than the Individuum in the Line of Ens we cannot go, nor can any Notion be superadded to it that be∣long Properly to Ens, but that of Existence, of which Ens is a Capacity. Whence we do not call Existence a Form (or Act,) for This joyn'd with the Matter (or Power) does constitute that com∣pound

Ens call'd Body, and, therefore, are both presuppos'd to Existence; but we call it the last Formality of every created Ens, because it has no Potentiality at all in that Line, but is Pure Actuality; and therefore most resembles GOD, our Creator and the sole Giver of It, whose very Essence is Self-Existence.

5. All those Notions before said, taking them precisely as determining the common Notion of Ens, and belonging to it (even to the last Actu∣ality of it [Existence] inclusively) are Metaphy∣sical Notions: The proper Object of which Sci∣ence is Ens; not taken as it abstracts from Ex∣istence, but as it abstracts from all the other Pre∣dicaments or common Heads of Notions; that is, from all Matter and Motion, and all Modes or Manners of them. For which Reason Exi∣stence, which more perfectly abstracts from both, does more formally belong to the Object of Me∣taphysicks.

Notes

• Less. 2. Sect. 5.
• †

  S. 1.
• S. 1.
• †

  Less. 4. Sect. 2, 4.
• Sect. 13
• L. 2. Sect. 12, 13.
• Sect. 14.