Faith vindicated from possibility of falshood, or, The immovable firmness and certainty of the motives to Christian faith asserted against that tenet, which, denying infallibility of authority, subverts its foundation, and renders it uncertain

Second Eviction.

§. 1. FRom this not-seeing the Con∣nexion of the two Terms in the Conclusion by a Medium immedi∣ately connected to them both, but by di∣stant Glances onely, which have not the power to make one see Intellectually the Thing is, or Assent; joyn'd with this that, notwithstanding, 'tis not seen those Terms are Opposit or Inconnectible; the Soul becomes hereupon, as it were, in∣vironed with a kind of Intellectual Dark∣ness, and sees not which way to step for∣wards, without danger of harming hor Cognoscitive or Truth-affecting Nature by Errour. Whence, she remains in a kind of Neutral Condition, which we call Sus∣pence. But, 'tis to be well noted, that this Suspensive Condition of the Soul, not being a state of Actuality or Deter∣mination, (much less of utmost Actua∣lity, as is the seeing, by virtue of that main Principle before-nam'd, that a thing is) but of Indetermination, Po∣tentiality, and Confusedness; its Na∣ture admits consequently infinite de∣grees,

according as the Appearances which incline her towards Assent or Dissent are greater or less. Moreover, as in the passing from Indetermination to Determination (for example) in a moti∣on to a Terminus of Rest, there are di∣verse approaches of that Motions Quan∣tity so very near the Terminus or End, that their distance is undiscernable to a vulgar eye, and needs exact skill to di∣stinguish them: So it happens here, that there must necessarily be found divers Inclinations or Approaches towards Assent, which have so small a degree of Suspence in them, that they are hard to be distinguisht from absolute Assents, but by a learned Reflecter; and the way he takes to distinguish them must be to observe whether the Understanding, acting re∣flectingly, that is, looking into the Na∣ture of its own Act, finds there that it absolutely yields it self over to judg the thing is existent or true, or whether it onely judges it very probable or Truth∣likely. For, any Assent to the greatest Likelihood of a thing is as far from be∣ing an Assent to the things Existence, as the Notion of Existent or True is from the Notion of very likely to be true. And

if the Assent to the former be not actually an Assent to the later, yet tend towards it, as it does; then 'tis Potential in respect of it, and so includes some degree of Suspence; which defect only can in our present case, hinder the other from be∣ing actually it, according to our former Discourse. Assent, then, to the meer Likelihood of a thing, is, or at least im∣plies, Suspence of its Existence

§ 2. Another thing which inclines men to confound the Assent to the Like∣lihood of a thing, with the Assent to its Existence or Truth, is Habituation or Cu∣stom. For, men being us'd to proceed naturally to outward Action upon a very high Probability, without more adoe or examination, they are hence apt to apprehend that a Conceit, which had so little and so undiscernable a pro∣portion of Suspence in it, was a perfect Assent: and that, because the Soul quite yielded to the Motive as to Exterior Action, therefore it yielded likewise as to Interior Assent. Whereas, by reflect∣ing on the Nature of this Act in the Soul, and by retriving its Grounds, we come to discover that, however the Soul runs promptly and rationally to Out∣ward

Action upon such a Motive, when she is concern'd to act, even after deli∣beration; yet, not so to Interiour As∣sent, if she acts rationally; but, upon reflexion, finding in her self nothing to fix in her the Existence of the thing, or elevate it beyond the possibility of not-being or being False, she hangs back from assenting the thing is, and is con∣strain'd to say interiorly, or acknowledg in her own breast, she may possibly be mistaken, and the thing possibly be not-Existent, for ought she sees; which re∣strains her from truly assenting that the thing is.

§ 3. An Instance will render our Di∣scourse clearer. 'Tis propos'd then (for example) to our Judging Power, whe∣ther America be or no? And we'l sup∣pose (to avoid a disputed case) the Evi∣dence of Authority has convinc'd the Understanding it once was, by the Im∣possibility the several Attesters should either be deceiv'd in a plain Object of Eye-sight, or have a common Motive able to make them conspire to bely their Eyes. But, the Question is, whether it be now or no. And, the uncouthness and unlikelihood that so vaste a place should

be destroy'd, joyn'd with the Customa∣riness of acting upon a very great proba∣bility, makes him who is to act in order to it, (for example, send a ship thither) proceed to his intended outward action fearlesly, and esteem him mad who de∣sists upon a conceit of so unlikely a failure. For, since all Action is in par∣ticulars, and Particulars are the very Sphear of Contingency, it follows, that we must not act at all, if we expect∣ed Demonstrations of the several Ob∣jects and Adjuncts of our outward Action: Whence he deserves justly to be accounted frantick who should desist from Action where there is so high a Probability; for this extravagant cau∣tiousness were in effect to take away the Motives to any Exteriour Action in the world, and consequently all such Action it self. But now, let two Speculaters or Scholars meet together, who consi∣der not the Practicableness, but meerly the Truth of things; and aim not to better their Purse by Merchandizing or outward Endeavours, but their Under∣standings by rightly-made Judgments or Assents, that is, by Knowledges: and we shall see their working on the Point

turns upon other hinges. In the other, there was Necessity of acting, without which the world could not subsist: but, here's no necessity of Assenting, which we suppose onely aim'd at, at present; nor can there be any, unless that Principle or Cause of all Assent [The same is the same with it self] comes to exercise its over-powering Virtue upon the Soul. There, it was enough that prudential con∣siderations discover'd a betterness to act exteriourly, all things weigh'd; to which needed not a severity of Princi∣ples forcing the Truth of the thing: but here, those Principles, which are the Maxims of Metaphysicks or Supreme Wisdom, are the only things to be con∣sulted; and the prudential weighing of Particulars avails little or nothing to∣wards the secure establishment of the Truth aim'd at. There, some harm was likely to ensue, if they acted not exteri∣ourly, and went not about their work: but, here, no harm at all could come by not acting interiourly; I mean, by not-Assenting, but Suspending till the beams of Truth, by the Fountain-light of that First Principle, clear'd their Understand∣ings: rather on the contrary, a great

harm was certain to ensue upon assent∣ing in that case, that is, an Injury to Rea∣son, their true Nature; by concluding, without seeing a middle Term connect∣ing the two Extreams, on which every act of right Reason is built. These Scholars then, or Pursuers of Truth, consult with Speculative, not Practical Principles, to guide their Assents by. They are certain that such an Effect (as is the destruction of America) cannot be without a Cause; and Experience tells them such Causes seldom or never hap∣pen: Yet, knowing that all material things have Contingency annext to their Natures, and not discovering any evident Principle in Nature hindering the vast Oceans on either side America to overswell the Continent, and so de∣stroy it; they are forc'd to confess in∣teriourly America may, for any thing they know, possibly not be; whence they are forc'd to suspend, as to its Existence, and only Assent to it's extream Likelihood of existing.

§ 4. The use I make of this discourse at present is this: that, though Likely∣hoods have a great latitude; yet Assent, (being the terminus of those Inclina∣tions

towards it, which gradually exceed one another) consists in an Indivisible, as does the notion of is, on which (either seen, or deem'd to be seen) 'tis built, and to which it goes parallell. That, all Acts falling short of Assent to the Existence of a thing advance no farther than great Assents to it's Likeli∣hood, and fall under the head of suspen∣sive Acts; as to that things Existence, as the Soul will discover upon reflexion: and that, when we mistake one for the other, 'tis for not distinguishing well the great resemblance between assenting as to outward Action, and as to the speculative Truth; as also between as∣senting to the extream Likelihood of a thing, and assenting to its Existence. That, whensoever we see the Possibility of a things being False or not-Existent (which in our case is all one) we cannot have an Assent to it's Exist∣ence, but to the likelihood of it only, and suspend as to its Existence or actual being: and that, therefore, they who acknowledg that, notwithstanding all the Means used and all the Grounds it has, Faith may possibly be false to us, cannot be held to assent to the Exist∣ence

or Truth of those points; but to suspend concerning their truth, and to assent only to their likelihood to be true, Which, whether it be a sufficient di∣sposition to denominate such persons Christians, will easily and best be de∣termin'd by the vulgar of Christianity, who possess the genuin and natural mean∣ing of the word Faith, untainted with the frantick conceits sprung from such speculations as are taken out of Fancy; not, as they ought, from the nature of the Thing.

§ 5. The same Argument may be made from the nature of firmly Holding, as was from Assent; and the self-same discourse, mutatis mutandis: since 'tis most Evident, none can firmly hold a thing to be true, which he sees and acknowledges, that is, holds may be False; however he may hold it Very likely to be True.

§ 6. The same is evinc'd from the notion of knowing: which word I take here abstractedly, unconcern'd what kind of knowledg it be; provided it be True and proper knowledg, and not ab∣usively so call'd. For, since nothing can be known to be but what is, nor

known to be such but what is such: again since Christians, if they have either Honesty or Wit in them, must, some way or other, know points of Faith to be true, whose truth they esteem them∣selves bound to profess and stand to even with the loss of their lives; it follows, those points must be what they are known to be, that is True; and con∣sequently (unless knowledg can be Igno∣rance) impossible not to be or to be False.

§ 7. What hath been said of Assent and Holding and Knowing may also be dis∣cours'd from the notion of Certainty: for this has the same nature with the former, as it is a determination of the Understanding; I mean, Intellectual de∣termination is the common Genus to them all: and they differ only in this, that Knowledg and Certainty are proper Effects of Evidence, whether sprung from the thing or from the Attester, nor can they be where there is wanting the Intel∣lectual Light issuing from that First Principle of all Evidence so oft spoken of; whereas H••lding or Assenting can proceed from the Blindness of Passion, or from Ignorance, as well as from the clear Sight of the Understanding. Now that

the Nature of Certainty consists in an Intellectual Determination thus originiz'd, and consequently, when put, excludes all possibility of being otherwise (which is the point I aym to evince) appears, partly from the Etymology, and most evidently from the Use of the Word. For, Certus signifies Determinate. As then, when the matter spoken of re∣strains that word to Volition, it sig∣nifies an Absolute Determination of Will or Resolution; as, certus ••undi: so, when we are speaking of the Ground of In∣tellectual Certainty, and say the thing is Certain, we intend to express full as much as when we say, the thing is; which speaks Ultimate Determination and Actuality in the Object, consider'd in it self: and, in like Manner, when the same word is intended to signifie Formal Certainty in Us, or that Di∣sposition of the Understanding where∣by it is said to be Certain, it must ne∣cessarily signifie (unless, contrary to the nature of Words it's most formal Notion be less rigorous then those which are less formal) a Determinate state of the Understanding, or an In∣tellectual Determination. Whence, as a

thing is then Certain or Determinate when it is; so the Understanding is then Determin'd according to it's Na∣ture, or Certain, when the Thing is seen to be as it is, which immediate Effect of the other is impossible, but by virtue of the first Principle of E∣vidence making that clear discovery; and, This engaged, all Intellectual Po∣tentiality, or Possibility of not being seen to be, is totally and formally, that is, most absolutely excluded. The true and ge∣nuine Notion, then, of Certainty imports an absolute impossibility that that judg∣ment which so fixes and determines the Understanding should be an Errour, or False: Since nothing can be seen to be, but what really is.

§ 8. Again, since Determination in any kind, is the Terminus of all Indeter∣mination in the same kind, and so, be∣yond it: it follows, that Certainty or Intellectual Determination, is plac'd be∣yond all possible degrees of Indetermi∣nation of the mind, or Uncertainty. Cer∣tainty, therefore, is not attain'd till all possible degrees of Uncertainty, and, con∣sequently, Possibility of Falshood to us, or Errour, be transcended and overcome.

Faith, then, must be deny'd to be Cer∣tain, if it be put Possible to be False.

§9. And, as my former Discourse has endeavour'd to display the Nature of Certainty from its Genus and Difference, which compound it's Definition; so the same will be still more satisfactorily evinc't from observing the Language of Mankind, when they use the word Cer∣tain. For, that being most evidently the signification of a word which the intelligent Users of that word intend to express by it: if by divers sayings of theirs we can manifest that they meant to signifie such a Conception by that Word, that will infallibly be the true meaning of it, and that Conception will have in it the true Nature of Certainty. Let us observe then attentively what is at the bottom of their hearts, when they use these and the like familiar Discour∣ses, which naturally break from them. How frequent is it, when any one asks another, Is such a thing true? and the other replies, I verily think it is; he re∣turns upon him with this pressing de∣mand; I, but are you certain of it? may not you be mistaken? Which clearly inti∣mates that that Disposition call'd Cer∣tainty,

is beyond all Inclinations, Moti∣ons, or indeterminate Tendencies of the Understanding, making it verily think 'tis true, which speaks the next remove, as it were, from a certain Assent; and, consequently, that 'tis an absolute deter∣mination and fixure of the Soul that 'tis true: As also, that Certainty elevates the Soul beyond hazard of mistake. Again, many times, when one is smartly questioned, if he be Certain of a thing? not daring, upon better reflexion, pre∣tend to Certainty, he replies warily (in a moderate word which diminishes and falls short of the other) that he is Mo∣rally certain of it; which evidences that the Notion of Certainty is in point of fixing or determining the Understand∣ing, beyond that counterfeit Certainty, call'd Moral Certainty: Wherefore, since all Moral Certainty (as they call it) how great soever, though it be penetrated perfectly according as 'tis in its own Na∣ture, is seen to consist with a Possibility to be otherwise; True Certainty, which ex∣ceeds it, must needs include an Impossibi∣lity to be otherwise. Faith, then, is not, in true speech, Certain, unless it be Impossi∣ble to be False.

§ 10. Again, let an Overweener, after his mistake becomes Visible, be chal∣leng'd with it; we find that, in com∣mon speech, we use these or the like words, You said, or thought, You were Certain of it, but You see You are mista∣ken, Is it not Evident that the word Certain excludes a possibility of being otherwise? since his being Certain of it formerly is deny'd purely upon this score, because he was mistaken: which shews that the true notion of Certain is inconsistent with mistake; that is, that Certainty implyes Unmistakableness or, which is all one, Inerrability hîc & nunc in the present affair. Whereas, had the notion of Certainty admitted a Pos∣sibility not to be as he judg'd, he had not been so mistaken in judging that Certain which by actually happening not to be was shewn afterwards Possible not to be. To think to evade, by alledging that it was not meant his mistake consisted in judging that Certain or Impossible not to be, which was Possible not to be, but in judging that would be, which after∣wards hap'd not to be, is meerly Childish∣ness and Folly amongst Men, who hold that things are carry'd on by the course

of Cause and Effect; and that things therefore happen because a Cause puts them, or not happen because no Cause puts them. To judg, then, a thing would not be is the same, amongst Intel∣ligent Men, as to judg there would be no Cause to make it be; and, if there would be none such, 'tis most evident it could not be, or was Impossible to be in this order of the world. Such answers are fit for men who are led more by Sounds than Sense; and who think a different word will gain them an Escape, though that word signifies the same thing as the former.

11. The same will appear from the Absurdity, which palpably discovers it self in any Expression that modifies the true Notion of Certain with a Contin∣gency: as if one should say, 'tis Certain per adventure, or 'tis fallibly Certain: The Nonsence of which shews that the true Notion of Certainty implies an Oppo∣sitness to all Contingency, or an Im∣possibility to be otherwise. You'l ask, what then must be said of the Phrase, [Moral Certainty] where Certainty seems to admit an allay of Contingency? I answer, 'tis evident even hence and from

all my former Discourse, that the word Certainty is there us'd Catachrestically or abusively, for some great Likelihood, and its Epithet means such a degree of it as is found generally in humane exteri∣our actions which depend on Free-will, and are contingent as being Particulars; and speaks not proper Certainty, as 'tis meant to signifie that perfect Intellectual Determination, whose Principles and Causes being high Truths, are unalter∣able. Whence, Moral Certainty, how high soever it be exalted and triumph in an empty name, is in reality Uncertainty; and the highest degree of Moral Cer∣tainty is the lowest degree of Uncertain∣ty, truly so call'd; that is, of that which expresses an Intellectual Indetermina∣tion.

§ 12. Thus much from the use of the word; which, when it falls naturally and unaffectedly from the tongue of the Speakers, is a proper Effect of the No∣tion or meaning in their Souls, that is, of the Signification of that word; whence 'tis an apt Medium to demon∣strate that Notion, its proper Cause, à posteriori.

§ 13. From this Discourse follows,

first, that, since, speaking of the present, (and the same, in proportion, holds of other differences of time) 'tis the same to say, The thing is certain, as to say the thing is; and to say the thing is speaks Indivisibility; the Notion of Certainty too consists in an Indivisible. By which is not meant that one Certainty may not be greater than another, both from a greater Perfection in the Subject, and a greater certifying Power in the Object: but, that Certainty, in the way of being generated in the Soul, is either there all at once or not at all; in the same sort as there is no middle between is and is not, (or half-beings of them) which are the formal Expressers of Certainty. Whence, again, appears that what we abusively call Moral Certainty, is indeed none at all; because it reaches not that Indivisi∣ble or Determinative Point in which True Certainty consists.

§ 14. Secondly, since true Certainty is caus'd in us by seeing the thing is; and this cannot be seen but by virtue of Prin∣ciples; (especially that chief one, A thing is the same with it self) which Prin∣ciples being Truths, cannot possibly be False: it follows both that what is Cer∣tain

cannot possibly be False, and that what can possibly be False subsists upon no Principles. Whence, all Moral Cer∣tainty, as they call it, as also all high Pro∣babilities, which confessedly may possi∣bly be false, are convinc'd to subsist upon no Principles: and they, who acknow∣ledg they have but Moral Certainty and high Probabilities for their Faith or Opi∣nion, confess they have no Principles, which in true Language deserve that name, to ground them; but, at best, cer∣tain likely Topical Mediums that oft prove true, or hold for the most part: which may serve for a talking kind of Discourse, or Exteriour Action; but are flat things and useless when Truth is to be concluded.

§ 15. Thirdly, it follows that true Certainty of any thing is the self-same with Infallibility or Inerrability, as to the same thing. For, Certainty is not had, till it be seen, that that First Princi∣ple, [A thing is the same with it self] is engag'd for the identification of the two Notions which make up the Proposition we are Certain of; that is, for the Truth of that Proposition: Wherefore, since we can have Infallible Assurance of the

Truth of that First Principle; as also of this, that nothing can be seen to be, un∣less it be; we can frame an Inerrable Judgment that, when we see that First Principle engag'd for the Identity of those two Notions, 'tis engag'd for it, and so they identify'd; that is, we must know Infallibly that that Proposition is true. This I say in case it be a True Cer∣tainty, and not an only deem'd or mista∣ken one: yet even then there is a deem'd Infallibility, and the person that mista∣kingly judges himself certain of a thing, judges withall that he cannot be mista∣ken, hic & nunc, in that particular, which manifests that the Notion of Certainty is the same with that of Infallibility, however it may be misapply'd. Again, since the natural use of words gives it not to be nonsence to say, [I am Infalli∣bly Certain of such a thing] 'tis plain that the Notion of Infallibly is not dis∣parate from the Notion of Certain, or in∣competent to it: it must then be either Tautological, or else be a different yet appliable Notion, and so apt to diffe∣rence or distinguish it; but it cannot be this later, for then the Notion of Cer∣tain ought in all Reason and Logick ad∣mit

with equal sense the opposit diffe∣rence [Fallibly] which we experience it does not; nothing being more absurd and foolish than to say, [I am fallibly certain of a thing] 'Tis clear then that infallibly is not fit to difference the No∣tion of Certain, or not a different Noti∣on from it; but the same sense reitera∣ted in another word for aggravations sake, as when we say, I saw it with mine own eyes; or such like; that is, if we consider it calmly, we shall find that that malignant word Infallibility which so bewonders our Opposers, amounts to no more but true Certainty, and has the self-same Notion with it.

§ 16. Fourthly, it appears that, see∣ing what may be otherwise, how unlikely soever, needs but a lucky chance to be so; they who say Faith may possibly be False, instead of establishing it, subject it to Chance and Contingency; and con∣fess it has no Grounds so to secure it but a greater Wit than has been formerly, may possibly shew it to be False; that is, may subvert all the Grounds it now stands on. So that these men are con∣vinc'd not to settle Faith upon any firm Grounds, or on the Nature of the thing:

but to hang it on Humane Wit, that is, on the Wit of the present Christians main∣taining its Plausibility; and, possibly, on the fortunate want of an acuter Wit than any now extant; who, when he shall arise, may perhaps outwit them, and shew all their Faith to be a ridiculous foolery.

§ 17. Lastly, speaking of Truths, 'tis perfect Nonsense to say they can possi∣bly be False; since 'tis a direct contra∣diction Truth should be Falshood; as is evident in Predications of past or future things, viz. in these, Christ has dy'd, the Resurrection will be: the former of which, if once True, has been, and so cannot have not been, the Circumstance of Time be∣ing gone in which only it could not have been; and the later, if once put to be true, that is, to stand under certain or unimpedible Causes, is Impossible to be False, or not to succeed. So that 'tis the greatest madness and folly in the world to put either of these possible to be False. if they be once rightly judg'd Truths: and indeed I fear rather that they who judg the later possible not to be, subject them to impedible Causes; and so make them, or at least their Grounds as to our know∣ledg,

Future Contingents, which have neither determinate Truth nor Falshood. Speaking then of those Propositions or Points of Faith which predicate de prae∣senti, it will be found by the Consider∣er, that they are all in a matter which is unalterable, and above Contingency; and, in case this were not, their very Deter∣mination to the present frees them from being other than they are for the present: Every thing while it is being necessarily what it is. There is no shadow, there∣fore, of Ground, for a man, who affirms Points of Faith to be Truths, to affirm withall they may possibly be False. All I can imagine in their behalf, to excuse them from speaking palpable Contra∣dictions, is this; that perhaps they may mean our Discourse, while in viâ to find out these Truths, was impedible, and so there was then a possibility they might not become seen to be True, that is, might be no Truths to us. But, the Question re∣turns, Whether, in the end of our weigh∣ing their Motives, we discover them to be Truths or no? If not, why do we so asseverantly affirm they are? and why are we bound by Religion to profess them to be so? or, if we come to dis∣cover

they are Truths, how are we so stu∣pid as not to discover withall, that they cannot possibly be Falshoods?

§ 18. My last Argument from Lo∣gick shall be this, that there is no way left to prove Faith, or perswade it to an∣other that acts according to perfect Rea∣son, in case it, that is, its Grounds as to our knowledg, can possibly be False. And, that this is so, is not so much evi∣dent from any particular Consideration in Logick, as from the whole Nature of Artificial Discourse, or Disputation. For, in case the Premisses be but Morally Cer∣tain, (as they call it) or possible to be false, that is, if the two Terms be not seen to be connected, these Propositions may, nay ought to be deny'd by the Respon∣dent; whose Office and Right it is to grant nothing but what is Evident, lest he ensnare himself; but to put the Ar∣guer to prove them. What then must the Opponent or Arguer do? Must he bring a Syllogism consisting of Premisses only morally Certain or possible to be false, to make the other good? What will it avail? since these Premisses are also de∣niable for the same reason, and so in infi∣nitum; that is, nothing at all can possi∣bly

be concluded finally, till Grounds impossible to be false be produced; which put, the Conclusion may be such also. Wherefore, unless Faith have Grounds impossible to be False, (and, consequently, able to shew It such also) none can Rati∣onem reddere Fidei, give a true Reason of their Faith; but such an one at best as, in due right of Dispute, is ••••deniable at pleasure: Whence Faith is rendred both unmaintainable or indefensible in it self, and unperswadable to others that guide themselves by perfect Reason. For, however all who discourse of Re∣ligion, when they would convert any to Faith, use not to pin their Motives to Syllogistical Form: Yet, since no Rea∣son in the case of convincing the Under∣standing, is allowable, but what will bear the test of true Logick; and this assures us there's no concluding any thing at all, without relying finally on Pre∣misses or Grounds impossible to be False: it follows that, how finely and quaintly soever these men talk, unless they pro∣duce such Grounds, they can conclude nothing at all; and all their importunate Perswasions, which are not reducible to these Grounds, (nay, are made use of by

Persons who declare against having any such Grounds for Faith) signifie just as much as if they should say, I beseech you, Sir, be so good natur'd as to believe me; though to tell you true, I acknowledg sincere∣ly neither can I bring, nor can there possi∣bly be brought any Ground able to make good what I say, or any undeniable Premisses to force my Conclusion.

Notes

• The Ori∣gin and Natures of Sus∣pence and Assent.
• The Point evinc't from the natures of Suspence and Assent
• From the nature of Holding.
• From the nature of Knowing.
• From the nature of Certainty, in many regards.
• From the Impossibi∣lity that what may be false can have any Principles.
• From the Identity of Certainty with In∣fallibility.
• From the contrary opinion's unavoid∣ably sub∣jecting Faith to Chance and Con∣tingency.
• From the Incompos∣sibility of Truth with False∣hood.
• From the nature of Disputa∣tion, and the Impos∣sibility o∣therwise to evince the Truth of faith.