Medicus medicatus, or, The physicians religion cured by a lenitive or gentle potion with some animadversions upon Sir Kenelme Digbie's observations on Religio medici / by Alexander Ross.

Animadversions upon Sir KENELME DIGBIE'S Ob∣servations on Religio Medici.

I Having done with the Physician, was counsel∣led by my friends to view that noble and in∣genuous Knights Ob∣servations, who hastily running over Religio Medici, and having let fall some phrases from his pen, which have or may startle the Reader; I thought good, upon the so∣licitation of my said friends, to point at them by a few Animadversions. It is no wonder that he hath phrased some things amisse; for the best have their failings,

—quando{que} bonus dormitat Homerus.

And S. Bernard, wee say, saw not all; and

what are spoken or written hastily, are not spoken and written warily; Canis festinans caecos parit catulos.

1. [I find Sir Kenelme to be of opinion, that the changing of the condition of a damned soule from paine to happinesse could not be ef∣fected, without God had made that soule ano∣ther creature then what it was: as, to make fire cease from being hot, requireth to have it be∣come another thing then fire.] I doe not see any reason, why the essence of the soule must be changed, upon the change of its condition from paine to happinesse; for these are accidents, which may be present or absent, without the destruction of the subject in which they are. Wee are all by nature the sons of wrath, by grace & rege∣neration we are made the sons of God; not by changing of our natures and essences, as Illyricus thought: for, though Paul changed his condition and name, hee changed not his nature; for he was the same man, being a vessell of mercy, which he was, be∣ing a vessell of wrath. [If hee saith, that in Eternity there is no change;] I answer, that that continued duration, which wee call

Eternitie, is unchangeable; yet in the things themselves, which are eternall, there is a passive power or possibilitie of change, or else wee cannot say, that un∣changeablenesse is a property in God, but communicable to the creature, which can∣not be. As for the fire, it may doubtlesse for a while cease to be hot, and yet not cease to be fire: as that fire in the Babylonish furnace, which did not touch the three Children, and yet burned the Chaldeans; this it could not have done, had it not been fire.

2. [Aristotle defines light to be actus per∣spicui, which Sir Kenelme likes not, because hee knowes not the meaning.] The meaning is plaine, that light is the active qualitie of the aire or water, by which they are made perspicuous, or fit mediums, through which wee see visible objects; for in darknesse, though the aire be a bodie still, yet it is not the medium of our sight, but onely po∣tentially; let the light come, then it is per∣spicuous, that is, through which wee may see the objects actually, and so it is actus perspicui: For in Philosophy, that is called

the act, which giveth a being to a thing, whether that being be accidentall or essen∣tiall; so the light, giving an accidentall being to the aire, in making it perspicuous, is fitly defined by the Philosopher, Actus perspicui quâ perspicuum: therefore here are no naked termes obtruded in the Schooles upon easie minds, as Sir Kenelme thinketh.

3. When Sir Kenelme thinkes [that the first matter hath not an actuall existence, with∣out the forme,] he must know, that the first matter is a substance, and hath a reall actu∣alitie, or that which is called Actus entita∣tivus in the Schooles, without the forme; else it could not be the principle, or cause of things: for, how can there proceed any ef∣fect from that which hath no being? but when the forme comes, it receives formall actuality, without which it is but in possi∣bilitie, which being compared to this act, it is a kind of non-entitie.

4. [The notions of matter, form, act, power, existence, &c. have in the understanding a di∣stinct entity, but in nature are no-where by themselves. Againe, these words are but ar∣tificiall termes, not reall things.] Notions have

their being only in the mind: 'tis true; but these are not notions: for then, all things that are made of matter and forme, are made of notions; and so notions are the first prin∣ciples and causes of all things. So likewise the objects of the two noblest Sciences, to wit, Physick and Metaphysick, are onely no∣tions and artificiall termes, not reall things, which cannot be.

5. [He doth not conceive, that wise men reject Astrologie so much, for being repugnant to Divinity, &c. To relie too much upon that vain art, he judgeth to be rather folly then impiety.] I know not who hee meanes by wise men; but the Church and Fathers have rejected this art, as repugnant to Divinity, and im∣pious. Aquila Ponticus, a translatour of the Bible, was thrust out of the Church of Christ for his study in this art. And how can this art be excused from impiety, which overthrowes the liberty of mans will, makes the soule of man mortall and materiall, by subjecting it to the power of the Stars, makes God the authour of sinne, makes men carelesse of doing good, or a∣voiding evill, which ascribes the coming

of Christ, the working of his miracles, the Prophets predictions, the Apostles la∣bours, the patience, sufferings, and faith of the Saints, to the influence of the Stars? And so in a word overthrowes all religi∣on and prayer: Orandi causas auferre conan∣tur, saith S.Austin; and therefore this art will rather lay the fault of mans misery upon God, the mover of the Stars, then upon mans owne wickednesse, saith the same Father. Aug. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. Who in another place, to wit, in his Commenta∣rie on the Psalmes, sheweth, that the Con∣verts of S. Paul, Act. 19. had been Astrolo∣gers; and therefore the books which they burned were of Astrologie. But is not A∣strologie repugnant to Divinity, and impi∣ous, when it robs God of his honour? which it doth, by undertaking to fore∣tell future contingencies, and such se∣crets as are onely knowne to God, this be∣ing his true property alone. By this Esay, ch. 41. distinguisheth him from false gods, Declare what will come to passe, and wee shall know you to be gods. And hee mockes these Diviners, ch. 47. and so doth Ieremy, ch. 10.

and Solomon, Eccles. chap. 8. and 10. sheweth ••he knowledge of future things to be hid ••rom man; of which the Poet was not ig∣••orant, when he saith,

Nescia mens hominum fati sortisque fu∣turae:

••herefore both the Astrologer, and he that consults with him, dishonours God in a high nature, by giving credit to, or having commerce with, those excommunicate and apostate Angels, and so endanger their owne soules: Is it because there is no God in Israel, that you consult with the god of Ekron? Now, that Astrologers have commerce with evill spirits, besides the testimony of Austin, de civit. Dei, lib. 5. cap. 7. and lib. 2. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. and other ancient Fathers, the proofes of divers witnesses, and their owne confessions, upon examination, doe make it apparent: Not to speake of their flagitious lives, and their impious and a∣theisticall Tenents; for this cause Astrolo∣gers are condemned by Councels and De∣crees of the Church, Conc. Bracar. 1. c. 9. & in Tolet. 1. sec. part. decret. c. 26.

6. [The Angels, in the very instant of their

creation, actually knew all that they were capa∣ble of knowing, and are acquainted with all free thoughts, past, present, and to come.] They knew not so much then as they doe now; because now they have the experimentall knowledge of almost six thousand yeares, and many things revealed to them since their creation. Secondly, they know not our free thoughts, even because they are free, and variable at our pleasure, not at theirs: it's onely Gods property to know the heart; yet some thing they may know by outward signes, or by revelation. Thirdly, they know not things future; for first, they know not the day of Judgement: secondly, they know not future contingent∣cies: thirdly, they know not infallibly na∣turall effects that are to come, though they know their causes; because all naturall causes are subordinate to God, who, when hee pleaseth, can stay their operations. What Angel could fore-know (if God did not reveale it) that the Sun should stand at the prayer of Iosua; that the fire should not burne the three Children; or the Lions devoure Daniel? Fourthly, as they know

••ot future contingencies, because they ••ave not certaine and determinate causes: ••o they know not mans resolutions, which depend upon his will, because the will is onely subject to God, as being the princi∣pall object and end of it; and he onely can ••encline it as hee pleaseth: therefore as Esay of the Gentile Idols, so say I of Angels, Let us know what is to come, to wit, infalli∣bly of your selves, and all, and wee shall know that you are gods.

7. [Sir Kenelme sayes, he hath proved suf∣ficiently light to be a solid substance and body.] These proofes I have not seen, therefore I can say nothing to them; but this I know, that if light be a body, when the aire is il∣luminated, two bodies must be in one place, and there must be penetration. Se∣condly, the motion of a body must be in an instant from the one end of the world to the other: both which are impossible. Thirdly, what becomes of this body, when the Sun goeth downe? Doth it pu∣trefie, or corrupt, or vanish to nothing? all these are absurd: Or doth it follow the body of the Sun? then, when the light is

contracted into a lesser space, it must be the greater: but wee find no such thing. And if light be a body, it must be every day generated and corrupted: why should not darknesse be a body too? But of this subject I have spoken else where; there∣fore I will say no more till I see Sir Ke∣nelme's proofes.

8. [The soule hath a strange kind of neere dependance of the body, which is (as it were) Gods instrument to create it by.] This phrase▪ I understand not: I have already proved, that the soule hath no dependance on the bodie, neither in its creation, essence, or operation; it hath no other dependance on the bodie, but as it is the forme thereof, to animate and informe it. So you may say, the Sun depends upon the earth, to warme and illuminate it. The body is the soules instrument, by which it produceth those actions, which are called organicall onely; but that God used the body, as it were an instrument, to create the soule by, is a new phrase, unheard of hitherto in Divinitie. God immediately createth and infuseth the soule into the body; hee used no other

••••strument in the workes of creation, but ••••xit, mandavit.

9. [Sir Kenelme thinkes, that terrene ••ules appeare oftnest in Cemeteries, because ••••ey linger perpetually after that life, which ••••ited them to their bodies, their deare con∣••••rts.] I know not one soule more terrene ••••en another in its essence, though one ••••ule may be more affected to earthly ••••ings then another. Secondly, that life, ••hich united the soule to the body, is not ••ost to the soule, because it still remaines in 〈◊〉〈◊〉; as light remaines still in the Sun, when ••ur Horison is deprived of it. Thirdly, if ••••ules after death appear, it must be either 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their owne, or in other bodies; for else ••hey must be invisible: if in their own, then ••hey must passe through the grave, and en∣••er into their cold and inorganicall bodies, ••nd adde more strength to them then ever ••hey had, to get out from under such a ••••ad of earth and rubbish: if in other ••odies, then the end of its creation is over∣••hrowne; for it was made to informe its ••wne bodie, to which onely it hath rela∣••ion, and to no other; and so we must ac∣knowledge

a Pythagoricall transanimatio•• Fourthly, such apparitions are delutions o•• Sathan, and Monkish tricks, to confirme su¦perstition.

10. [Soules, he sayes, goe out of their bodie•• with affections to those objects they leave behin•• them.] Affections, saith Aristotle, are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in that unreasonable part of the soul•• or rather, of the whole compositum; for th•• soule hath no parts: and though whilst i•• the body it receiveth, by meanes of its im¦mediate union with the spirits, some im¦pressions, which we call affections; yet, be¦ing separated, is free from such, and carrie•• nothing with it, but the reasonableand in∣organicall faculties of the Intellect and Will And, to speak properly, affections are moti¦ons of the heart, stirred up by the know∣ledge and apprehension of the object, goo•• or bad; the one by prosecution, the othe•• by avoiding: so that where the heart i•• not, nor the externall senses to conveig•• the object to the phantasie, nor the animal•• spirits to carry the species of the object from the phantasie to the heart, there ca•• be no affection; but such is the estate of

••he soule separated; it hath no commerce 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all with the body, or bodily affections. ••nd of this the Poets were not ignorant, ••hen they made the departed soules to ••rink

Securos latices, & longa oblivia —

••f the river Lethe, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the wished for goddesse by ••hose that are in misery.

11. [He thinkes, that when the slaine body ••uddenly bleedeth, at the approach of the mur∣••erer, that this motion of the bloud is caused by ••he soule.] But this cannot be; for the soule, when it is in the body, cannot make it ••leed when it would; if it could, we should ••ot need Chirurgions to phlebotomise and ••carifie us: much lesse then can it, being se∣••arated from the body. Secondly, in a ••old body the bloud is congealed, how ••hall it grow fluid againe without heat? or how hot without the animall and vitall spirits? and how can they worke without the soule? and how can this operate with∣out union to the body? If then any such ••leeding be, as I beleeve that sometimes ••here hath been, and may be so againe, I

thinke it the effect rather of a miracle, t•• manifest the murtherer, then any natural•• cause: for I have read, that a mans arme•• which was kept two years, did, at the sigh•• of the murtherer, drop with bloud; which could not be naturally, seeing it could no•• but be withered and dry after so long time: yet I deny not but, before the body be cold, or the spirits quite gone, it may bleed; some impressions of revenge and anger being left in the spirits remaining, which may move the bloud: but the sa∣fest way is, to attribute such motions of the bloud to the prayers of these soules under the Altar, saying, Quousque, Domine?

12. [No annihilation can proceed from God: it is more impossible, that not-being should flow from him, then that cold should flow immediately from fire.] 'Tis true, that God is not an efficient cause of annihilation (for of a non-entity there can be no cause) yet we may safely say, that hee is the deficient cause: for, as the creatures had both their creation, and have still their conservation, by the influx of Gods Almighty power, who, as the Apostle saith, sustaines all

things by the word of his power: so if he should suspend or withdraw this influx, all things must returne to nothing, as they were made of nothing. There is then in the creature both a passive possibilitie of annihilation, and in God an active possi∣bilitie to withdraw his assistance: and why should we be afraid to affirm such a pow∣er in God? Before the world was made there was annihilation, and yet God was still the same, both before and since, with∣out any alteration in him: So, if the world were annihilated, God should lose no∣thing, being in himselfe all things. Againe▪ as God suspended his worke of creation the seventh day, without any diminution of his power and goodnesse; so hee may suspend, if hee please, the work of conser∣vation, which is a continuated production. Besides, as God created not the world by necessity of his nature, but by his free will; so by that same freedome of will, hee su∣staines what hee hath created, and not by any necessity: and therefore not only cor∣ruptible bodies, but even spirits and an∣gels, have in them a possibility of annihila∣tion,

if God should withdraw from them his conservative influence. Ieremy was not ignorant of his owne and his peoples annihilation, if God should correct them in fury, Ierem. 10. But, though there be a possibility in the creatures (if God with∣draw his power) of annihilation, yet wee must not think, that this possibility in them flowes from the principles of their owne nature; for in materiall substances there is no such possibility, seeing the matter is e∣ternall: and much lesse can it be in imma∣teriall substances, in which there is neither physicall composition, nor contrariety. As the Sun then is the cause of darknesse, and the Pilot the cause of shipwrack: the one, by withdrawing his light; the o••her, by denying his assistance: so may God be the cause of annihilation, by suspending or subtracting his influence.

13. [He thinkes it is a grosse conception to think, that every atome of the body, or every graine of ashes of the cadaver burned and scat∣tered by the wind, should be raked together, and made up anew into the same body it was.] But this is no grosse conceit, if he consider the

power of the Almighty, who can with as great facility re-unite these dispersed a∣tomes, as he could at first create them; ut∣pote idoneus est reficere qui fecit. The Gen∣tiles objected the same unto the Christians, as a grosse conceit of theirs, as Cyril shew∣eth, to whom Tertullian returnes this an∣swer, That it is as easie to collect the dis∣persed ashes of thy body, as to make them of nothing, Ubicunque resolutus fueris, quae∣cunque te materia destruxerit, hauserit, abole∣verit, in nihil prodegerit, reddet te, ejus est ni∣hilum ipsum cujus est totum.

14. But Sir Kenelme in his subsequent discourse, to salve this grosse conception, as hee calls it, of collecting the dispersed ashes of the burned body, [tells us, that the same body shall rise that fell; but it shall be the same in forme onely, not in matter; which he proves by some reasons: First, that it is the forme, not the matter that gives numericall in∣dividuation to the body. Secondly, that the matter, without forme, hath no actuall being. Thirdly, that identity belongeth not to the mat∣ter by it selfe. Fourthly, that the body of a man is not the same it was, when it was the body of

a childe. Fifthly, he illustrates this by some Si∣milies: As, that a ship is still the same, though it be all new timbered: The Thames is still the same river, though the water is not the same this day that flowed heretofore: That a glasse full of water, taken out of the sea, is distingui∣shed from the rest of the water; but being re∣turned backe againe, becomes the same with the other stocke: and the glasse, being againe filled with the sea-water, though not out of the same place, yet it is the same glasse full of water that it was before: That, if the soule of a newly dead man should be united to another body, taken from some hill in America, this body is the same identicall body hee lived with before his death.] This is the summe of Sir Kenelm's Philosophy and Divinity concerning the resurrection; In which are these mistakes: First, the resurrection, by this opinion, is overthrowne; a surrection wee may call it of a body, but not the resurrection of the same body. This is no new opinion, but the heresie of the Marcionites, Basilidians, and Valentinians, whom Tertullian calls Partia∣nos sententiae Sadducaeorum, as acknowledg∣ing but halfe a resurrection: Resurrectio di∣ci

non potest, ubi non resurgit quod cecidit, saith Gregory. Secondly, Christ is said 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to transfigure or transforme our vile bodies in the resurrection; but if the same numericall body rise not, our resurrection will be a forming of a new body, not a transforming of the old: Or, an assumption of a body rather, then a resurrection: Or, if you please, a Pythagoricall transanimation. Thirdly, the end why man was made, or why his body was united to his soule, was, that both might enjoy God, the chief bea∣titude; but man should be frustrated of his end, if the same body did not rise that was given him in the creation. Fourthly, if the essentiall forme of mans body was totally lost, as the formes of other creatures are by corruption, wee might have some reason to thinke, that the body should not rise the same numerically which fell: but mans soule, which is his essentiall forme, remains still the same; therefore the body shall re∣turne the same. Fifthly, though the childe begotten be not numerically the same with the parent begetting, because the whole matter of the parent is not transfused into

the childe; yet, in the resurrection, the same numericall body shall returne that fell, be∣cause the whole matter of it remaines. Sixthly, though the union of the body to the soule in the resurrection be not numeri∣cally the same action that was in generati∣on, yet the body shall be the same; because the entity and unity of the body is not hin∣dered by the multiplication or iteration of accidents, such as union is. Seventhly, our resurrection shall bee conformable to Christs; but he raised up the same numeri∣call temple of his body which was destroy∣ed; as the same numericall body of Ionas was disgorged, which was swallowed by the Whale. Eighthly, if in artificiall things the introduction of a new forme makes not the matter to be identically different from what it was, much lesse can mans body be any other then what it was, by introdu∣cting the same essentiall forme, which was never lost, though for a while separated. Ninthly, it stands with Gods justice and mans comfort, that the same body which was the soules companion in tribulation, should be also companion with it in glo∣rie;

that the same body, which was to the soule the organ of iniquity, should be also the organ of paine and misery; the same soules and bodies that run together in the same race, let them weare the same crown, and reigne together in the same glory. Let the Baptist have the same head he lost, and Bartholomew the same skin he parted with. This was Iob's comfort on the dung-hill, that though wormes destroy his body, yet hee should see God in his flesh, whom I my selfe (saith he) shall see, and mine eyes shall behold, and none other for mee, though my reines are consumed within me.

His second mistake is, [That the forme, not the matter, gives numericall individuation to the body.] Is the dead body of an Ethio∣pian numerically the same with the dead bo∣die of a Scythian? he will not say so; then they are different bodies: but by what? the forme is gone: is not then the diffe∣rence in respect of the matter and acci∣dents, which remaine in the carkasse? 'Tis true, that the chiefe cause of individuation is the forme in men, yet not as it gives es∣sence; for so it makes the specificall union

by which all men are one; but as it gives existence to the matter, which it terminates with quantitie, and invests with other ac∣cidents, which matter and accidents are the secondary cause of individuation: but in dead bodies, the forme of man being gone, there remaines nothing but the form of a carkasse, or the form of mixtion, which determinating the matter of the carkasse with its accidents, makes up the numericall individuation, by which one carkasse is di∣stinguished from another.

His third mistake, [That the matter, with∣out forme, hath no actuall being.] The mat∣ter, as it is a substance and hath entity, as it is the other principle of generation, and as it is the cause of motion, it must needs have an actuall being, or else it can be none of these: it must be all one with privation, if it have no actuall being. 'Tis true, it hath not that measure of actuall being, which it receives from the forme, till the union; and yet I see not how the matter is at any time without forme, seeing it is never without privation, which presupposeth a forme in the matter, which is to be expelled

for introduction of another.

His fourth mistake, [That identitie be∣longs not to the matter by it selfe.] So he may as well say, that entity belongs not to the matter by it selfe; for identity followes the entity, as unity doth, which is in a maner the same that identity: he should have said, that matter gives not identity to things, neither genericall, specificall, nor numericall, for such proceeds from the forme; yet there can be neither of these identities, without the mat∣ter: for the conjunction of the forme with the matter makes identity; and yet before the forme be united, the particular parts of the matter have their particular identities and inclinations to such and such formes: as▪ mans seed to the forme of a man, not of an horse; an egge to the forme of a chick, not of a man; so after the soule is gone, that identity remaines in the matter which was before, to wit, an inclination to that forme which once it had, rather then to a∣ny other; or, rather then any other part of the matter can have to this forme.

His fifth mistake, [That the body of a man is not the same it was.] Philo••ophers say,

that the matter remaines after the forme is gone; so that a dead body, in respect of its matter, is the same it was whilst the soule was in it: If then the absence or change of the forme takes not away the identity of the matter, much lesse can that identity of the body be gone, whilst the soule remains in it. They that bring markes and spots in their skins, as Seleucus and Augustus did, re∣taine them still untill their skin be consu∣med; which shewes, that the body is the same in infancie a••d old age. If Ulysses had not brought home, after his twenty years travell, the same body he carried out, his Nurse had not knowne him by his foot; nor had his dogge fawned on him. I know the common opinion is, that the body is the same in respect of continuation, and because it hath the same essentiall forme; otherwise there is a continuall deperdition and reparation of the matter by nutrition and auction: but I cannot find, that there is any deperdition of the solid parts, or any alteration in the heterogeneall, but onely in the bloud and spirits, or such fluid parts: And doubtlesse, the primogeneall or radicall

humour, which wee bring with us, wee re∣taine still in us, till it be quite wasted, and then there is no reparation; so that the body is still the same, whilst the soul is in it, both in respect first, of continuation; secondly, of the forme of man; thirdly, of the forme of mixtion; fourthly, of the solid homoge∣neall parts; fifthly, of all the heterogeneall; sixthly, of the radicall moisture and natu∣rall heat: so that if there be any deperdi∣tion, it is in respect of the fluid parts only, and that so slowly and insensibly, that there is no reason why wee should thinke, the body of an old man to be any other then what it was in child-hood; and if it were not the same, it could not be the fit subject of generation and corruption, nutri∣tion, augmentation and alteration.

Lastly, for his Similies, they will not hold: for, a ship which is all new timbe∣red, though it be called the same in vulgar speech, yet indeed is not the same; for the forme which remaines, is onely artificiall and accidentall, which ought not to carry away the name of identity or diversity from the materialls, which are substanti∣all.

Secondly, the Thames is the same ri∣ver now that heretofore, not in respect of the water, which is still flowing, but in re∣spect of the same springs that feed it, the same channell that contains it, and the same bankes that restraine it; so that the Thames is still the same, but the water without these other makes not the Thames: neither is there any consequence from a fluid to a solid body. Thirdly, a glasse full of sea∣water, is the same glasse when it's full and empty; but the water is not the same which is taken out of divers parts of the sea: I meane not the same individuall wa∣ter, though it be the same specificall, to wit, of the same sea; no more then two bran∣ches lopt off from a tree are the same, though the tree be the same. Fourthly, the soule of a newly dead man, united to ano∣ther body, will not make it the same iden∣ticall body he lived with before his death; for, if the soule of Dives had entered into the scabby body of Iob or Lazarus, had that been his indenticall body which hee left? then that tongue of Iob or Lazarus which was, must be tormented in flames,

and that tongue of Dives which was, shall ••cape: is this justice? If the soule of Laza∣rus, when it was foure dayes absent from ••he body, had not returned to that body ••hat was his, and which Christ raised, but to the body of some other, that had been doubtlesse no resurrection of Lazarus his body, but a transmigration of Lazarus his soule.

In the Postscript [Sir Kenelme doth not conceive grace to be a quality infused by God into the soule, but a concatenation rather or complex of motives, that encline a man to piety, and set on foot by Gods grace and favour.] 'Tis true, wee are not justified by any inherent or infused quality in us, which the Roma∣nists call gratia gratis data; for when the Scripture speaks of our justification, it speaks of that grace, which is set in opposition to workes; not only such as may be done by a naturall man out of the light of reason, but such as are called the gifts of Gods Spirit▪ for Abraham was justified not by his workes, but by faith; and wee are justified by faith, not by the workes of the Law. If of grace, then not of workes, otherwise

grace were not grace. Faith there, is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 taken for a quality, but for the object a••¦prehended by faith, which is Christ; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 grace in the matter of Justification is tak•••• for the free acceptation, mercy and goo••¦nesse of God in Christ. By this grace w•• are saved, and this was given us before th•• world was made; therefore this grace ca•• signifie nothing inherent in us: But if we•• take the word Grace in a larger extent, the•• it signifieth every thing freely given; fo•• gratia is from gratis, & so Nature it self, & the gifts of Nature are graces, for we deser∣ved them not: Ex gratia nos fecit Deus, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex gratia refecit. So in a stricter sense, thos•• spirituall gifts of God, which more neerl•• cencerne our salvation, are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 graces, in Scripture: faith, hope, charity, an•• other Christian vertues, are called graces, & yet they are qualities: the gifts of prophe∣cying, teaching, or evangelizing, are qua∣lities, and yet are graces: For to every one o•• us is given grace, according to the measure o•• the gift of Christ. Eloquence is that grace, which was diffused in Christs lips. The Gospel is that grace, under which wee are,

••ot under the Law: therefore though the ••••ace, by which we are justified, is no qua∣••••ty i••herent in us; yet wee must not deny, ••ut those graces, by which wee are sancti∣••ed, are qualities. But to say with Sir Ke∣••elme, [that the accidents of misfortune, the ••entlenesse and softnesse of nature, the impre∣••editated chance of hearing a Sermon, should ••ake up that which we call justifying grace] ••or of this he speaketh) is a harsh and dan∣••erous phrase, and contradictory to his ••wne position; for, what is gentlenesse and ••oftnesse of nature, but qualities? and yet ••ee will have them to make up that grace, ••y which man is converted, and so he will ••ave our conversion or justification to de∣••end on our selves.

And thus have I briefly pointed at the ••istakes of this noble and learned Knight, ••hose worth and ingenuity is such, that ••ee will not take it amisse in mee, to vindi∣••ate the truth, which is the thing I one∣••y aime at. The Moone hath her spots, and ••he greatest men have their failings. No man is free from errour in this life.

Truth could never yet be monopolized; th•• great Merchants of spirituall Babylon have not ingrossed it to themselves, nor was it ever tyed to the Popes Keyes, for all thei•• brags: The God of truth send us a time▪ wherein mercy and truth may meet to∣gether, righteousnesse and peace may kisse each other. Amen.

FINIS.

Notes

• 3.
• Pag.
• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 21.
• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 22.
• Pag
• Pag. 3••
• Isa. 4•• 22, 23▪
• Pag. 4
• 〈…〉〈…〉.
• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 43.
• Pag. 46
• ••ag. 46.
• Pag. 4 Pag. 4••
• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 51.
• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 78.
• 〈…〉〈…〉
• Pa•• 81 83 85
• Phil. 21.
• Rom. •• Rom. ••
• Tim. ••.
• ••ugust.
• Ephes. ••.7.
• Psa. 4 5.
• ••ohn 1.