Six philosophical essays upon several subjects ... by S.P. Gent. of Trinity Colledge in Oxford.

A Demonstration of the Cer∣tainty of Things, and of the Being of a God.

AS there is not a more valuable Privilege bestow'd by the gracious Donor of all good things upon any part of his Creation than that which the Possessors of it call by the name of right Under∣standing or Reason, so could there not have been a greater Curse inflicted on rational Beings than if what they term right Reason were nothing but Delusion and Infatuation: for beside that Principle, which is unalienable from a rati∣onal Nature, of eschewing all Error as such, the consequence would have been either, that we must have pursu'd false Ends through sincere Means, or real Ends through false Means, or lastly false Ends through false Means; and the effects of either of these had prov'd intolerable, the more because the inconvenience would not have attended two or three Counsels of our Lives only, but all our Motions and Endeavours whether of greater or less Importance: nay so miserable had been our state, that if we could have been sensible of it, no more comfort could have been had than remedy; and if insensible, the whole drudgery of the Delusion must have been first entirely finish'd, e'er we could so much

as know we had taken such pains to be disap∣pointed. Annihilation were certainly more e∣ligible, or at least not to be is as good as to be in vain, for if an end is unattainable, it is all one in the effect, as if there were no pursuant to attain it. It nearly concerns us therefore, as many as are conscious to our selves of possessing this Principle, to examine the Pretences of it, and whether it is infallible in all its Determina∣tions or only in some, and if but in some, which they properly are: to inform himself whereof I do not think it by any means necessary for a man to strip off Flesh and Blood, to benumb himself all over, to give his person the lye, to close up his Eyes and forget his faculty of feel∣ing. For this is endeavouring to reduce him∣self to that sleeping state in which the great Ad∣visers of this method suppose the most subtile delusion. 'Tis a mere waking Dream, and Na∣ture must undergo many a bitter pang before she can wreath her self into the Monster. When with half the trouble I can state a Principle or an Axiom in my mind that shall be never the worse for my being in my senses, which there∣fore if they may not be credited, may however be decently neglected. And although in the formation of abstracted▪ Ideas they often divert and interrupt us, yet they are undoubtedly a far greater hinderance when so much violence is offer'd them. If lest to themselves they might perhaps sometimes retard, or bring us out of the way: they might interpose their gross compounded Objects, and mix again those simple Conceptions which the Understanding has with much labour refin'd and sorted: they

might confound Notes of Discrimination with Notes of Identity, reverse general Ideas, and detain us with the sensible Properties of Indivi∣dual. Nay further, they might counterfeit the Species of Objects, and surprize and perplex us with their Incoherences: yet if we attempt to discipline and restrain them, much more utter∣ly to discard and null them, they grow twice as troublesome, and instead of diverting the Mind by fits as before, perfectly distract it, and find it so much trouble in subduing and governing them, that unless it were capable of more Ope∣rations than one at once, it cannot pursue the contemplation of those Notices and Ideas, for the more accurate perception of which it relin∣quishes all the Benefit and Instruction of the Senses. Thus for instance, when I take upon me to abstract the individuating Properties whereby this man differs from that, and he a∣gain from a third, and so forward, in order to constitute an Idea of such a number of Proper∣ties as are common to the whole College of In∣dividuals, which is the Idea of a Species, the presence of any of those Individuals before our eyes may solicit the Soul to return to a com∣pound Contemplation of it, or else the Imagi∣nation may of a sudden re-unite what the Intel∣lect had separated, may perversly range the Concretes before it, and so retard the Operati∣on: but then if all these Individuals are to be reduc'd to the State of a Species, and at the same time our Faculties must be continually upon the Watch, continually suppressing and chastizing the Insolences of sense; if the Intel∣lect must look two ways at once, mark out her

Lines and form her Planes, while she repulses a Sally; this would be hard service indeed, and she would find her self at last necessitated to at∣tend altogether one of the two, or atchieve but half of either. And of this the Cartesians ap∣pear eminent examples against themselves, who endeavouring to form an Hypothesis in despite to their Senses, meet with so violent an opposi∣tion from them, that while they are disputing the Field with them, and subjecting the Rebels to the Understanding, the work of ratiocination halts, and many times as soon as one Premise is handsomely plac'd, a sudden strife of the Senses for liberty shall commence, against which the Understanding must make head, and after the Fray is a little over, forgetting her self, she presumes she had before laid down two Premis∣ses, and in that assurance demurs not to draw a Conclusion: or perhaps, when she has stated both her Premisses, the senses begin to heave, and she must correct them, upon which she lo∣ses the judgment she had pass'd upon the Ideas of her Premisses, and so fetches a wrong Infe∣rence from them. Thus in essaying to demon∣strate the Immateriality of the Soul from the Essence of it, as being contradistinct to that of the Body, they propose to prove, that the bo∣dy may not exist, but the Soul must, and from thence infer, that the Souls Essence cannot be the same with the body's, and that therefore the Soul cannot but be immaterial: now the possibility of the Non-existence of their Bodies, which at first they barely propos'd they present∣ly after presum'd, which such curious and scru∣pulous Reasoners could hardly have done, but

that by the untractableness of the Senses their Intellect was so disturb'd and annoy'd, as upon recollection to look upon that as warrantably presum'd, which was but gratis suppos'd: ac∣cordingly it is made a foundation for a further Conclusion, that the Soul is immaterial because its Essence is distinct from the Bodies which is material: and here again a short skirmish with the Senses seems to have interven'd between the Premisses and Conclusion, else it could ne∣ver have been, that such cautious Philosophers should derive the evidence of the latter from the former, because if they had carry'd it along with them, that at most they had but evinc'd the possibility of their Body's not existing, and the certainty of their Soul's existence, they could never, unless for the reason I have now given, have alledg'd it as a necessary consequence from such Premisses, that the Essence of the Soul and Body are contradistinct; since 'tis obvious to every one who will faithfully connect these Premisses with this Conclusion, and that in their full and proper Sense and Extent, that if the Body as truly exists as the Soul, they cannot differ on the score of Existence, and that untill the Existence of the Body can be prov'd utterly false as well as questionable (not that I think there are any grounds for attempting the latter) it cannot be necessarily concluded from possible Premisses, that the Essences of the Soul and Bo∣dy are contradistinct, nor from that conclusion as founded on such Premisses, that the Soul is immaterial. The occasion of which and many more mistakes in men so diligent and jealous could be no other than the many Advocations

and Diversions they received from their Senses, and therefore they ought to be a warning to us not to pick any Quarrels with our Senses in or∣der to the stating solid Principles, nor to hold for an Axiom, that the Corruption of the Sen∣ses is the generation of Reason.

And yet on the other hand it were not safe with Epicurus to confide wholly on the Senses, to yield an implicit assent to all their Informa∣tions, and to be directed either in the search of Truth or Good solely by their conduct, al∣though I think there is no harm in being so much a Stoick, as to impute those errors which result from the Impressions of the Senses so long as they keep their natural Disposition and Tenor) not to the Organs, but to the Objects: however as long as between the one and the o∣ther we are in some cases liable to be deceiv'd, a wise man would use their assistance warily, and be sure to look upon them as bare instruments, not free Agents: for we are naturally dispos'd to commit our selves to all determinations in∣differently of a free Agent, and no less ready by reason of so near a relation between them to confound the Senses with the Intellect, being very prone to be guilty of the same Metonymies in the common cases of Life. Thus the Pain∣ter himself will tell you that his Pencil will draw a small Line, and such Drugs will make a good Colour if mixt together; the Countryman that his Plow-share cuts the Glebe; and the Shep∣herd that his Crook pulls his Sheep: and this way of speaking being familiar to us when we talk of the instruments of Mechanicks, we have unfortunately contracted a habit of expressing

our selves by the same figure when we discourse of those instruments of our Understanding, the Senses: which we are also the more easily in∣clin'd to through our not observing what I mention'd before, the true nature and just bounds of the relations between our Senses and Understanding. But when we consider them as instruments only, we regard them proportio∣nably, we decline all assent to them till such time as circumstances are weigh'd, and all those conditions answer'd, without which their Te∣stimony is exceptionable; such are the suitable Site and Distance of the Object, the due Tem∣perament of the Organ, the thickness or rare∣ness of the Medium, and the like. So when a Mountain appears a Cloud, the distance of the Object is to be enquir'd; when the colour of the Plumes varies on the neck of the Dove, the nature of the Medium, when the Snow seems yellow, the disposition of the Organ: and when all these conditions are duly examin'd, we shall learn what grounds we have to assent, and by becoming acquainted with the defects of our Senses be able to form judgments as certain from them in cases wherein they are faulty, as in ca∣ses wherein they are faithfull: for if we can tell what is wanting to the perfection of a thing, we cannot but know withal the true state of that thing while under such an imperfection as clear∣ly as if that imperfection were away, we should know the state of the same thing in its perfecti∣on; an instance of this is that choice one among the Academicks of an Oar half under water, of whose real Figure, notwithstanding so plausible an appearance, I can as confidently judge as if

the whole were out of the Water, seeing I know my eye to be in that case incapacitated to repre∣sent to my mind the true state of the Object, and withal understand how far and wherein its representation deviates from a just one: whence I can deduce sure Inferences either in relation to that appearance which I know to be false, or to that state of the Object which I know to be real. But beside this, another Discipline no less per∣nicious has obtain'd as generally almost among the Learned as the former among the Plebeians, of confounding the Senses one with another, a miscarriage occasion'd by that admir'd Theo∣rem, That all the Senses are concluded in that one of feeling, which by an easie consequence disposes us to believe it necessary that whatsoe∣ver affects us by one sense, would, if in like manner apply'd to the Organs of our other Sen∣ses, affect them also, and that therefore when an Object has past the Test of one, there is no further need to examine it by the rest, because all are affected after one manner, so that if any thing acts upon my Faculty of seeing, it ought to be a sufficient evidence, that it is in the pow∣er of the same to act as effectually upon my Fa∣culty of hearing, &c. till at length we come to imagine that whatsoever our Eyes represent to us under the Figure of a Palpable Substance, is in it self such. Thus while some Philosophers have beheld the Azure of the Sky, they have been mov'd to fansie it a solid Arch compacted as it were of Blew Stone, or some such kind of matter, whence arose that wild System of solid Orbs, by which the Ancients made a mere Pa∣per-mill of the Heavens; although I confess we are not so often by this means deceiv'd in the

general intrinsick properties of Substances, as in their external modifications, in the discern∣ing of which we should not behave our selves so like Infants, if we would not so often rely upon the Authority of one Sense for the certainty of that which can only be prov'd by another Sense. How often have we known wise people scar'd with the lustre of Phosphorus, rotten Wood, and stinking Fish, only because they suppos'd such an Affinity between the Senses, that if one receiv'd such an Influence from its Object as is proper to that Sense, the other would also up∣on trial receive those Influences from the same Object which are proper to them? Now where these two Rules are observ'd, that we look on the Senses as bare instruments, and that we do not confound them one with another, I think we may safely trust to and rely upon them, for the first will prevent our assenting too soon, and the latter will be a means of knowing when it is time.

But the most simple way of reasoning is cer∣tainly the best; for although the Authority of the Senses is not to be utterly rejected, nay, al∣though it is for the most part to be receiv'd; yet if more simple evidence can be had, the Un∣derstanding is doubly gratified, and the Will by far more plyant; for evidence is as precious to the one, as it is prevalent upon the other: the first is not capable of any clearer information, nor the latter of a stronger impression. Whence it comes to pass, that it is impossible for a man to be a Sceptick. He may indeed affect the name, but cannot be the thing: because when he would seem to deny an Axiom, he must be understood

to want evidence, and to have it at the same time: to want it, because he says so, and to have it, because he can bring no other argu∣ment for his not having it than a bare denying of it, which is none at all. 'Tis true indeed, every man knows best how he feels himself af∣fected at any time, but if his Neighbour find it out of his own power to evade the force of such and such a proposition, he may assure himself that the same proposition can be no more eva∣ded by the Pretender to Scepticism than by himself, unless he believes that Pretender's Un∣derstanding and Will to be of a quite different constitution from his own, or else that such a Pretender is endow'd with neither, or deny'd the use and liberty of them, or last of all that the Pretender's faculties transcend his own, and that by vertue of a more sublime apprehension he understands that to be false, which to ano∣ther appears necessarily true. In one of these three conditions the Pretender must be, if he can really within his own breast deny the truth of an Axiom that is properly such: for if his Faculties be exactly of the same kind and extent with his Neighbours, it is impossible but what affects those of the latter in such a certain de∣gree, must affect those of the former in the same degree, seeing where the cause is one, and the Patients on which an Effect is to be wrought by that Cause are the very same in kind, the Effect must also be the same: for else two different Effects could be produced, caeteris paribus, by the same Cause, which in a Cause suppos'd to move at least one of the two Patients fatally and inevitably as soon as addressed to that

Patient (and such is the self-evidence of a pro∣position to the Faculties of the Pretenders Neighbour in our case) cannot be, because if address'd to one of the Patients it unavoidably begets in it such an Effect, it must as unavoidably, when address'd to another Patient, perfectly the same, beget in it the same Effect: otherwise its Effect would be necessary and yet not neces∣sary, which the Pretender's Neighbour knows of himself cannot be true, nor can the Preten∣der's faculties be of a different kind, provided they be of the same extent as his Neighbour's, (for if they are larger or narrower, we are to consider them as supposed to be such afterwards) because there can be no Species of Rational Fa∣culties distinct in Essence and Nature from his own, for whoever has a power of Apprehending, of Judging, of Concluding Coequal with his, must apprehend, judge and conclude as he does, for if he have distinct powers equivalent to these, he must apprehend, judge and conclude by the help of those powers in the same degree as his Neighbour, and if he cannot, his powers are not equivalent, and are therefore to be consider'd, when we shall speak of them as suppos'd less. Do his Faculties therefore differ from ours on∣ly in order? that is, Does he judge before he apprehends? or conclude before he judges? in that respect again, his Rational Powers will be inferiour to his Neighbour's, and therefore they cannot be of a different kind from those of the latter, and equivalent to them. Neither may they be superiour, since if they surpass the Be∣liever's either in alacrity of Perception, strength of Judgment, or security of Ratiocination,

which is what I mean by Superiour, instead of disbelieving what his Neighbour cannot but assent to, his knowledge of it must be more clear and ample, and his conviction much ful∣ler than his Neighbour's, who assisted with that poor capacity that he is endow'd with, finds himself oblig'd to acknowledge the truth of manifest Axioms, and plainly perceives that they cannot be false: how much rather then must the Pretender be sensible of their evidence, being assisted with Faculties so much larger and perfecter, in as much as that which approves its own certainty to Faculties less capable of ap∣prehending it, must approve it no less, for the reasons already alledg'd, where we demonstra∣ted it impossible, that Faculties exactly of the same kind and extent should be alike affected by the same Impressions, to Faculties more capable of apprehending it? Nay, must over and above approve it self so much the more effectually to them, as they are degrees more apprehensive of it than the less capable: for carrying in it self the unquestionable tokens of truth, so that as soon as it reaches the apprehension, it con∣vinces the judgment, it cannot offer it self to a more eminent apprehension, but it must be more intimately known to it, nor convince at the same time a clearer Judgment, but with a proportionably greater evidence. For notwith∣standing that evidence which convinces the As∣senter be to him so clear, that nothing can be clearer, yet it is not to be doubted but that Fa∣culties more exquisite can more readily conceive and easily entertain such evidence. However it is sufficient for us, if the evidence but equally

convince both. But may not the Pretender's Faculties be inferiour? May they not be fewer? May they not be less perfect? And indeed it seems a difficult matter to prove him a Master of Right Reason, who declares himself proof a∣gainst the first Principles of it. In this security it is that the Pretenders hug themselves. It looks like an errant Impossibility, that their Fa∣culties should lie thus naked and expos'd to eve∣ry Body's else. But they are deceiv'd, and as little able to conceal their own abilities as they are averse. The disguise will not stick on long enough for them to enter upon their part, but betrays them e'er the very first act. For the As∣senter knowing by himself that first Principles or Axioms exercise only the Judgment or se∣cond Operation of the Mind, and terminate in it, may resolve himself, that if that Operation is in the Pretender's power, he cannot but ap∣prehend the certainty of those Axioms which of themselves and antecedently to any Ratioci∣nation imprint a security of their Truth, and that this Operation is in the Pretender's power, himself evinces, when he forms that Propositi∣on by which he declare himself unaffected with the evidence of those Axioms; for he who de∣nies that this thing can be predicated of that thing, is oblig'd to such an act of examining the relation between one Idea and another, as we call Judgment, and furthermore by exerting this Act demonstrates himself to have the pow∣er of assenting or dissenting, seeing he that de∣nies such a relation to be between one Idea and another, or affirms that there is no such relati∣on between them, expresses by that very act an

assent to the latter proposition, or a dissent to the former. Nor matters it any thing whether this act be called an Act of Assent or Dissent, for either of them consists in a Persuasion of Mind, be that Persuasion either of the one kind or of the other. He therefore that pronounces a Proposition in which he denies the truth of another Proposition, at the same time signifies his Persuasion, and no more than both these ca∣pacities is requisite to the being such a Patient as the Assenter's first Principles or Axioms when offer'd, necessarily affect in such a manner and degree. But suppose the Pretender is not per∣suaded of what he pronounces. If he is not, then he is either persuaded of the contrary, and so becomes one with the Assenter, or is altogether unaffected, or at best but dubiously with either Proposition, and neglects or discredits no less what himself pronounces than what the Assenter pronounces. But this he cannot do, as being qualified to pronounce such a judgment, for in pronouncing it he unites and divides Ideas ac∣cording to his own choice, and choosing to unite this Idea with that, or divide it from it, is an Act of Assent or Distent. Unless therefore the Pretender, when he pronounces his Judgment is suppos'd to be acted by a blind Principle, and his words to be no more than sounds form'd by a fatal motion of the Organs of Speech, not the Interpreters of an Intelligent Being, (which being suppos'd, we make the Pretender uncapa∣ble of being a Sceptick as much as before, for if he is only a blind unintelligent Nature, he can∣not perceive in himself an indifference to the force of the Proposition in which consists his

Scepticism) the whole extravagant Mask drops off o'course. Not that if he could keep it on ever so long, the Assenter is concern'd to force him to common sense against his Will so long as himself is sincerely satisfied of the truth of such undenyable Propositions, and upon Propositi∣ons of this kind, we now purpose to proceed.

The Propositions which I shall expect to be granted me, are these two,

• Whatsoever affects, has a being.
• Whatsoever is affected, has a Being.

Nor will I yet dare to assume them, although clear enough by their own light, without as∣signing just reasons for so doing. The truth of the first is no way to be question'd, if that which assects can affect only by application of it self to that which is affected, and this it must necessa∣rily do either immediately to that which is im∣mediately affected by it, or by communication of other intermediate Afficients. And more certain nothing can be, than that That which is nor can∣not so apply it self. As necessarily also must eve∣ry thing that is affected in any manner exist, be∣cause that in order to be affected, it must be such a Patient as is capable of receiving and sustain∣ing the Afficient when it applies it self, which a mere Negative cannot be. And this without reducing the matter to any Axioms of the Schools cannot but be so far convictive.

Seeing therefore I am conscious to my self of being in the number of those things which find themselves affected, I am certain, that I truly and really exist, and that not only as to that part of me which is a Judge of the reality of my being affected, but as to that part also

which is only capable of being affected, not of being a Judge of it, because whether the latter part, by which I design the purely sensitive part, is or is not consummated but by the former or purely cogitative part, a question which might admit of a long dispute if it were necessary, it is certain, that I am truly and properly affected in both parts. That I am affected in the first, the very doubting of it evidently proves, much more, as I have already shewn, the denying of it; it being impossible, but that he which su∣spends his Judgment, must find himself no less affected by the matter of his suspense, than if it were become the subject of his Assent or Dissent, for although it does not affect him so as proper∣ly in the event to dispose or determine his Will, yet it makes him equally sensible of the pre∣sence and application of such matter, as the same would do, if become a Subject of his As∣sent or Dissent: which it does, as has already been evinc'd when such matter passes once into an Affirmation or Negation. And because that Operation of the cogitative part, by which it conceives the certainty of its being affected, is indeed a Judgment consisting of an Idea of Af∣fection either in general or special, the thing af∣fected, and the act of affecting, for whoever conceives thus much of himself, I am affected, must apprehend such a thing as Affection impli∣ed in the word Affected, something also affected declar'd by the person I; and lastly, the appli∣cation of the former to the latter: and seeing that there is no man, whether he doubts, af∣firms, or denies, (and one of these three every man as to his cogitative part must do) but con∣ceives

or feels the certainty of his being affected, it necessarily follows, that that portion of the cogitative part truly exists, which exerts the Act call'd Judgment, and not this only, but because (which has been prov'd above) in all Acts of Judgment is compriz'd an Assent or Dissent, and these appertain to the Will, that the Faculty of the Will no less truly exists. And as for the Imagination and Memory, the first of them consisting in simple apprehension is so contain'd in the Faculty of Judgment, that it is evident he who is possest of the latter, must be as truly endow'd with the former, but whe∣ther those Sensibles about which this Faculty is conversant be true and sincere, we shall present∣ly examine. The Memory is indeed all consci∣ousness, being no more than a power of resto∣ring the perception of Affections already past, but so far as it is distinct from simple apprehensi∣on or Judgment, it is no more than a bare secu∣rity of having receiv'd such and such Impressions; which security where ever it is lodg'd, is its own Testimony, and he that has it cannot but know he has it, because if he denies he has it, he must form to himself such a Judgment, as will evi∣dently shew that he has it, for in forming such a Judgment, he must, in the first place, consi∣der himself as the subject of which he denies such an Attribute to be predicable, then the Attribute it self; and lastly the extent of relati∣on between them, so that unless he can conceive all these together, he must have it, which yet he cannot conceive together, because if he could, a due order of Succession in the terms of such a Judgment were not absolutely necessary, both

the Relatives and the Relation between them being so to be conceiv'd at the same instant as any one of them: Whereas such a Judgment cannot be form'd as shall consist of fewer terms than these, nor the dependance of these terms pronounc'd, unless they be dispos'd in a certain due order and succession. The necessity there∣fore of such a succession being thus evinc'd, it appears, that he who denies himself to have Memory, must consider himself being the first term in such a Judgment, not with the other terms in the same instant of Conception, but as the first of the line and the others in their order distinctly afterwards, and when he has reflected upon each of them, must to perfect the Judg∣ment compare and weigh the relation of the Pre∣dicate with the Subject, which is not to be ef∣fected without restoring that Perception or Ap∣prehension of the Subject wherewith he was af∣fected, when in the order of his Reflections he first consider'd that subject as the first term of the Judgment, and this is Memory. The same argument will hold, if instead of denying he pretends to doubt whether he has Memory or not, for I cannot conceive within my self thus much, I doubt of such a thing, but by a Judg∣ment, in which the case is all one as before: Thus the certainty of the Existence of all the Faculties or Portions of the cogitative part of me is demonstrated upon the foregoing Princi∣ples, and consequently of the whole. Many more arguments might be fetch'd to inforce these now alledg'd; but perhaps one is more than necessary, nothing being more out of the power of a thinking Being than in good earnest

to persuade it self that it is no Being. Nay even supposing it possible that it should be veri∣ly persuaded that it has no Being, it cannot but when it feels it self so persuaded, be at the same juncture assur'd that it really is; so that while I suppose such a thing possible, I must suppose it impossible, and that being a direct contradi∣ction cannot be true; therwise the Principles so lately granted might be true and not true, and whatsoever affects or is affected be and not be. We are therefore next to examine whether there is the same security of the real Existence of the sensitive part, and this upon the same Princi∣ples. Certain it is that I perceive my self af∣fected as well in this part as in the other, but whether or no this Perception is intirely owing to the cogitative part, or cannot be wrought without the intervention of Organs external to that and Corporeal, may by some Scepticks be offer'd as matter of Dispute, because if such Perception can be effected without such Exter∣nal Organs, those Organs may be no more than mere Phantom, Emptiness and Delusion; and on the other hand, if it cannot be effected but by such External Organs, those Organs must be both distinct from the thinking part, and as properly existent as that. To proceed therefore regularly, it is necessary that we contemplate what those Affections are which are proper to the sen∣sitive part, and whence they arise. In themselves they are such as can only inhere in, and arise from Beings extended; of which we shall here∣after prove that by the laws of its nature it can∣not be other. Nor is the consequence of this Demonstration to be evaded, for if these Affe∣ctions

of the sensitive part can only inhere in an extended Being, and arise from the Essential Properties of an extended Being; and if all ex∣tended Beings must be real, the sensitive part must therefore be real and truly distinct from a Being uncapable by it self of receiving immediate∣ly those impressions unless in a far more imper∣fect manner, which it ultimately receives and consummates by vertue of the Affections be∣longing to that External Being which consti∣tutes the sensitive part, provided it be also de∣monstrated, that that Being which constitutes the cogitative part is indeed uncapable by it self of receiving immediately those Impressions, un∣less in a far more imperfect manner. And this I question not but to perform in its proper place. In the mean while to prove that the Affections of the sensitive part only inhere in, and are proper to an extended Being: I think the first thing to be done is to enquire what they are, and that by Particulars according to the vulgar Division of them, by which they are distributed into the five external Senses, and the common internal: where yet it ought to be remembred that external is not oppos'd as before, to a Be∣ing Incorporeal, seated within the External, but to an extended one (extended so far as it is properly sensitive, as shall be hereafter shewn) more External with respect to the Incorporeal Being than what is here call'd internal. The first of these is the power of perceiving the Di∣mensions and Complexions of Objects, both which are proper to no Beings but what are extended, for all Dimensions whether incom∣pleat, as a Point, Line, or Superficies; or

compleat, as Prosundity in conjunction with the former, cannot be conceiv'd but in a sub∣ject capable of such Dimensions: not but in more abstracted Speculations those Dimensions may be contemplated without particular regard had to the Subject of them, but if we consider them in the relation which they bear to a Being extended, we shall easily learn how inseparable they are from it, and therefore how necessarily that Being wherein such Dimensions are found is extended; and again it is no less evident that Objects carrying Complexion or Colour must be also extended, because all Colour, whether it arises from the Modification of the superficial parts of a Body; or whether it be what the A∣ristotelians call a Form, (if indeed they are to be distinguish'd) or whatever its Essence is, must be co-extended with a Superficies, insomuch that when the Intellect abstracts it from a real Superficies, it cannot be conceiv'd any otherwise than circumscrib'd and expanded to certain Bounds and Limits on all sides as a Superficies, and because it cannot be conceiv'd without the Dimensions of a Superficies, nor a Superficies out of a Being extended, supposing, as I said before, we consider both the former, in the rela∣tion which they bear to the latter; we cannot but conclude that Colour or Complexion, where∣ever it is found, must be in a Body truly and re∣ally extended. I say therefore, as Dimension and Complexion are proper to no Beings but what are extended, and from these inseparable; so we are also sure, that the sensitive part, by which we obtain the Perception of these Pro∣perties is it self extended, because thus much is

certain, that either the Intellect by its intuitive Faculty does immediately obtain these Impressi∣ons of Dimension and Colour, or if not, either it must receive them from the Objects them∣selves without the Interposition of any other extended Being, or by the conveyance of some other, unless it be granted that some other In∣corporeal Being is the Author of this commu∣nication; and then that as being an Afficient or Operator must exist, if a Finite, independence on, and by vertue of an Infinite, as the sequel shall demonstrate; if an Infinite, so much therefore of our Argument is made good with∣out further study. Now the utmost our Intel∣lectuals can archieve by their intuitive Faculty of it self, is to feign an Object to be, and to be present, not to perceive it properly as real and present. It can form an Idea of Dimension in general, or any one kind of Dimension, as also of Colour in general, or any particular sort of Colour, but then this Idea shall be variable at pleasure; the Dimensions shall be larger or less, of this Form or that Form, and the complexi∣on of this kind or that kind, as the Soul plea∣ses; whereas the Figure and Colour of those Objects which affect us, as to what we call sight, are not in our Power nor Subject to that Faculty which can vary those particular Dimen∣sions and Colours it self has form'd at discretion. These latter affect us without any antecedent counsel or resolution of the Soul, whereas the Faculty of Imagination cannot set to work with∣out being first determin'd by a plain Act of the Will: so I cannot beget in my self the Perce∣ption of any figure without a motion first made

in my Soul to form such a Conception, and a tacit consent also to pursue that motion, where∣as we often find that Figures and Colours too surprize us, and are not, as in other cases, to be remov'd or chang'd at the decree of our Will. Seeing therefore they affect us, and not by our own procurement, and seeing the varia∣tion of them does not depend on our own Fa∣culties, 'tis evident they must so far, as things are so and so figur'd and colour'd, be distinct from them, because whatsoever is figur'd and colour'd, must, as has been shewn above, be extended; and that the Faculties of the Soul cannot be, as shall be shewn hereafter: altho' if they could, it would avail nothing against us, as shall be also shewn hereafter. Nor mat∣ters it as to the question in hand, whether that which appears to be just so and so figur'd and co∣lour'd, really is so, but whether it only appears in such a manner to be so figur'd and colour'd as that by the power of my Intellectual Faculties I cannot make it otherwise, and as that it offers it self unsought and unlook'd for so dispos'd. Esse and apparere in this case are one, and if we are not able to vary these Dimensions and Colours which affect us, though they may not perhaps truly and properly, as they are of such a parti∣cular kind belong to such a Subject, it is De∣monstration as they are Dimensions and Colours in general, they exist in some extended Being distinct from my Intellectuals. And by this Principle it is easie to solve those Difficulties which may be started concerning Dreams and Lunacy, for although those Difficulties, if ad∣mitted, are not, as the Cartesians and Malbran∣chians

have surmiz'd, any valid Objections or Exceptions to general rules of certainty of the Senses, it being very sufficient, if they are at such certain times, and on such certain occasi∣ons true, when by particular attention they have been found to be so, because indeed, any one instance for us justly pursu'd to the Consequen∣ces we fetch from it, is of force to confirm all that we shall contend for, yet because no room for cavil should be left; I think upon these terms it is apparent, that as to the general properties of the Objects of Sense, they are as faithfully represented to our Senses in our Dreams as at other times. The Subjects of those Proper∣ties, 'tis true, are not in reality present, but those Impressions which were a little before made upon the Organs hold good, and affect the Soul when no longer diverted by impressi∣ons, which though weaker, and therefore una∣ble to destroy the more durable, do, neverthe∣less, while an entrance is open for them, pre∣vent the Soul's being affected with any other. Now it is absolutely necessary that these impres∣sions of such long continuance made upon the sensitive part, be either made by that, of it self, or else by Objects of the sensitive part; if by it self, and it be prov'd, as it shall, extended and distinct from the thinking part by arguments un∣denyable in themselves, and fetch'd from diffe∣rent instances, the Objection leaves us as to this part of it in the same place where it found us: if by Objects of the sensitive part, no more is requir'd than to prove from instances more cer∣tain and unquestionable, and indeed most cer∣tain, that all Objects of the sensitive part must

be extended, which leads us again back to our general rules. And indeed, unless the Objecti∣on evidently carry'd in it such a repugnancy to our general Rules, as that it could not be sol∣vable upon the Suppositions made by us in them, let it be never so difficult to be accounted for in it self, it avails nothing against the force of those general rules: for granting it be solvable upon those Suppositions, as to what we are concern'd for in it the possiblity of its Being so is equally consistent with our general Rules of certainty, as they are principles from which such and such Conclusions are to be brought; as if the Ob∣jection had been ever so easily solvable in those Questions which may be started about it consi∣der'd in it self, so that it is to no purpose to urge, How do I know but my senses may de∣ceive me, when I'm awake, as well as when I'm asleep? because, although perhaps the true and real manner of their so affecting and disposing us as we find they or their Objects, or some∣thing like what we mean by them does, is un∣known to us, yet I can assure my self, that for ought I perceive of them (and I can judge no∣thing at all of them beyond that, unless by ge∣neral Rules of certainty) that we should be affe∣cted after such a manner by them, is not only consistent with our general Rules of certainty of the Senses, but altogether conformable to them, and more than a probable Argument of that which we are presently to evince, that the Organs of Sense are distinct from the thinking part no less than the Object. Indeed we can∣not say, but the Objection may prove that for such Objects to be just then present, when as in

a Dream, we really imagine them to be so, is not absolutely necessary; but it cannot infer that Objects properly and truly such, at least with respect to their general Properties, such as we in such circumstances take them to be, need not at one time or other to have been really pre∣sent: perhaps too, these general properties might not then have been united as in my Dream, suppose of a Chimaera; but one in one Object might have made deeper impressions than any other in the same Object, and another in ano∣ther, but that alters not the case supposing, as we experience when awake, the Soul has a pow∣er of joyning and mixing these selected parts and properties. And all this, according to the common Notion of the Origin of Dreams, which, as I have said already, whether con∣sonant to these or those Physical Principles or not, most certainly suffice to account for all those difficulties which at present concern us with relation to certainty of the Senses, and therefore the Objection grounded upon those difficulties stands no longer in the way of our general Rules. And as for the manner how the Impressions of Objects are so fasten'd upon the Organs, as to affect them after so long a time, we are as much excus'd from searching into that, as into the manner of Objects moving our Organs when we are awake. It is enough, if by our general Rules we become sure that at both times they truly act so upon us. And in∣deed since only Bodies have obtain'd those general Qualities which the Soul perceives her∣self affected with, as from those Bodies; and since, as we shall prove hereafter, the Soul her∣self

is a Being unextended, it cannot be, that the Soul should be so affected, as to the Perception of those general Qualities, unless by such Beings as have only obtain'd them, and those are Bo∣dies: I say, as to the Perception of those gene∣ral Qualities, as Colour and Dimension in gene∣ral, not the particular dispositions or sorts of them, as whether the Object wherein I am sure is Colour and Dimension in general be Red or Green, &c. Crooked or Streight. For here, though not often, we sometimes may err, as in the particular Colours of a Prism or the figure of a stick half under Water. Wherein yet we may know by the Rules of certainty al∣ready laid down, that there really is Colour and Dimension in general, and that therefore their Subjects are Beings truly and properly ex∣tended: so that whether awake or asleep, those general properties of extended Beings which af∣fect us must be lodg'd in Beings truly and pro∣perly extended, which is as much as serves for our present purpose, although even supposing the Soul to be material, if it be one solid Piece of matter, it cannot be affected, as by proper∣ties of extended Beings, unless by the applicati∣on of a Being truly extended to its own Superfi∣cies; or if it consists of many parts of matter, either each part (whether it be mov'd or not mov'd) must be endow'd with the power of per∣ceiving such properties, or only certain of them: if each part, the same application either of some other part of it, which in respect of the per∣ceiving part, is no more than its Object; or of some extended Being distinct from all parts of the Soul is still necessary to affect in such a man∣ner

because no part of matter can be affected with such Qualities as are proper to Matter, but by receiving the Impressions of them from some other portion of Matter. And this must be, ev'n supposing such Matter to perceive by a perceptive Quality unknown to us, for if it be a perceptive Quality at all, it must be such an one as we make the Soul to have, supposing it immaterial, and consequently subject to the same Laws as are proper to the other. Nor shall we, I hope, need to say any more as to this Objection in our Examination of the o∣ther Senses. To proceed then, as the Soul can∣not by her intuitive Faculty alone, so perceive these Objects of Sight, as she finds she does per∣ceive unalterable by and independent on her Fa∣culties; so cannot the immediate application of the Object to her Faculties effect those Perce∣ptions without the commerce of extended Or∣gans: and here we have two things to prove, That the Soul cannot perceive those general pro∣perties of extended Beings distinct from her self, but by the intervention of extended Instruments united to her by the most intimate Union, that an unextended and extended Being are capable of, and that these Objects are by no means so united: from whence it plainly follows, that there are other extended Instruments by inter∣vention, of which the Soul perceives those ge∣neral properties, and these we shall prove to be the Senses. Now the most intimate Union that can be between unextended and extended Beings is of Composition; for that which is extended, allotting it never so many occult properties, can∣not be unextended while 'tis extended; and

the most intimate Union of Composition is, when one of the Beings united cannot be affected, but the other must be affected also; supposing the Beings united to be consider'd as passive which we have already shewn the Soul, when she per∣ceives the general properties of Objects, as in the Objects must be, and therefore whatever is united to her by a most intimate Union of Com∣position, if such an Union, as I understand, be a most intimate, must with her be passive too. And indeed those things which cannot have one Being in common, can be no nearer united than necessarily to affect or be affected in common; since whatsoever is not essentially uni∣ted to any thing else, must be essentially distinct from it, and whatsoever cannot be conceiv'd without its Extension, as all extended Beings (whether in that Extension consists their Essence or not) must be essentially distinct from whatso∣ever cannot be conceiv'd with Extension, which we have promis'd already to prove hereafter of the Soul; and whatsoever is essentially distinct from any thing else, can obtain no nearer an al∣liance than that of acting and suffering with it: So as that in the latter case, the one cannot be affected but the other must be affected also, un∣less when one is passive, the other may be active: but that cannot be, for in order to this, they must be so far disunited as that one, viz. the ex∣tended Being must, in cases of Sensation alrea∣dy specified, affect the other by an extrinsecal Impression, or such an Impression as must imply, that that which impresses is no more united to that which is impressed upon, than the Object of Sense is to the perceptive Faculty of the Soul,

and that's not at all, for the properties of Di∣mension and Complexion in those Objects could not be perceiv'd, as in a distinct and separate State from that which perceives them, in which yet, for reasons lately alledg'd, they cannot but be, unless they were at least so far divided from it, as that it should not be united to their Super∣ficies, which it is impossible for it to be, while it plainly perceives that Superficies to be extra se, and withal, that it cannot be ty'd nearer to any Superficies, with the Perception of which it is as distinctly affected, as with that of an Object, than at most, barely to be surrounded by it, which is far from any Union of Composition. Not yet can the application of the Object's Su∣perficies to the perceptive Faculty, without the intervention of extended Organs united to the perceptive Faculty by the most intimate Union of Composition, produce such a Perception, be∣cause the utmost that the Imagination of her self can effect, is, as was observed before, to feign Objects real and present; nor can the Su∣perficies of the Object, by approaching only, dispose that Faculty which is not else dispos'd to take any notice of it; for unless that Object can so affect the perceptive Faculty, as to pro∣cure in it that real Perception of it self, which the Faculty is no more than able to feign, it's approach conduces not at all to the begetting such a Perception: and thus much it is certain it cannot, unless there be, at least, in this ex∣tended Object, a power of exciting, which pow∣er must either subsist in it independantly of it, or as an accident move and operate only in con∣junction with its Subject: not the first, because

this power being on such conditions, an unex∣tended Being must beget still that Perception, either by the approach of that extended Being, which is its Subject, or by it self: the one it is no more able to do, than the extended Being approaching the perceptive Faculty without a∣ny such assistant, nor yet by it self, because un∣less it has in it self the Notices or Perceptions of such general properties of an extended Being, it cannot by a mere confus'd and blind Sollicita∣tion cause our perceptive Faculty to acknow∣ledge such general Properties, which consider'd (as we consider it now) in it self, it has not, and consequently cannot move us to take notice of them, and therefore the perceptive Faculty does by other means receive those distinct and clear Impressions of Dimension, Colour, &c. than by that which has them not in it self, nor yet effects those Impressions by the means of that which has such properties in it self. But then, supposing it only an accident, it's effect cannot exceed that of its Subject, viz. a bare brute ex∣tended Being; and by the mere accession of this, which yet is all the Operation conceivable in a bare brute extended Being, the immaterial Fa∣culty can be no more affected, than if the ex∣tended Being had not approach'd, no more be∣ing in the Faculty, as has been prov'd above, than at most to feign the Object real and pre∣sent; nor any vertue in the immediate impres∣sion of the extended Being, by which alone it can procure a Perception of its own general proper∣ties in the perceptive Faculty. Because there∣fore the accession of the Object cannot produce a Perception of its general properties in the Fa∣culty;

nor the Faculty by her-self form those independant and distinct Perceptions which she has of Objects, some other extended Instru∣ments more intimately united, are requisite to the begetting such a Perception, and these are the Organs of Sense, which are more sensibly and closely united, than that those general pro∣perties, by which we know Objects to be distinct from the Faculty, are so by the Faculty to be perceiv'd in them. And the same security we have for the rest of the Externals, Hearing, Ta∣sting, Smelling, and Feeling, of the last more especially, because in it we are affected after such a manner, as to perceive those general pro∣perties peculiar to the Sensation of this Sense, as Dimension, (which is common with this Sense to that of Seeing) Hardness, Softness, Roughness, Smoothness, and the like; and which are not to be found, but in a truly extend∣ed Being, as in two distinct Superficies, that of the Organ reaching the Object, and that of the Object pressing the Organ, an evident Demonstration upon those Principles we have already laid down, as well of the certainty of both their Extensions, as of their being distinct from each other. But this, with the other three Externals, I shall leave (for brevity sake) to be examin'd by the Discipline of Certainty already offer'd, and therefore offer'd in general terms; declining particularly the discussion of the three other Senses, because all the Objects of them are primarily Objects of the other two; and as to those general properties which are as∣signable to them, as Tast in general, Sound in general, Odour in general, fall under the same

Doctrines with the former; only this may be necessary to observe once again, that the surest means of escaping error, is to try and judge on∣ly of those properties which the Judgment shall, by due methods understand to be appropriated to each Sense, by that Sense. What these me∣thods are may easily be collected from what has been said before. As little occasion have we al∣so to add any thing of the Internal, Common Sense, which by Aristotle and others is call'd so, because conversant about sensible Objects, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Arist. de A∣nimâ li. 3. cap. 2.) not as being corporeal▪ as follows, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, (see beside the Comment of the Coim∣bra Doctors) by whom it is defin'd, that Sense, by which we distinguish the several properties, which we acquire a Perception of by the five Externals, and can be no other than that per∣ceptive or apprehensive Faculty which is to be prov'd immaterial, for there is no distinguishing one thing from another, but by a clear and di∣stinct apprehension of each.

What we are next to prove, is the reality of extended Beings, and the Immateriality of that Being which perceives or apprehends and judges of them. Whenever we conceive an ex∣tended Being as able to affect us in the manner lately mention'd, we must conceive something more than length and breadth alone, because they cannot alone affect us with those general properties which we perceive in Objects long and broad, for if they affect, they must really

be, and yet they cannot really exist, unless they have also Depth as well as Length and Breadth, a proposition of it self so evident, that it ad∣mits of no further Illustration. And indeed it is high time to desist from this Demonstration of the Truth of the Senses, which I have not drawn out to such a length, as believing any just Scruples are to be raised about them, but to re∣move those unjust ones, which other have be∣got in the minds of many. In order to prove the latter, viz. the Immateriality of the appre∣hensive and Judicious Part, I will not pretend to define all the properties that may accrue to a Being extended, and boldly to exclude Cogitati∣on from among them, but shall make it my bu∣siness to evince from what we certainly know of an extended Being, that Cogitation cannot apper∣tain to it. Now thus much we plainly know of an extended Being, that it cannot be such, unless it have three Dimensions, Length, Breadth, and Depth; and nothing Long, Broad, and Deep can move it self, unless by virtue of some other power lodg'd in it; which power, as it is to be the Inciter of its extended Subject, can∣not but be so far independant of it, as to be able to move without it, because the motion of that is antecedent to the motion of its Subject, and if it be so far independant, it must necessarily sub∣sist in a state distinct from its extended Subject, since it is a most gross absurdity to suppose, that Faculty whereby the Being in which it rests is incited to move, should be incapacitated to move, unless with that Being wherein it rests; and yet if it is not, it is plain it must subsist di∣stinctly from it, because all properties, the foun∣dation

of whose Existence is their Subject, can∣not but move along with their Subject; for in∣deed, to suppose such to move without their Subject, is to set them free either more or less from their Subject, and to allow them to move only in proportion to the degree of such their Liberty and Alienation. Now every act of Per∣ception, if it proceed from any thing extended, must be wrought by motion, for all alteration must be the effect of motion, and whether that which properly perceives, be extended or not, the condition of it is in some degree alter'd, it be∣ing conscious to it self of a different state from what it had before: as when it has perceiv'd a Triangular Body, or (suppose) none before, and afterwards perceives a round one. If that from whence therefore this alteration arises is lodg'd in a Being extended, Motion is lodg'd in it, and if Motion, it must be either that in∣dependant Power discours'd of before, or an ac∣cident only concomitant with Extension: grant∣ing the first, by what has been so lately offer'd, we prove it to be distinct from the Being ex∣tended, and so immaterial, but if you will have it to be an accident only Concomitant with Ex∣tension; upon this Supposition again, it cannot move or be mov'd, but along with its extended Subject, and in the same Species of Motion, that is, it can only change Site and Place, since an extended Substance in motion differs from one at rest no more than relatively, or with respect to something without it self. For we will suppose a Cube divided into ten thousand Cubes, and every one of these subdivided into twice as many more, till of one solid Cube it becomes at last a heap

of Atoms; and next let us suppose these Atoms so dispos'd to play amongst one another, that each of them shall (if you please) have a quite different motion from all the rest. What changes would ensue in this Cube of matter? None certainly intrinsecal. But that Portion of the Cube, which before its division lay con∣tinuous to one certain Angle of it, upon the Intersection would relinquish the Superficies whereto it was continuous before, and apply its own naked Superficies to another; suppose that of the Instrument, or in what part it might not be contiguous to the Instrument, to the Su∣perficies of any intermediate matter whatever. The Division and Subdivision thus atchiev'd, and all the Particles thrown into Motion, what other alterations are like to arise? Still none, for every of the mov'd Particles continues in∣trinsecally the same; and the relative difference too is the same as it was in the Division, this single circumstance excepted, that in the Divi∣sion the changes of each Particle's Site might be fewer and slower, which in the commotion they shift oftner and quicker; so that a Body mov'd, and a body at rest, are materially and intrinsecally the same; but by reason of Moti∣on, one Body looses that relation of Vicinity which it had to another Body, and renews it with a third. But beside, the power of Perce∣ption must be essentially united to that of Judg∣ment; for as it is evident, that those Ideas of things, which the judgment compares, are the very same with those which we receive by sim∣ple apprehension, only more in number, and Parts so mainly constituent of every Operation

of Judgment, that there can be no such Opera∣tion effected without them, so cannot that pow∣er, whereby single Ideas are barely contempla∣ted, be indeed distinct from that which con∣templates them in the same manner, only in greater numbers, and under their mutual Rela∣tions: seeing where the Operation is essentially one, the Operant cannot be more; for altho' two distinct Efficients may concur to the pro∣ducing one Effect, yet that Effect must ne∣cessarily be compound, so as that the portion of the Effect wrought by one Efficient, may be distinct from the portion of the other Efficient, but every act of Judgment is simple, and one portion of it, viz. that of comparison, cannot be separated from the other of Ideas without being lost. The Unity of the Efficient there∣fore being thus prov'd from the Unity of the Ef∣fect, all that we have to prove is, that every act of Judgment must be truly and properly Moti∣on; and every act that has in it succession must be Motion, not that of Bodies out of one place or position into another, which yet is analogous to it so far as it is successive, but the continua∣tion of a complex act through all its parts, or that Transition which in every judgment we make from one simple Idea to another: and this power of Motion, if seated in matter, must be independent of it, as acting without it, be∣cause before it, for the other brute properties of matter are of necessity perfectly unactive and montionless, till agitated by this power indepen∣dent of them. But there might yet another ar∣gument, as well as a further confirmation of this be fetch'd à Posteriori, from the Wisdom of

God, when that and his other Perfections have been first prov'd from the Existence of even the smallest Particle of matter, which according to the method we shall now pursue, may be clear∣ly and directly prov'd.

Having therefore thus demonstrated the Ex∣istence and general Properties of all Beings im∣mediately affecting either our sensitive or think∣ing Faculties, as also the certainty of the Ex∣istence of those Faculties, and difference of their Nature, we come next to enquire how they obtain'd this Existence and these Properties; whether they gave them to themselves, or re∣ceiv'd them from some other Cause. Most evi∣dent it is, that they exist according to a certain Line, Succession, or Course of Moments, and that as to order of Time as they now are, so a little before they were; which Line or Course being trac'd by the moments whereof it consists to the utmost Length that our or any Multipli∣cation of such Moments can reach, will at last terminate in some certain Point, beyond which Moment the Existence of such Beings is not to be referr'd, and in which they first began to be. And this Beginning it is impossible they should have had from themselves, because they could not affect till they were; and if not affect, not effect; whence it follows, that they had some primary distinct Cause subsisting from Eternity, not extended, because a successive Existence is inseparable from Extension, for we can no soon∣er perceive an extended Being, but we must con∣ceive it as existing in time, because every ex∣tended Being is apt for, or capable of being mov'd along the parts of a Line, the measure

of Motion, by which we thus demonstrate the Succession of its Existence.

[illustration]

Let (a) be the Being extended; (f) (l) a a Line along which (a) may be mov'd, while (a) exists upon the space of the Line (f) (l) between (f) (h), it cannot exist also upon the space between (i) (b). And yet seeing it is ca∣pable of being mov'd along the Line (f) (l), till arriv'd to the space between (i) (b), it is no less capable of existing upon the space between (i) (b), but not till it has left off to exist upon the space between (f) (h): and yet it could not be capable of existing upon the space between (i) (b), after it had existed upon the space between (f) (h), unless it had existed be∣fore between (f) (h), and so many moments of Existence after its Existence between (f) (h), as its Motion should last through the several spa∣ces, till it might arrive at that between (i) (b), which Succession of Existence being trac'd back to the utmost extent that any Multiplication can attain, will at last terminate in some certain point, and therefore beyond that require a Cause which might subsist from Eternity. Beside, without Motion, this extended Being could ef∣fect or affect nothing; and yet this first Mover, if an extended Substance, could not have self-motion by the Demonstrations already offer'd upon that Argument.

And this prime unextended Cause must be also Infinite, not only possessing Perfections e∣qual to those of its own Effect; but all others whatsoever, or all Perfection possible, and that because its Existence is necessary and eternal, for to all manner of Perfection there accrues, at least, a Possibility of Existence. So that whatsoever Perfection is missing in the Effects of this prime Cause, cannot but exist in the Cause it self; see∣ing, as we observ'd before, all Perfection carries in it at least a Possibility of Existing, which yet it could not, unless it may exist in the Prime Cause, in case it cannot in its Effects. There is no absurdity at all in affirming, that whatsoever is a Perfection may exist; so far from that, that it is impossible to feign any Perfecti∣on wanting such a Possibility: but if it may neither exist in the Effects nor prime Cause, (sup∣posing that to be single) it is an absurdity to say that such a Possibility is essential to all Perfecti∣on▪ And although in the Effects of the prime Cause, whatsoever is possible may not be found, and indeed cannot, for they are all notoriously limited, the Extended by their Superficies, and the Unextended by the defect of their powers; and whatsoever is limited either way, must be capable of Univocal Additions; and when those are obtain'd, still of greater; so that something of Perfection will ever be wanting to them: yet in the prime Cause it self, whose Existence is necessary, all manner of Perfection must, be∣cause of its Possibility of Existence, truly and really exist; for it could not be in its own nature apt to exist, unless it had been so either from Eternity or from a certain Period of Time: now

although the Perfections of the Effects of the prime Cause are in their own Nature capable of existing only within a certain Period of time; yet whatsoever Perfection may possibly exist in the prime Cause, whose Existence is necessary, cannot but truly and really exist in it: Now all Perfection whatsoever carries with it such a Possibility; as for instance, the power of crea∣ting a new World out of nothing, or a new or∣der of Effects answerable to that already created is such a Perfection, as may possibly be in the prime Cause of those Effects already extant. But yet it could not possibly be in this prime Cause, unless co-eternal with it; seeing if it were tem∣porary, it must be only the Effect of this prime Cause, and not of the Essence of it, nor co-e∣ternal with it, unless it necessarily existed, be∣cause all Eternals exist by necessity. Neither is this to say, that what is most perfect, must therefore exist, because Existence is one of the Perfections of that most Perfect, whereas indeed it is inseparable from even the least Perfection. No, all that I contend for amounts to no more than, That in a Being of necessary Existence, and in such an one only, all Perfection possible must as necessarily exist. Not but from the considera∣tion of the nature of the Effects already in Be∣ing the Infinity of the prime Cause, is no less conspicuous, supposing it no derogation, as in∣deed it is not, from the Majesty of the prime Cause, to say, that it cannot create more kinds of Beings than what are already created. Kinds, I say, which are these, a Spirit and a Bo∣dy; and in truth it implies a mere Con∣tradiction, to say there can be more Kinds of

Beings than these; for whatsoever is, must ei∣ther be extended or not extended; if the for∣mer, 'tis a Body; if the latter, 'tis either an Intelligent Spirit, or a blind, unintelligent E∣nergy. And by these, I mean a Spirit in ge∣neral. Now more sorts of Beings than these there cannot be; and a contradiction, I say, is the Effect of supposing there can; because ad∣mitting a third Kind, it must be of such Beings as are neither extended nor unextended, which 'tis evident cannot be any Beings at all. But of these Kinds the Cause that first produc'd 'em, can, at pleasure, produce new Qualities and Numbers, since it is perfectly, and in all respects the same that it was from Eternity; it being impossible, but that whatsoever exists from E∣ternity must be immutable, because its Existence is necessary. Nay further, all Quantities or Numbers of Substances anew created, be they never so great, a Cause of Eternal Subsistence can produce in one act, because it does not ope∣rate according to the Succession of the parts of time, although to us it may seem so to do, whose comprehension is so narrow, in compari∣son of it, as not to collect any manner of Exi∣stence or Operation, but what is successive, ei∣ther from the notice of our own Existence or, Operation, or those of other Beings falling un∣der our observation. So soon as such Substan∣ces are created, they cannot, 'tis true, exist, but according to such a Succession; but the act of Creation, as it is the act of the Creator, is no more concern'd with any order of time than the Agent: So that if a thousand Worlds not yet created were to be created with respect to the

Creator, they must be created together with that World already created. All which is no other than consonant to the Principles of those many Philosophers who define Eternity a Possession at once of all Past, Present, and to Come. To be sufficient therefore to create all Substances that can be created without a Contradiction, and this at once, certainly appertains to no less than a power Infinite; for although the Quantities and Numbers of the Substances created, let them be never so great, must be Finite, yet the power of creating as many more remains in the Creator. Nor seems it any diminution of the Cre∣ator's Perfection, that the Quantities and Numbers of the Substances created must be Finite; since if they might be Infinite, they might not only rival their Cause, but oblige him to confer that upon Beings not existing from Eternity, which only accrues to Beings existing from Eternity; for nothing can be Infinite as to continuance, unless a necessary Existent; and nothing Infinite on other accounts unless Infinite as to continu∣ance, because every thing else must be the Ef∣fect of a Being of Infinite continuance, and that Effect must be less perfect than its Cause, as partaking, even of substantially and essential∣ly the same as the Cause, of but a portion of its Cause, which yet a Temporary Being cannot of an Eternal, because whatever is Eternal in such a Being, is in its own nature incommuni∣cable to a Temporary Being: and yet no Effect of an Infinite Cause can be less perfect than its Cause without being Finite, by which it ap∣pears, that to suppose the Quantities and Num∣bers of the Substances created may be Infinite,

is to suppose the Cause of them may be guilty of a most gross Absurdity and Contradiction; and not only so, but that it may likewise be mu∣table, though of necessary Existence. What I have said of Substances, holds equally of their Properties. And this argument it self might suffice to demonstrate the Infinity of each Per∣fection in the Creator, which may be found in a more imperfect degree in the things crea∣ted.

The Eternity of the All perfection, and par∣ticularly of the Omnipotence of this prime Cause being thus evinc'd, we are yet to reflect a little upon the necessity of all those Possible and Eternal Perfections being united in that one prime Cause; and here it must be remember'd, that if they are not united in the same Infinite, they must either as to one part or kind of them be Finite or Infinite: not Infinite, for what can be a bolder contradiction, than that one share of such Perfections should be Infinite, when there remains a great deal of Perfection not u∣nited to it. Finite therefore. If Finite, in some measure defective; if defective, wanting that principle, which, where ever it is found, constitutes that Being altogether perfect, viz. a necessity of existing, the want whereof must be therefore the foundation of Imperfection, be∣cause Perfection is constituted of Reality, being only a Plenitude of Existence, so as that, for in∣stance, the Perfection of a Body is no more than the real Existence of its Extension, and of what∣ever else goes to the constituting of a Body; and the Perfection of its Extension, &c. consists in its being real or positive, for nothing is further

perfect than it is positive; nor whatever com∣poses the Essences of things any otherwise con∣summate, than as those Constituents are true and genuine Existents. It cannot therefore exist necessarily, and if not necessarily, not from Eternity; whence it is clear it must be essenti∣ally united to all other possible Perfection, that is of Eternal Existence (Essentially, I say, be∣cause there can be no Union of Composition be∣tween two Beings, unless each is in its own na∣ture able to subsist by it self.) So that all Per∣fection, whose Existence is from Eternity, must be collected and essentially united in one Eter∣nal, most Perfect Cause of all other Beings whatsoever.

I know not whether I need particularly in∣sist upon any further Eviction of the Omnisci∣ence of this prime Cause, that being inclusively prov'd by the general Argument so lately hand∣led in proof of his All-perfection: but yet be∣cause this Attribute is a proper foundation for the Demonstration of his Providence, it may not be amiss to consider it in it self. So slight is the acquaintance we have with Spiritual Be∣ings of a limited nature, and much more with that of an unlimited one, that what we learn concerning them, we acquire partly by general Rules of Entities, partly from certain general Properties of the Spiritual Beings themselves. That the prime Cause must in it self have In∣telligent Faculties, there needs no other Evi∣dence than that certain Effects of it have. That part of its Productions which is call'd and known to be the Rational and Thinking, have receiv'd of it considerable Abilities in that kind.

We apprehend, we know, we think, and are admitted not only to the Contemplation of our selves and Fellow-Creatures, but even into the Sanctum Sanctorum, to the Contemplation of the prime Cause it self: yet not without great restrictions; it being the Prudence of the prime Cause to bestow but a scanty Portion of that upon its Creatures, which as it would be in them the similitude of it self, so it would tempt them to presume upon their own dignity, and consequently to be forgetfull of his. (Not to mention here the event of our first Parents Lapse.) However such a portion of Understand∣ing we can boast of as serves to signifie the Do∣nour an Intelligent Being also: and as the In∣telligent part of his Creation bespeaks him In∣telligent, so that with all the other parts of it bespeak him infinitely so, because indeed they could not have been at all, unless that which gave them their Being had thoroughly and most intimately known the Ends and Essences of them, because a Being independent, existing from E∣ternity, and therefore necessary and immutable, could not be mov'd to exert the act of Creation, unless by more than a brute Principle of Moti∣on, which Motion must either have continu'd from Eternity, and so the Effects of it have been Eternal, the Absurdity of which we have alrea∣dy refuted, or have been an arbitrary or volun∣tary Motion arising from a Principle of Intelli∣gence. Nor can it be, but that these two Prin∣ciples should operate for ends; seeing this vo∣luntary Motion could not have proceeded from the Intelligent Principle, unless the Intelligent Principle upon notice or conception (if I may

so speak) of things, found, at least, some end to urge that voluntary Motion; so that as every the least Effect of that Motion must have been for an end; so must it also have issued from an Intelligent Principle in the arbitrary Mover: whence it is evident this arbitrary Mover or Cause must have a perfect and absolute know∣ledge of all its own Effects. But here I would not be understood either to define the Intelle∣ctual Powers of the first Cause, or the Man∣ner of their Operations; when all I attempt, is to shew, that the least Effect of the prime Cause must flow from a voluntary Motion (to which although infinitely more perfect, that imperfect one of our Wills is somewhat analogous) arising from an Idea of that which is to be the Effect of that voluntary Motion, and that Idea also infinitely more perfect than any of ours. And as this arbitrary Cause cannot but have the most entire and absolute knowledge of all its own Effects, so must it be no less acquainted with whatever is possible besides, because it compre∣hends in it all such Possibilities; and whatsoe∣ver it so comprehends it must it self be consci∣ous of, seeing those Principles of Intelligence and voluntary Motion already mention'd, can∣not be, as perhaps in Inferiour and Finite Ra∣tionals, distinct from the other Faculties and Attributes, but on the same account that such Principle are asserted at large to be in the prime Cause, they must also be annex'd to what∣soever of it is found to be of eternal Existence; seeing whatsoever is found to be so, is alike in∣dependent of any foreign Impulsor as the prime Cause understood at large, alike necessary and

immutable, and accordingly a Being alike Intel∣ligent and Arbitrary.

Again, as this prime Cause is infinitely pow∣erfull and Wise, so it must be infinitely Just and Mercifull too, and that because its Effects are the Objects of its Love, as well as the Off∣spring of its power, for so long as they exist, they are certainly precious in its esteem, and not only when they were first created, but even as long as they continue in being, it cannot but repute them good. In truth, unless they were so, their All-wise Cause would fall under the imputation of acting in vain, and be oblig'd in its own Justification to annihilate the universal System, or at least such portions of it as were of no value in its sight; by which Rule, as we may be assur'd of its general Concern for all, so of that Concern's being proportionable to the particular value of each Member: so that eve∣ry such Member in its particular Station is con∣sulted, and provided for according to its Dig∣nity, the measure whereof is best to be learn'd by examining how large its capacity is of being benefited by the first Cause, for there is no∣thing more certain, than that the first All-wise Cause rather than act in vain and to no pur∣pose, will benefit it and bless it to the full mea∣sure of that Capacity: Yet not without condi∣tions too, where and so far as the Effect is qua∣lify'd for entring, or has actually enter'd into them. Wherefore in cases even of Degeneracy in such an Effect, the small remains of that Per∣fection which it receiv'd at first from its Cause, are still valu'd by its Cause, nay even when it seems good to the Cause, that its Effects should

undergo any Severities, it cannot but either com∣pensate for them afterwards, which for the rea∣sons already given, it is oblig'd to do, when conditions are observ'd; or if it consigns over the violators to a perpetual punishment (not to insist upon any other defence of its Justice therein) I know not why we may not believe that the Effects even by the Laws of their na∣ture, decline through degeneracy into such a state of Misery, and acquire such a Disposition, that upon being translated according to the or∣dinary course of things into a new Station and condition, they necessarily become miserable, part∣ly thro' those Defects which they owe to them∣selves, and partly from impressions from without, which could not affect them, if the nature of the Effect had undergone no change by its Degene∣racy. Lastly, Nothing is a more easie Demon∣stration than of the Providence of the first Cause from the certainty of its Justice and Mercy. In∣deed it is most conspicuous in every part of its great Work, wherein the whole contrivance ap∣pears so admirable, the subserviency of this to that so regular, and the distribution of proper∣ties so just, that of all Miracles, the order of Nature, which we daily behold, is certainly the greatest. Nor does there seem to be any necessity of betaking our selves to the more sim∣ple methods of Demonstration, when if we would never so fain, we cannot extricate our selves from evidences of such a Providence. And when Democritus had modell'd his Atoms, and Epicurus had, as he fansied, put them in a right way to gather into a Body, what did it avail them? They neither could be Atoms till they

were made so, nor move a point on, till the first Mover set them forward. But then what if the Beauty, Structure, and Order which en∣su'd, could not arise from any such Principles, as it is plain they could not? For supposing ne∣ver so great variety in the figures of the A∣toms, that one Species of Motion, viz. Casus declivis, could not by any means beget such a multiplicity of Forms, but only generate a so∣lid, flinty Mass; solid and flinty, I say, be∣cause no manner of concourse could so strongly compact the Atoms as that. Indeed it must have fasten'd all of them so close together that nothing could have broken so many free distinct Bodies off the Rock, but the Supervention of an Almighty Arm: nor yet could each such Frustulum have been so modify'd and temper'd as we find, unless by the same: So that the Founders and Maintainers of these Principles, instead of mending the matter, only made more work for themselves, and brought their Parti∣cles so fairly together at last, that when they should have been got asunder again, nothing but a superiour Agent, being that which they made sure of escaping, could separate them. For alas! Chance has not strength enough. If she might bring them together, she could do no more afterwards, but leave them together. Be∣sides, what is this Chance at last? So far from being a Cause, that it never can be any thing but a Coincident. For granting these Atoms fell thus together; did they chance, I beseech you, to fall together before they did fall together? And still it's all the same thing, whe∣ther these Atoms encounter in one kind of Mo∣tion

or in many; for if in many, so as that they gather into many distinct Bodies, each of those Bodies must be superlatively compact, seeing that motion, which is to bring them together, will bring them as close together, as they can be brought, when there is nothing to interpose. But what shall at last animate some of these lumps, and temper all of them? Let the Ato∣mist therefore take his choice, whether he will have one great Mass, or many little ones. But I digress too far, it being my present design not so much to confute Error as demonstrate Truth; although indeed the latter is much at one with the former, especially in the dispute before us. Yet the reigning sottishness of that opinion so star'd me in the face, while I would discourse upon the Providence of the prime Cause, that I could not handsomely forbear a rebuke, the continuation of the Effects of the prime Cause being no better accounted for by this barren, childish Hypothesis than their O∣riginal; for as they could not give themselves a Being, but must necessarily have receiv'd it from an All-perfect Cause; so (not to mention the necessity of perpetual Creation, in order to the Subsistence of such Effects, sufficiently evinc'd by others) from the nature and Attributes of this prime Cause, I think I have clearly de∣monstrated, that it certainly governs and is con∣cern'd for all, even the smallest of its Effects, and this All-perfect first Cause is GOD.

But now where appears that little half Ani∣mal the Atheist? No longer, I hope, setting up for a Philosopher, when for ought I know, the Brutes even of the slowest apprehension may

claim Pre-eminence in the Schools before him: The Brutes, whose every motion betrays a con∣sciousness of a Truth, which nothing but the darkest blindness of Soul can escape. The Brain must be clouded thick on all sides, or so dazling a Lustre could not but strike it. Is this then the penetrating Man? the subtile in∣ventive, Verè adeptus? a Prodigy in good ear∣nest! if he could raise Effects without Causes, and begin to build his Houses from the Tiles. But alas! there is not one Phaenomenon in all nature to be so much as plausibly interpreted, but upon the confidence of a first Cause. Those Accounts of Meteors which we have receiv'd, are perhaps the fairest and easiest on all hands of any other Physical Notices, whether we con∣sult Cartes, Gassendus, Aristotle, or the Stoicks, (Comets only excepted) and yet no Vapours could be so much as exhal'd, or any condens'd or rarefy'd, but by the interposition of the first Cause; for if transmutations analogous to those in the Alembicks of our Vertuosi require such peculiar and most exquisite Instruments; how much rather do they require an Omnipotent Author and Cause to give an Efficacy to these Instruments? And indeed the first blunder of the Atheistical Philosopher has ever been his mi∣staking Instruments for Efficient Causes; for not discerning the difference between that which acts only necessarily, and that which acts arbi∣trarily, the poor Beetles have all along excluded a Deity by confounding the first with the lat∣ter. Yet there's the mischief of it, these Peo∣ple cannot but be lost to all sound Reason and Sense, before they straggle into such unaccoun∣table

delirious Notions; and how is it possible to correct Error, when instead of any Candour and Judgment, you have nothing to treat with but obstinate Conceitedness, profound Igno∣rance, and desperate Indocility.