A defence and continuation of the ecclesiastical politie by way of letter to a friend in London : together with a letter from the author of The friendly debate.

CHAP. III.

The Contents.

VArious Instances of our Authors pitiful and disingenuous way of Cavilling. His Arts of darkning and perplexing the plain design of my Discourse, in sundry notorious particu∣lars. A brief and plain Account of the Parts, Coherence and Design of the former Treatise, to prevent all future Mistakes and Pervert∣ings. My state of the Controversie provides against the Inconveniences of both Extreams, an unlimited Power on one hand, and an un∣bounded Licence on the other. The bounds it sets to the Power of the Civil Magistrate, are easie to be observed, and unnecessary to be transgrest, viz. That Governours take care not to impose things apparently evil, and that Subjects be not allowed to plead Conscience for disobedience in any other case. The Duty of Obedience surmounts the Obligation of Doubts and Scruples, and in doubtful cases obliges to

Action. 'Tis impossible to prevent all man∣ner of Inconveniences that may follow upon any Hypothesis of Government. My mid∣dle way lyable to the fewest, and therefore most eligible. The bare pretence of a tender Conscience against the Commands of Autho∣rity, is an impregnable Principle of Sedition. A cluster of our Author's shameless Falsifi∣cations. His forgery of my ascribing to the Civil Magistrate an universal and immediate Power over Conscience. His impudent shuff∣ling in applying what was affirm'd of a doubt∣ful Conscience in particular, to Conscience in general. Another instance of this in apply∣ing what was affirm'd of the Rituals and Ex∣ternal Circumstances of Worship, to the Prin∣ciples of Faith, and Fundamentals of Religion. His change of the state of the Question, viz. Not whether Magistrates have any Power o∣ver Conscience, but whether I have asserted it to be absolute and immediate. Some short Glances upon some lesser Impertinencies.

§. 1. HEre his first Attempt is, to spit his Gloom, and cast darkness and ambi∣guity over the design of my Discourse: How has he bestirred himself to raise Mists upon my clearest and most perspicuous Expres∣sions?

And what Clouds of Words has he pour'd forth to involve the Evidence of my Arguments, and the plainness of my Method? How dexterously does he cull out a single Proposition to oppose to the scope and plain meaning of the coherent Discourse? And when he has got the poor, naked and defenceless Thing alone, how unmercifully does he turn and tease it into a thousand postures? and how wantonly does he tire himself with insult∣ing over the feebleness of its supposed Escapes and Subterfuges? But to give you some particular Instances of this wo∣ful way of trifling.

In the first place, he quarrels my first Paragraph as obscure and ambiguous. Why! because it gives not any Definiti∣on of the Nature of Conscience, nor any Account of the Bounds of its Liberty, nor determines divers other great and weigh∣ty Difficulties relating to the present En∣quiry. What a monstrous fault is this! Not to couch the sense of three hundred Pages in one single Section; and what a fatal Misadventure, not to decide a per∣plexed Controversie before 'tis fairly pro∣posed? Pray, Sir, by what Rules of Art am I bound to determine the Right of the Cause, when I onely undertake to repre∣sent

the Pleas and Pretences of the diffe∣rent Parties? If I have not accurately enough described the Competition be∣tween the Liberties of Conscience, and the Prerogatives of Princes, (which is the onely thing I pretended to attempt in that Paragraph) let him cavil at that: but if I have, it seems but an untoward humour to quarrel me for not crowding the Dis∣course of my whole Book into the com∣pass of the Contents of one Chapter. But Men, resolved to be peevish, are ne∣ver to seek for Grounds of Contention. Of the same nature, and to as wise pur∣pose is his Cavil at my first Proposition, viz. That 'tis absolutely necessary to the Peace and Government of the World, that the Supreme Magistrate of every Commonwealth should be vested with a Power to Govern and Conduct the Con∣sciences of Subjects in Affairs of Religion. And though I have at large proved this Assertion from that Powerful Influence that Religion has upon the Peace of King∣doms, and the Interests of Government; yet as for Proofs, he always scorns them, as neither pertinent to his purpose, nor worthy his Cognizance: 'Tis below his State to answer Arguments, he can bear them down with scorn and confidence;

'tis the Work of his Generation to establish final Determinations of Controversies, and he was born to put an everlasting Period to all Disputes and Scholastick Brawls. And therefore having first pour'd forth above two Pages full of positive and rambling talk upon this occasion, with what severity does he afterward school me for so crude and unlearned an Asser∣tion? For who (says he) understands what are the Affairs of Religion here intended, all or some? What are the Consciences of Men? what it is to govern and conduct them? &c. What a strangely nice and delicate Confessor have I, that will not allow me the Liber∣ty to use any known and vulgar Word, till I have first defined it with solid and Scholastick exactness? Methinks 'tis somewhat too severe this, a Man had bet∣ter hold his peace than be put to this pe∣nance for every word he speaks. But the plain truth is, I thought (simple as I am) every Swain that understands but Coun∣try English, could not be ignorant of the literal meaning of those terms, Affairs of Religion, Conscience, Government, &c. and therefore I did not dream it was necessa∣ry for avoiding ambiguity, to guard eve∣ry common Expression with rigorous and Logical Definitions. But yet what if

after all this, I have distinctly accounted for these things, and set restraints upon their signification, as far as it might con∣cern the matters of my Enquiry? What if I have expresly declared what affairs of Religion they are that are subject to the Government of the Supreme Magistrate, viz. not all, but some, i. e. matters of out∣ward Worship, and that are not in them∣selves apparently or essentially evil? What then can be the importance of this mighty Cavil? Nothing but this, that I am a crude and unskilful Writer, be∣cause I have not been so happy as to couch the whole state of an intricate Controversie, nor to clear off all Diffi∣culties and Objections relating to it, in the compass of five Lines. And if this be a Miscarrriage, yet my Adversary has not stuff't his Words so full with Sense and Notion, that he should object it as a defect to any Man for not being able to reduce the sense of an ordinary Volume into one single Proposition: other Men have more Cry then Wool, as well as my self. And yet he is so unmerciful and un∣reasonable as to expose my Title Page for not expressing my particular Determina∣tions of the whole Matter in Debate; and often produces that as a shameful in∣stance

of my loose way of stating Contro∣versies. But this Man would snarl at the Title of the New Testament, because it contains not every particular Story re∣corded in the four Gospels; I am sure he might do it with as just reason, as urge the Title of my Book for proof that I have not distinctly enough represented my particular Thoughts and Conceptions of the whole matter under debate. Did e∣ver Man burthen the Press with such slen∣der stuff, or present the World with such pitiful entertainment? And yet he has vast stores of this Ammunition; and he never charges upon me with more fierce∣ness then when he shoots these Paper-Pellets.

§. 2. Thus you find him in the same Page ratling my carelesness for calling Con∣science sometimes every Mans Opinion, some∣times an Imperious Faculty, which surely are not the same. Though I might with warrant from good Authorities have stiled it a Domestick God, a Guardian Angel, the Mirrour of the Divinity, the Law of the Mind, the Practical Understanding, the Repository of Moral Principles, a Book and a Table, with innumerable other Ap∣pellations, given to it as it bears Analogy

and Resemblance to other Beings; all which Names may agree to Conscience as vastly as they disagree among them∣selves; and it is a very little proportion of likeness that you will find between a God and a Book, and yet Conscience is both. But however, I discoursed not of this important matter in such fanciful and allusive Expressions, and kept my self close to the rigour and propriety of Scho∣lastick Terms; and so I might warrantably call it both an Opinion and a Faculty, upon the account of its several Accepta∣tions: For every Novice (that has seen but a Dutch Systeme of Divinity) knows, that 'tis sometime taken for the Faculty of the Practical Understanding, sometime for an habitual Recourse to its Practical Principles, and sometime for a single A∣ction and Exercise of Conscience; from which variety of Apprehension, it is not onely capable, but necessary to be cloath∣ed with as great variety of Expression; and though a Faculty and an Opinion are not the same thing, yet Conscience is both: And therefore I doubt not but I may often have promiscuously sign'd it with these and other different Titles, without any uncertainty of signification, according as the design of my Discourse

might demand, and its Coherence may justifie; though where I have, as I am not able to remember, so neither is our Author pleased to direct us. But his cu∣stom is to except against any thing, upon what account soever it is spoken, as if it were intended for a scrupulous and exact Definition. Whereas there are innu∣merable other Reasons and occasions of Speech, that must be expressed in as diffe∣rent Schemes and Contextures of Lan∣guage; though had I undertaken to de∣fine the signification of Conscience, I might safely have called it either an Act or an Habit, or a Faculty; and yet he will never discover any such uncertain Expressions in any thing that pretends to the Office of a Definition. And I re∣member when I call Conscience an Impe∣rious Faculty, 'tis by way of Irony, when Subjects make bold to infringe the Rights of Sovereign Princes under its pretence and protection.

The next following words are not so near in their Neighbourhood to these, as in their Kindred; 'tis a Cavil of the same Breed and Family, viz. That I sometimes plead for the uncontroulable Power of Magi∣strates over Religion and the Consciences of Men, sometimes assert their Ecclesiastical Iu∣risdiction

as the same thing; whereas (he sup∣poses) no Man ever yet defined Ecclesiastical Iurisdiction to be an uncontroulable Power over Religion and the Consciences of Men. Nei∣ther yet do I: What! Can I not use the Terms of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and uncontroulable Power, but one must im∣mediately be thought a Definition of the other? Though Ecclesiastical Jurisdi∣ction may be an uncontroulable Power, yet it may not so properly be defined by it, because it may have more necessary and more material Attributes, whereby its Nature may be more distinctly under∣stood. Our Author often tells us, that my way of Discourse agrees not with that way of Logick in which he has been in∣structed: I would advise him therefore to acquaint himself with the Philosophy of the five Predicables, that will quickly in∣form him, that all the ways of Predica∣tion are not primary and essential, and consequently that 'tis not impossible but that one thing may (as they word it) be affirmed of another, without being an in∣separable Ingredient of its specifick Con∣stitution. Did I ever dream (dull Beast as I am) that when I asserted and proved the Power of the Supreme Magistrate o∣ver Affairs of Religion to be uncontroul∣able,

as exclusive of an Ecclesiastical Ju∣risdiction, distinct from the Civil, (for those words were spoken particularly up∣on that occasion, and to that purpose) that I should be called to so hard an account for crude and ill-contrived Definitions? I presumed a Man might assert an Ortho∣dox Proposition without being thought to define the precise Notion of the thing asserted. Alas! I did but vindicate his Majesties Supremacy against the En∣croachments of the Pope and the Pres∣bytery, that would usurp a Dominion o∣ver Princes, by instating themselves in an Ecclesiastical Soveraignty. If I have not made good my Argument, let him not spare it; if I have, I hope it is no disparagement to a good Argument that 'tis no good Definition. I have some∣times at Idle Hours (the time when this Man writes Books) recreated my self with observing the Impertinencies of tri∣fling Scriblers, but cannot remember that ever I met with such slight and horrid stuff as this. And seriously these Ex∣ceptions are so frivolous and unconceive∣ably thin, that I cannot fancy any thing either in Art or Nature that more ap∣proaches the Notion of Superficies dis∣join'd from Body. And yet we are not

arrived at the end of these poor and beg∣garly stratagems, we have divers others as miserable & slender shifts to impose upon the ignorance and credulity of the Multi∣tude. And to this purpose are distant and remote Propositions hudled together, and represented as if they related to the same matter, and had been spoken upon the same occasion. Nay, he spares not to accuse me of contradictory Assertions, because some of my Answers deny what was affirmed in some of my Objections. Thus out of my first Section he picks this Sentence, Conscience is subject and accountable to God alone, and it owns no Superiour but the Lord of Consciences. And then this he matches with another, cull'd out of my second Section, That those who make it ac∣countable to none but God alone, do in effect u∣surp their Princes Crown, defie his Authority, and acknowledge no Governour but themselves. This last Assertion I there made good by clear and undeniable evidence: but Ar∣guments are too hot for our Authors Fin∣gers, and therefore in stead of handling them, he onely blows upon Assertions; and in lieu of discrediting the truth of this Proposition, by defeating the evi∣dence of its proof, he onely attempts to expose its silliness, by representing its

gross inconsistency with the words im∣mediately foregoing. And is it not a shameful Incongruity, that my Reply should contradict my Objection? And yet that is the plain state of the Case: for if you look no farther than the bare Contents of the Chapter, you will find that the scope of the first Paragraph is to represent the Competition between the Power of Princes, and the Consciences of Subjects; where I more particularly aim∣ed to set off its Pleas and Pretences for its Exemption from Soveraign Authori∣ty; and then in the next Paragraph, I endeavoured in answer to the former Plea, to display the horrid Mischiefs that must unavoidably follow upon the admit∣tance of these Pretences for the absolute Exemption of Conscience from the Juris∣diction of the Supreme Power. And now what a prodigious inconsistency is this, that my Answers should grapple with my Objections, and that Ob. and Sol. should run a tilt at one another? And when I had shewn the danger of what had been urged in the Exception, by its di∣rect tendency to the Dissolution of Go∣vernment, what a strange Affront must it be to my own Teeth, to retort upon my supposed Adversary with an Infe∣rence

contradictory to his Objection? Certainly never was any Man before me upbraided with this sort of Contradicti∣ons. And if this be to speak Daggers, how heavy will the Charge fall upon all the Professors of Controversial skill?

§. 3. Another Impeachment near a∣kin to this, you may meet with Pag. 86. where 'tis charged upon me as a notorious Barbarism, that I should affirm the Supreme Magistrate may oblige his Subjects Consciences under Penalties, and yet punisheth none for their Crime, but for the Example of others. A grave and profound Nothing this! For where lies the Inconsistency between these two Propositions? Are not all Pe∣nalties both threatned and inflicted pure∣ly as Inducements to Obedience? and are they not indifferently serviceable to that end, whether they are design'd to deter the Person himself by his own Ex∣perience, or any other by his Example from the like Practices? Temporal In∣flictions are but accessional strengths to the Obligations of Conscience, that Men may be concern'd to avoid the Punish∣ment as well as the Crime; and there∣fore though it be punishable to affright o∣thers from the same Enormities, what

hinders but that Men may be obliged in Conscience to forbear them under the Sanction of an higher Penalty? The pure Reason of all Humane Punishments, is nothing but the Publick Interest; and therefore their measure is ever proporti∣on'd to the influence that the Crimes have upon the Concerns of the Commu∣nity: and Malefactors are executed, not to revenge their Injuries, but to prevent those Mischiefs the Publick would sustain by their Impunity. And if this be any reason why Humane Laws should not pass any Obligation upon the Conscience, be∣cause their Penalties are inflicted for▪ the sake of others, then no Capital Laws can ever bind the Conscience, because all Capital Inflictions neither have nor can have any other end but what relates to o∣thers. What else can this Man design by such crude and blundring Cavils, but meerly to amuse, or (what is the same with them) satisfie the People? They run over these Lines; and because they cannot find where the Crisis of the Excep∣tion lies, they pass it by for a deep and Scholastick Subtilty: Though all the My∣stery lies in the palpable folly; and the onely difficulty that amazes the common Reader, is its having none at all.

This was an Essay of his Skill, but his next attempt is a proof of his Courage: for it is no doubt an Heroick Act of Bold∣ness, to dare to impose upon the Publick with meer and ungrounded Forgeries; and such is that Assertion he would fasten upon me, as a further proof of the incon∣sistency of my Thoughts, viz. That I confine the whole Work and Duty of Conscience to the inward Thoughts and Perswasions of the Mind. This in down-right English is a shameless Lye. Sir, you must pardon my rudeness; for I will assure you, after long meditation, I could not devise a more pertinent Answer to so bold an one as this: I confess 'tis no extraordinary conceit, but 'tis the best Repartee my bar∣ren Fancy was able to suggest to me upon so rude an occasion. Suppose it were your own case, that you could be so ill-advised as to print Books, should any Person be so bold and disingenuous as not onely to pervert your meaning, and disturb your method, but (what is base without allay) fasten upon you Assertions equally false and wicked, without any reference to Page or Section, and without any imagi∣nable foundation of his mistake; what other return would you vouchsafe to make to such an unmannerly attempt,

than what I have made? Meer Calumny as it deserves no more serious Resentment than utter neglect, so it is capable of no more civil Confutation than flat denial. I could take occasion from this falshood to add some Reflections of another Na∣ture; but it is so utterly groundless that it needs, and so grosly disingenuous that it deserves, no other Baffle but pure dis∣dain. Perhaps a Scotch-man would only have told him, (as the Bishop of Derry tells a Man of as lavish a Pen as my Au∣thor) that he is very good Company; but I am a blunt English-man, and hate a Lye as I do Idolatry or Witchcraft; and there∣fore you must pardon my plainness if I call a Fable a Fable. Now beside this Argument drawn from a Topick so vile, that you see I am almost ashamed to name it, the sum of all the other Exceptions a∣mounts to this; That I do not define when I argue, nor distinctly state my own Determinations when I remonstrate to o∣ther Mens: That I do not propound and solve Difficulties in the same Words, and that my Answers contradict my Objecti∣ons: That every Paragraph does not dis∣charge the Undertaking of my whole Book: That the Reasonings of each Chapter are not fully and distinctly ex∣press't

in its short and general Contents; and that all the particular Notions and Determinations of the Discourse, are not comprized in the Title-Page: In brief, that I have fail'd of the Glory to dispatch all Difficulties and decide all Controversies in one breath. Woful Misadventures these! It were easie to present you with vast heaps of Instances to the same purpose; but I have neither leisure nor patience to reckon up more particularities (to spare harder Expressi∣ons) of his folly. 'Tis enough that his whole Book is nothing but a Treasury of Cavils; and that he draws his Argu∣ments not from any Principles of sincere Reason, but from the Topicks of prating and vulgar Talk. You cannot dip into a Page, but you will light upon some such lank and windy Exceptions, as I have a∣bove recited; and yet I must not stay to glance at them, they are so innumerable: these that I have already represented, lay first in my way, and in the very entrance, and upon the very threshold of his Book, and they may suffice for a short Specimen of that singular Logick he pretends to. And if the Reader will be at the pains (as I fear he will not) to compare his Ca∣vils with my Replys, that will infinitely

satisfie him of the impertinency of this Mans way of scribling: but if he will not, I shall be ashamed of entertaining him so long with such poor and unedify∣ing Remarks. And therefore I shall not waste more time in pursuing such slender Trifles, but shall rather, to prevent him hereafter from abusing the People with these and the like mean Artifices, set down a short Model of the Parts, the Co∣herence & the Design of my former Trea∣tise: for few vulgar Readers (I perceive) have either Patience or Ability to carry along with them the Method and Con∣nexion of a large Discourse.

§. 4. In the first place then, I begun with a more general account of the abso∣lute necessity of investing Soveraign Prin∣ces with an Ecclesiastical Power and Ju∣risdiction over the Consciences of Men in Matters of Religion; and this I pro∣ved at large, by representing what migh∣ty and powerful influence it casts upon all the most important Ends and Interests of Government; so that to exempt its due Conduct and Management from the Au∣thority of the Supreme Civil Power, is apparently to strip it of its greatest securi∣ty, to disable it from a right discharge of

its Office and Jurisdiction, and to expose the Publick Setlement to the Whimsies and Exorbitances of every crazy Zealot. And having laid this large Foundation upon the firmest Principles of Reason, and the most undeniable Experience of Mankind; I proceeded in the next place to erect a more particular Hypothesis of the Nature and Extent of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction: where I run a Parallel be∣tween the Affairs immediately relating to Religious Worship, and the Duties and Offices of Morality; proving Moral Vertues to be more material Parts of Re∣ligion than any outward Expressions of Worship whatsoever. And from hence I thought it but a very modest and rea∣sonable Demand, That Men would but yield to allow to Supreme Power the same Authority and Dominion over the Means and subordinate Instruments of Religion, as they are ready enough to ascribe to it over its more important Ends and De∣signs; and so agree to set the same Bounds and Measures to both Jurisdictions. And now having reduced them to this Equa∣lity of Power, I advanced to a more par∣ticular state of the whole Controversie, by shewing to what Affairs in both kinds the Exercise of all Humane Authority is

extended, where it is limited, and in what cases it is restrained. And here I first exempted all the inward Actions of the Mind, from the Cognizance and Jurisdi∣ction of all Humane Authority; and with∣al, shewed how the substantial part of Re∣ligious Worship is performed within, and so is in its own Nature beyond the reach of the Civil Magistrate; and how all Expressions of External Worship, as such, are no Essential Parts of Religion, and therefore that he is not in any capacity of doing direct and immediate Violence to Religion it self. The Controversie be∣ing thus stated, as to the inward Actions of the Mind, the next Enquiry is con∣cerning outward Practices; and they are of two sorts, either such as are apparent∣ly and antecedently evil, and these are a∣bove the reach, and beyond the Obliga∣tion of all Humane Laws; their Mora∣lity is already so determined, that no Humane Power can alter their Nature, or rescind their Obligation; but every thing forbidden becomes an intrinsecal and un∣alterable Sin, and every thing command∣ed an eternal and unchangeable Duty. Or else they are such as still remain in the state of indifferency, and are left unde∣termined as to their Morality, either by

any certain Law of Nature, or any clear positive Law of God; and these are lia∣ble to the Commands and Determinati∣ons of Supreme Authority, and are the proper Objects of Humane Laws, in that there is no other restraint set to the extent of their Jurisdiction, but the Counter∣mand of a Superiour Power; and there∣fore whatsoever Matters are left at Li∣berty by the Divine Law, must be sup∣posed determinable either way by the Commands of Soveraign Authority. These are the most distinct Rules of Con∣science in this Enquiry, in reference to the Nature of the Actions themselves: But besides these, there are other accessi∣onal Reasons of Good and Evil, that a∣rise from the apprehensions of the Minds of Men concerning them; and they also are of two sorts; either such as relate to the Conceptions of other Men, which may in some cases lay a restraint upon our Practices, as in cases of meer scandal, and this by some is pretended to excuse their disobedience to the Churches Con∣stitutions; and therefore I have distinct∣ly examined the Nature and the Reason∣ableness of this Pretence, and shewn how the Commands of Authority abolish all the Pretences, and supersede all the Ob∣ligations

of scandal. Or else they are such as relate to a Mans own apprehensi∣ons, and this takes in the pretence of a doubtful and unsatisfied Conscience, which is so zealously pleaded by most of our Separatists in justification of their Schism; and therefore because I deem'd it was of more close and immediate Con∣cernment to our present Affairs, I have with greater exactness examined and sta∣ted the Obligatory Power of a weak and a tender Conscience, and have largely proved the manifest absurdity of pleading Doubts and Scruples in opposition to the Commands of Authority; and shewn that nothing can or ought to check with our Obligations to Obedience, unless it cross with Matters of certain and appa∣rent Duty; and that all cases capable of Doubt and Uncertainty, cannot be sup∣posed of importance enough to weigh a∣gainst the great Sin and Mischief of Dis∣obedience: So that the Result of my whole Discourse will at last run it self into this plain and easie Proposition, That Obedience is indispensably due to all the Commands of Supreme Authority that are not certainly and apparently sin∣ful.

And now tell me how I could have

drawn up the state of this Controversie in a plainer or more familiar Method? For the Propositions, you see, are distinct and comprehensive, they take in all the par∣ticular Actions and Affairs of Humane Life; and I cannot think of any imagi∣nable Difficulty or Objection relating to the present matter in debate, that does not apparently fall in under one of the forementioned Heads of Action. Or how I could better have avoided the Inconve∣niences of both extreams, and which way else I might have determined the matter by such easie and moderate Principles, as may fairly satisfie all Mens Consciences that are ingenuous, and condemn all that are not.

§. 5. For (1.) to vest the Supreme Ma∣gistrate in an unlimited and unaccount∣able Power, is clearly to defeat the Effi∣cacy and Obligatory Force of all his Laws, that cannot possibly have any binding Vertue upon the Minds of Men, when they have no other inducement to Obedience than barely to avoid the Pe∣nalty. But if the Supreme Power be ab∣solute and unlimited, it does for that ve∣ry Reason remove and evacuate all other Obligations; for otherwise it is restrained

and conditional; and if Men lie under no other Impulsive than that of the Law it self, they lie under no Obligation than that of Prudence and Self-interest; and it remains entirely at the choice of their own discretion, whether they shall or shall not obey, and then there is neither Go∣vernment nor Obligation to Obedience; and the Principle of Mens Complyance with the Mind of Superiours, is not the Declaration of their will and pleasure, but purely the Determination of their own Judgments. And therefore 'tis ne∣cessary for the security of Government, (though for nothing else) to set bounds to its Jurisdiction; otherwise like the Roman Empire it sinks and dissolves by its own weight, no Humane Power is a∣ble to support it self, and the Thrones of Princes are establish't upon the Dominion of God; remove his Authority, and the force derived upon their Laws by vertue of his Commands, and you untie all the Bands of Government, and set Men at Liberty from all Obligations to the Duty of Obedience.

Or else (2.) to grant Subjects a law∣less and uncontroulable Liberty in all matters and pretences of Religion, is to dissolve one half of the Government in∣to

to perfect Anarchy, and yield up the Con∣stitution of all Publick Affairs to the Hu∣mour and the Insolence of every wild En∣thusiast; and every pert Fellow that can abuse either himself or others with Fa∣natick Whimsies, has it always in his own power to expose the setled frame of Government to the zealous folly of the Multitude. If he have but a warm Brain and a bold Face, with what ease may he fire the Rabble into Tumults and Godly Seditions? 'Tis but pouring forth dark Prophesies, and Scripture-Allegories, and declaiming against the Oppression of Earthly Powers, and then with what eagerness will the Capricious People flow into Cabals of Zeal, and Musters of Re∣formation? What Maxime in Policy is so fully ratified by the Histories of all Nations, as that there is nothing equal∣ly dangerous to the Publick Tranquil∣lity with the Zeal of the Multitude? and 'tis not easie to determine, whether Mankind have smarted more deeply by the Ambition of Tyrants, or the Impo∣stures of Religion. However, 'tis suffi∣ciently verified by the experience of A∣ges, that there is not any Passion so inci∣dent to Humane Nature as Popular Zeal, nor any Madness so ungovernable as that

of Religion; and therefore what can more become or import the Wisdom of Governours, than to keep a watchful eye upon all its designs and pretences. But these things I have already represented in smarter and more elaborate Periods, and therefore I will forbear to abate their e∣vidence by these crude and hasty Sugge∣stions. But onely supposing it is not im∣possible (what our Author has not gain-said, nor indeed can, without out-facing the experience of Mankind) but that the Factions and Hypocrisies of Religion may create Publick Disturbances, the dedu∣ction is easie and natural, that to grant it a total exemption from the Soveraign Authority, is at all times to expose the Commonwealth to great Disorders, and oftentimes to unavoidable Dissolution.

And therefore seeing an unbounded Li∣cence on one hand, and an unlimited Power on the other, are so pregnant with Mischiefs and intolerable Inconveniences, the onely proper Determination that this Enquiry is capable of, is to assign the just extent of a limited Jurisdiction, and to state as distinctly as the Nature of the thing debated will admit, how far, in what cases, and over what matters it may be safely exercised, and within what Li∣mits

it ought to be restrained; and he that prescribes the most useful and pra∣cticable Measures, makes the fairest Es∣say at the Decision and Atonement of this Controversie. This was the At∣tempt, whatever was the Success of my Discourse: and to say nothing of some more particular Rules and Directions, the two great Lines wherein I have enclosed all matters of Humane Laws, are of such a wide and comprehensive extent, that in the midst of all the variety and intricacy of Humane Affairs, 'tis both easie to dis∣cern their lawful Bounds, and unneces∣sary to transgress them. For (1.) let Authority beware of imposing things certainly and apparently evil, and then there is no danger of their doing any vi∣olence to the Consciences of peaceable and sober Men, or of their suffering any disturbance from them: For the proper Office of Humane Power, is to consult the Peace and Interest of Humane Socie∣ty; and the only immediate use of Pub∣lick Laws, is to secure and provide for the Publick Good. 'Tis no part of their Concernment to institute Rules of Moral Good and Evil; that is the Care and the Prerogative of a Superiour Lawgiver; and therefore provided they do not cross

with the express Declaration of his indis∣pensable Will and Pleasure, all other matters fall within the Verge of their Legislative Power: For as nothing that carries with it an antecedent Irregula∣rity, can ever be supposed either necessa∣ry or advantageous to the Publick Good, and therefore may without any danger of impairing the strength of its Power be lopt off from the Rights of Soveraign Ju∣risdiction; so also many things left alto∣gether indifferent and uncommanded by the Law of God, may in all the various postures and turns and circumstances of Humane Affairs, prove sometimes bene∣ficial, and sometimes pernicious to the Commonwealth; and therefore the Su∣preme Magistrate being appointed the Supreme Judge of the Publick Good, there is no remedy but they must fall under the Guidance of his Laws, and Conduct of his Government. Now 'tis very easie for Christian Princes to move within so fair a compass; and if any go beyond it, as it is not for their Advan∣tage, so it is not of our Concernment: For that Man must talk after a wild rate, that should pretend to discover an evi∣dent Opposition in any of the Laws of our Kingdom, to the plain and indispen∣sable

Duties of the Gospel: or if they will be so precipitate as to pretend this, we are very well content to devolve the issue of the Controversie upon that Un∣dertaking; and then are they brought under an engagement to prove a certain and undeniable repugnancy between the Laws of our Church, and the Laws of God; and to suspend their disobedience to them, till they can warrant its neces∣sity by some plain and express Text of Scripture: And if they will but perse∣vere in Conformity, till they are indeed able thoroughly and satisfactorily to con∣vince themselves of its evident unlaw∣fulness, that would for ever prevent all thoughts and attempts of Separation. And this crosses me over to the opposite Bound of this Enquiry, from the Power of the Magistrate to the Duty of the Sub∣ject, Viz. That they would not scruple or deny Obedience to the Commands of lawful Superiours, till they are sincerely (not in pretence onely) convinced of the certain and apparent unlawfulness of the Command.

§. 6. And if we stop not the Subjects Liberty to remonstrate to the Commands of Authority at this Principle, we shall

be for ever at an utter loss to set any cer∣tain Bounds to the just and allowable Pre∣tensions of Conscience: For if they will not consent to have their Pleas of Ex∣emption confined within the certain and evident Measures of Good and Evil, but desire to be excused as to all other Pre∣texts and Perswasions of Conscience, howsoever doubtful and uncertain; then must every Conceit that may either be mistaken or pretended for a Conviction of Conscience, be permitted to over-rule all the Power, and baffle all the Wisdom of Government: For be it never so wild or so extravagant, if they are strongly or seriously possest with the Phantasm, that and onely that shall ever exercise any Au∣thority over their Thoughts and Actions; and if Magistrates shall in any case think good to curb its heats and exorbitances, they offer violence to the sacred and in∣dispensable Obligations of Conscience; and this unavoidably exposes the Peace of Kingdoms to all the Follies of Zeal, and Impostures of Enthusiasm, and pro∣stitutes the Power of Princes to the stub∣bornness and insolence of Popular Folly. Every one that is timorous or melancho∣ly, that has an indisposed Body, or a trou∣bled Mind; that wants Sleep, or wants

Company; that has an hard Spleen, or a soft Head; that has a strong Fancy, or a weak Judgment; a bold Ignorance, or a conceited Knowledge; an impertinent Opinion, or a restless Humour; a Whim∣sie in the Crown, or a Vapour in the Hy∣pocondria, may upon that account exempt himself from all the Authority of the Laws, and all the Obligations of Obedi∣ence: For you know what a vulgar Phae∣nomenon it is for these and the like ef∣fects of folly and weakness, to abuse the Consciences of well-meaning Men into Scruple and Irresolution; and therefore if every Man that has or (what is the same thing in reference to Government) can pretend to tenderness and want of sa∣tisfaction, shall be allowed to plead Ex∣emption from the Duty of Obedience to the will of his lawful Superiours, there will be no avoiding the Co••sequence, at least as to the practice of the World, but that all the Power and Wisdom of Au∣thority must submit to the Follies, Passi∣ons and Extravagances of the Multitude; and howsoever Men may wind themselves up and down in Mazes of endless Nice∣ties and Distinctions, they will never clear themselves from the unavoidable e∣vent of Anarchy and Confusion, as long

as they promiscuously admit the Pretensi∣ons of an unsatisfied Conscience; and yet that they will be forced to do, if they stop not at the plain, the easie and the discernable Measures of Duty; and therefore Men must not be allowed to ex∣cuse themselves from the Authority of Humane Laws upon slender grounds and weak surmises, nor conclude the matter of the Law to be antecedently unlawful, unless it be certainly and apparently so. And this will farther appear highly rea∣sonable from the Nature of Gods Laws, that are always plain and easie; and the Nature of the Matters about which they are employed, that are always of a great and evident necessity: so that things re∣ally liable to doubt and disputation, are not of importance enough to be reckoned in the number of indispensable Duties; and unless they are clearly and apparently evil, that is an unquestionable evidence that they are not intrinsecally so: the perspicuity of the Law, and the impor∣tance of the Duty, are to an ingenuous Mind uncapable of doubt and uncertain∣ty; and therefore where there appears no certain and express Repugnancy to the Law of God, that is presumption enough to satisfie any sober and peaceable Man in their lawfulness.

§. 7. But that which is most material to the Determination of Conscience in this Enquiry, is this, That there is no Rule of Life and Manners more express and unavoidable, nor any Duty in the Gospel enjoined in more positive Terms, and under more severe Penalties, than this of Obedience to the Commands of Su∣preme Authority; and God has tied all their just Laws upon our Consciences, by vertue of his own Authority, and under pain of his own displeasure; and as Men would acquit themselves in their Obedi∣ence to his Laws, they are bound under the same Sanctions to acquit themselves in their Obedience to theirs. And now upon this Principle no truly upright and conscientious Man will ever go about to riggle himself out of his Duty to his law∣ful Superiours, out of any regard to any Law of God, when he is not as clearly and abundantly satisfied of the certainty and necessity of its Obligation: Nay, he can∣not with safety and without violence to his own Conscience remonstrate to the Commands of lawful Authority, unless upon Reasons more bright and forcible than the express words of St. Paul, It is ne∣cessary that ye be subject, not onely for wrath,

but also for Conscience sake. And if Men would (as they ought) suspend their Scruples and Exceptions till they can make it out to themselves that they are as certain, as necessary, and as universal Duties of Religion as Obedience to the Commands of lawful Superiours, we could not desire a more effectual Bar to all our Schisms and Distractions: For none of the matters of our difference can either pretend to, or are indeed capable of equal evidence with this express Pro∣position of the blessed Apostle; and there∣fore if they would stand firm and loyal to this Doctrine, till they can produce more clear and convincing Scriptures to vouch their own singular Conceits, that must for ever stifle all former Quarrels, and pre∣vent all farther Dissentions. v.g. Where∣as our Author is required by his lawful Superiours to use the Sign of the Cross in the Sacrament of Baptism, he puts in his Exception against the lawfulness of the Command, in that it enjoins a Symboli∣cal Ceremony; and every Symbolical Ce∣remony is of the Nature of a Sacrament; and no Sacrament can or ought to be in∣stituted but by Divine Authority; and therefore for any Humane Power to esta∣blish new Symbolical Ceremonies, is to

invade Gods own peculiar Royalty and Jurisdiction. In which Cavil are invol∣ved a great number of dark, uncertain, and perhaps indeterminable Enquiries: yet however, to keep to the main pre∣tence, let him but conform to this Injun∣ction, till he can alledge any Text of Scripture that affirms in as clear and dog∣matical words, that every Symbolical Ceremony is of the Nature of a Sacra∣ment, as are those of St. Peter, Be ye sub∣ject to every Ordinance of Man for the Lords sake. And then we shall neither need nor desire any farther security to prevent his defection from the establish't Discipline of the Church in that Affair: So that if Men would learn to be peaceable and in∣genuous, this plain and obvious Principle would either forestal or supersede all their scruples. And in truth the Commands of Authority so much surmount their Obligation, and anticipate their Pre∣tence, that the very Plea of a tender and unsatisfied Conscience in Opposition to Publick Laws, is in it self a direct Prin∣ciple of Sedition, and an open Affront to Government; and therefore whoever they are that vouch and pretend its prohibiti∣on to the proceedings of lawful Authori∣ty, deserve for that reason alone the

shame and correction of sturdy and irre∣claimable Schismaticks. And here 'tis a woful Impertinence for Men to oppose (as our Author has done) the Authority of God and of Conscience to that of Men, for that is to plead God and Conscience against themselves, in that Humane Laws are as much tied upon us by his own immediate Command as his own im∣mediate Institutions; and whatsoever lawful Superiours impose upon our Pra∣ctice, that he binds upon our Conscience; and though their Decrees pass no direct Obligation upon the Consciences of Men, yet the Laws of God directly and imme∣diately bind their Consciences to Obe∣dience; and he has threatned the same Eternal Penalties to our contempt of, and disobedience to their Laws, as he has an∣next to his own Commands: 'Tis enough therefore that the Conscience is bound by the Laws of Men, though that Obligation be tied upon it by the Laws of God. So that it is not the different Obligations of Hu∣mane and Divine Laws, that are to be considered in this Enquiry; for the Au∣thority of God is equally concerned in both, and all the Contest lies entirely be∣tween the Matters of the Command, viz. Whether God have by as certain, as ab∣solute

and as indispensable a Law re∣strained us from the practice of what our Superiours enjoin, as he has enjoined us to yield all ready and cheerful Obedience to their Commands. And when the state of the Controversie is shifted to this En∣quiry, 'tis another woful Impertinence to plead the Rule of St. Paul, [He that doubteth is damned if he eat,] to counte∣nance and warrant their suspension of O∣bedience: for where the doubt has but one handle, there it concerns us to hold that fast; but where it has more, 'tis the safest way to hold by the strongest: my meaning is, where the danger of Sin lies but upon one side of the Action, 'tis no doubt a Mans Wisdom to determine his choice on the other that is undoubtedly safe and innocent: but when there lies danger on both sides of the Enquiry, then the doubt ceases to bind from Action, and onely binds to Enquiry, and 'tis his Duty to resolve with the weightiest and most important Reasons; and the strongest Ob∣ligation always cancels the doubt, and determines the Judgment. And this is the palpable difference of our case from that of St. Paul. There all the Jealousie lay on the side of the Action, and there was no ground or pretence for any suspi∣cion

of Sin in the forbearance; and there∣fore it was a safe and easie Determination of the Scruple, to resolve that way where there is neither doubt nor danger; and in that case a total suspension of Action is our proper Duty. But this is widely remote from the posture of our present Affairs, where there lies some hazard of miscarriage on all sides; and therefore the doubt is no warranty for the suspen∣sion of Obedience, because if the matter of the Command be not certainly unlaw∣ful, 'tis certain that is so; and therefore it can have no more Power to suspend, than it has to bind to Action; and there remains no other way to appease and sa∣tisfie the Conscience, but to apply it self to depose the doubt, and resolve to dis∣card its unreasonable and trifling suspici∣ons, and confidently follow the guidance of its most probable Judgment and De∣termination. And here the safest course as to the case under our present enquiry, is to follow my former advice of joining in with the Commands of Authority, that are not certainly and apparently sinful; for nothing can out-balance their Obli∣gation, unless evident and unquestiona∣ble disobedience to God himself: so that where this is not either plainly apparent,

or very forcibly proved, there 'tis but reasonable to sink the Scale, and deter∣mine the Balance on the side of Autho∣rity; and 'tis a safe and an useful Rule of Life, that in all disputable Cases the Commands of Authority abrogate the Irresolution, and oblige to Action: But if after they have determined the Case, the Conscience will still remain stubborn or timorous, so that it will not, or dare not venture upon a Determination, 'tis either such a troublesome Infirmity as must be corrected, or such an head-strong Humour as must be broken, otherwise there is no conceivable way of governing Men that are either proud, or peevish, or ignorant. This is plain and down-right Sense, and (if I mistake not) Reason too. And I know but one Exception that seems to carry in it any colour or appea∣rance of difficulty against this way of sta∣ting the Government of Humane Affairs, and 'tis this.

§. 8. When we come to apply parti∣cular Actions to these general Rules of Life and Government, who shall judge of their Agreement with the Limits and Measures assign'd, if this must be left to the different Judgments of the Prince

and the Subject, this Fabrick falls to pieces again, and Men are still left at li∣berty to judge of the lawfulness of their Superiours Command, by the best Light God has given them, and they may be absolved from their Obligation by the Countermand of their private Judgment, and so we are just as before, and this great En∣gine for Publick Tranquillity vanisheth into Air and Smoak.

But this Cavil (if it be of any strength or value) concerns not in particular my state of the Controversie, and lies indif∣ferently against all Setlement of Humane Affairs, and strikes equally at all Hypo∣theses of Government: for upon what Principles soever Men shall setle and de∣termine this Enquiry, it will return upon them with as much, if not more force than upon my Determinations: For whatever Bounds and Limits they assign to the extent of Humane Power, all its Commands must still be liable to the dif∣ferent Judgments of the Person that en∣joins, and the Person that obeys: about which 'tis as possible and as likely they may disagree, as about those that I have prescribed; and therefore I never design'd to prevent such Inconveniences as are unavoidable to Humane Affairs, but one∣ly

to setle their management upon the best and safest Principles that the Na∣ture of things is capable of. For either Religion is entirely exempted from the Cognizance of Humane Powers, and the Obligation of Humane Laws, or else 'tis in some cases obnoxious to their Jurisdi∣ction. The former is an Opinion so wild and intolerable, as that it was never here∣tofore own'd by any but such perverse People as renounced all Subjection to Earthly Princes, nor indeed can it be ad∣mitted without dissolving the whole Fa∣brick of Humane Government: For that Prince must needs be vested with an ab∣solute and uncontroulable Power, whose Subjects can challenge an Exemption from his Authority as to all matters and pretences of Religion, i. e. as to all things, in that it extends its influence to all the affairs of Humane Life; and therefore its Exemption is no less than flat Anarchy, a Dissolution of all Laws, and Subversion of all Societies. The truth whereof is so infinitely certain from the Reason of Things, and so universally confessed by the Experience of Mankind, that it could never enter the Minds of any Men, un∣less a few savage and inhumane Wretch∣es, that would have voted to break up

Humane Society, that they might betake themselves to the Woods and Desarts, and there live after the Manners and Cu∣stoms of unsociable Creatures, and wild Vermin. But of this I have treated large∣ly enough, and it is not contradicted by our Author: he grants, as all Men do that are not utterly revolted from the first Principles and Fundamental Laws of Humane Nature, that in some cases and upon some occasions 'tis necessary for the Supreme Magistrate to interpose his Pow∣er to setle and govern the things of Reli∣gion. Thus far we are agreed, and only differ in marking out the distinct Bounds, and stating the particular Cases of his Jurisdiction: and here, whatsoever De∣terminations he may propose, they must fall under the different Opinions of the Prince and the Subject. v. g. Whereas he conceits he has sufficiently stated the Controversie in the general words of our blessed Saviour, spoken to another pur∣pose, and upon a different occasion, Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesars, and to God the things that are Gods: I demand who shall determine the particular Rights of God and of Caesar? Who shall assign the just Limits of their respective Domini∣ons? and who shall judge when Caesar passes

beyond the Bounds of his Imperial Juris∣diction, and when he intrenches upon Gods Authority, by taking upon him a Dominion in such Matters as God has re∣served for his own proper Cognizance, and immediate Royalty? So that in this, and all other Determinations, there is no possible way to avoid making the last Ap∣peal to different Judgments, because that is absolutely unavoidable in the natural Constitution of Humane Affairs. And therefore I never attempted (as some Men have done) to devolve the entire Power of judging upon the Judgment of one Party; but onely supposing our dif∣ferent Respects and Obligations to these different Judgments, to propound the safest and most moderate Principles upon which to setle and accommodate the Government of Humane Affairs; and to adjust all matters capable of debate be∣tween them, by such fair Proposals, and upon such reasonable Principles, that, if the Parties concern'd will be ingenuous in their respective Capacities, will effe∣ctually enough secure the common Peace and Happiness of Mankind: if they will not, the Publick Miseries and Calamities that ensue upon the default of either Par∣ty, will be proportion'd to the degrees of

their respective Transgressions; and a∣gainst them 'tis not in my power to pro∣vide, unless I could devest the Minds of Men of all Liberty of Judgment, and Freedom of Will: for whilst they re∣main, 'tis at their own choice whether they will follow the best and wisest advice in the World.

§. 9. Thus if Magistrates fail on their part, and Enact any Laws in defiance of the certain and apparent Laws of God, from thence arise the Calamities of Ty∣ranny and Persecution, and against this evil there is no remedy but Patience and Prayers: Divine Providence is Superiour to the Power of Soveraign Princes, and superintends their Government of the World; and therefore to God alone must we address our Complaints for relief a∣gainst Cruelty and Oppression; and if he judge it convenient for the interests of his Church, and the purposes of Religi∣on, he will so order the Circumstances of Things, and the Management of Affairs, as to rescue them out of their Streights and Exigences. The Hearts and the Scepters of Kings are subject to his Al∣mighty Wisdom; and he so disposes them, as to make them comply with the

Decrees of his uncontroulable Will; and therefore whatever inconveniences may befal Good Men through the Folly or the Wickedness of Governours, they must be patiently endured, as certain Issues, and unsearchable Designs of Divine Pro∣vidence; and we have no recourse for Succour or Deliverance, but to his infi∣nite Mercy and Goodness: this is our only Support and Sanctuary, and who can desire greater Safety than to be under his immediate Care and Protection? And therefore there is nothing more unbe∣coming the Faith and the Profession of a Christian, than to betake himself to vio∣lent and irregular Courses against the In∣conveniences of Government: 'tis a di∣rect and open affront to the Superinten∣dency of Providence, that has reserved this Prerogative to it self: 'tis our Duty to obey cheerfully, or to suffer patiently; and to leave all other Events of Things to his All-comprehensive Wisdom. Man∣kind must be subject to Government; no Government can be effectual unless it be Supreme and Absolute; and therefore God has been pleased to enjoin us a full and entire Subjection to our lawful Supe∣riours; and as for what may ensue there∣on, we must leave to his wise and un∣erring

Disposal, and then certainly we may rest secure of a good Issue of Things. So that if the Magistrate erre in his Judg∣ment of the extent of his Authority, and act beyond the Bounds of his lawful Ju∣risdiction, 'tis not in the Power of Sub∣jects to redress or to remove the Mischiefs that must ensue upon his Government: they must discharge their Duty, and sub∣mit to their Fate; and as for the Refor∣mation of any Publick Miscarriages, they must leave it entirely to the Will and the Wisdom of the Soveraign Power. So that the material thing of which Princes ought to be careful, is that their Laws cross not with the express Laws of God; and this they may easily avoid, if they will be up∣right and ingenuous; and this if they will do, they may as easily avoid all the Mis∣chiefs and Inconveniences that may befal Men of peaceable Spirits through their default. But as 'tis their Duty not to transgress their own Bounds; so on the other side, 'tis as much their Interest to restrain their Subjects from transgressing theirs; and not suffer them to remon∣strate to the Equity of their Laws, unless when they can plead a clear & undoubted pre-engagement to an higher Authority; and they must not prostitute the Interests

of the Republique, and the Reverence of Government, to the Niceties of every curious Imagination, or the Cavils of every peevish Humour. There is no end of trifling and unreasonable Pretences, if once the common People are permitted to put in their Exceptions against the Publick Laws; and what a weak and im∣pertinent thing were the Power of Prin∣ces, if it might be over-ruled by the Fol∣ly of the Multitude? And how bravely would the World be govern'd, if the Au∣thority and Obligation of Laws must be left arbitrary to the Opinion of every vain and foolish Fellow? And therefore in such cases the Allegation of a tender Conscience confutes it self, and 'tis but a soft and plausible word to qualifie a stubborn and contentious Humour; and did not something else bear Men up a∣gainst the force of Authority, a weak Conscience has not boldness enough to oppose its own Power and Judgment a∣gainst the Will of Superiours, and the Wisdom of Publick Laws: 'tis not so imperious and impatient in its Pretensi∣ons, but 'tis (if it really is what it pre∣tends to be) of a yielding, a modest and a governable Temper, apt and easie to re∣ceive any competent Satisfaction, willing

to comply with the Necessities of Go∣vernment, and the Interests of Publick Order; and therefore when Men are zea∣lous and confident in their disobedience to Authority, and are forward upon all occasions to take offence at the Publick Laws, whatever they fancy to them∣selves, or pretend to others, 'tis a proud, a malapert, and an insolent Humour, that affects to affront Authority, and to raise Trophees to its Zeal and Courage, by controuling the Decrees of Princes, and trampling upon the Laws of Discipline. And therefore nothing more imports the Publick Peace, than to take down such bold and daring Spirits; and their high Stomachs must be broken, before they can be made fit Subjects of Civil Societies, and fit Members of Bodies Politick. Dis∣order and Disturbance is the natural Re∣sult of their Complexion, and they can∣not forbear to fret and annoy Autho∣rity with every peevish and unreasona∣ble Conceit. So that the bare Pretence of Tenderness of Conscience in defiance to the Commands of Authority, is at once a bold Attempt, and an impregnable Principle of Sedition: for unless Men have lost their due sense of reverence and submission to Government, they will not

pretend it; and when they do, if their Pretence be admitted, they are but en∣couraged to continue refractory in their disobedience, and to make all the Laws of Discipline and Publick Order yield up their Authority to a proud and an insolent Humour. This is the plain and real ac∣count of my state of the Controversie; and if any Man can determine it upon more reasonable, more moderate, and more discernable Principles, I am not so fond of my own Conceptions, as to be unwil∣ling to subscribe to wiser Proposals. But these things I have accounted for more at large, in the last Chapter of my former Treatise; where I have in many particu∣lars shewn the horrible vanity of preten∣ding dissatisfaction of Conscience against the Commands of lawful Authority. And had not our Author rather design'd to prolong, than to determine this Dispute, in stead of his wild rambling up and down without drift or method, he would with a more particular Regard have faln upon that part of my Discourse; but its Exa∣mination would have been of immediate Concern to his own Pretences, and would have brought the Controversie to too speedy an Issue, and perhaps too satisfa∣ctory a Decision; and therefore he baulks

that as too hazardous an Enterprize, and is unwilling to venture the whole Cause upon one Engagement, but keeps this back as a Reserve for a second Onset, and for matter of new Cavil: at present it suffices for his purpose (which is not to satisfie, but to shuffle with his Readers) to load my more general Assertions with such loose and uncertain Cavils, as are already prevented in my more particular Determinations of the Enquiry.

§. 10. But though this way of abuse be (one would think) bold enough, yet in the next attempt his Confidence im∣proves, (and it were hard fortune if he should prove Bankrupt upon so fair a Stock:) before he did but overlook my plain meaning, but now he proceeds to pervert and slander it, and his peevish∣ness becomes malice. He is not content to abuse the People with dull mistakes, and to defeat the efficacy of my Dis∣course upon the Minds of Men, by distur∣bing its method, and representing its whole design in such an awkard and dis∣orderly manner, as may utterly confound and perplex their thoughts as to my drift and meaning. This, alas! is mean re∣venge, and is not full enough of mischief

to appease his wrath; it onely calls my Understanding into question, and exposes my Wit to the Cavils and Impertinencies of talking People; and therefore he roundly charges me with the blackest and most horrid Tenets; he aggravates and sets off their horrour with infinite Repe∣titions, (for that is the most lofty strain of their Eloquence, and the Figure that moves the Passions of their Multitude) and employs all the forces of slander and peevishness to raise popular rage and in∣dignation. The Result of his Indictment is, that I assert such Opinions, from whence it follows, that whatever the Magistrate com∣mands in Religion, his Authority does so imme∣diately affect the Consciences of Men, that they are bound to observe it on pain of the greatest Sin and Punishment; or, as he expresses the same thing elsewhere, that no Man must do or practise any thing in the Worship of God, but what is prescribed, appointed and commanded by the Magistrate, upon pain of Sin, Schism, Re∣bellion, and all that follows thereon. These are big words indeed: but if it shall ap∣pear that this Charge is not so loud and black, as 'tis false and disingenuous, I will give him the Liberty of an Appeal to all Mankind for the clearing of his In∣tegrity: and when I have represented up∣on

what slight grounds he raises this great and heinous Accusation, I doubt not but his disingenuity will appear so palpable and notorious, that it will expose him at least to the pity of the most Zealous She of his own Congregation. And therefore let us see by what mighty Topicks and Testimonies he makes good so high a Charge.

In the first place my Title Page rises up in Judgment against me, (and never was poor Man so all-be-confuted with a Title Page as I have been) viz. That the Magi∣strate has Power over the Consciences of his Sub∣jects in Religion: and to strengthen this Testimony, two other Propositions are join'd with it, viz. That the Magistrate has Power to govern and conduct their Consciences in Religious Affairs; and that, Religion is sub∣ject to his Dominion, as well as all other Affairs of State. And now, though these are none of my primary and Fundamental Asserti∣ons, (which an ingenuous Adversary would chiefly have pursued) but honest and well-meaning Sayings, that the Con∣text would abundantly warrant and justi∣fie; yet will I for ever yield my self a baffled Fellow, if from thence any Fe∣male or Independent Logick can infer ei∣ther that the Magistrate has an unlimited

Power over, or passes an immediate Ob∣ligation upon the Consciences of Men; or, in our Authors own words, That what∣ever the Magistrate commands in Religion, his Authority does so immediately affect the Consci∣ences of Men, that they are bound to observe it on the pain of the greatest sin and punishment. This trash neither needs nor deserves any further severity; and therefore I will onely leave it to the Readers thoughts to consider by what Art, and in what Me∣thod of Reasoning this Conclusion may be created out of these Premises: an all∣mighty Confidence may attempt much, and perhaps do it too; but yet some things there are beyond the reach and power of Omnipotence it self, and I know nothing more absolutely impossible than to produce Sense out of Non-sense, or (what is the same thing) to make good the Reasonableness of false and unrea∣sonable Inferences.

But from this great head of Imperti∣nency, he proceeds to his more service∣able Topick of Forgery; and if he can∣not bring the Mountain to Mahomet, 'tis no great difficulty to carry Mahomet to the Mountain; and if his Conclusions will not suit with my Assertions, he knows how to make my Assertions suit with his

Conclusions; and when he has charged me with a false Inference, 'tis an admi∣rable way to justifie the Logick of his Calumny by forged Premises. And thus to make good his former Inference of my ascribing to the Civil Magistrate an im∣mediate and universal Power over the Consciences of Men, he tells his belie∣ving Reader I have affirmed, pag. 27. That 'tis a Soveraignty over Mens Consciences in Matters of Religion, and this universal, abso∣lute, and uncontroulable. Though this Ca∣lumny were true, yet (so injudicious is our Authors Invention) 'tis monstrously impertinent; for there is no imaginable ground to conclude from hence, That the Supreme Authority immediately affects the Con∣sciences of Men: For suppose the Civil Magistrate instated in an absolute and un∣controulable Power, what necessity is there that their Commands should tie themselves upon our Consciences by ver∣tue of their own immediate Authority? Nay, 'tis impossible any thing should im∣mediately affect the Conscience but the Authority of God; and 'tis by vertue of his Command that any other Commands can pass an Obligation upon it; and there∣fore though the Commands of the Civil Magistrate should pass an universal Obli∣gation

upon the Consciences of Men, yet 'tis an Inference like the rest of our Au∣thors, from thence to conclude that they therefore affect them by their own direct and immediate Sanction. But this is not all, 'tis as false as foolish: I have indeed asserted the absolute Power of the Civil Magistrate over Affairs of Religion, in Opposition to the Pretences of a distinct Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction: For having first asserted the necessity of a Soveraign Power over these matters, from their Concernment in the Peace and Govern∣ment of the World, I thence proceeded to enquire where and in whom it ought to reside; and having shewn the Incon∣sistency of erecting two Supreme Powers, one over Civil, the other over Ecclesiasti∣cal Affairs, I concluded that the Supreme Government of every Commonwealth must of necessity be universal, absolute and uncontroulable, in that it extends its Jurisdiction as well to Affairs of Religi∣on, as to Affairs of State, because they are so strongly influential upon the Inte∣rests of Mankind, & the Ends of Govern∣ment. And now is this to make the Ec∣clesiastical Authority of the Civil Magi∣strate absolutely paramount, without re∣gard to any other Jurisdiction of what na∣ture

soever, when I onely maintain it in defiance to the Claims of any other Hu∣mane Power? This was the subject of that Enquiry. And when I asserted the Soveraign Power to be absolute and un∣controulable, 'tis apparent nothing else could be intended than that it ought not to be controul'd by any distinct Power, whether of the Pope or the Presbytery; and when I asserted it to be universal and unlimited, it could be understood in no other sense than that it was not confined to matters purely Civil, but extended its Jurisdiction to matters of an Ecclesiasti∣cal importance; upon which account a∣lone I determined it to be absolute, uni∣versal and uncontroulable. This is the main and the Fundamental Article of the Reformation, and that which distin∣guishes the truly Orthodox and Catho∣lick Protestant both from Popish and Presbyterian Recusants; and is the one∣ly fence to secure the Thrones of Princes against the dangerous Encroachments of those bold and daring Sects; and therefore from so avowed a truth, to charge me for ascribing in general Terms an absolute, universal & uncontroulable Power to the Civil Magistrate over the Consciences of Men in matters of Religion, argues more

boldness than wit and discretion, and gives us ground to suspect that these Men are not less forsaken of shame and modesty, than they are of Providence: for it must needs be a very bold Face, and a very hard Forehead, that could ever venture to obtrude such palpable and dis∣ingenuous Abuses upon the World.

§. 11. But our Author proceeds in his Method, and his Charge and his Confi∣dence advance together; and before you fin•• him at the end of this Paragraph, you will find him bravely attempting the highest degree of boldness. The next proof he singles out for his purpose, is a passage of the twelfth Section of my first Chapter: He [the Magistrate] may if he please reserve the exercise of the Priesthood to himself: From whence it clearly follows (as he dreams) that Queen Elizabeth might, if she pleased, have exercised the Priestly Function in her own Person. And he takes frequent occasion to insult over the weakness of this Assertion, and tri∣umph in the wit of this Inference. But I shall not insist upon its woful imperti∣nency to the Conclusion, wherewith he confidently winds up this heap of Ca∣lumnies, viz. That from hence it follows, that

whatever the Magistrate commands in Religion, his Authority does so immediately affect the Consciences of Men, that they are bound to ob∣serve it on the pain of the greatest sin and pu∣nishment. For how is it possible for any Man to infer from his Right to the Priest∣ly Office, an unlimited and immediate Power over Religion, unless it could be proved that this absolute Soveraignty is unalienable from the Priesthood? and when that is pretended or performed, we will farther consider the Validity of this Inference. Nor shall I mind him what an ill piece of Policy it is for him to disavow the Authority of the Female Sex in the Conduct of Religion; when the chief and most important Affairs of the sepa∣rate Churches are transacted and go∣vern'd by their Zeal; and when the A∣pron-strings are the strongest Bond of the Congregational Union; and when (as they manage the business) St. Peter's Keys are hang'd at their Girdles, and e∣very conceited Sister assumes to her self, if not the Infallibility of Pope Ioan, yet at least the Power and Authority of Don∣na Olympia. Nor lastly, shall I present the Salique Law of the Christian Church, that devests that Sex of all right and pre∣tence of Succession to the Priesthood; by

which they are restrain'd from intermed∣ling with any Offices of the Sacred Fun∣ction, though it should descend by right of Inheritance to the Heirs Male of the Blood Royal. Such a trifling Objection is not worth so much pains; 'tis sufficient to inform you, that in the Paragraph a∣foresaid I undertook to give an account of the true Original of all Civil and Ec∣clesiastical Government: where I shewed how in the first Ages of the World they were vested in the same Person, and found∣ed upon the same Right of Paternal Au∣thority: and in this state of things ante∣cedent to all superinduced Restraints, and positive Institutions, I asserted the Su∣preme Magistrate might, if he pleased, reserve the exercise of the Priesthood to himself, though afterwards the Priestly Office was in the Jewish Commonwealth expresly derogated from the Kingly Pow∣er, by being setled upon the Tribe of Le∣vi, and the Line of Aaron; and so like∣wise in the Christian Church, by being appropriated to the Apostles and their Successours, that derive their Ministerial Office (for that of Priesthood our Author will not admit of under the Gospel) from our blessed Saviours express and immedi∣ate Commission. Now what I affirm'd

of things in the bare state of Nature, without the guidance of Revelation, for our Author to represent it, as if I had applied it indifferently to all Ages and Periods of the Church, by whatsoever positive Laws and different Institutions they may be govern'd, is wonderfully suitable to the Genius of his own Wit and Ingenuity, and sufficiently discovers who he is, though we had no other evidence of the Man and his Humour, 'tis his way and method, and betrays him as much as the word Entanglement, that is the Shibbo∣leth of all his Writings.

But I must not think to escape thus, he is resolved to bear me down for an illi∣terate Dunce with Face and downright Confidence; and to this purpose he tells the Reader, that the Young Man, as pert and peremptory as he is, seems not much ac∣quainted with the rise of the Office of the Priest∣hood amongst Men, as shall be demonstrated if farther occasion be given thereunto. This he affirms boldly, and when it is proved, it shall be granted: but till then, let me beg the Reader to suspend his censure of my Ignorance; and I hope by this time he is satisfied 'tis not absolutely impos∣sible but that our Author may boldly af∣firm what he knows not how to prove,

and confidently undertake what he is not able to perform. However, a modest Man would either not have mentioned this Exception, or would have made it good, and not have presumed that the World should take his Brags for Argu∣ments; and take it for a reasonable Con∣futation of my Assertion, because he says he can confute it, aye that he can. This is the most it amounts to; and whether it be his Intention or no, he might have said nothing to as much purpose as to say so much and no more. But other Men would stand still as fast as this Man gal∣lops; and when he comes to the end of his career, he is just where he was at the beginning.

§. 12. And yet the next proof is just as wise and as wonderful as this, viz. That this Power I have ascribed to the Civil Magistrate, is not derived from Christ, or any Grant of his, but is antecedent to his coming, or any Power given unto him, or granted by him. But what is all this to his Inference of the Magistrates absolute and immediate Power over Con∣science? That Power in which God vest∣ed Princes, must be such as is compatible with his own Supremacy, and that con∣sists

in his absolute and immediate Sove∣raignty over the Minds of his reasonable Creatures; and therefore was in its own Nature uncapable of being granted away to any subordinate Authority. But how∣ever, you will conclude with him from this Principle, that Magistrates owe no Allegiance and Subjection to the Scepter of Christ, seeing they derive not their Authority from his Commission, but were instated in its actual Possession before e∣ver he was advanced to the Government of the Universe. I say, No: for though they were vested in an ancient and origi∣nal Right, yet its Continuance, ever since he commenced his Empire, depends meerly upon his Confirmation, in that whoever does not reverse a former Grant, confirms it. And therefore though they were impowered to govern the Church of God antecedent to our Saviours Supre∣macy, yet that they are still intrusted with the same Authority they owe entirely to his Soveraign will and pleasure, because 'tis now in his Power to devest them of this, or any other of their ancient Prero∣gatives: so that seeing he has thought good to continue the Government of the World in the same state and posture he found it in, Princes are not now less in∣debted

to him for the Grant of their Im∣perial Power, than if they had been at first instated in it by his immediate and and positive Commission. And to this purpose did I discourse in that Paragraph out of which he has singled this Proposi∣tion, viz. to shew how unreasonable it is for Men to demand an express Grant from our Saviour to Civil Magistrates for the Government of his Church, when they were already establish't in the full exer∣cise of this Jurisdiction by the right of Nature, and the consent of Nations: so that in stead of requiring this of us, they are rather obliged to shew where he has expresly disrobed and aliened the Eccle∣siastical Jurisdiction from the Royal Pre∣rogative: for if he have not, there is no pretence or exception but that it still con∣tinues as inseparable a Right of the Su∣preme Magistrate in every Nation, as if he had setled it upon him by his own po∣sitive and immediate Institution.

His next Exception is down-right Jug∣ling, viz. That I assert, That Magistrates have a Power to make that a particular of the Divine Law, which God had not made so, and to introduce new Duties in the most important parts of Religion. He knows these words have no relation in the place where they

stand to matters of meer Religion and im∣mediate Worship, but are spoken onely of the Duties and Offices of Morality, which I had before proved to be the main Designs and most essential Parts of Reli∣gion, and likewise shewn that the Civil Magistrate was impower'd to introduce upon the Divine Law new Duties and Instances of Moral Vertue, from whence I thought it but reasonable to conclude his Power over the outward Expressions of Religious Worship, that are but cir∣cumstances, or at highest but subordinate and less material Duties, if compared to the great and important Vertues of Mo∣rality. Whether my Proposition or my Inference be reasonable or no, concerns not our present Enquiry; our Author in this place puts in no Exception against them: but whether this Quotation be ei∣ther honestly or pertinently alledged a∣gainst me, do you judge; when he could not but know that these words, whether true or false, could have no imaginable reference to matters of Religious Wor∣ship properly so called, but were expresly limited to the Instances of Moral Good∣ness, that yet he should produce them in this feat shuffling and uncertain manner of Expression, onely that the common

People might not understand them, as they relate to my account and Notion of Religion, i. e. as it takes in Duties of Morality; but in the Vulgar sense of the word, as it signifies Religious Worship. This you see is wretched Troth; but that which follows is glorious and undaunted Slander; when he immediately subjoins to the former words, So that there is a pub∣lick Conscience, which Men are in things of a publick Concern (relating to the Worship of God) to attend unto, and not to their own. And if there be any sin in the Command, he that impo∣sed it, shall answer for it, and not I, whose whole duty it is to obey. This Inference being so immediately tack't to the former Pro∣position, its unavoidable result must be this at least, That as to the most impor∣tant parts of Religion, there is a publick Conscience, to which Men are to attend, and not to their own. This is somewhat rank Doctrine, and favours not a little of the Leviathan. But yet how can I a∣void it? are not these my own words? Though that I might deny, yet am I con∣tent to confess that I have said something not much unlike them, in the sixth Secti∣on of my last Chapter; where, in answer to the Pretence of a tender, a scrupulous, and an unsatisfied Conscience, among

many other things, I have shewn that in doubtful and disputable Cases of a pub∣lick Concernment, private Men are not properly sui Iuris, and are not to be di∣rected by their own Judgments, nor de∣termined by their own Wills, but by the Commands and Determinations of the Publick Conscience. Now does it not admirably become our Authors modesty to take this Assertion concerning such nice and petty things as are liable to doubt, scruple, and Disputation, and cou∣ple it with another sentence above two hundred Pages distance, that speaks of the most important parts of Religion? as if they had been spoken upon the same oc∣casion, and related to the same matter; thereby to abuse his vulgar and unwary Reader into a round belief, as if what I had asserted concerning the Subjection of a doubtful Conscience in less important matters to the Commands of Publick Au∣thority, were to be understood of all the Obligations of Conscience in the most im∣portant Duties of Religion. Did I not fore∣warn you of what heights and depths of Ingenuity we should meet with, before we arrived at the Conclusion of this Pa∣ragraph? And now do you tell me whe∣ther you ever observed in any Writer

more generous strains of Candour and Civility? Did ever Man treat Adver∣sary with fairer and more ingenuous U∣sage than I have met with from this can∣did Author? Disputants of a more sul∣len Humour would have thrown more knotty Objections in my way, that would have cost some pains and sweat to assoil their difficulty: but he deals tenderly with me as a young beginner, and will not dishearten my industry by setting too hard a Task to my raw and unimproved Abilities; that by my Conquest and Tri∣umph over such weak Opposition, I might be encouraged to greater Under∣takings.

§. 13. And therefore he proceeds to tempt my weak and juvenile Essays upon so great a Master of Skill, by seeming se∣rious and eager in the farther pursuit of these vain and trifling advantages, and raising more vehement slanders upon more unreasonable grounds; and the next Article of his Charge to this purpose is, that I maintain that the Supreme Magistrate in every Nation hath Power to order and ap∣point what Religion his Subjects shall profess and observe, provided he enjoineth nothing that countenanceth Vice, or disgraceth the Deity, &c.

Our Author is old excellent at Cavil and Calumny, but here he excels himself: he gives in a brisk and ratling Indictment, without any shadow of proof to justifie the Allegation: 'tis drawn up in his own terms and forms of Expression, and one∣ly one poor Line of mine bobb'd in to give countenance to such an horrid and shame∣less Falsification, viz. provided that he in∣joineth nothing that either countenanceth Vice, or disgraceth the Deity. This I have, and still do affirm concerning Rituals, Ceremonies and Postures of outward Worship, that they ought not to be censured as unlaw∣ful, unless they tend to debauch Men either in their Practices or their Conce∣ptions of the Deity: and therefore if they are not chargeable with one or both of these, nothing can hinder their being capable of being adopted into the Mini∣stries of Divine Service, or exempt them from being subject to the Determinations of Humane Power. This is, I think, a chaste and a modest Truth: but for our Author to apply this Power that I have ascribed to the Supreme Magistrate, onely over the outward Forms and Ceremonial Expressions of Religious Worship, to the appointment and institution of Religion it self, so as to leave it entirely at his

disposal to order and appoint what Religion his Subjects shall profess and observe, is (and I can say no worse) but like himself, and agreeable to that Character I have often suggested to you of his way of writing and ingenuity: and 'tis a falshood so coarsly lewd and barbarous, that nothing but an incorrigible Brow could have ven∣tured to obtrude it upon the World, much less to persist in it so long, and repeat it so often as he has done, as if he were resol∣ved to bear down the common sense and reason of Mankind, by the unyielding Gallantry and Vigour of his Confidence.

But there is not any one passage in my whole Discourse, that has been so ser∣viceable to his purpose as this lame and imperfect Allegation; it vouches every Clamour, and every Impertinency, and every Slander and false Report shrowds it self under its Protection; and if he have a mind to forge and fasten any extrava∣gant Conceit upon me, 'tis but devising some wild Proposition, and twisting it with these words, and then he may ex∣patiate against the wickedness of so dan∣gerous an errour with a grave and solemn invective; and I am as confidently con∣cluded Guilty, as if it had been my own express and positive Assertion. Thus this

passage is produced against me; That whilst Men reserve to themselves the freedom and liberty of judging what they please, or what seems good unto them in matters of Re∣ligion, and the Worship of God, they ought to esteem it their Duty to practise in all things ac∣cording to the Prescription of their Rulers, though every way contrary unto, and inconsistent with their own Iudgments and Perswasions, unless it be in things that countenance Vice, and disgrace the Deity. These words are set down in a distinct Character, and the Reader (if he be courteous) is not to doubt but they were faithfully transcri∣bed out of my Book, though you cannot find a syllable of it there, except onely the last words of restriction. But howe∣ver, 'tis a lewd and ungodly Assertion, and therefore away he flies with it; What? it defeats all effectual Obligati∣ons of Conscience, it enervates all real sense of Religion, and it casts off all se∣rious regard to the Divine Authority; and upon this Principle Men may profess what Religion they please, and turn Ma∣humetans, Papists, and Apostates, for their own convenience. These indeed are sad and woful Inferences; but let him look to that; for the Premises are his as well as the Conclusions; though in my

Opinion it is a prodigious piece of bold∣ness that he should so rashly, so confi∣dently and so groundlesly charge me with such knavish and dishonest Principles, as are not fit for any Men to pretend to, un∣less such crafty Artists as know how to sing their Songs upon Sigionoth, and be∣lieve that God abets and owns every In∣terest that thrives and prospers in the World: and when they Dance to the Tune of the Times, have the face to look demurely, and to profess they onely fol∣low the Pipe of Providential Dispensati∣ons. But now if we take this mangled and dismembred Sentence, and restore it to its proper place, there is neither harm nor Heresie: i. e. if we affirm that no Rites and Ceremonies are in themselves unlawful (for I here speak onely of things as considered in their own nature) in the Worship of God, unless they tend to countenance Vice, or disgrace the Deity: here is no danger of encouraging or ma∣king Apostates; for the material and di∣viding differences of the establish't Reli∣gions in the World, consist not in Ritu∣als and Ceremonials, but in Articles of Belief, and Objects of Worship. We con∣demn neither Turks nor Papists for their forms and postures of Adoration, (unless

they fall under one or both of the Obli∣quities aforesaid) but for giving Divine Worship to a lewd Impostor, and to a sensless piece of matter: let them but address the same Worship to its due and proper Object, and we will never stand stiffly with them about the outward Rites and Ceremonies of its Expression; but will freely allow them to conform to the significant Customs of their own Coun∣try, as we do to those of ours. Now 'tis these things that are, or at least are pretended to be, the onely matters of our present Schisms and Differences; and 'tis these things onely that I assert to be de∣terminable by Supreme Authority, pro∣vided they neither encourage Vice, nor dishonour God: under which Restrictions whatsoever Rites and Usages they may enjoyn, can never be concluded unlawful in themselves; and if they are so upon any other account, that is to be discour∣sed elsewhere, but it concerns not our present Enquiry, that onely undertook to account for the Comparison between the matters of Religious Worship, and the Duties of Morality, in reference to the Power of the Civil Magistrate, as consider'd in their own respective Na∣tures.

I might give you in many more proofs and instances of his abuse of these words: but what I have already represented, is, I hope, a sufficient taste of his Ingenuity. And yet as gross and shameless as this slander is, 'tis infinitely out-done by the next, viz. That I have given as absolute a Soveraignty to the Civil Magistrate o∣ver the Church of God, as to the Lord Christ himself. And this he endeavours to prove after his way, by amassing toge∣ther all the former Calumnies that I have already washt off: but to complete and accomplish the whole design, he adds one of his own pure wit and contrivance: Is the Authority of Christ the formal Reason, ma∣king Obedience necessary to his Commands and Precepts? So is the Authority of the Magi∣strate in reference to what he requires. Do Men therefore sin, if they neglect the Obser∣vance of the Commands of Christ in the Worship of God, because of his immediate Authority so to command them binding their Consciences? So do Men sin if they omit or neglect to do what the Magistrate requires in the Worship of God because of his Authority, without any farther respect. In the former passages there are at least some sprinklings of my own words, but this is meer and abstracted slander, and has nor colour nor founda∣tion

in my Discourse; and therefore I can give it no other Reply, than sincere∣ly to profess, that were there any thing in my Book that should but seem to as∣cribe to the Civil Magistrate as immedi∣ate a Soveraignty over the Consciences of Men, as our blessed Saviour both claims and exercises, I my self would be the first Man that should cast a Stone at such bold and ridiculous Assertions. And here one would think is enough of Slander and Calumny, and yet he has not done with so pleasant an Argument, but gives it you all over again in a Proclamation fra∣med out of the supposed Principles and Directions of my Book; which being nothing but a meer Repetition of the same Trash, that I have already cashier'd, I deem it neither needful nor pertinent to return him any other answer, than that as 'tis not the first Proclamation that this Author has drawn up, so I pray God it may be the last.

§. 14. And now, Sir, tell me what I shall conclude of this Mans Conscience? Must I impute such labour'd and affected Mistakes to an excuseable Ignorance, and set the most shameless Falsifications upon the score of Inadvertency? I know

the power of prejudice and passion to seal up the Minds of Men against the evidence of Truth; yet such is the evidence of Truth in our present case, that no pre∣judice can be thick enough to withstand, or passion blind enough to defeat its effi∣cacy. Nothing but an hard Forehead and a lewd Conscience could ever embolden him so rudely to spoil and discompose the apparent aim & method of my Discourse, and so impudently to abuse and impose upon the World by such groundless and enormous pervertings. A multitude of his weaker Cavils and less Miscarriages I am inclined to ascribe to his rash and pre∣cipitate Humour: for I know he is wont to write or dictate Books as fast as other Men can read them; and a wise Man would take more time to weigh the mat∣ter of a Discourse, than he does to con∣fute it; and so may possibly pour out gross and palpable mistakes through haste and inadvertency. But those Instances I have represented to you of his way of shuffling and falsifying, are so many, so labour'd, and so unreasonable, that they could proceed from no other Fountain but wilful and affected Malice: for 'tis absolutely impossible that meer Chance and Heedlesness should blunder upon so

many Impostures so full of design and contrivance. But however, you see how by this means not onely the state of the Question, but the whole matter of the Enquiry is quite alter'd: 'tis not now contended whether the Supreme Magi∣strate of every Commonwealth be vested with an Ecclesiastical Power and Sove∣raignty over matters of Religion. Tush, that is granted without demur or dispute, and our Author (though his Acquain∣tance are none of the most loyal and peaceable) knows no Man that pretends ex∣emption from the Obligation of Humane Laws, but onely on this Plea, that God by his Law re∣quires them to do otherwise. So that in what matters soever the Law of God does not require them to do otherwise, there Hu∣mane Laws must pass a certain Obligati∣on upon Conscience: for if they do not oblige that, they oblige nothing. Now this is an ample Grant of all that I de∣sign'd and pretended to prove in my first Chapter, viz. That Magistrates are vested with some Authority over Con∣science in matters of Religion: So that in this it seems we are fully agreed, and our Author after all his heat and talk freely confesses 'tis indispensably neces∣sary to the Publick Peace and Tranquil∣lity,

which you know is the main Consi∣deration that I urged and pursued in be∣half of my Opinion. But, says our Au∣thor, this is not all, for I have so descri∣bed and discoursed of the Power of the Civil Magistrate over Conscience and Religion, as to make it of an absolute Ju∣risdiction, an unlimited extent, and an immediate Obligation: 'tis this he all a∣long represents, and upon this that he mainly insists. If I am guilty of this Charge, I must shift as I can: but if I am not, what hinders but we may shake hands and be friends? And therefore having so fully discover'd the horrid and uncon∣ceiveable vanity of the proofs alledged against me to this purpose, and so fairly clear'd the innocence and honesty of my Intentions, I may, I hope, hereafter rea∣sonably expect, and justly challenge a compleat discharge from all such sinister and idle suspicions. Is not this blessed work, that I should be forced to write so much to so little purpose; not at all to prove the Truth of what I have written, but to disprove the Falshood of what I have not written?

§. 15. And now though I am provided with Remarks upon the remaining passa∣ges

of this Chapter, yet I know not to what purpose I should trouble my self or the Reader with them, after the Consi∣derations that I have already represent∣ed, that are (I presume) competent e∣nough to justifie the innocence of my De∣sign, and to shame the disingenuity of his Cavils; and that is all that is needful in answer to his way of proceeding, which, you see, was not to confute, but to per∣vert my Discourse. And if I should pur∣sue all Advantages, examine all Miscar∣riages, and lay open all Follies and Im∣pertinencies, I should presume too much upon the Publick Patience, and swell my Reply to too unreasonable a Bulk; so many, so vain, and so impertinent are his Topicks of Cavil. However, the re∣mainder of his Talk is built upon the supposition of the Truth and Reality of these Falsifications; and therefore by what I have already discoursed in answer to their Forgery, I have made it altoge∣ther needless to take any farther notice of his wild and rambling Harangues: For if they are pertinent to their Premises, they are impertinent to my Discourse; if they are not, they are impertinent to his own. Though the truth is, should I grant him the priviledge he is resolved

to take, of falsifying, yet he deduce•• things so loosly and incoherently, that I might easily make good my Cause against him, if I should undertake the defence of those Untruths and Monstrous Absurdi∣ties he fastens on me. I might demand of him to what purpose he here acquaints us with that solemn and systematick di∣stinction of the Declaration of Gods Will, either by the Light of Nature, or by the Light of Revelation, unless it be to inform the World of this new and important Mystery, that a positive Com∣mand of God may, as to any particular instance, suspend the Obligation of the greatest Command of the Law of Na∣ture; and so it actually did in the Pre∣cept given to Abraham for sacrificing his Son. For whatever any School-men may determine in this case, 'tis apparent here neither was nor could be any suspension of the Law of Nature, (whose Obligati∣on is so eternal and unchangeable, that nothing can suspend it for one moment without doing violence to the antecedent Reasons of Good and Evil) but onely a positive Command to execute a Divine Decree by vertue of a Divine Commis∣sion, i. e. to put his Son to death by his Authority that is absolute Lord of Life;

a matter against which the Law of Na∣ture never had or could have any Prohibi∣tion: For though possibly it restrained A∣braham from attempting his Sons Life by vertue of his own Dominion, yet when he was warranted to it by a special Com∣mand of God himself, to have refused its execution, had been to remonstrate to the Justice of one of the most Fundamen∣tal Laws of Nature: so that there was no suspension of the Law, but an altera∣tion of the Case, and a Command to do something, which that neither did nor could forbid. To what purpose does he twit me for asserting Magistratical Omnipo∣tency, rather than the Divine Right of Episcopacy? I am at Age and Liberty (as young as he would make me) to chuse my own Theme; and perhaps the next Book I publish, that shall be the Argu∣ment of my Discourse; and then I doubt not but he will as much correct me for leaving the pursuit of my former subject, as he does now for pursuing it. To what purpose does he preach to Soveraign Prin∣ces not to take upon themselves that ab∣solute Power, I have for my own advan∣tage ascribed to them, unless he had also proved it is not for theirs? 'Tis a strong Motive, no doubt, to encourage his Ma∣jesty

to listen to his advice, by informing him, it was not the Acclamation of the Mul∣titude unto Herod, The Voice of God and not of Man; but his own arrogant satisfacti∣on in that Blasphemous Assignation of Divine Glory to him, that exposed him to the Iudgments and Vengeance of God. For certainly Prin∣ces will require more forcible Reasons to part with the absoluteness of their Sove∣raign Power, than such Preaching Imper∣tinencies. To what purpose does he add, That never any Magistrate, unless Nebu∣chadnezzar, Caligula, Domitian, and persons like to them, ever pretended to exercise the Power here assign'd unto them? I will not be so froward as to tell him, that now he is as much too free in his Concessions, as he is at other times too stingy: for should I put him upon the proof, he would want Records to make it good, that all these Princes ever claimed such a bold and un∣limited Jurisdiction; though perhaps o∣thers have: for what thinks he of Ar∣taxerxes's Commission to Ezra? Whosoever will not do the Law of thy God, and the Law of the King, let Iudgment be executed speedily upon him, whether it be unto Death, or to Ba∣nishment, or to Confiscation of Goods, or to Impri∣sonment. I know not how any Prince can challenge or assume a more severe, abso∣lute,

and uncontroulable Power, than this granted in this Commission; and yet Ez∣ra reflects upon it as a special and imme∣diate issue of Divine Providence. To what purpose does he tell us, the Power I ascribe to Magistrates is none other but that which is claimed by the Pope of Rome? That may be his Usurpation upon the Rights of Princes, but 'tis no proof that they may not challenge the Supremacy over the Consciences of their own Subjects, be∣cause he usurps it. To what purpose does he tell us, That the Mormo here made use of, is the same in substance that has been set up by the Papists ever since the Reformation? When nothing can be justly pleaded in behalf of lawful Government, but what may be unjustly pretended to by Tyrants and Usurpers: and in the happy days of Oliver Cromwel, the same Arguments and Texts of Scripture were prest for Obe∣dience and Subjection to the Rebel, as were onely design'd to secure Loyalty to rightful Soveraigns. Let the Romanists make out the Justice of their Title of Su∣premacy over the Kingdom of England, and the Equity of their Cause in the due ma∣nagement of their Power, and then we will listen to their Pretences: but in the mean while, from the necessity of an Ec∣clesiastical

Jurisdiction, to plead the Right of a Papal Soveraignty, is an imperti∣nency onely wild enough to serve our Authors turn, and signifies no more than because there is Tyranny practised in the World under fair and plausible Preten∣ces, that therefore there must be no just Grounds and Principles for lawful Go∣vernment. To what purpose does he waste so many Pages, to enquire where∣fore the Power of the Magistrate should not be extended to the inward Thoughts and Appre∣hensions of Men about the Worship of God, as well as to Expressions of them in pure spiritual Acts of that Worship? For not to catch at the ridiculous, canting and mysterious Non-sense of the Expression of our inward Thoughts in pure spiritual Acts, when all Expression of them is outward and cor∣poral: 'tis sufficient that God has not been pleased to vest them with any Pow∣er over our Thoughts; but for what cause, himself best knows; and there∣fore though I could give no account for his so doing, that would not cast the least shadow of an Objection upon the Truth and Reality of my Perswasion. To what purpose does he tell us in the close of this Enquiry, that we can give no other ima∣ginable answer to it, than that Men who

plead for Indulgence and Liberty of Conscience in the Worship of God, according to his Word, and the Light which he has given them there∣in, have indeed no Conscience at all? When this answer is so infinitely silly, that we can scarce suppose any Man in his wits so extravagant as to pretend it, and when there are other very pertinent Replys, so easie and so obvious, viz. That they may possibly have no Conscience at all, whatever they pretend, or at least such an one as is abused with foolish, or de∣bauch't with wicked Principles, and so may plot or practise Sedition against the State under pretence or mistake of Con∣science, and for that reason ought not to be allowed to plead its Authority against the Commands of lawful Superiours. In fine, to what purpose does he so briskly taunt me for thwarting my own Prin∣ciples, because I have censured the im∣pertinency of a needless Provision in an Act of Parliament? I may obey the Law, though I may be of a different Per∣swasion from the Lawgivers in an Opi∣nion remote and impertinent to the mat∣ter of the Law it self: nay, I may con∣demn the wisdom of Enacting it, and yet at the same time think my self to lie under an indispensable Obligation to

obey it: for the formal reason of its Ob∣ligatory Power (as any Casuist will in∣form him) is not the Judgment and Opi∣nion of the Lawgiver, but the Declara∣tion of his Will and Pleasure. There is abundance more of this slender stuff, wherewith (as himself brags) he has loaded this Principle; though, alas! were its Foundations never so weak and trem∣bling, it might securely enough support so light a Burthen; and though it were really bottom'd upon the Sands, there is but little danger that such a shallow Stream of Talk should overturn it: so that though I stand upon such advanta∣geous ground, if I should descend to a strict and particular examination of all the Flaws and Follies of his Tattle, yet they are so apparently false or imperti∣nent, or both, and afford so little occa∣sion for useful and material Discourse, that I had rather chuse to forego my own advantage, than spoil my Book, and tire my Reader by insisting too tediously upon such empty trifles and dreams of shadows. To conclude, this Author is so accustom∣ed to popular impertinency, that he seems to hate severe Discourse as much as car∣nal Reason, and both as much as Idola∣try: so that he onely prates when he

should argue, and inveighs when he should confute: Give him what advan∣tage you will, he regards it not, but jogs on in his road of talking, and 'tis no mat∣ter whether you take the right or wrong handle of the Question, it may be either for any thing material that he has to ex∣cept against it. Nay, you may suffer him to Limetwig you with Ink and Paper, and gagg you with a Quill, and put what words he pleases into your mouth, and yet ea∣sily defend your self against all his faint assaults, and impertinent Objections. In so much that I durst undertake the de∣fence of the thickest and most defenceless Impostures in the World, against his weak and miserable way of Confutation. And I doubt not but I could produce as strong and enforcing evidence for the Divine Original and Authority of the Alcoran, as some body has for the Self-evidencing light and power of the holy Scriptures.

Notes

• Pag. 88.
• Pag. 92, 93
• Pag 9••.
• Pag. 85.
• Pag. 85.
• Vid. c. 1. S••ct. 10.
• Pag. 89.
• Pag. 85
• Pag 107, 144.
• Pag. 150.
• Pag. 97.
• Pag. 105.
• Pag. 95.
• Ibid.
• Pag 96.
• Vide pag. 114, 136, 137, 159
• Pag. 159.
• Pag. 96.
• Pag 159.
• Ibid.
• Pag. 97.
• Pag. 125.
• Pag. 103.
• Pag. 104.
• Pag. 113.
• Pag. 139.
• Pag. 101.
• Pag. 108.
• Pag. 109, 10.
• Ibid.
• Pag. 111.
• Pag. 116.
• Pag. 157.
• From pag. 117, to p. 125.
• Pag. 133, 134, 135.