Philosophical letters, or, Modest reflections upon some opinions in natural philosophy maintained by several famous and learned authors of this age, expressed by way of letters / by the thrice noble, illustrious, and excellent princess the Lady Marchioness of Newcastle.

SECT. II.

I.

MADAM,

BEing come now to the Perusal of the Works of that learned Author Dr. Moor, I find that the onely de∣sign of his Book called Antidote, is to prove the Existence of a God, and to refute, or rather convert Atheists; which I wonder very much at, con∣sidering, he says himself, That there is no man under the cope of Heaven but believes a God; which if so, what needs there to make so many arguments to no purpose? unless it be to shew Learning and wit; In my opinion, it were better to convert Pagans to be Chri∣stians, or to reform irregular Christians to a more pious life, then to prove that, which all men believe, which is the way to bring it into question. For certainly, according to the natural Light of Reason, there is a God, and no man, I believe, doth doubt it; for though

there may be many vain words, yet I think there is no such atheistical belief amongst man-kind, nay, not onely amongst men, but also, amongst all other creatures, for if nature believes a God, all her parts, especially the sensitive and rational, which are the living and knowing parts, and are in all natural creatures, do the like, and therefore all parts and creatures in nature do adore and worship God, for any thing man can know to the contrary; for no question, but natures soule adores and worships God as well as man's soule; and why may not God be worshipped by all sorts and kinds of creatures as well, as by one kind or sort? I will not say the same way, but I believe there is a general worship and adoration of God; for as God is an Infinite Deity, so certainly he has an Infinite Worship and Ado∣ration, and there is not any part of nature, but adores and worships the only omnipotent God, to whom belongs Praise and Glory from and to all eternity: For it is very improbable, that God should be worshipped onely in part, and not in whole, and that all creatures were made to obey man, and not to worship God, onely for man's sake, and not for God's worship, for man's use, and not God's adoration, for mans spoil and not God's blessing. But this Presumption, Pride, Vain-glory and Ambi∣tion of man, proceeds from the irregularity of nature, who being a servant, is apt to commit errors; and cannot be so absolute and exact in her devotion, adoration and worship, as she ought, nor so well observant of God as God is observing her: Nevertheless, there is not any of her parts or creatures, that God is not acknowledged by, though not so perfectly as he ought, which is caused by the irregularities of nature, as I said before.

And so God of his mercy have mercy upon all Crea∣tures; To whose protection I commend your Ladi∣ship, and rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

II.

MADAM,

SInce I spake in my last of the adoration and worship of God, you would faine know, whether we can have an Idea of God? I answer, That naturally we may, and really have a knowledge of the existence of God, as I proved in my former letter, to wit, that there is a God, and that he is the Author of all things, who rules and governs all things, and is also the God of Nature: but I dare not think, that naturally we can have an Idea of the essence of God, so as to know what God is in his very nature and essence; for how can there be a finite Idea of an Infinite God? You may say, As well as of Infinite space. I answer, Space is relative, or has respect to body, but there is not any thing that can be compared to God; for the Idea of Infinite nature is material, as being a material creature of Infinite material Nature. You will say, How can a finite part have an Idea of infinite nature? I answer, Very well, by reason the Idea is part of Infinite Nature, and

so of the same kind, as material; but God being an Eter∣nal, Infinite, Immaterial, Individable Being, no natural creature can have an Idea of him. You will say, That the Idea of God in the mind is immaterial; I answer, I cannot conceive, that there can be any imma∣terial Idea in nature; but be it granted, yet that Im∣material is not a part of God, for God is individable, and hath no parts; wherefore the Mind cannot have an Idea of God, as it hath of Infinite nature, being a part of nature; for the Idea of God cannot be of the essence of God, as the Idea of nature is a corporeal part of nature: and though nature may be known in some parts, yet God being Incomprehensible, his Essence can by no wayes or means be naturally known; and this is constantly believed, by

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend, and Servant.

III.

MADAM,

ALthough I mentioned in my last, that it is impos∣sible to have an Idea of God, yet your Author is pleased to say, That he will not stick to affirm, that the Idea or notion of God is as easie, as any notion else whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the world. To which I answer, That

in my opinion, God is not so easily to be known by any creature, as man may know himself; nor his attributes so well, as man can know his own natural proprieties: for Gods Infinite attributes are not conceivable, and cannot be comprehended by a finite knowledg and un∣derstanding, as a finite part of nature; for though nature's parts may be Infinite in number, and as they have a relation to the Infinite whole, if I may call it so, which is Infinite nature, yet no part is infinite in it self, and therefore it cannot know so much as whole nature: and God being an Infinite Deity, there is required an Infi∣nite capacity to conceive him; nay, Nature her self al∣though Infinite, yet cannot posibly have an exact notion of God, by reason of the disparity between God and her self; and therefore it is not probable, if the Infinite ser∣vant of God is not able to conceive him, that a finite part or creature of nature, of what kind or sort soever, whe∣ther Spiritual, as your Author is pleased to name it, or Corporeal, should comprehend God. Concerning my belief of God, I submit wholly to the Church, and believe as I have bin informed out of the Athanasian Creed, that the Father is Incomprehensible, the Sonne Incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost Incomprehen∣sible; and that there are not three, but one Incompre∣hensible God; Wherefore if any man can prove (as I do verily believe he cannot) that God is not Incompre∣hensible, he must of necessity be more knowing then the whole Church, however he must needs dissent from the Church. But perchance your Author may say, I raise new and prejudicial opinions, in saying that matter is eternal. I answer, The Holy Writ doth not mention Matter to be created, but onely Particular

Creatures, as this Visible World, with all its Parts, as the history or description of the Creation of the World in Genesis plainly shews; For God said, Let it it be Light, and there was Light; Let there be a Firmament in the midst of the Waters, and let it divide the Waters from the Waters; and Let the Waters under the Heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry Land appear; and let the Earth bring forth Grass, the Herb yielding Seed, and the Fruit-tree yielding Fruit after his kind; and let there be Lights in the Firmament of the Heaven, to divide the Day from the Night, &c. Which proves, that all creatures and figures were made and pro∣duced out of that rude and desolate heap or chaos which the Scripture mentions, which is nothing else but matter, by the powerful Word and Command of God, executed by his Eternal Servant, Nature; as I have heretofore declared it in a Letter I sent you in the beginning concerning Infinite Nature. But least I seem to encroach too much upon Divinity, I submit this Interpretation to the Church; However, I think it not against the ground of our Faith; for I am so far from maintaining any thing either against Church or State, as I am submitting to both in all duty, and shall do so as long as I live, and rest,

MADAM,

Your Faithful Friend and Servant.

IV.

MADAM,

SInce your Worthy and Learned Author is pleased to mention, That an ample experience both of Men and Things doth enlarge our Understanding, I have taken occasion hence to enquire, how a mans Under∣standing may be encreased or inlarged. The Under∣standing must either be in Parts, or it must be Indivi∣dable as one; if in Parts, then there must be so many Understandings as there are things understood; but if Individable, and but one Understanding, then it must dilate it self upon so many several objects. I for my part, assent to the first, That Understanding increases by Parts, and not by Dilation, which Dilation must needs follow, if the Mind or Understanding of man be Indivisible and without parts; but if the Mind or Soul be Individable, then I would fain know, how Under∣standing, Imagination, Conception, Memory, Re∣membrance, and the like, can be in the mind? You will say, perhaps, they are so many faculties or pro∣perties of the Incorporeal Mind, but, I hope, you do not intend to make the Mind or Soul a Deity, with so many attributes, Wherefore, in my opinion, it is safer to say, That the Mind is composed of several active Parts: but of these Parts I have treated in my Philosophy, where you will find, that all the several Parts of Na∣ture are Living and Knowing, and that there is no part that has not Life and Knowledg, being all composed

of rational and sensitive matter, which is the life and soul of Nature; and that Nature being Material, is composable and dividable, which is the cause of so ma∣ny several Creatures, where every Creature is a part of Nature, and these Infinite parts or creatures are Nature her self; for though Nature is a self-moving substance, and by self-motion divides and composes her self several manners or ways into several forms and figures, yet be∣ing a knowing, as well as a living substance, she knows how to order her parts and actions wisely; for as she hath an Infinite body or substance, so she has an Infinite life and knowledg; and as she hath an Infinite life and knowledg, so she hath an infinite wisdom: But mistake me not, Madam; I do not mean an Infinite Divine Wis∣dom, but an Infinite Natural Wisdom, given her by the Infinite bounty of the Omnipotent God; but yet this Infinite Wisdom, Life and Knowledg in Nature make but one Infinite. And as Nature hath degrees of matter, so she has also degrees and variety of corpo∣real motions; for some parts of matter are self-moving, and some are moved by these self-moving parts of mat∣ter; and all these parts, both the moving and moved, are so intermixed, that none is without the other, no not in any the least Creature or part of Nature we can con∣ceive; for there is no Creature or part of Nature, but has a comixture of those mentioned parts of animate and inanimate matter, and all the motions are so ordered by Natures wisdom, as not any thing in Nature can be otherwise, unless by a Supernatural Command and Power of God; for no part of corporeal matter and motion can either perish, or but rest; one part may cause another part to alter its motions, but not to quit

motion, no more then one part of matter can annihilate or destroy another; and therefore matter is not meerly Passive, but always Active, by reason of the thorow mixture of animate and inanimate matter; for although the animate matter is onely active in its nature, and the inanimate passive, yet because they are so closely united and mixed together that they make but one body, the parts of the animate or self-moving matter do bear up and cause the inanimate parts to move and work with them; and thus there is an activity in all parts of matter moving and working as one body, without any fixation or rest, for all is moveable, moving and moved. All which, Madam, if it were well observed, there would not be so many strange opinions concerning nature and her actions, making the purest and subtillest part of mat∣ter immaterial or incorporeal, which is as much, as to extend her beyond nature, and to rack her quite to no∣thing. But I fear the opinion of Immaterial substances in Nature will at last bring in again the Heathen Reli∣gion, and make us believe a god Pan, Bacchus, Ceres, Venus, and the like, so as we may become worship∣pers of Groves and shadows, Beans and Onions, as our Forefathers. I say not this, as if I would ascribe any worship to Nature, or make her a Deity, for she is one∣ly a servant to God, and so are all her parts or creatures, which parts or creatures, although they are transform∣ed, yet cannot be annihilated, except Nature her self be annihilated, which may be, whensoever the Great God pleases; for her existence and resolution, or total destruction, depends upon Gods Will and Decree, whom she fears, adores, admires, praises and prayes unto, as being her God and Master; and as she adores

God, so do all her parts and creatures, and amongst the rest Man, so that there is no Atheist in Infinite Nature, at least not in the opinion of,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

V.

MADAM,

I Cannot well conceive what your Author means by the Common Laws of Nature; But if you desire my opinion how many Laws Nature hath, and what they are; I say Nature hath but One Law, which is a wise Law, viz. to keep Infinite matter in order, and to keep [so much Peace, as not to disturb the Foundation of her Government: for though Natures actions are various, and so many times opposite, which would seem to make wars between several Parts, yet those active Parts, being united into one Infinite body, cannot break Natures general Peace; for that which Man names War, Sickness, Sleep, Death, and the like, are but various particular actions of the onely matter; not, as your Author imagines, in a confusion, like Bullets, or such like things juggled together in a mans Hat, but very orderly and methodical: And the Playing motions of nature are the actions of Art, but her serious actions are the actions of Production, Generation and Trans∣formation

in several kinds, sorts and particulars of her Creatures, as also the action of ruling and governing these her several active Parts. Concerning the Pre∣eminence and Prerogative of Man, whom your Author calls The flower and chief of all the products of nature upon this Globe of the earth; I answer, That Man can∣not well be judged of himself, because he is a Party, and so may be Partial; But if we observe well, we shall find that the Elemental Creatures are as excellent as Man, and as able to be a friend or foe to Man, as Man to them, and so the rest of all Creatures; so that I can∣not perceive more abilities in Man then in the rest of na∣tural Creatures; for though he can build a stately House, yet he cannot make a Honey-comb; and though he can plant a Slip, yet he cannot make a Tree; though he can make a Sword, or Knife, yet he cannot make the Mettal. And as Man makes use of other Crea∣tures, so other Creatures make use of Man, as far as he is good for any thing: But Man is not so useful to his neighbour or fellow-creatures, as his neighbour or fellow-creatures to him, being not so profitable for use, as apt to make spoil. And so leaving him, I rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

VI.

MADAM,

YOur Author demands, Whether there was ever any man, that was not mortal, and whether there be any mortal that had not a beginning? Truly, if na∣ture be eternal, all the material figures which ever were, are, and can be, must be also eternal in nature; for the figures cannot be annihilated, unless nature be destroy∣ed; and although a Creature is dissolved and trans∣formed into numerous different figures, yet all these several figures remain still in those parts of matter, whereof that creature was made, for matter never chan∣ges, but is always one and the same, and figure is no∣thing else but matter transposed or transformed by mo∣tion several modes or ways. But if you conceive Mat∣ter to be one thing, Figure another, and Motion a third, several, distinct and dividable from each other, it will produce gross errors, for, matter, motion, and figure, are but one thing. And as for that common question, whether the Egg was before the Chick, or the Chick before the Egg, it is but a thred-bare argument, which proves nothing, for there is no such thing as First in E∣ternity, neither doth Time make productions or gene∣rations, but Matter; and whatsoever matter can pro∣duce or generate, was in matter before it was produced; wherefore the question is, whether Matter, which is Nature, had a beginning, or not? I say not: for put the case, the figures of Earth, Air, Water, and Fire,

Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Animals, Ve∣getables and Minerals, &c. were not produced from all Eternity, yet those figures have nevertheless been in Matter, which is Nature, from all eternity, for these mentioned Creatures are onely made by the corpo∣real motions of Matter, transforming Matter into such several figures; Neither can there be any pe∣rishing or dying in Nature, for that which Man calls so, is onely an alteration of Figure. And as all other productions are but a change of Matters sensitive motions, so all irregular and extravagant opinions are nothing but a change of Matters rati∣onal motions; onely productions by rational mo∣tions are interior, and those by sensitive motions ex∣terior. For the Natural Mind is not less material then the body, onely the Matter of the Mind is much purer and subtiller then the Matter of the Body. And thus there is nothing in Nature but what is material; but he that thinks it absurd to say, the World is composed of meer self-moving Matter, may consider, that it is more absurd to believe Immaterial substances or spirits in Nature, as also a spirit of Nature, which is the Vicarious power of God upon Matter; For why should it not be as probable, that God did give Matter a self∣moving power to her self, as to have made ano∣ther Creature to govern her? For Nature is not a Babe, or Child, to need such a Spiritual Nurse, to teach her to go, or to move; neither is she so young a Lady as to have need of a Go∣verness, for surely she can govern her self; she needs not a Guardian for fear she should run away

with a younger Brother, or one that cannot make her a Jointure. But leaving those strange opinions to the fancies of their Authors, He add no more, but that I am,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend, and Servant.

VII.

MADAM,

YOur Author being very earnest in arguing a∣gainst those that maintain the opinion of Matter being self-moving, amongst the rest of his argu∣ments brings in this: Suppose, says he, Matter could move it self, would meer Matter with self-motion amount to that admirable wise contrivance of things which we see in the World? — All the evasion I can imagine, our adver∣saries may use here, will be this: That Matter is capable of sense, and the finest and most subtil of the most refined sense; and consequently of Imagination too, yea happily of Reason and Understanding. I answer, it is very probable, that not onely all the Matter in the World or Universe hath Sense, but also Reason; and that the sensitive part of matter is the builder, and the rational the designer; whereof I have spoken of before, and you may find more of it in my Book of Philosophy. But, says your Author, Let us see, if all their heads laid

together can contrive the anatomical Fabrick of any Crea∣ture that liveth? I answer, all parts of Nature are not bound to have heads or tayls; but if they have, surely they are wiser then many a man's. I demand, says he, Has every one of these Particles, that must have a hand in the framing of the body of an animal, the whole design of the work by the Impress of some Phantasme upon it? or as they have several offices, so have they several parts of the design? I answer, All the actions of self-moving Matter are not Impresses, nor is every part a hand∣labourer, but every part unites by degrees into such or such a Figure. Again, says he, How is it conceiveable that any one Particle of Matter, or many together, (there not existing, yet in Nature an animal) can have the Idea Impressed of that Creature they are to frame? I answer, all figures whatsoever have been, are, or can be in Na∣ture, are existent in nature. How, says he, can they in framing several parts confer notes? by what language or speech can they communicate their Counsels one to ano∣ther? I answer, Knowledg doth not always require speech, for speech is an effect and not a cause, but knowledg is a cause and not an effect; and nature hath infinite more ways to express knowledg then man can imagine, Wherefore, he concludes, that they should mutually serve one another in such a design, is more im∣possible; then that so many men, blind and dumb from their nativity, should joyn their forces and wits together to build a Castle, or carve a statue of such a Creature, as none of them knew any more in several, then some one of the smallest parts thereof, but not the relation it bore to the whole. I answer, Nature is neither blind nor dumb, nor any ways defective, but infinitely wife and knowing; for

blindness and dumbness are but effects of some of her particular actions, but there is no defect in self-moving matter, nor in her actions in general; and it is absurd to conceive the Generality of wisdom according to an Irre∣gular effect or defect of a particular Creature; for the General actions of Nature are both life and knowledg, which are the architects of all Creatures, and know better how to frame all kinds and sorts of Creatures then man can conceive; and the several parts of Matter have a more easie way of communication, then Mans head hath with his hand, or his hand with pen, ink, and paper, when he is going to write; which later example will make you understand my opinion the better, if you do but compare the rational part of Matter to the head, the sensitive to the hand, the inanimate to pen, ink and paper, their action to writing, and their framed figures to those figures or letters which are written; in all which is a mutual agreement without noise or trouble. But give me leave, Madam, to tell you, That self-moving Matter may sometimes erre and move irregularly, and in some parts not move so strong, curious, or subtil at sometimes, as in other parts, for Nature delights in va∣riety; Nevertheless she is more wise then any Particu∣lar Creature or part can conceive, which is the cause that Man thinks Nature's wise, subtil and lively actions, are as his own gross actions, conceiving them to be con∣strained and turbulent, not free and easie, as well as wise and knowing; Whereas Nature's Creating, Genera∣ting and Producing actions are by an easie connexion of parts to parts, without Counterbuffs, Joggs and Jolts, producing a particular figure by degrees, and in order and method, as humane sense and reason may

well perceive: And why may not the sensitive and ra∣tional part of Matter know better how to make a Bee, then a Bee doth how to make Honey and Wax? or have a better communication betwixt them, then Bees that fly several ways, meeting and joyning to make their Combes in their Hives? But pardon, Madam, for I think it a Crime to compare the Creating, Generating and producing Coporeal Life and Wisdom of Nature unto any particular Creature, although every particu∣lar Creature hath their share, being a part of Nature. Wherefore those, in my opinion, do grosly err, that bind up the sensitive matter onely to taste, touch, hear∣ing, seeing, and smelling; as if the sensitive parts of Nature had not more variety of actions, then to make five senses; for we may well observe, in every Crea∣ture there is difference of sense and reason according to the several modes of self-motion; For the Sun, Stars, Earth, Air, Fire, Water, Plants, Animals, Mine∣rals; although they have all sense and knowledg, yet they have not all sense and knowledg alike, because sense and knowledg moves not alike in every kind or sort of Creatures, nay many times very different in one and the same Creature; but yet this doth not cause a general Ignorance, as to be altogether Insensible or Irrational, neither do the erroneous and irregular actions of sense and reason prove an annihilation of sense and reason; as for example, a man may become Mad or a Fool through the irregular motions of sense and reason, and yet have still the Perception of sense and reason, onely the alteration is caused through the alteration of the sen∣sitive and rational corporeal motions or actions, from regular to irregular; nevertheless he has Perceptions,

Thoughts, Ideas, Passions, and whatsoever is made by sensitive and rational Matter, neither can Percep∣tion be divided from Motion, nor Motion from Mat∣ter; for all sensation is Corporeal, and so is Perception. I can add no more, but take my leave, and rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

VIII.

MADAM,

YOur Author is pleased to say, that Matter is a Prin∣ciple purely passive, and no otherwise moved or mo∣dified, then as some other thing moves and modifies it, but cannot move it self at all; which is most demonstra∣ble to them that contend for sense and perception in it: For if it had any such perception, it would, by vertue of its self-motion withdraw its self from under the knocks of hammers, or fury of the fire; or of its own accord approach to such things as are most agreeable to it, and pleasing, and that without the help of muscles, it being thus immediately endowed with a self-moving power. By his leave, Ma∣dam, I must tell you, that I see no consequence in this argument; Because some parts of matter cannot with∣draw themselves from the force and power of other parts, therefore they have neither sense, reason, nor perception: For put the case, a man should be over∣powr'd

by some other men, truely he would be forced to suffer, and no Immaterial Spirits, I think, would assist him. The very same may be said of other Crea∣tures or parts of Nature; for some may over-power others, as the fire, hammer and hand doth over-power a Horse-shooe, which cannot prevail over so much odds of power and strength; And so likewise it is with sickness and health, life and death; for example, some corporeal motions in the body turning Rebels, by mo∣ving contrary to the health of an animal Creature, it must become sick; for not every particular creature hath an absolute power, the power being in the Infi∣nite whole, and not in single divided parts: Indeed, to speak properly, there is no such thing as an absolute power in Nature; for though Nature hath power to move it self, yet not beyond it self. But mistake me not, for I mean by an absolute Power; not a circum∣scribed and limited, but an unlimited power, no ways bound or confined, but absolutely or every way Infi∣nite, and there is not any thing that has such an absolute power but God alone: neither can Nature be undivi∣dable, being Corporeal or Material; nor rest from motion being naturally self-moving, and in a perpetual motion. Wherefore though Matter is self-moving, and very wise, (although your Author denies it, cal∣ling those Fools that maintain this a opinion) yet it can∣not go beyond the rules of its Nature, no more then any Art can go beyond its Rules and Principles: And as for what your Author says, That every thing would approach to that, which is agreeable and pleasant; I think I need no demonstration to prove it; sor we may plainly see it in all effects of Nature, that there is Sym∣pathy

and Antipathy, and what is this else, but ap∣proaching to things agreeable and pleasant, and with∣drawing it self from things disagreeable, and hurtful or offensive? But of this subject I shall discourse more hereafter, wherefore I finish here, and rest,

MADAM,

Your Faithful Friend and Servant.

IX.

MADAM,

YOur Authors opinion is, That Matter being once actually divided as far as possibly it can, it is a per∣fect contradiction it should be divided any further. I answer, Though Nature is Infinite, yet her actions are not all dilative nor separative, but some divide and some compose, some dilate and some contract, which causes a mean betwixt Natures actions or motions. Next your Author says, That as Infinite Greatness has no Figure, so Infinite Littleness hath none also. I answer, Whatsoever hath a body, has a figure; for it is impossible that substance, or body, and figure, should be separated from each other, but wheresoever is body or substance, there is also figure, and if there be an infi∣nite substance, there must also be an infinite figure, although not a certain determined or circumscribed fi∣gure, for such a figure belongs onely to finite particulars;

and therefore I am of your Authors mind, That it is a contradiction to say an Infinite Cube or Triangle, for a Cube and a Triangle is a perfect circumscribed figure, having its certain compass and circumference, be it ne∣ver so great or little; wherefore to say an Infinite Cube, would be as much as to say a Finite Infinite. But as for your Authors example of Infinite matter, space or duration, divided into three equal parts, all which he says must needs be Infinite, or else the whole wil not be so, and then the middle part of them will seem both Finite and Infinite. I answer, That Matter is not dividable into three equal parts, for three is a finite number and so are three equal parts; but I say that Matter being an Infinite body, is dividable into Infinite parts, and it doth not follow, as your Author says, That one of those infinite parts must be infinite also, for else there would be no difference betwixt the whole and its parts; I say whole for di∣stinctions and better expressions sake, and do not mean such a whole which hath a certain number of parts, and is of a certain and limited figure, although never so great; but an Infinite whole, which expression I must needs use, by reason I speak of Infinite parts; and that each one of these Infinite parts in number may be finite in substance or figure, is no contradiction, but very probable and rational; nay, I think it rather absurd to say that each part is infinite; for then there would be no difference betwixt parts and whole, as I said be∣fore. Onely this is to be observed, that the Infinite whole is Infinite in substance or bulk, but the parts are Infinite in number, and not in bulk, for each part is circumscribed, and finite in its exterior figure and sub∣stance. But mistake me not, when I speak of circum∣scribed

and finite single parts; for I do not mean, that each part doth subsist single and by it self, there being no such thing as an absolute single part in Nature, but Infinite Matter being by self-motion divided into an infinite number of parts, all these parts have so near a relation to each other, and to the infinite whole, that one can∣not subsist without the other; for the Infinite parts in number do make the Infinite whole, and the Infinite whole consists in the Infinite number of parts; wherefore it is onely their figures which make a difference betwixt them; for each part having its proper figure different from the other, which is circumscribed and limited, it is called a finite single part; and such a part cannot be said Infinitely dividable, for infinite composition and division belong onely to the Infinite body of Nature, which being infinite in substance may also be infinitely divided, but not a finite and single part: Besides, Infi∣nite composition doth hinder the Infinite division, and Infinite division hinders the Infinite composition; so that one part cannot be either infinitely composed, or infinitely divided; and it is one thing to be dividable, and another to be divided. And thus, when your Au∣thor mentions in another place, That if a body be divi∣sible into Infinite Parts, it hath an Infinite number of ex∣tended parts: If by extension he mean corporeal dimen∣sion, I am of his opinion; for there is no part, be it ne∣ver so little in Nature, but is material; and if material, it has a body; and if a body, it must needs have a bo∣dily dimension; and so every part will be an extended part: but since there is no part but is finite in its self, it cannot be divisible into infinite parts; neither can any part be infinitely dilated or contracted; for as compo∣sition

and division do hinder and obstruct each other from running into Infinite, so doth dilation hinder the Infinite contraction, and contraction the Infinite dila∣tion, which, as I said before, causes a mean betwixt Na∣ture's actions; nevertheless, there are Infinite dilations and contractions in Nature, because there are Infinite contracted and dilated parts, and so are infinite divisions because there are infinite divided parts; but contracti∣on, dilation, extension, composition, division, and the like, are onely Nature's several actions; and as there can be no single part in Nature that is Infinite, so there can neither be any single Infinite action. But as for Matter, Motion and Figure, those are Indivi∣dable and Inseparable, and make but one body or sub∣stance; for it is as impossible to divide them, as impos∣sible it is to your Author to separate the essential propri∣eties, which he gives, from an Immortal Spirit; And as Matter, Motion and Figure are inseparable; so is like∣wise Matter, Space, Place and Duration; For Parts, Motion, Figure, Place and Duration, are but one In∣finite body; onely the Infinite parts are the Infinite divi∣sions of the Infinite body, and the Infinite body is a composition of the Infinite parts; but figure, place and body are all one, and so is time, and duration, except you will call time the division of duration, and duration the composition of time; but infinite time, and infinite duration is all one in Nature: and thus Nature's Prin∣cipal motions and actions are dividing, composing, and disposing or ordering, according to her Natural wis∣dom, by the Omnipotent God's leave and permission. Concerning the Sun, which your Author speaks of in the same place, and denies him to be a Spectator of our

Particular affairs upon Earth; saying, there is no such divine Principle in him, whereby he can do it. I will speak nothing against, nor for it; but I may say, that the Sun hath such a Principle as other Creatures have, which is, that he has sensitive and rational corporeal motions, as well as animals or other Creatures, al∣though not in the same manner, nor the same organs; and if he have sensitive and rational motions, he may al∣so have sensitive and rational knowledge or perception, as well as man, or other animals and parts of Nature have, for ought any body knows; for it is plain to hu∣mane sense and reason, that all Creatures must needs have rational and sensitive knowledg, because they have all sensitive and rational matter and motions. But leaving the Sun for Astronomers to contemplate upon, I take my leave, and rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend, and Servant.

X.

MADAM,

YOur Author in his arguments against Motion, be∣ing a Principle of Nature, endeavours to prove, that Beauty, Colour, Symmetry, and the like, in Plants, as well as in other Creatures, are no result from the meer motion of the matter; and forming this

objection, It may be said, says he, That the regular motion of the matter made the first plant of every kind; but we demand, What regulated the motion of it, so as to guide it, to form it self into such a state? I answer, The Wis∣dom of Nature or infinite Matter did order its own actions so, as to form those her Parts into such an exact and beautiful figure, as such a Tree, or such a Flower, or such a Fruit, and the like; and some of her Parts are pleased and delighted with other parts, but some of her parts are afraid or have an aversion to other parts; and hence is like and dislike, or sympathy and antipathy, hate and love, according as nature, which is infinite self-moving matter, pleases to move; for though Na∣tural Wisdom is dividable into parts, yet these parts are united in one infinite Body, and make but one Being in it self, like as the several parts of a man make up but one perfect man; for though a man may be wise in se∣veral causes or actions, yet it is but one wisdom; and though a Judg may shew Justice in several causes, yet it is but one Justice; for Wisdom and Justice, though they be practised in several causes, yet it is but one Wis∣dom, and one Justice; and so, all the parts of a mans body, although they move differently, yet are they but one man's bodily actions; Just as a man, if he carve or cut out by art several statues, or draw several Pi∣ctures, those statues or pictures are but that one man's work. The like may be said of Natures Motions and Figures; all which are but one self-active or self-mo∣ving Material Nature. But Wise Nature's Ground or Fundamental actions are very Regular, as you may observe in the several and distinct kinds, sorts and par∣ticulars of her Creatures, and in their distinct Pro∣prieties,

Qualities, and Faculties, belonging not onely to each kind and sort, but to each particular Creature; and since man is not able to know perfectly all those pro∣prieties which belong to animals, much less will he be able to know and judg of those that are in Vegetables, Minerals and Elements; and yet these Creatures, for any thing Man knows, may be as knowing, understand∣ing, and wise as he; and each as knowing of its kind or sort, as man is of his; But the mixture of ignorance and knowledg in all Creatures proceeds from thence, that they are but Parts; and there is no better proof, that the mind of man is dividable, then that it is not perfectly knowing; nor no better proof that it is composeable, then that it knows so much: but all minds are not alike, but some are more composed then others, which is the cause, some know more then others; for if the mind in all men were alike, all men would have the same Ima∣ginations, Fancies, Conceptions, Memories, Remem∣brances, Passions, Affections, Understanding, and so forth: The same may be said of their bodies; for if all mens sensitive parts were as one, and not dividable and composeable, all their Faculties, Properties, Con∣stitutions, Complexions, Appetites, would be the same in every man without any difference; but humane sense and reason doth well perceive, that neither the mind, life nor body are as one piece, without division and com∣position. Concerning the divine Soul, I do not treat of it; onely this I may say, That all are not devout a∣like, nor those which are, are not at all times alike de∣vout. But to conclude: some of our modern Philo∣sophers think they do God good service, when they en∣deavour to prove Nature, as Gods good Servant, to

be stupid, ignorant, foolish and mad, or any thing rather then wise, and yet they believe themselves wise, as if they were no part of Nature; but I cannot ima∣gine any reason why they should rail on her, except Nature had not given them as great a share or portion, as she hath given to others; for children in this case do often rail at their Parents, for leaving their Brothers and Sisters more then themselves. However, Nature can do more then any of her Creatures: and if Man can Paint, Imbroider, Carve, Ingrave curiously; why may not Nature have more Ingenuity, Wit and Wis∣dom then any of her particular Creatures? The same may be said of her Government. And so leaving Wise Nature, I rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

XI.

MADAM,

TO your Authors argument, That if Motion be∣long naturally to Matter, Matter being Uniform, it must be alike moved in every part of particle ima∣ginable of it, by reason this Motion being natural and es∣sential to Matter, is alike every way. I answer, That this is no more necessary, then that the several actions of one body, or of one part of a body should be alike; for though Matter is one and the same in its Nature,

and never changes, yet the motions are various, which motions are the several actions of one and the same Na∣tural Matter; and this is the cause of so many several Creatures; for self-moving matter by its self-moving power can act several ways, modes or manners; and had not natural matter a self-acting power, there could not be any variety in Nature; for Nature knows of no rest, there being no such thing as rest in Nature; but she is in a perpetual motion, I mean self-motion, given her from God: Neither do I think it Atheistical (as your Author deems) to maintain this opinion of self∣motion, as long as I do not deny the Omnipotency of God; but I should rather think it Irreligious to make so many several Creatures as Immaterial Spirits, like so many severall Deities, to rule and govern Nature and all material substances in Nature; for what Atheism doth there lie in saying, that natural matter is natu∣rally moving, and wise in her self? Doth this oppose the omnipotency and Infinite wisdom of God? It ra∣ther proves and confirms it; for all Natures free power of moving and wisdom is a gift of God, and proceeds from him; but I must confess, it destroys the power of Immaterial substances, for Nature will not be ruled nor governed by them, and to be against Natural Immaterial substances, I think, is no Atheisme, except we make them Deities; neither is it Atheisme to contradict the opinion of those, that believe such natural incorporeal Spirits, unless man make himself a God. But although Nature is wise, as I said before, and acts methodically, yet the variety of motions is the cause of so many Irre∣gularities in Nature, as also the cause of Irregular opi∣nions; for all opinions are made by self-moving matters

motions, or (which is all one) by corporeal self-motion, and some in their opinions do conceive Nature according to the measure of themselves, as that Nature can, nor could not do more, then they think, nay, some believe they can do as much as Nature doth; which opinions, whether they be probable or regular, I'le let any man judg; adding onely this, that to humane sense and rea∣son it appears plainly, that as God has given Nature a power to act freely, so he doth approve of her actions, being wise and methodical in all her several Productions, Generations, Transformations and Designs: And so I conclude for the present, onely subscribe my self, as re∣ally I am,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend, and Servant.

XII.

MADAM,

I Am of your Authors opinion, concerning self-acti∣vity or self-motion, That what is Active of it self, can no more cease to be active then to be: And I have been always of this opinion, even from the first begining of my conceptions in natural Philosophy, as you may see in my first Treatise of Natural Philosophy, which I put forth eleven years since; where I say, That self-moving Matter is in a Perpetual motion; But your Author en∣deavors

srom thence to conclude, That Matter is not self-active, because it is reducible to rest. To which I answer, That there is no such thing as Rest in Na∣ture: Not do I say, that all sorts of motions are subject to our senses, for those that are subject to our sensitive Per∣ceptions, are but gross Motions, in comparison to those that are not subject to our exterior senses: as for exam∣ple; We see some bodies dilate, others consume, others corrupt; yet we do not see how they dilate, nor how they consume, nor how they corrupt: Also we see some bodies contract, some attract, some condense, some consist, &c. yet we do not see their contracting, attract∣ing, condensing, consisting or retenting motions; and yet we cannot say, they are not corporeal motions, be∣cause not subject to our exterior senses; for if there were not contracting, attracting, retenting or consistent cor∣poreal self-motions, it had been impossible that any creature could have been composed into one united fi∣gure, much less stayed and continued in the same fi∣gure without a general alteration. But your Author says, If Matter, as Matter, had Motion, nothing would hold together, but Flints, Adamants, Brass, Iron, yea, this whole Earth, would suddenly melt into a thinner sub∣stance then the subtil Air, or rather it never had been con∣densated together to this consistency we find it. But I would ask him, what reason he can give, that corpo∣real self-motion should make all matter rare and fluid, unless he believe there is but one kind of motion in Na∣ture, but this, human sense and reason will contradict; for we may observe there are Infinite changes of Moti∣on, and there is more variety and curiosity in corporeal motions, then any one single Creature can imagine,

much less know; but I suppose he conceives all corpo∣real matter to be gross, and that not any corporeal mo∣tion can be subtil, penetrating, contracting and dila∣ting; and that whatsoever is penetrating, contracting and dilating, is Individable: But by his leave, Madam, this doth not follow; for though there be gross degrees of Matter, and strong degrees of Corporeal Motions, yet there are also pure and subtil degrees of Matter and Motions; to wit, that degree of Matter, which I name sensitive and rational Matter, which is natural Life and Knowledg, as sensitive Life and rational Knowledg. Again, your Author askes, What glue or cement holds the parts of hard matter in Stones and Metals together? I answer, Consistent or retentive corporeal motions, by an agreeable union and conjunction in the several parts of Metal or Stone; and these retentive or consi∣stent motions, are as strong and active, if not more, then some dilative or contractive motions; for I have mentioned heretofore, that, as sensitive and rational corporeal motions are in all Creatures, so also in Stone, Metal, and any other dense body whatsoever; so that not any one Creature or part of Matter is without Mo∣tion, and therefore not any thing is at rest. But, Madam, I dare say, I could bring more reason and sense to prove, that sensitive and rational Matter is ful∣ler of activity, and has more variety of motion, and can change its own parts of self-moving Matter more suddenly, and into more exterior figures, then Imma∣terial Spirits can do upon natural Matter. But your Author says, That Immaterial Spirits are endued with Sense and Reason; I say, My sensitive and rational corporeal Matter is Sense and Reason it self, and is the

Architect or Creator of all figures of Natural matter; for though all the parts of Matter are not self-moving, yet there is not any part that is not moving or moved, by and with the mover, which is animate matter. And thus I conclude, and rest constantly,

MADAM,

Your Faithful Friend and Servant.

XIII.

MADAM,

THat Matter is uncapable of Sense, your Author proves by the example of dead Carcasses; For, says he, Motion and Sense being really one and the same thing, it must needs follow, that where there is mo∣tion, there is also sense and perception; but on the contra∣ry, there is Reaction in dead Carkasses, and yet no Sense. I answer shortly, That it is no consequence, because there is no animal sense nor exterior perceptible lo∣cal motion in a dead Carcass, therefore there is no sense at all in it; for though it has not animal sense, yet it may nevertheless have sense according to the nature of that figure, into which it did change from being an ani∣mal. Also he says, If any Matter have sense, it will follow, that upon reaction all shall have the like; and that a Bell while it is ringing, and a Bow while it is bent, and eve∣ry fack-in-a-box, that School-boys play with, shall be

living animals. I answer, It is true, if reaction made sense; but reaction doth not make sense, but sense makes reaction; and though the Bell hath not an ani∣mal knowledg, yet it may have a mineral life and knowledg, and the Bow, and the Jack-in-a-box a ve∣getable knowledg; for the shape and form of the Bell, Bow, and Jack-in-a-box, is artificial; nevertheless each in its own kind may have as much knowledg as an ani∣mal in his kind; onely they are different according to the different proprieties of their Figures: And who can prove the contrary that they have not? For certain∣ly Man cannot prove what he cannot know; but Mans nature is so, that knowing but little of other Creatures, he presently judges there is no more knowledg in Na∣ture, then what Man, at least Animals, have; and con∣fines all sense onely to Animal sense, and all knowledg to Animal knowledg. Again says your Author, That Matter is utterly uncapable of such operations as we find in our selves, and that therefore there is something in us Immaterial or Incorporeal; for we find in our selves that one and the same thing, both hears, and sees, and tastes, and perceives all the variety of objects that Na∣ture manifests unto us. I answer, That is the reason there is but one matter, and that all natural perception is made by the animate part of matter; but although there is but one matter in Nature, yet there are seve∣ral parts or degrees, and consequently several actions of that onely matter, which causes such a variety of percep∣tions, both sensitive and rational: the sensitive percep∣tion is made by the sensitive corporeal motions, copy∣ing out the figures of forreign objects in the sensitive or∣gans of the sentient; and if those sensitive motions do pat∣tern

out forreign objects in each sensitive organ alike at one and the same time, then we hear, see, taste, touch and smell, at one and the same time: But Thoughts and Passions, as Imagination, Conception, Fancy, Me∣mory, Love, Hate, Fear, Joy, and the like, are made by the rational corporeal motions in their own degree of matter, to wit, the rational. And thus all perception is made by one and the same matter, through the variety of its actions or motions, making various and several fi∣gures, both sensitive and rational. But all this variety in sense and reason, or of sensitive and rational percep∣tions, is not made by parts pressing upon parts, but by changing their own parts of matter into several fi∣gures by the power of self-motion: For example, I see a Man or Beast; that Man or Beast doth not touch my eye in the least, neither in it self, nor by pressing the ad∣joyning parts: but the sensitive corporeal motions streight upon the sight of the Man or Beast make the like figure in the sensitive organ, the Eye, and in the eyes own sub∣stance or matter, as being in the eye as well as the other degrees of matter, to wit, the rational and inanimate, for they are all mixt together. But this is to be obser∣ved, That the rational matter can and doth move in its own substance, as being the purest and subtillest degree of matter; but the sensitive being not so pure and sub∣til, moves always with the inanimate Matter, and so the perceptive figures which the rational Matter, or ra∣tional corporeal Motions make, are made in their own degree of Matter; but those figures which the sensitive patterns out, are made in the organs or parts of the sen∣tient body proper to such or such a sense or percepti∣on: as in an animal Creature, the perception of sight

is made by the sensitive corporeal motions in the Eye; the perception of hearing, in the Ear,. and so forth. As for what your Author says, That we cannot con∣ceive any portion of Matter, but is either hard or soft; I answer, That these are but effects of Matters actions, and so is rare, and dense, and the like; but there are some Creatures which seem neither perfectly rare, nor dense, nor hard, nor soft, but of mixt qualities; as for example, Quicksilver seems rare, and yet is dense; soft, and yet is hard; for though liquid Quicksilver is soft to our touch, and rare to our sight, yet it is so dense and hard, as not to be readily dissolved from its nature; and if there be such contraries and mixtures in one particular creature made of self-moving Matter, what will there not be in Matter it self, according to the old saying: If the Man such praise shall have; What the Master that keeps the knave? So if a particular Creature hath such opposite qualities and mixtures of corporeal motions, what will the Cre∣ator have which is self-moving Matter? Wherefore it is impossible to affirm, that self-moving Matter is ei∣ther all rare, or all dense, or all hard, or all soft; be∣cause by its self-moving power it can be either, or both, and so by the change and variety of motion, there may be soft and rare Points, and hard and sharp Points, hard and contracted Globes, and soft and rare Globes; also there may be pressures of Parts without printing, and printing without pressures. Concerning that part of Matter which is the Common Sensorium, your Author de∣mands, Whether some point of it receive the whole Image of the object, or whether it be wholly received into every point of it? I answer, first, That all sensitive Matter is not in Points: Next, That not any single part can

subsist of it self; and then that one Part doth not receive all parts or any part into it self; but that Parts by the power of self-motion can and do make several figures of all sizes and sorts, and can Epitomize a great object into a very little figure; for outward objects do not move the body, but the sensitive and rational matter moves ac∣cording to the figures of outward objects: I do not say always, but most commonly; But, says your Author; How can so smal a Point receive the Images of so vast or so various objects at once, without obliteration or confusion. First, I answer, That, as I said before, sensitive Mat∣ter is not bound up to a Point, nor to be a single self∣subsisting Part. Next, as for confusion, I say, that the sensitive matter makes no more confusion, then an En∣graver, when he engraves several figures in a small stone, and a Painter draws several figures in a small compass; for a Carver will cut out several figures in a Cherry-stone, and a Lady in a little black Patch; and if gross and rude Art is able to do this, why may not In∣genious and Wise Nature do? And as Nature is inge∣nious and knowing in her self, so in her Parts, and her Parts in her; for neither whole nor Parts are ignorant, but have a knowledg, each according to the motion of its own Parts; for knowledg is in Motion, and Motion in Matter; and the diversity and variety of motion is the diversity and variety of knowledg, so that every parti∣cular figure and motion hath its particular knowledg, as well as its proper and peculiar parts; and as the parts join or divide, so doth knowledg, which many times causes Arts to be lost and found, and memory and re∣membrance in Particular Creatures: I do not say, they are utterly lost in nature, but onely in respect to parti∣cular

Creatures, by the dissolving and dividing of their particular figures. For the rational matter, by reason it moves onely in its own parts, it can change and re∣change into several figures without division of parts, which makes memory and remembrance: But men not considering or believing there might be such a degree of onely matter, namely rational, it has made them erre in their judgments. Nevertheless there is a difference be∣tween sensitive and rational parts and motions, and yet they are agreeable most commonly in their actions, though not always. Also the rational can make such figures as the sensitive cannot, by reason the rational has a greater power and subtiler faculty in making variety, then the sensitive; for the sensitive is bound to move with the inanimate, but the rational moves onely in its own parts; for though the sensitive and rational often∣times cause each other to move, yet they are not of one and the same degree of matter, nor have they the same motions. And this rational Matter is the cause of all Notions, Conceptions, Imaginations, Deliberation, Determination, Memory, and any thing else that be∣longs to the Mind; for this matter is the mind of Na∣ture, and so being dividable, the mind of all Creatures, as the sensitive is the life; and it can move, as I said, more subtilly, and more variously then the sensitive, and make such figures as the sensitive cannot, without outward ex∣amples and objects. But all diversity comes by change of motion, and motions are as sympathetical and agree∣ing, as antipathetical and disagreeing; And though Na∣ture's artificial motions, which are her Playing moti∣ons, are sometimes extravagant, yet in her fundamen∣tal actions there is no extravagancy, as we may observe

by her exact rules in the various generations, the distinct kinds and sorts, the several exact measures, times, propor∣tions and motions of all her Creatures, in all which her wisdom is well exprest, and in the variety her wise plea∣sure: To which I leave her, and rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend, and Servant.

XIV.

MADAM,

IF there be any sense and perception in Matter, says your Author, it must needs be Motion or Reaction of one part of matter against another; and that all diver∣sity of sense and perception doth necessarily arise from the diversity of the Magnitude, Figure, Posture, Vigour and Direction of Motion in Parts of the Matter; In which variety of perceptions, Matter hath none, but such, as are impressed by corporeal motions, that is to say, that are perceptions of some actions, or modificated Impressions of parts of matter bearing one against another. I have declared, Madam, my opinion concerning Perception in my former Letters, that all Perception is not Im∣pression and Reaction, like as a Seal is printed on Was: For example, the corporeal rational motions in the mind do not print, but move figuratively; but the sen∣sitive motions do carve, print, engrave, and, as it were,

pencil out, as also move figuratively in productions, and do often take patterns from the rational figures, as the rational motions make figures according to the sensitive patterns; But the rational can move without patterns, and so the sensitive: For surely, were a man born blind, deaf, dumb, and had a numb palsie in his exterior parts, the sensitive and rational motions would never∣theless move both in body and mind according to the nature of his figure; for though no copies were taken from outward objects, yet he would have thoughts, passions, appetites, and the like; and though he could not see exterior objects, nor hear exterior sounds, yet no question but he would see and hear interiously after the manner of dreams, onely they might not be any thing like to what is perceiveable by man in the World; but if he sees not the Sun-light, yet he would see something equivalent to it; and if he hears not such a thing as Words, yet he would hear something equivalent to words; for it is impossible, that his sensitive and ratio∣nal faculties should be lost for want of an Ear, or an Eye; so that Perception may be without exterior ob∣ject, or marks, or patterns: for although the sensitive Motions do usually pattern out the figures of exterior objects, yet that doth not prove, but they can make in∣terior figures without such objects. Wherefore Per∣ception is not always Reaction, neither is Perception and Reaction really one thing; for though Perception and Action is one and the same, yet not always Reacti∣on; but did Perception proceed from the reaction of outward objects, a blind and deaf man would not so much as dream; for he would have no interior motion in the head, having no other exterior sense but touch,

which, if the body was troubled with a painful disease, he would neither be sensible of, but to feel pain, and interiously feel nothing but hunger and fulness; and his Mind would be as Irrational as some imagine Vege∣tables and Minerals are. To which opinion I leave them, and rest,

MADAM,

Your Faithful Friend and Servant.

XV.

MADAM,

YOur Author is pleased, in Mirth, and to disgrace the opinion of those which hold, that Perception is made by figuring, to bring in this following ex∣ample: Suppose, says he, one Particle should shape it self into a George on Horse-back with a Lance in his hand, and another into an Inchanted Castle; this George on Horse-back must run against the Castle, to make the Castle receive his impress and similitude: But what then? Truly the Encounter will be very Vnfortunate, for S. George indeed may easily break his Lance, but it is impossible that he should by justling against the Particle in the form of a Castle, conveigh the intire shape of himself and his Horse thereby, such as we find our selves able to imagine of a man on Horse-back; which is a Truth as de∣monstrable as any Theorem in Mathematicks. I answer,

first, That there is no Particle single and alone by it self; Next, I say, It is more easie for the rational matter to put it self into such figures, and to make such encoun∣ters, then for an Immaterial mind or sustance to ima∣gine it; for no imagination can be without figure, and how should an Immaterial created substance present such Figures, but by making them either in it self or upon matter? For S. George and the Castle are figures, and their encounters are real fighting actions, and how such figures and actions can be in the mind or memory, and yet not be, is impossible to conceive; for, as I said, those figures and actions must be either in the incorpo∣real mind, or in the corporeal parts of matter; and if the figures and motions may be in an incorporeal sub∣stance, much more is it probable for them to be in a corporeal; nay if the figures and their actions can be in gross corporeal matter, why should they not be in the purest part of matter, which is the rational matter? And as for being made known to the whole body, and every part thereof, it is not necessary, no more then it is ne∣cessary, that the private actions of every Man or Family should be made known to the whole Kingdom, or Town, or Parish: But my opinion of self-corporeal motion and perception, may be as demonstrable as that of Immaterial Natural Spirits, which, in my mind, is not demonstrable at all, by reason it is not corporeal or material; For how can that be naturally demon∣strable, which naturally is nothing? But your Author believes the Mind or rational Soul to be individable, and therefore concludes, that the Parts of the same Matter, although at great distance, must of necessity know each Particular act of each several Part; but that is not neces∣sary;

for if there were not ignorance through the division of Parts, every man and other creatures would know alike; and there is no better proof, that matter, or any particular creature in nature is not governed by a crea∣ted Immaterial Spirit, then that knowledg is in parts; for the hand doth not know what pain the head feels, which certainly it would do, if the mind were not dividable into parts, but an individable substance. But this is well to be observed, that some parts in some actions agree generally in one body, and some not; as for example, temperance and ap∣petite do not agree; for the corporeal actions of appetite desire to join with the corporeal actions of such or such other parts, but the corporeal actions of temperance do hinder and forbid it; whereupon there is a faction amongst the several parts: for example, a Man desires to be drunk with Wine; this desire is made by such corporeal actions as make appetite; the rational corporeal motions or actions which make tem∣perance, oppose those that make appetite, and that sort of actions which hath the better, carryes it, the hand and other parts of the body obeying the strongest side; and if there be no wine to satisfie the appetite, yet ma∣ny times the appetite continues; that is, the parts con∣tinue in the same motions that make such an appetite; but if the appetite doth not continue, then those parts have changed their motions; or when by drinking, the appetite is satisfied, and ceases, then those parts that made the appetite, have altered their former motions. But oftentimes the rational corporeal motions may so agree with the sensitive, as there may be no opposition or cros∣sing at all, but a sympathetical mutual agreement be∣twixt

them, at least an approvement; so that the ratio∣nal may approve what the sensitive covet or desire: Also some motions of the rational, as also of the sensitive matter, may disagree amongst themselves, as we see, that a man will often have a divided mind; for he will love and hate the same thing, desire and not desire one and the same thing, as to be in Heaven, and yet to be in the World: Moreover, this is to be observed, That all rational per∣ceptions or cogitations, are not so perspicuous and clear as if they were Mathematical Demonstrations, but there is some obscurity, more or less in them, at least they are not so well perceivable without comparing several figures together, which proves, they are not made by an indivi∣dable, immaterial Spirit, but by dividable corporeal parts: As for example, Man writes oftentimes false, and seldom so exact, but he is forced to mend his hand, and correct his opinions, and sometimes quite to alter them, according as the figures continue or are dissolved and al∣tered by change of motion, and according as the acti∣ons are quick or slow in these alterations, the humane mind is setled or wavering; and as figures are made, or dissolved and transformed, Opinions, Conceptions, I∣maginations, Understanding, and the like, are more or less; And according as these figures last, so is con∣stancy or inconstancy, memory or forgetfulness, and as those figures are repeated, so is remembrance; but some∣times they are so constant and permanent, as they last as long as the figure of the body, and sometimes it hap∣pens not once in an age, that the like figures are repeat∣ed, and sometimes they are repeated every moment: As for example; a man remembers or calls to mind the figure of another man, his friend, with all his qualities,

dispositions, actions, proprieties, and the like, several times in an hour, and sometimes not once in a year, and so as often as he remembers him, as often is the figure of that man repeated; and as oft as he forgets him, so often is his figure dissolved. But some imagine the ra∣tional motions to be so gross as the Trotting of a Horse, and that all the motions of Animate matter are as rude and course as renting or tearing asunder, or that all im∣pressions must needs make dents or creases. But as Na∣ture hath degrees of corporeal matter, so she hath also degrees of corporeal motions, Matter and Motion be∣ing but one substance; and it is absurd to judg of the in∣terior motions of self-moving matter, by artificial or exterior gross motions, as that all motions must be like the tearing of a sheet of Paper, or that the printing and patterning of several figures of rational and sensitive matter must be like the printing of Books; nay, all arti∣ficial Printings are not so hard, as to make dents and impresses; witness Writing, Painting, and the like; for they do not disturb the ground whereon the letters are written, or the picture drawn, and so the curious actions of the purest rational matter are neither rude nor rough; but although this matter is so subtil and pure, as not subject to exterior human senses and organs, yet certainly it is dividable, not onely in several Creatures, but in the several parts of one and the same Creature, as well as the sensitive, which is the Life of Nature, as the other is the Soul; not the Divine, but natural Soul; neither is this Soul Immaterial, bnt Corporeal; not composed of raggs and shreds, but it is the purest, simplest and subtillest matter in Nature. But to con∣clude, I desire you to remember, Madam, that this

rational and sensitive Matter in one united and fi∣nite Figure or particular Creature, has both com∣mon and particular actions; for as there are several kinds and sorts of Creatures, and particulars in every kind and sort: so the like for the actions of the rational and sensitive matter in one particular Crea∣ture. Also it is to be noted, That the Parts of rational matter, can more suddenly give and take In∣telligence to and from each other, then the sensitive; nevertheless, all Parts in Nature, at least adjoyning parts, have Intelligence between each other, more or less, because all parts make but one body; for it is not with the parts of Matter, as with several Con∣stables in several Hundreds, or several Parishes, which are a great way distant from each other, but they may be as close as the combs of Bees, and yet as partable and as active as Bees. But concerning the Intelligence of Natures Parts, I have sufficiently spo∣ken in other places; and so I'le add no more, but that I unfeignedly remain,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

XVI.

MADAM,

SEnsation in corporeal motion is first, and Perception follows, sayes your Author: to which opinion I give no assent, but do believe that Perception and Sensation are done both at one and the same time, as be∣ing one and the same thing without division, either in reason or sense, and are performed without any knocks, or jolts, or hitting against. But let me tell you, Ma∣dam, there arises a great mistake by many, from not distinguishing well, sensitive Motion, and rational Moti∣on; for though all motions are in one onely matter, yet that matter doth not move always in the same man∣ner, for then there could be no variety in Nature; and truly, if man, who is but a part of Nature, may move diversly, and put himself into numerous postures; Why may not Nature? But concerning Motions, and their variety, to avoid tedious repetitions, I must still re∣ferr you to my Book of Philosophical Opinions; I'le add onely this, that it is well to be observed, That all Mo∣tions are not Impressions, neither do all Impressions make such dents, as to disturb the adjoyning Parts: Wherefore those, in my opinion, understand Nature best, which say, that Sensation and Perception are re∣ally one and the same; but they are out, that say, there can be no communication at a distance, unless by pres∣sing and crowding; for the patterning of an out∣ward object, may be done without any inforcement or

disturbance, jogging or crowding, as I have declared heretofore; for the sensitive and rational motions in the sensitive and rational parts of matter in one creature, ob∣serving the exterior motions in outward objects, move accordingly, either regularly or irregularly in patterns; and if they have no exterior objects, as in dreams, they work by rote. And so to conclude, I am absolutely of their opinion, who believe, that there is nothing existent in Nature, but what is purely Corporeal, for this seems most probable in sense and reason to me,

MADAM,

Your Faithful Friend and Servant.

XVII.

MADAM,

OUtward Objects, as I have told you before, do not make Sense and Reason, but Sense and Reason do perceive and judg of outward objects; For the Sun doth not make sight, nor doth sight make light; but sense and reason in a Man, or any other creature, do perceive and know there are such objects as Sun, and Light, or whatsoever objects are present∣ed to them. Neither doth Dumbness, Deafness, Blind∣ness, &c. cause an Insensibility, but Sense through ir∣regular actions causes them; I say, through Irregular actions, because those effects do not properly belong to

the nature of that kind of Creatures; for every Crea∣ture, if regularly made, hath particular motions pro∣per to its figure; for natural Matters wisdom makes distinctions by her distinct corporeal motions, giving every particular Creature their due Portion and Pro∣portion according to the nature of their figures, and to the rules of her actions, but not to the rules of Arts, Mathematical Compasses, Lines, Figures, and the like. And thus the Sun, Stars, Meteors, Air, Fire, Water, Earth, Minerals, Vegetables and Animals, may all have Sense and Reason, although it doth not move in one kind or sort of Creatures, or in one particular, as in another: For the corporeal motions differ not onely in kinds and sorts, but also in Parti∣culars, as is perceivable by human sense and reason; Which is the cause, that Elements have elemental sense and knowledg, and Animals animal sense and know∣ledg, and so of Vegetables, Minerals, and the like. Wherefore the Sun and Stars may have as much sensi∣tive and rational life and knowledg as other Creatures, but such as is according to the nature of their figures, and not animal, or vegetable, or mineral sense and know∣ledg. And so leaving them, I rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

XVIII.

MADAM,

YOur Author denying that Fancy, Reason and Animadversion are seated in the Brain, and that the Brain is figured into this or that Conception: I demand, says he, in what knot, loop or interval thereof doth this faculty of free Fancy and active Reason reside? My answer is, that in my opinion, Fancy and Reason are not made in the Brain, as there is a Brain, but as there is sensitive and rational matter, which makes not onely the Brain, but all Thoughts, Conceptions, I∣maginations, Fancy, Understanding, Memory, Re∣membrance, and whatsoever motions are in the Head, or Brain: neither doth this sensitive and rational mat∣tet remain or act in one place of the Brain, but in every part thereof; and not onely in every part of the Brain, but in every part of the Body; nay, not onely in every part of a Mans Body, but in every part of Nature. But, Madam, I would ask those, that say the Brain has neither sense, reason, nor self-motion, and therefore no Perception; but that all proceeds from an Imma∣terial Principle, as an Incorporeal Spirit, distinct from the body, which moveth and actuates corporeal matter; I would fain ask them, I say, where their Immaterial Ideas reside, in what part or place of the Body? and whether they be little or great? Also I would ask them, whether there can be many, or but one Idea of God? If they say many, then there must be several, distinct Dei∣tical

Ideas; if but one, Where doth this Idea reside? If they say in the head, then the heart is ignorant of God; if in the heart, then the head is ignorant thereof, and so for all parts of the body; but if they say, in eve∣ry part, then that Idea may be disfigured by a lost mem∣ber; if they say, it may dilate and contract, then I say it is not the Idea of God, for God can neither contract nor extend; nor can the Idea it self dilate and contract, being immaterial; for contraction and dilation belong onely to bodies, or material beings: Wherefore the comparisons betwixt Nature and a particular Creature, and between God and Nature, are improper; much more betwixt God and Natures particular motions and figures, which are various and changeable, although methodical. The same I may ask of the Mind of Man, as I do of the Idea in the Mind. Also I might ask them, what they conceive the natural mind of man to be; whether material or immaterial? If material, their opinion is rational, and so the mind is dividable and composable; if immaterial, then it is a Spirit; and if a Spirit, it cannot possibly dilate nor contract, having no dimension nor divisibility of parts, (although your Author proves it by the example of Light; but I have exprest my meaning heretofore, that light is divisible) and if it have no dimension, how can it be confined in a material body? Wherefore when your Author says, the mind is a substance, it is to my reason very probable; but not when he says, it is an immaterial substance, which will never agree with my sense and reason; for it must be either something, or nothing, there being no medium between, in Nature. But pray mistake me not, Madam, when I say Immaterial is nothing; for

I mean nothing Natural, or so as to be a part of Na∣ture; for God forbid, I should deny, that God is a Spiritual Immaterial substance, or Being; neither do I deny that we can have an Idea, notion, conception, or thought of the Existence of God; for I am of your Au∣thors opinion, That there is no Man under the cope of Heaven, that doth not by the light of Nature, know, and believe there is a God; but that we should have such a perfect Idea of God, as of any thing else in the World, or as of our selves, as your Author says, I can∣not in sense and reason conceive to be true or possible. Neither am I against those Spirits, which the holy Scripture mentions, as Angels and Devils, and the di∣vine Soul of Man; but I say onely, that no Immaterial Spirit belongs to Nature, so as to be a part thereof; for Nature is Material, or Corporeal; and whatsoever is not composed of matter or body, belongs not to Na∣ture; nevertheless, Immaterial Spirits may be in Na∣ture, although not parts of Nature. But there can nei∣ther be an Immaterial Nature, nor a Natural Immate∣rial; Nay, our very thoughts and conceptions of Im∣material are Material, as made of self-moving Matter. Wherefore to conclude, these opinions in Men pro∣ceed from a Vain-glory, as to have found out some∣thing that is not in Nature; to which I leave them, and their natural Immaterial Substances, like so many Hobgoblins to fright Children withal, resting in the mean time,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend, and Servant.

XIX.

MADAM,

THere are various opinions concerning the seat of Common Sense, as your Author rehearseth them in his Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul; But my opinion is, That common sense hath also a common place; for as there is not any part of the body that hath not sense and reason, so sense and reason is in all parts of the body, as it is observable by this, that e∣very part is subject to pain and pleasure, and all parts are moveable, moving and moved; also appetites are in e∣very part of the body: As for example, if any part itches, it hath an appetite to be scratched, and every part can pattern out several objects, and so several touches; and though the rational part of matter is mixt in all parts of the body, yet it hath more liberty to make va∣riety of Motions in the head, heart, liver, spleen, sto∣mack, bowels, and the like, then in the other parts of the body; nevertheless, it is in every part, together with the sensitive: but they do not move in every part alike, but differ in each part more or less, as it may be observed; and although every part hath some diffe∣rence of knowledg, yet all have life and knowledg, sense and reason, some more, some less, and the whole bo∣dy moves according to each part, and so do all the bo∣dily Faculties and Proprieties, and not according to one single part; the rational Soul being in all parts of the bo∣dy: for if one part of the body should have a dead Palsie,

it is not, that the Soul is gone from that part, but that the sensitive and rational matter has altered its motion and figure from animal to some other kind; for certainly, the rational Soul, and so life, is in every part, as well in the Pores of the skin, as in the ventricles of the brain, and as well in the heel as in the head; and every part of the body knows its own office, what it ought to do, from whence follows an agreement of all the parts: And since there is difference of knowledg in every part of one body, well may there be difference be∣tween several kinds and sorts, and yet there is know∣ledg in all; for difference of knowledg is no argument to prove they have no knowledg at all. Wherefore I am not of the opinion, that that which moves the whole body, is as a Point, or some such thing in a little kernel or Glandula of the Brain, as an Ostrich-egge is hung up to the roof of a Chamber; or that it is in the stomack like a single penny in a great Purse; nei∣ther is it in the midst of the heart, like a Lady in a Lobster; nor in the bloud, like as a Menow, or Sprat in the Sea; nor in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, as a lousie Souldier in a Watch-tower. But you may say, it is like a farthing Candle in a great Church: I answer, That Light will not enlighten the by Chap∣pels of the Church, nor the Quest-house, nor the Belfrey; neither doth the Light move the Church, though it enlightens it: Wherefore the Soul after this manner doth not move the corporeal body, no more then the Candle moves the Church, or the Lady moves the Lobster, or the Sprat the Sea as to make it ebb and flow. But this I desire you to observe, Madam, that though all the body of man

or any other Creature, hath sense and reason, which is life and knowledg, in all parts, yet these parts being all corporeal, and having their certain proportions, can have no more then what is belonging or proportio∣nable to each figure: As for example; if a Man should feed, and not evacuate some ways or other, he could not live; and if he should evacuate and not feed, he could not subsist: wherefore in all Natures parts there is ingress and egress, although not always perceived by one creature, as Man; but all exterior objects do not enter into Man, or any other Creature, but are figured by the rational, and some by the sensitive parts or mo∣tions in the body; wherefore it is not rational to believe, that exterior objects take up any more room, then if there were none presented to the sensitive organs: Nor is there any thing which can better prove the mind to be corporeal, then that there may be several Figures in seve∣ral parts of the body made at one time, as Sight, Hear∣ing, Tasting, Smelling, and Touching, and all these in each several organ, as well at one, as at several times, either by patterns, or not; which figuring without Pattern, may be done as well by the sensitive motions in the organs, as by the rational in the mind, and is called remembrance. As for example: a Man may hear or see without an object; which is, that the sensitive and rati∣onal matter repeat such figurative actions, or make others in the sensitive organs, or in the mind: and Thoughts, Memory, Imagination, as also Passion, are no less cor∣poreal actions then the motion of the hand or heel; neither hath the rational matter, being naturally wise, occasion to jumble and knock her parts together, by reason every part knows naturally their office what

they ought to do, or what they may do. But I con∣clude, repeating onely what I have said oft before, that all Perceptions, Thoughts, and the like, are the Effects, and Life and Knowledg, the Nature and Essence of self-moving Matter. And so I rest,

MADAM,

Your Faithful Friend and Servant.

XX.

MADAM,

IAm not able to conceive how the Mind of Man can be compared to a Table-book, in which nothing is writ; nor how to a Musician, who being asleep, doth not so much as dream of any Musick, but being jogg'd and awakend by another, who tells him two or three words of a Song, and desires him to sing it, pre∣sently recovers himself, and sings upon so slight an Inti∣mation: For such intimations are nothing else but outward objects, which the interior sense consents to, and obeys; for interior sense and reason doth often obey outward objects: and in my opinion there is no rest in Nature, and so neither in the Mind or natural Soul of Man, which is in a perpetual motion, and needs therefore no jogging to put it into any actual motion; for it hath actual motion and knowledg in it self, because it is a self∣moving substance, actually knowing, and Material or

Corporeal, not Immaterial, as your Author thinks: and this material or corporeal Mind is nothing else but what I call the rational matter, and the corporeal life is the sensitive matter. But this is to be observed, that the motions of the corporeal Mind do often imi∣tate the motions of the sensitive Life, and these again the motions of the mind: I say oftentimes; for they do it not always, but each one can move without taking any pattern from the other. And all this I un∣derstand of the Natural Soul of Man; not of the Di∣vine Soul, and her powers and faculties, for I leave that to Divines to inform us of; onely this I say, that men not conceiving the distinction between this natu∣ral and divine Soul, make such a confusion betwixt those two Souls and their actions, which causes so many disputes and opinions. But if Nature hath power from God to produce all kinds of Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, Animals, and other sorts of Creatures, Why not also Man? Truly if all Crea∣tures are natural Creatures, Man must be so too; and if Man is a natural Creature, he must needs have na∣tural sense and reason, as well as other Creatures, be∣ing composed of the same matter they are of. Nei∣ther is it requisite, that all Creatures, being of the same matter, must have the same manner of sensitive and rational knowledg; which if so, it is not necessary for Corn to have Ears to hear the whistling or chirp∣ing of Birds, nor for Stones to have such a touch of feeling as animals have, and to suffer pain, as they do, when Carts go over them; as your Author is pleased to argue out of AEsopes Tales; or for the He∣liotrope to have eyes to see the Sun: for what necessity

is there that they should have humane sense and reason? which is, that the rational and sensitive matter should act and move in them as she doth in man or animals: Certainly if there must be any variety in nature, it is requisite she should not; wherefore all Vegetables, Mi∣nerals, Elements, and Animals, have their proper mo∣tions different from each others, not onely in their kinds and sorts, but also in their particulars. And though Stones have no progressive motion to withdraw themselves from the Carts going over them, which your Author thinks they would do, if they had sense, to avoid pain: nevertheless they have motion, and con∣sequently sense and reason, according to the nature and propriety of their figure, as well as man has accord∣ing to his. But this is also to be observed, that not any humane Creature, which is accounted to have the per∣fectest sense and reason, is able always to avoid what is hurtful or painful, for it is subject to it by Nature: Nay, the Immaterial Soul it self, according to your Author, cannot by her self-contracting faculty withdraw her self from pain. Wherefore there is no manner of conse∣quence to conclude from the sense of Animals to the sense of Minerals, they being as much different as their Figures are; And saying this, I have said enough to express the opinion and mind of,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

XXI.

MADAM,

YOur Author endeavours very much to prove the Existency of a Natural Immaterial Spirit, whom he defines to be an Incorporeal substance, Indi∣visible, that can move it self, can penetrate, contract and dilate it self, and can also move and alter the matter. Whereof, if you will have my opinion, I confess freely to you, that in my sense and reason I cannot conceive it to be possible, that there is any such thing in Nature; for all that is a substance in Nature, is a body, and what has a body, is corporeal; for though there be several degrees of matter, as in purity, rarity, subtilty, activity; yet there is no degree so pure, rare and subtil, that can go beyond its nature, and change from corporeal to incorporeal, except it could change from being some∣thing to nothing, which is impossible in Nature. Next, there is no substance in Nature that is not divisible; for all that is a body, or a bodily substance, hath extension, and all extension hath parts, and what has parts, is divi∣sible. As for self-motion, contraction and dilation, these are actions onely of Natural Matter; for Matter by the Power of God is self-moving, and all sorts of motions, as contraction, dilation, alteration, penetra∣tion, &c. do properly belong to Matter; so that natu∣ral Matter stands in no need to have some Immaterial or Incorporeal substance to move, rule, guide and govern her, but she is able enough to do it all her self, by the

free Gift of the Omnipotent God; for why should we trouble our selves to invent or frame other unconceiva∣ble substances, when there is no need for it, but Matter can act, and move as well without them and of it self? Is not God able to give such power to Matter, as to an other Incorporeal substance? But I suppose this opi∣nion of natural Immaterial Spirits doth proceed from Chymistry, where the extracts are vulgarly called Spi∣rits; and from that degree of Matter, which by reason of its purity, subtilty and activity, is not subject to our grosser senses; However, these are not Incorporeal, be they never so pure and subtil. And I wonder much that men endeavour to prove Immaterial Spirits by corpo∣real Arts, when as Art is not able to demonstrate Na∣ture and her actions; for Art is but the effect of Nature, and expresses rather the variety, then the truth of natu∣ral motions; and if Art cannot do this, much less will it be able to express what is not in Nature, or what is beyond Nature; as to trace the Visible (or rather Invi∣sible) footsteps of the divine Councel and Providence, or to demonstrate things supernatural, and which go be∣yond mans reach and capacity. But to return to Im∣material Spirits, that they should rule and govern infi∣nite corporeal matter, like so many demy-Gods, by a dilating nod, and a contracting frown, and cause so many kinds and sorts of Corporeal Figures to arise, being Incor∣poreal themselves, is Impossible for me to conceive; for how can an Immaterial substance cause a Material cor∣poreal substance, which has no motion in it self, to form so many several and various figures and creatures, and make so many alterations, and continue their kinds and sorts by perpetual successions of Particulars? But

perchance the Immaterial substance gives corporeal matter motion. I answer, My sense and reason cannot understand, how it can give motion, unless motion be different, distinct and separable from it; nay, if it were, yet being no substance or body it self, accord∣ing to your Authors and others opinion, the question is, how it can be transmitted or given away to corporeal matter? Your Author may say, That his Immaterial and Incorporeal spirit of Nature, having self-motion, doth form Matter into several Figures: I answer, Then that Immaterial substance must be transformed and me∣tamorphosed into as many several figures as there are figures in Matter; or there must be as many spirits, as there are figures; but when the figures change, what doth become of the spirits? Neither can I imagine, that an Immaterial substance, being without body, can have such a great strength; as to grapple with gross, hea∣vy, dull, and dead Matter; Certainly, in my opinion, no Angel, nor Devil, except God Impower him, would be able to move corporeal Matter, were it not self∣moving, much less any Natural Spirit. But God is a Spirit, and Immovable; and if created natural Imma∣terials participate of that Nature, as they do of the Name, then they must be Immovable also. Your Au∣thor, Madam, may make many several degrees of Spirits; but certainly not I, nor I think any natural Creature else, will be able naturally to conceive them. He may say, perchance, There is such a close conjuncti∣on betwixt Body and Spirit, as I make betwixt rational, sensitive, and inanimate Matter. I answer, That these degrees are all but one Matter, and of one and the same Nature as meer Matter, different onely in degrees of

purity, subtilty, and activity, whereas Spirit and Body are things of contrary Natures. In fine, I cannot con∣ceive, how a Spirit should fill up a place or space, ha∣ving no body, nor how it can have the effects of a body, being none it self; for the effects flow from the cause; and as the cause is, so are its effects: And so confessing my ignorance, I can say no more, but rest,

MADAM,

Your Faithful Friend and Servant.

XXII.

MADAM,

YOur Author having assigned Indivisibility to the Soul or Spirit that moves and actuates matter, I desire to know, how one Indivisible Spirit can be in so many dividable parts? For there being Infinite parts in Nature, they must either have one Infinite Spi∣rit to move them, which must be dilated infinitely, or this Spirit must move severally in every part of Nature: If the first, then I cannot conceive, but all motion must be uniform, or after one and the same manner; nay, I can∣not understand, how there can be any dilation and con∣traction, or rather any motion of the same spirit, by reason if it dilate, then, (being equally spread out in all the parts of Matter,) it must dilate beyond Matter; and if it con∣tract, it must leave some parts of matter void, and without

motion. But if the Spirit moves every part severally, then he is divisible; neither can I think, that there are so many Spirits as there are Parts in Nature; for your Author says, there is but one Spirit of Nature; I will give an easie and plain example: When a Worm is cut into two or three parts, we see there is sensitive life and motion in every part, for every part will strive and endeavour to meet and joyn again to make up the whole body; now if there were but one indivisible Life, Spi∣rit, and Motion, I would fain know, how these seve∣red parts could move all by one Spirit. Wherefore, Matter, in my opinion, has self-motion in it self, which is the onely soul and life of Nature, and is dividable as well as composable, and full of variety of action; for it is as easie for several parts to act in separation, as in composition, and as easie in composition as in separa∣tion; Neither is every part bound to one kind or sort of Motions; for we see in exterior local motions, that one man can put his body into several shapes and po∣stures, much more can Nature. But is it not strange, Madam, that a man accounts it absurd, ridiculous, and a prejudice to Gods Omnipotency, to attribute self∣motion to Matter, or a material Creature, when it is not absurd, ridiculous, or any prejudice to God, to attribute it to an Immaterial Creature? What reason of absurdity lies herein? Surely I can conceive none, ex∣cept it be absurd and ridiculous to make that, which no man can know or conceive what it is, viz. an immate∣rial natural Spirit, (which is as much as to say, a na∣tural No-thing) to have motion, and not onely mo∣tion, but self-motion; nay, not onely self-motion, but to move, actuate, rule, govern, and guide Matter,

or corporeal Nature, and to be the cause of all the most curious varieties and effects in nature: Was not God able to give self-motion as well to a Material, as to an Immaterial Creature, and endow Matter with a self-mo∣ving power? I do not say, Madam, that Matter hath motion of it self, so, that it is the prime cause and prin∣ciple of its own self-motion; for that were to make Matter a God, which I am far from believing; but my o∣pinion is, That the self-motion of Matter proceeds from God, as well as the self-motion of an Immaterial Spirit; and that I am of this opinion, the last Chapter of my Book of Philosophy will enform you, where I treat of the Deitical Centre, as the Fountain from whence all things do flow, and which is the supream Cause, Au∣thor, Ruler and Governor of all. Perhaps you will say, it is, because I make Matter Eternal. Tis true, Madam, I do so: but I think Eternity doth not take off the dependance upon God, for God may nevertheless be above Matter, as I have told you before. You may ask me how that can be? I say, As well as any thing else that God can do beyond our understanding: For I do but tell you my opinion, that I think it most probable to be so, but I can give you no Mathematical Demon∣strations for it: Onely this I am sure of, That it is not impossible for the Omnipotent God; and he that que∣stions the truth of it, may question Gods Omnipotency. Truly, Madam, I wonder how man can say, God is Omnipotent, and can do beyond our Understanding, and yet deny all that he is not able to comprehend with his reason. However, as I said, it is my opinion, That Matter is self-moving by the power of God; Neither can Animadversion, and Perception, as also the

variety of Figures, prove, that there must be another external Agent or Power to work all this in Matter; but it proves rather the contrary; for were there no self∣motion in Matter, there would be no Perception, nor no variety of Creatures in their Figures, Shapes, Na∣tures, Qualities, Faculties, Proprieties, as also in their Productions, Creations or Generations, Transforma∣tions, Compositions, Dissolutions, and the like, as Growth, Maturity, Decay, &c. and for Animals, were not Corporeal Matter self-moving, dividable and com∣posable, there could not be such variety of Passions, Complexions, Humors, Features, Statures, Appe∣tites, Diseases, Infirmities, Youth, Age, &c. Nei∣ther would they have any nourishing Food, healing Salves, soveraign Medicines, reviving Cordials, or deadly Poysons. In short, there is so much variety in Nature, proceeding from the self-motion of Matter, as not possible to be numbred, nor thorowly known by any Creature: Wherefore I should labour in vain, if I endeavoured to express any more thereof; and this is the cause that I break off here, and onely subscribe my self,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

XXIII.

MADAM,

COncerning the comparison, your Author makes between an Immaterial Spirit, and Light, That, as Light is contractive and dilative, and yet not di∣visible, so is also an Immaterial substance. Give me leave to tell you, that in my opinion, all that is contractive and dilative, is also dividable, and so is light: As for ex∣ample; when a Candle is snuff'd, the Snuffers do not onely clip the wick, but also the light: The like when a dark body is interposed, or crosses the rays of the Sun; it cuts those rays asunder, which by reason they cannot joyn together again, because of the interposed body, the light cut off, suddenly goeth out; that is, the mat∣ter of light is altered from the figure of light, to some o∣ther thing, but not annihilated: And since no more light can flow into the room from the Fountain or Spring of Light, the Sun, because the passage is stopt close, the room remaineth dark: For Light is somewhat of the nature of Water; so long as the Spring is open, the Water flows, and whatsoever is taken away, the Spring supplies; and if another body onely presses tho∣row it, it immediately joyns and closes its severed parts again, without any difficulty or loss; The same doth Light; onely the difference is, that the substance of Light is extraordinary rare, and pure; for as Air is so much rarer then Water, so Light is so much rarer and purer then Air, and its matter may be of so dilating a

nature, as to dilate from a point into numerous rayes. As for ordinary Fire-light, it doth not last longer, then it hath fuel to feed it, and so likewise it is with the light of the Sun; for Light is according to the substance that feeds it; and though it is a substance it self, yet it in∣creases and decreases, according as it hath something that succours or nourishes it. But some may object, that if Light were a body, and did contract and dilate, as I say, it is impossible that it could display it self in so great and vast a compass, and remove so suddenly and instantly as it doth. To which objection, I answer, first, That although I say, Light is a real corporeal substance, and doth contract and dilate it self from a point into nu∣merous rayes, as also in another Letter I sent you be∣fore, That Light and Darkness do succeed each other; nevertheless, as for the perception of Light, I am not so eager in maintaining this opinion, as if it was an In∣fallible Truth, and impossible to be otherwise; but I say onely, That, to my sense and reason, it seems very probable, that it may be so, that the light of the Sun doth really dilate it self into so vast a compass as we see; and that light and darkness do really succeed each other, as all other Creatures do: But yet it seems also probable to mee, that the parts of the Air may onely pattern out the figure of light, and that the light we see in the Air may be onely patterns taken from the real figure of the light of the Sun: And therefore, if it be according to the former opinion, to wit, That the light of the Sun doth really dilate it self into so vast a compass, My an∣swer is, That contraction and dilation are natural cor∣poreal actions or motions, and that there is no altera∣tion of motion in Nature, but is done in Time, that is,

successively, not instantly; for Time is nothing else but the alteration of motion: Besides, I do not perceive any so sudden and swift alteration and succession of light, but that it is done by degrees: As for example; in the morning, when it begins to dawn and grow light, it appears clearly to our sight how light doth come forth, and darkness remove by degrees; and so at night, when it grows dark, how light removes, and darkness succeeds; nay, if there be any such sudden change of the motions of Light, I desire you to con∣sider, Madam, that light is a very subtil, rare, pier∣cing and active body, and therefore its motions are much quicker then those of grosser bodies, and cannot so well be perceived by our gross exterior senses. But if it be, that the Air doth pattern out the light of the Sun, then the framed objection can prove nothing, be∣cause there is not then such a real dilation or succession of light, but the corporeal figurative motions of the Air do make patterns of the light of the Sun, and dissolve those patterns or figures again, more suddenly and quickly then man can shut and open his eyes, as being more subtil then his gross exterior senses. But it may be said, that if Air did pattern out the light of the Sun, the light would increase by these numerous patterns. I an∣swer, that cannot appear to our Eyes; for we see onely the pattern'd figure of light, and that a great compass is enlightned; also that the further the air is from the Sun, the darker it is; nevertheless, I do verily believe, that the body of the Sun is far brighter then the light we see, and that the substance of light, and the patterns taken from light, are not one and the same, but very different. And thus much of light. As for Penetra∣tion,

I conceive it to be nothing else but division; as when some parts pierce and enter through other parts, as Duellers run each other thorow, or as water runs through a sieve. And this is the opinion of,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend, and Servant.

XXIV.

MADAM,

HAving given you my opinion, both of the sub∣stance and perception of Light, in my last Letter, I perceive your desire is to know how Shadows are made. Truly, Madam, to my sense and rea∣son, it appears most probable, that shadows are made by the way of patterning: As for example; when a Man's, or Trees, or any other the like Creature's sha∣dow is made upon the Ground, or Wall, or the like; those bodies, as the Ground, or Wall, do, in my opi∣nion, pattern out the interposing body that is between the light and them: And the reason that the shadow is longer or shorter, or bigger or less, is according as the light is nearer or further off; for when the light is perpendicular, the interposing body cannot obscure the light, because the light surrounding the interposing body by its brightness, rather obscures the body, then the body the light; for the numerous and splendorous pat∣terns

of light taken from the body of the Sun, do quite involve the interposing body. Next, you desire to know, Whether the light we see in the Moon, be the Moons own natural light, or a borrowed light from the Sun: I answer, that in my opinion, it is a borrowed light; to wit, that the Moon doth pattern out the light of the Sun: and the proof of it is, that when the Sun is in an Eclipse, we do plainly perceive that so much of the Sun is darkned as the Moon covers; for though those parts of the Moon, that are next the Sun, may, for any thing we know, pattern out the light of the Sun, yet the Moon is dark on that side which is from the Sun. I will not say, but that part of the Moon which is towards the Earth, may pattern out the Earth, or the shadow of the Earth, which may make the Moon appear more dark and sullen; But when the Moon is in an Eclipse, then it is plainly perceived that the Moon patterns out the Earth, or the shadow of the Earth. Besides, those parts of the Moon that are farthest from the Sun, are dark, as we may observe when as the Moon is in the Wane, and enlightened when the Sun is nearer. But I will leave this argument to observing Astrolo∣gers, and rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

XXV.

MADAM,

IF acording to your Authors opinion, In every par∣ticular world, such as Man is especially, his own Soul (which is a Spirit) be the peculiar and most perfective architect of the Fabrick of his Body, as the Soul of the world is of it: Then I cannot conceive in my reason, how the separation is made in death; for I see, that all ani∣mals, and so man-kind, have a natural desire to live, and that life and soul are unwilling to part; And if the power lies in the Soul, why doth she not continue with the Body, and animate, move and actuate it, as she did before, or order the matter so, as not to dissolve? But if the dissolution lies in the body, then the body has self-motion: Yet it is most probable, if the soul be the architect of the body, it must also be the dissolver of it; and if there come not another soul into the parts of mat∣ter, the body must either be annihilated, or lie immo∣ved as long as the world lasts, which is improbable; for surely all the bodies of men, or other animals, are im∣ployed by Nature to some use or other: However, it is requisite, that the soul must stay so long in the body, until it be turned into dust and ashes; otherwise, the body having no self-motion, would remain as it was when the soul left it, that is, entire and undissolved: As for example; when a man dies, if there be no motion in his body, and the soul, which was the mover, be

gone, it cannot possibly corrupt; for certainly, that we call corruptton, is made by motion, and the body requires as much motion to be dissolved or divided, as it doth to be framed or composed; Wherefore a dead body would remain in the same state continu∣ally, if it had no self-motion in it: And if another soul should enter into the body, and work it to a∣nother figure, then certainly there must be much more souls then bodies, because bodies are subject to change into several forms; but if the animal spirits, which are left in the body after the soul is gone, are able to dissolve it without the help of the soul, then it is probable they could have fram'd it without the help of the soul; and so they being material, it must be granted, that matter is self-moving: But if corporeal matter have corporeal self-motion, a self∣moving Immaterial Spirit, by reason of their diffe∣rent natures, would make great obstruction, and so a general confusion; for the corporeal and incorpo∣real motions would hinder and oppose each other, their natures being quite different; and though they might subsist together without disturbance of each o∣ther, yet it is not probable they should act together, and that in such a conjunction, as if they were one united body; for it is, in my opinion, more pro∣bable, that one material should act upon another material, or one immaterial upon another imma∣terial, then that an immaterial should act upon a material or corporeal. Thus the consideration or contemplation of immaterial natural Spirits puts me always into doubts, and raises so many contradictions in my sense and reason, as I know not, nor am not

able to reconcile them: However, though I am doubtful of them, yet I can assure your self that I continue,

MADAM,

Your Faithful Friend and Servant.

XXVI.

MADAM,

BY reason the Soul is a Spirit, and therefore Con∣tractible and Dilatable, your Authors opinion is, That it begins within less compass at first in organi∣zing the fitly prepared matter, and so bears it self on in the same tenour of work, till the body hath attained its full growth; and that the Soul dilates it self in the dilating of the Body, and so possesses it through all the members thereof. Truly, Madam, as for the contraction and dilation of an immaterial Spirit, if I heard never so many arguments, I should hardly be able to conceive the possibility of it; For in my opinion, dilating and con∣tracting are motions and actions of Nature, which be∣long to natural material Creatures, and to none else; for dilation and contraction cannot be without extension, but extension belongs to parts which an immaterial Spi∣rit hath not: But suppose it be so, then the Soul must con∣tract and dilate, extend and shrink together, and so grow less and bigger, according to the extension of the

body; and when the body dies, the soul, in my opinion, must contract to a very point; and if one part of the body die before the other, the soul must by degrees withdraw out of those parts: also when a part of the body is cut off, the soul must needs contract, and grow less; the like when a man is let blood. Which con∣tracting of the soul, by your Authors leave, doth seem, to my imagination, just like the contracting of Hod∣mandod into her shell. Besides, if the soul be indivi∣dable, and equally spread all over the body, then, to my opinion, she must necessarily be of a human shape; and if the body be deformed, the soul must be deformed al∣so; and if the body be casually extended, as by taking Poyson into the body, the soul must be so too, as being individable and filling every part; and if a man be born with six fingers or toes, the soul must be so too; or if a dwarf, the soul must be a dwarf also; and if he be born deaf and dumb, the soul must be so too. But if two Twins, as it may fall out, should be born united in one body, I would fain know then, whether they would have two souls, or but one? As for example, if they should have but one body, and one stomack, liver, heart, spleen, lungs, bowels, and yet have four legs, four hands, and two heads: It seems, to my opinion, that then two Immaterial Souls must be joyned as into one; neither do I know yet how this could well be, the monster having but one body, nor how that Immate∣rial Soul can be divided, being inseparably double, when the body dies. But, Madam, all this I speak of the Natural Soul of Man, not of the Divine Soul, which is not subject to natural imperfections, and cor∣poreal errors, being not made by Nature, but a super∣natural

and divine gift of the Omnipotent God, who surely will not give any thing that is not perfect. Where∣fore it is not probable, this Divine Soul, being not sub∣ject to Nature, should be an architect of the body, as having an higher and more divine imployment, viz. to fix her self on her Creator, and being indued with su∣pernatural faculties, and residing in the body in a super∣natural manner; all which I leave to the Church: for I should be loth to affirm any thing contrary to their Doctrine, or the Information of the holy Scripture, as grounding my belief onely upon the sacred Word of God, and its true Interpretation made by the Orthodox Church; but not upon the opinions of particular per∣sons: for particular mens opinions are not authentical, being so different and various, as a man would be puzled which to adhere to. Thus, Madam, I a∣void, as much as ever I can, not to mix Divinity with Natural Philosophy; for I consider, that such a mix∣ture would breed more confusion in the Church, then do any good to either; witness the doctrine of the Soul of Man, whereof are so many different opinions: The onely cause, in my opinion, is, that men do not con∣ceive the difference between the Divine, and Natural material Soul of Man, making them both as one, and mixing or confounding their faculties and proprieties, which yet are quite different; thus they make a Hodg-podg, Bisk or Olio of both; proving Divi∣nity by Nature, and Faith by Reason; and bringing Arguments for Articles of Faith, and sacred Mysteries out of Natural Arts and Sciences; whereas yet Faith and Reason are two contrary things, and cannot con∣sist together; according to the Proverb, Where

Reason ends, Faith begins. Neither is it possible that Divinity can be proved by Mathematical Demonstra∣tions; for if Nature be not able to do it, much less is Art: Wherefore it is inconvenient to mix supernatural Spirits with Air, Fire, Light, Heat, Cold, &c. and to apply corporeal actions and qualities to them; and the Divine Soul, with the Brain, Blood, Flesh, Animal Spirits, Muscles, Nerves, Bones, &c. of Man; all which makes a confusion betwixt the Mind or Natural Soul of Man, and the Supernatural and Divine Soul inspired into him by God; for both their faculties and proprieties are different, and so are their effects, as proceeding from so different causes. And therefore, Madam, as for Divinity, I pray devoutly, and be∣lieve without disputing; but as for Natural Philo∣sophy, I reason freely, and argue without believing, or adhering to any ones particular opinion, which I think is the best and safest way to choose for,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend, and Servant.

XXVII.

MADAM,

YOur Author in the continuation of his discourse concerning the Immaterial Soul of Man, demon∣strating, that her seat is not bound up in a certain place of the body, but that she pervades all the body and

every part thereof, takes, amongst the rest, an argu∣ment from Passions and Sympathies: Moreover, says he, Passions and Sympathies, in my judgment, are more easily to be resolved into this hypothesis of the Soul's per∣vading the whole Body, then in restraining its essential presence to one part thereof. — But it is evident that they arise in us against both our will and appetite; For who would bear the tortures of fears and jelousies, if he could avoid it? Concerning Passions, Madam, I have gi∣ven my opinion at large in my Book of Philosophy, and am of your Authors mind, that Passions are made in the Heart, but not by an Immaterial spirit, but by the Rational soul which is material; and there is no doubt, but that many Passions, as Fear, Jealousie, &c. arise against our will and appetite; for so may forreign Nations invade any Kingdom without the will or desire of the Inhabitants, and yet they are corporeal men: The same may be said of Passions; and several parts of mat∣ter may invade each other, whereof one may be afraid of the other, yet all this is but according as corporeal matter moves, either Generally, or Particularly: Ge∣nerally, that is, when many parts of Matter unite or joyn together, having the like appetites, wills, designs; as we may observe, that there are general agreements amongst several parts, in Plagues, as well as Wars, which Plagues are not onely amongst Men, but a∣mongst Beasts; and sometimes but in one sort of ani∣mals, as a general Rot amongst Sheep, a general Mange amongst Dogs, a general Farcy amongst Horses, a ge∣neral Plague amongst Men; all which could not be without a general Infection, one part infecting another, or rather one part imitating the motions of the other,

that is next adjoyning to it; for such infections come by the neer adhesion of parts, as is observable, which immaterial and individable natural Spirits could not ef∣fect; that is, to make such a general infection in so ma∣ny several parts of so many several Creatures, to the Creatures dissolution: Also there will be several Inva∣sions at one time, as Plague, and War, amongst neigh∣bouring and adjoining Creatures or Parts. But this is to be observed, That the sensitive corporeal motions make all diseases, and not the Rational, although the Rational are many times the occasion, that the sensitive do move into such or such a disease; for all those that are sick by conceit, their sicknesses are caused by the ra∣tional corporeal motions. But being loth to make te∣dious repetitions hereof, having discoursed of diseases and passions in my mentioned Book of Philosophy, I will refer you thither, and rest,

MADAM,

Your Faithful Friend and Servant.

XXVIII.

MADAM,

COncerning Dimness of Sight, which your Author will have to proceed from the deficiency of the Ani∣mal Spirits, My meaning in short is, That when sight is dim, though the sensitive organs are perfect,

this dimness is caused by the alteration onely of the sen∣sitive motions in the organs, not moving to the nature of sight. And so is made Deafness, Dumbness, Lame∣ness, and the like, as also Weariness; for the Relaxa∣tion of strength in several parts, is onely an alteration of such sorts of motions which make the nerves strong; and if a man be more dull at one time, then at another, it is that there are not so many changes of motions, nor so quick motions at that time, as at another; for Nature may use more or less force as she pleases: Also she can and doth often use opposite actions, and often sympathetical and agreeable actions, as she pleases; for Nature having a free power to move, may move as she will; but being wise, she moves as she thinks best, either in her separating or uniting motions, for continu∣ance, as well as for variety. But if, according to your Author, the Immaterial Soul should determinate mat∣ter in motion, it would, in my opinion, make a confu∣sion; for the motions of the Matter would often op∣pose and cross the motions of the Immaterial Soul, and so they would disagree, as a King and his Subjects, (except God had given the Soul an absolute power of command, and restrained matter to an irrisistible and necessitated obedience; which, in my opinion, is not probable:) By which disagreement, Nature, and all that is in Nature, would have been quite ruined at this time; for no kinds, sorts, or particulars, would keep any distinction, if Matter did not govern it self, and if all the parts did not know their own affairs, abilities, offices, and functions: Besides, it would, to my think∣ing, take up a great deal of time, to receive com∣mands in every several action, at least so much, that

for example, a man could not have so many several thoughts in so short a time, as he hath. But concern∣ing the Animal Spirits, which your Author calls the Instruments, Organs and Engines of the Incorporeal Soul; I would fain know, whether they have no motion but what comes from the Soul, or whether they have their own motion of themselves? If the first, then the Soul must, in my opinion, be like a Deity, and have a divine Power, to give and im∣part Motion; if the second, then the spirits being material, it follows that Matter hath motion of it self, or is self-moving; But if the Immaterial natural Soul can transfer her gifts upon corporeal matter, then it must give numerous sorts of motions, with all their de∣grees; as also the faculty of figuring, or moving fi∣guratively in all corporeal Matter: Which power, in my judgment, is too much for a Creature to give. If you say, the Immaterial Soul hath this power from God; I answer, Matter may have the same; and I cannot imagine why God should make an Im∣material Spirit to be the Proxy or Vice-gerent of his Power, or the Quarter-master General of his Divine Providence, as your Author is pleased to style it, when he is able to effect it without any Under-Officers, and in a more easie and compendious way, as to impart immediately such self-moving power to Na∣tural Matter, which man attributes to an Incorpo∣real Spirit. But to conclude, if the Animal Spi∣rits be the Instruments of the Incorporeal Soul, then the Spirits of Wine are more powerfull then the Animal Spirits, nay, then the Immaterial Soul her self; for they can put them and all their actions quite

out of order: the same may be done by other material things, Vegetables, Minerals, and the like. And so leaving this discourse to your better consideration, I take my leave for this time, and rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful and affectionate Friend, and Servant.

XXIX.

MADAM,

TOuching the State or Condition of the Super∣natural and Divine Soul, both in, and after this life, I must crave your excuse that I can give no account of it; for I dare affirm nothing; not onely that I am no professed Divine, and think it unfit to take any thing upon me that belongs not to me, but also that I am unwilling to mingle Divinity and Natural Philo∣sophy together, to the great disadvantage and preju∣dice of either; for if each one did contain himself with∣in the circle of his own Profession, and no body did pretend to be a Divine Philosopher, many absurdities, confusions, contentions, and the like, would be a∣voided, which now disturb both Church and Schools, and will in time cause their utter ruine and destruction; For what is Supernatural, cannot naturally be known by any natural Creature; neither can any supernatural Creature, but the Infinite and Eternal God, know

thorowly everything that is in Nature, she being the In∣finite servant of the Infinite God, whom no finite Crea∣ture, of what degree soever, whether natural or superna∣tural, can conceive; for if no Angel nor Devil can know our thoughts, much less will they know Infinite Nature; nay, one finite supernatural Creature cannot, in my opinion, know perfectly another supernatural Creature, but God alone, who is all-knowing: And therefore all what is said of supernatural Spirits, I believe, so far as the Scripture makes mention of them; further I dare not presume to go; the like of the supernatural or divine Soul: for all that I have writ hitherto to you of the Soul, concerns the natural Soul of Man, which is material, and not the supernatural or divine Soul; neither do I contradict any thing concerning this divine soul, but I am onely against those opinions, which make the natural soul of man an immaterial natural spirit, and confound supernatural Creatures with natu∣ral, believing those spirits to be as well natural Crea∣tures and parts of Nature, as material and corporeal beings are; when as there is great difference betwixt them, and nothing in Nature to be found, but what is corporeal. Upon this account I take all their relati∣ons of Daemons, of the Genii, and of the Souls after the departure from humane Bodies, their Vehicles, Shapes, Habitations, Converses, Conferences, Entertainments, Exercises, Pleasures, Pastimes, Governments, Orders, Laws, Magistrates, Officers, Executioners, Punish∣ments, and the like, rather for Poetical Fictions, then Rational Probabilities; containing more Fancy, then Truth and Reason, whether they concern the divine or natural Soul: for as for the divine Soul, the Scripture

makes no other mention of it, but that immediately after her departure out of this natural life, she goeth either to Heaven or Hell, either to enjoy Reward, or to suffer Punishment, according to man's actions in this life. But as for the Natural Soul, she being material, has no need of any Vehicles, neither is natural death any thing else but an alteration of the rational and sen∣sitive motions, which from the dissolution of one figure go to the formation or production of another. Thus the natural soul is not like a Traveller, going out of one body into another, neither is air her lodging; for cer∣tainly, if the natural humane soul should travel through the airy regions, she would at last grow weary, it be∣ing so great a journey, except she did meet with the soul of a Horse, and so ease her self with riding on Horse∣back. Neither can I believe Souls or Daemons in the Air have any Common-wealth, Magistrates, Offi∣cers and Executioners in their airy Kingdom; for wheresoever are Governments, Magistrates and Execu∣tioners, there are also Offences, and where there is power to offend, as well as to obey, there may and will be sometimes Rebellions and Civil Wars; for there being different forts of Spirits, it is impossible they should all fo well agree, especially the good and evil Genii, which certainly will fight more valiantly then Hector and A∣chilles, nay, the Spirits of one sort would have more Civil Wars then ever the Romans had; and if the Soul of Caesar and Pompey should meet, there would be a cruel fight between those two Heroical souls; the like between Augustus's and Antonius's Soul. But, Ma∣dam, all these, as I said, I take for fancies proceeding from the Religion of the Gentiles, not fit for Christians

to embrace for any truth; for if we should, we might at last, by avoiding to be Atheists, become Pagans, and so leap out of the Frying-pan into the Fire, as turning from Divine Faith to Poetical Fancy; and if Ovid should revive again, he would, perhaps, be the chief head or pillar of the Church. By this you may plainly see, Madam, that I am no Platonick; for this opinion is dangerous, especially for married Women, by reason the conversation of the Souls may be a great temptation, and a means to bring Platonick Lovers to a neerer ac∣quaintance, not allowable by the Laws of Marriage, although by the sympathy of the Souls. But I conclude, and desire you, not to interpret amiss this my discourse, as if I had been too invective against Po∣etical Fancies; for that I am a great lover of them, my Poetical Works will witness; onely I think it not fit to bring Fancies into Religion: Wherefore what I have writ now to you, is rather to express my zeal for God and his true Worship, then to prejudice any body; and if you be of that same Opinion, as above mentioned, I wish my Letter may convert you, and so I should not account my labour lost, but judg my self happy, that any good could proceed to the advancement of your Soul, from,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

XXX.

MADAM,

I Sent you word in my last, I would not meddle with writing any thing of the Divine Soul of Man, by reason it belongs to Faith and Religion, and not to Natural Philosophy; but since you desire my opinion concerning the Immortality of the Divine Soul, I can∣not but answer you plainly, that first I did wonder much you made question of that, whose truth, in my opinion, is so clear, as hardly any rational man will make a doubt of it; for I think there is almost no Chri∣stian in the world, but believes the Immortality of the Soul, no not Christians onely, but Mahometans and Jews: But I left to wonder at you, when I saw Wise and Learned Men, and great Divines, take so much pains as to write whole Volumes, and bring so many arguments to prove the Immortality of the Soul; for this was a greater Miracle to me, then if Nature had shewed me some of her secret and hidden effects, or if I had seen an Immaterial Spirit. Certainly, Madam, it seems as strange to me to prove the Immortality of the Soul, as to convert Atheists; for it impossible, almost, that any Atheist should be found in the World: For what Man would be so senceless as to deny a God? Wherefore to prove either a God, or the Immortality of the Soul, is to make a man doubt of either: for as Physicians and Surgeons apply strengthening Medicines onely to those parts of the body which they suppose

the weakest, so it is with proofs and arguments, those being for the most part used in such subjects, the truth of which is most questionable. But in things Divine, Disputes do rather weaken Faith, then prove Truth, and breed several strange opinions; for Man being naturally ambitious, and endeavouring to excel each other, will not content himself with what God has been pleased to reveal in his holy Word; but invents and adds something of his own; and hence arise so many monstrous expressions and opinions, that a simple man is puzzled, not knowing which to ad∣here to; which is the cause of so many schismes, sects, and divisions in Religion: Hence it comes also, that some pretend to know the very nature and essence of God, his divine Counsels, all his Actions, Designs, Rules, Decrees, Power, Attributes, nay, his Mo∣tions, Affections, and Passions, as if the Omnipotent Infinite God were of a humane shape; so that there are already more divisions then Religions, which di∣sturb the peace and quiet both of mind and body; when as the ground of our belief consists but in some few and short Articles, which clearly explained, and the moral part of Divinity well pressed upon the Peo∣ple, would do more good, then unnecessary and te∣dious disputes, which rather confound Religion, then advance it: but if man had a mind to shew Learning, and exercise his Wit, certainly there are other sub∣jects, wherein he can do it with more profit, and less danger, then by proving Christian Religion by Na∣tural Philosophy, which is the way to destroy them both. I could wish, Madam, that every one would but observe the Command of Christ, and give to God

what is Gods, and to Caesar what is Caesars, and so distinguish what belongs to the actions of Nature, and what to the actions of Religion; for it appears to my Reason, that God hath given Nature, his eternal Ser∣vant, a peculiar freedom of working and acting, as a self-moving Power from Eternity; but when the Om∣nipotent God acts, he acts supernaturally, as beyong Nature; of which devine actions none but the holy Church, as one united body, mind and soul, should dis∣course, and declare the truth of them, according to the Revelation made by God in his holy Word, to her Flock the Laity, not suffering any one single person, of what profession or degree soever, indifferently to comment, interpret, explain, and declare the meaning or sense of the Scripture after his own fancy. And as for Nature's actions, let those whom Nature hath indued with such a proportion of Reason, as is able to search into the hid∣den causes of natural effects, contemplate freely, with∣out any restraint or consinement; for Nature acts free∣ly, and so may natural Creatures, and amongst the rest Man, in things which are purely natural; but as for things supernatural, man cannot act freely, by reason they are beyond his sphere of conception and under∣standing, so as he is forced to set aside Reason, and onely to work by Faith. And thus, Madam, you see the cause why I cannot give you a full description of the Divine Soul of Man, as I mentioned already in my last, but that I do onely send you my opinion of the natural soul, which I call the rational soul; not that I dare say, the supernatural soul is without natural reason, but natural reason is not the divine soul; neither can natural reason, without Faith, advance the divine soul

to Heaven, or beget a pious zeal, without divine and supernatural Grace: Wherefore Reason, or the ratio∣nal Soul is onely the Soul of Nature, which being ma∣terial, is dividable, and so becomes numerous in parti∣cular natural Creatures; like as the sensitive life being also material and dividable, becomes numerous, as be∣ing in every Creature, and in every part of every Crea∣ture; for as there is life in every Creature, so there is also a soul in every Creature; nay, not onely in every Creature, but in every particle of every Creature, by reason every Creature is made of rational and sensitive Matter; and as all Creatures or parts of Nature are but one infinite body of Nature, so all their particular souls and lives make but one infinite soul and life of Nature; and this natural soul hath onely natural actions, not supernatural; nor has the supernatural soul natural acti∣ons; for although they subsist both together in one bo∣dy, yet each works without disturbance to the other; and both are Immortal; for of the supernatural soul there is no question, and of the natural soul, I have said before, that nothing is perishable or subject to annihi∣lation in nature, and so no death, but what is called by the name of death, is onely an alteration of the corpo∣real natural motions of such a figure to another figure; and therefore as it is impossible, that one part of Mat∣ter should perish in Nature, so is it impossible, that the natural or rational soul can perish, being material: The natural humane soul may alter, so as not to move in an animal way, or not to have animal motions, but this doth not prove her destruction or annihilation, but onely a change of the animal figure and its motions, all remaining still in Nature. Thus my Faith of the Di∣vine,

and my opinion of the Natural Soul, is, that they are both Immortal; as for the immediate actions of the Divine Soul, I leave you to the Church, which are the Ministers of God, and the faithful dispensers of the sacred mysteries of the Gospel, the true Expounders of the Word of God, Reformers of mens lives, and Tutors of the Ignorant, to whom I submit my self in all that belongs to the salvation of my Soul, and the re∣gulating of the actions of my life, to the honour and glo∣ry of God. And I hope they will not take any offence at the maintaining and publishing my opinions con∣cerning Nature and Natural effects, for they are as harmless, and as little prejudicial to them, as my de∣signs; for my onely and chief design is, and ever hath been to understand. Nature rightly, obey the Church exactly, Believe undoubtedly, Pray zealously, Live vertuously, and Wish earnestly, that both Church and Schools may increase and flourish in the sacred knowledge of the true Word of God, and that each one may live peaceable and happily in this world, die qui∣etly, and rise blessedly and gloriously to everlasting Life and happiness: Which happiness I pray God also to confer upon your Ladiship; Till then, I rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful and constant Friend, to serve you.

XXXI.

MADAM,

I Will leave the Controversie of Free-Will and Ne∣cessity, which your Author is discoursing of, to Di∣vines to decide it, onely I say this, that Nature hath a natural Free-will and power of self-moving, and is not necessitated; but yet that this Free-will proceeds from God, who hath given her both will and power to act freely. But as for the question, whether there be no∣thing in the Universe, but meer body? I answer, My opinion is not, that there is nothing in the world but meer Body; but that Nature is purely material or cor∣poreal, and that there is no part of Nature, or natural Creature, which is not Matter, or Body, or made of Matter; also, that there is not any thing else mixt with body, as a copartner in natural actions, which is di∣stinct from Body or Matter; nevertheless, there may be supernatural spiritual beings or substances in Nature, without any hinderance to Matter or corporeal Nature. The same I may say of the natural material, and the divine and supernatural Soul; for though the divine Soul is in a natural body, and both their powers and actions be different, yet they cause no ruine or distur∣bance to each other, but do in many cases agree with each other, without incroachment upon each others powers or actions; for God, as he is the God of all things, so the God of Order. Wherefore it is not pro∣bable, that created Immaterial or Incorporeal beings

should order Corporeal Nature, no more then Cor∣poreal Nature orders Immaterial or Incorporeal Crea∣tures. Neither can, in my opinion, Incorporeal Creatures be clearly conceived by Corporeals, al∣though they may really exist and subsist in Nature; onely, as I said before, it is well to be considered, that there is difference betwixt being in Nature, and being a part of Nature; for bodiless things, and so spiritual sub∣stances, although they may exist in Nature, yet they are not natural, nor parts of Nature, but super∣natural, Nature being meerly corporeal, and Matter the ground of Nature; and all that is not built upon this material ground, is nothing in Nature. But you will say, The divine Soul is a part of Man, and Man a part of Nature, wherefore the divine Soul must needs be a part of Nature. I answer, Not: For the divine Soul is not a part of Nature, but supernatural, as a supernatural Gift from God onely to Man, and to no other Creature: and although in this respect it may be called a part of Man, yet it is no natural or material part of Man; neither doth this supernatural Gift disturb Nature or natural Matter, or natural Matter this supernatural Gist. And so leaving them both, I rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

XXXII.

MADAM,

IF you desire my opinion concerning Witches, whereof your Learned Author hath many Discourses and Stories: I will tell you really, that in my sense and reason, I do not believe any, except it be the witch of Endor, which the Scripture makes mention of; for though I believe that there is a Devil, as the Word of God and the Church inform me, yet I am not of the opinion, that God should suffer him to have such a familiar conjunction, and make such contracts with Man, as to impower him to do mischief and hurt to others, or to foretell things to come, and the like; for I believe that all things Immaterial, as Spirits, Angels, Devils, and the divine Soul of Man, are no parts of Na∣ture, but Supernatural, Nature knowing of no Crea∣ture that belongs to her, but what is material; and since incorporeal Creatures are no parts of Nature, they nei∣ther have natural actions, nor are they concerned as co∣partners or co-agents in the actions of Nature and na∣tural Creatures; but as their substances, so their actions are supernatural, and beyond our conceivement. As for Faires, I will not say, but there may be such Crea∣tures in Nature, and have airy bodies, and be of a hu∣mane shape, and have humane actions, as I have de∣scribed in my Book of Poems; for there are many things in Nature, whereof Man hath no knowledg at

all, and it would be a great folly for any one to deny what he doth not see, or to ascribe all the unusual ef∣fects in Nature to Immaterial Spirits; for Nature is so full of variety, that she can and doth present some∣times such figures to our exterior senses, as are not familiar to us, so as we need not to take our re∣fuge to Immaterial Spirits: nay, even those that are so much for Incorporeal Spirits, must confess, that they cannot be seen in their own natures, as being Invisible, and therefore have need to take vehicles of some grosser bodies to manifeft themselves to men: and if Spirits cannot appear without bodies, the neer∣est way is to ascribe such unusual effects or appari∣tions, as happen sometimes, rather to matter that is already corporeal, and not to go so far as to draw Immaterial Spirits to Natural actions, and to make those Spirits take vehicles fit for their purposes: for Nature takes sometimes delight in unusual Varie∣ties. Concerning those stories which your Author relates of the strange effects of Food received into a mans body, how they did work upon the Imagina∣tion, and change and transform the humors of those that did feed upon them, those, I say, seem very pro∣bable to me. As for example; of a Wench who being struck into an Epilepsy, upon the seeing of a Male∣factors Head cut off, was advised to drink Cats-blood; which being done, she not long after degenerated into the nature and property of that Animal, cried and jump'd like a Cat, and hunted Mice with the same silence and watchfulness as they do. Then of a Man, being long fed with Swines-blood, which took a special pleasure in wallowing and tumbling himself in the mire. Also of

a Girle, which being nourished up with Goats-milk, would skip like a Goat, and brouze on Trees as Goats use to do. And of a Man, who by eating the brains of a Bear, became of a Bear-like disposition. All these stories I believe to be true; for naturally the motions of a Man may sometimes sympathize so much with the received food, as to make an alteration in his hu∣mour or disposition. But although it be natural, yet it is not regular, at least not usual, but proceeds from an irregular and unusual change of motions, like as the conception and generation of a Monster; For if it were ordinary, then those which drink much of the blood of beasts, would also degenerate into a beastly nature, the contrary whereof is sufficiently known: Likewise those that drink much of Cows-milk, would change into their humors and natures. But certainly, some kinds of meats do not onely cause sickness, but madness, and strange Imaginations; all which unna∣tural or unusual accidents are caused by Matter's irre∣gular motions; Whereof I have declared my opinion in other places; and so I rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful and constant Friend, to serve you.

XXXIII.

MADAM,

YOu will have my opinion of the Book that treats of the Pre-existence of Souls, and the Key that unlocks the Divine Providence; but I have told you heretofore, that there are so many different opi∣nions concerning the Soul, as I do not know which to embrace, for the multiplicity confounds my choice: and the cause of these various opinions, in my simple judgment, is, that most men make no difference be∣tween the Divine, and Natural Soul. As for the Na∣tural Soul, humane sense and reason may perceive, that it consists of Matter, as being Material; but as for the Divine Soul, being not material, no humane sense and reason is able naturally to conceive it; for there cannot possibly be so much as an Idea of a natural nothing, or an immaterial being, neither can sense and reason na∣turally conceive the Creation of an Immaterial sub∣stance; for as the Creation of material Creatures, as of this World, belongs to Faith, and not to Reason, so doth also the Creation of Immaterial substances, as Spi∣rits; nay, it is more difficult to understand a Natural Nothing to be made out of nothing, then a Natural Something out of nothing. And as for the Progress of Immaterial Souls, which the same Author mentions, I cannot conceive how No-thing can make a Progress, and therefore I suppose, it is an Improper, or Meta∣phorical expression. The truth is, what is Imma∣terial,

belongs not to a Natural knowledg or under∣standing, but is Supernatural, and goes beyond a na∣tural reach or capacity. Concerning the Key of Di∣vine Providence, I believe God did never give or lend it to any man; for surely, God, who is infinitely Wise, would never intrust so frail and foolish a Creature as Man, with it, as to let him know his secret Counsels, Acts, and Decrees. But setting aside Pride and Pre∣sumption, Sense and Reason may easily perceive, that Man, though counted the best of Creatures, is not made with such infinite Excellence, as to pierce into the least secrets of God; Wherefore I am in a maze when I hear of such men, which pretend to know so much, as if they had plundered the Celestial Cabinet of the Omnipotent God; for certainly, had they done it, they could not pretend to more knowledg then they do. But I, Madam, confess my Ignorance, as ha∣ving neither divine Inspirations, nor extraordinary Vi∣sions, nor any divine or humane learning, but what Nature has been pleased to bestow upon me: Yet in all this Ignorance, I know that I am, and ought to be,

MADAM,

Your humble and faithful Servant.

XXXIV.

MADAM,

SInce in my former Letters I have discoursed of Im∣material Spirits, and declared my meaning, that I do not believe them to be natural Creatures, or parts of Nature; you are of opinion, as if I did con∣tradict my self, by reason that in the first Edition of my Book called Philosophical Opinions, I name the rational and sensitive Matter, rational and sensitive Spirits. To which I answer, first, That when I did write my first Conceptions in Natural Philosophy, I was not so ex∣perienced, nor had I those observations which I have had since; Neither did I give those first Conceptions time to digest, and come to a maturity or perfect growth, but forced them forth as soon as conceived, and this made the first publishing of them so full of Imper∣fections, which I am much sorry for; But since that time, I have not onely reviewed, but corrected and al∣tered them in several places, so that the last Impression of my Philosophical Opinions, you will find more per∣fect and exact then the former. Next, I pray you to take notice, Madam, that in the mentioned first E∣dition, by the word Spirits, I meant Material, not Im∣material Spirits; for observing, that Learned Men do discourse much of Animal Spirits, which are Material, and that also high extracts in Chymistry are called Spi∣rits; I used that word purposely, thinking it most pro∣per and convenient to express my sense and meaning of

that degree of matter which I call rational and sensitive. But considering again, that my opinions, being new, would be subject to misapprehensions and mis-interpre∣tations; to prevent those, I thought it fitter to leave out the word Spirits in the second, as also in the last Editi∣on of my named Book of Philosophy, lest my Readers should think I meant Immaterial Spirits; for I confess really, that I never understood, nor cannot as yet ap∣prehend Immaterial Spirits; for though I believe the Scripture, and the Church, that there are Spirits, and do not doubt the existency of them, yet I cannot con∣ceive the nature of Immaterial Spirits, and what they are; Wherefore I do onely treat of natural material substances, and not of incorporeal; also my discourse is of the Infinite servant of the Infinite God, which ser∣vant is corporeal or material Nature: God is onely to be admired, adored, and worshipped; but not un∣gloriously to be discoursed of; Which Omnipotent God, I pray of his Infinite Mercy to give me Faith to believe in him, and not to let presumption prevail with me so, as to liken vain and idle conceptions to that Incomprehensible Deity. These, Madam, are my humble Prayers to God; and my request to you is, that I may continue the same in your love and affection, which I have been hitherto; so shall I live content, and rest,

MADAM,

Your faithful Friend and Servant.

Notes

• Antidote, Book 1. c. 10. a. 5.
• Of the Im∣mortality of the Soul, l. 1. a. 4.
• Antid. Book. 2. Ch. 2. a. 1.
• Antid. Book. 2. c. 2.
• C. 3.
• Antid. 1. 3. c. 15. a. 3.
• Of the Im∣mortality of the Soul, l. 1. c. 12.
• Of the Im∣mortality of the Soul, l. 2. c. 1. a. 3.
• a

  In the Ap∣pend. to the Antid. c. 3. a. 10.
• In the Pre∣face before the Imm. of the Soul.
• Antid. Book. 2. c. 4.
• Append. to the Antid. c. 11.
• Antid. l. 2. c. 1.
• Of the Im∣mortality of the Soul, l. 1. c. 7.
• Of the Im∣wortality of the Soul. l. 2. c. 2.
• Of the Im∣mortality of the Soul. l. 2. c. 1. a. 1, 6, 7.
• In the second Book of the Immortality of the Soul, ch. 6.
• In the Pref. of the Imm. of the Soul.
• Antid. lib. 1. c. 11.
• Lib. 2. c. 4.
• Antid. Book. 1. c. 5.
• Ch. 3.
• Append. to the Antid. ch. 3.
• Antid. lib. 2. ch. 2.
• In the Ap∣pend. to the Antid. c. 3. and Of the Im∣mortality of the Soul, l. 1. c. 5.
• Sect. 1. Let. 20.
• Of the Im∣mortality of the Soul. l. 2. c. 10.
• Of the Im∣mortality of the Soul, l. 2. c. 10.
• Immort. of the Soul. Book 2. c. 10.
• Immort. of the Soul. Book 2. 6b. 8.
• Immort. of the Soul. Book 3. c. 13.
• Of the Im∣mortality of the Soul. l. 1. c. 3.
• Lib. 2. c. 2.
• Antid. lib. 3.
• In his dis∣course of Eu∣thusiasm. esct.