A collection of miscellanies consisting of poems, essays, discourses, and letters occasionally written / by John Norris ...

Of Courage.

A Ristotle in his Morals begins the Doctrine of Vertues with Courage; which has found work for his Interpreters to assign the reason of his method. But, methinks, there is no great need they should either study or differ much about it. For certainly, among all the Ver∣tues this will justly challenge the Precedency, and is the most Cardinal and fundamental part of Morality. This Vertue is pre-required to the susception of all the rest. For the very en∣trance into the School of wisdom and a ver∣tuous course is a state of Discipline, Difficulty and Hardship. And therefore 'tis sapere aude, a great piece of daring and boldness to set up for a good man: especially, if to the proper difficulties and Agonies of a Vertuous engage∣ment, we add those calamities and straits it oftentimes exposes us to, through the malice and folly of the world. So that as Plato writ upon his School 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Let none enter here that understands not Mathematics, it may be set as a Motto upon the School of Ver∣tue, Let none enter here that wants Courage.

And as 'tis necessarily requisite to the susce∣ption of all other vertues, so is it their main support, guardian and establishment. Without

this, every other Vertue is precarious, and lies at the mercy of every cross accident. Without this, let but a Pistol be held to the breast, and the severest Chastity will be frighted into com∣pliance, the most Heroic Friendship into trea∣chery, and the most ardent Piety into renun∣ciation of God and Religion. There is nothing among all the frailnesses and uncertaintys of this sublunary world so tottering and unstable, as the vertue of a Coward. He has that within him that upon occasion will infallibly betray every vertue he has; and to secure him from sin, you must keep him from Temptation. This was the Principle the Devil went upon in his en∣counter with Job, Do but put forth thy hand, (says he to God) and touch all that he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face. He was right e∣nough in the Proposition, tho mistaken in the application.

Having now seen the usefulness of this great Vertue, 'twill be worth while to enquire a lit∣tle into its Nature. And that the rather, be∣cause 'tis not only variously and falsly appre∣hended by the many, but too confusedly and darkly deliver'd even by Moralists themselves.

That which with the Vulgar passes for Cou∣rage, is certainly nothing else but stupidity, desperateness or fool-hardiness; a brutish sort of Knight-errantry in seeking out needless en∣counters, and running into dangers without fear or wit; which is so far from having the

fore-mention'd property of Courage, of being a guardian, and security of our Vertues, that 'tis in it self a sin.

But are we like to have a better account of it from the Moralists? why they tell you that it is a Mediocrity between Fear and Boldness; So Aristotle in his Ethics. But then as for de∣fining what this Mediocrity is (wherein the ve∣ry point of the business lies) you are as much to seek as ever.

Others will tell you that 'tis a firmness of mind in sustaining evils, and undertaking dangers. Accordingly they assign two parts of Courage Sustinere & Aggredi. Thus Epictetus and the School of the Stoics. But what it is thus firm∣ly to sustain or undertake an evil, and what evils are to be thus sustain'd or undertaken, they either could not, or have not thought fit to ac∣quaint us.

In order therefore to the settling the Point in hand, I consider 1st in general, that Cou∣rage has evil of Pain for its object, which in some circumstances is to be chosen or submit∣ted to. Whence I form this general Idea of Courage that 'tis a firm and peremptory reso∣lution of Mind to chuse evil of Pain in right circumstances, or when 'tis truly eligible. This Definition I confess runs in general Terms, much like one of Aristotles, but I intended it for no other. Only it has this advantage above his, that it lays a Foundation for one that is more particular.

For 'tis but here to subjoin when an evil is truly eligible, and the Idea of Courage will be sufficiently determinate and express. Now to make a thing eligible 'tis necessary that some way or other it appear good; evil being no way eligible under its own formality. And to make an evil put on the nature and appearance of good, two things are necessary. 1st that it be a lesser evil than some other, and 2ly that the chusing of it be a necessary Medium for the preventing of that other. Then, and in no o∣ther case, is evil truly eligible: and consequent∣ly, we shall not be mistaken in the Idea of Cou∣rage, if we define it to be such a firm and con∣stant 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or disposition of mind, whereby a man is fix'd and determin'd never to dread any evil, so far as to decline it when the chusing it is the only remedy against a greater. And this is most eminently signalized in the case of Mar∣tyrdom, when a man submits to the greatest evils of Pain to avoid that much greater one of Sin. This is the very summity and perfection of Courage, that which an Hannibal or a Sci∣pio could never equal in all their gallantry and feats of war: and I dare venture to pronounce, that he who would rather dye or part with any worldly interest than commit a sin, can never be a Coward.

And here I cannot but take notice of a false notion of Honour and Courage whereby the world has been generally abused; especially

those men that make the highest pretensions to both. According to these mens Measures of things, 'tis sufficient reason to post a man up for a Coward if he refuse a Duell; And to merit a badge of Honour from the Herald's Office if he accept it. These men would be ready to laugh at me, I know, as a lover of Paradoxes, should I tell them that their characters must be quite transposed to make them true. And yet I can∣not help it, so it falls out that he who declines the Duell is indeed the man of Honour and Courage, and he who accepts it is the Coward. For he who declines it, despises the obloquy and scorn of the world that he may approve himself to God and his own Conscience, would rather be pointed and hiss'd at, than be damn'd; and so chuses a lesser evil to avoid a greater. But he that accepts the Duel, so dreads the loss of his credit among those whose good opinion is of no value, that to avoid it he chuses to incur sin and damnation; and so chuses a greater evil to avoid a less. And if this be Courage, we must strike it out of the Catalogue of the Vertues, for nothing is so, that is not under the direction of Prudence; much less what is down-right Folly and the very exaltation of Madness.