A collection of miscellanies consisting of poems, essays, discourses, and letters occasionally written / by John Norris ...

Another Letter to the same Person, concerning the true Notion of Pla∣to's Ideas, and of Platonic Love.

Tanta vis in Ideis constituitur, ut nisi his intellectis, sapiens esse nemo possit.

Augustinus Tom. 4. Pag. 548. Q. 46.

SIR,

1. WERE I not as well acquainted with your singular modesty, as I am with your intellectual accomplishments, I should readily conclude, that your directing your enquiries to me proceeded not so much from a Curiosity to improve your own Know∣ledge, as to try mine. But when I consider that you are ignorant of nothing so much as of your own Worth and Abilities, I begin to think it possible that you may propose these Questions even to me out of a desire to be inform'd. Which way soever it is, I acknowledge my self to be obliged to you for affording me an opportuni∣ty of serving you, especially in such an Instance, where I cannot gratify your Request without

humouring my own Genius at the same time. For indeed to my apprehension, there is not a finer or more Sublime piece of Speculation in all Plato's Philosophy, than that of his Ideas▪ and that of his Love, tho it has undergone the same hard Fate with many other excellent Theories, first, to be either ignorantly misunderstood, or maliciously misrepresented, and then popularly vilify'd and decry'd.

2. To do right therefore to the name of this great Man, as well as to satisfy your Demands, I shall first propose the general mistake, and then rectify it, first present you with the suppos'd Opinion of Plato, and then with the true and genuin one. I begin with his Ideas, by which 'tis taken for granted by the generality of Wri∣ters, especially those of the Peripatetic Order, that he understood universal Natures or ab∣stract Essences subsisting eternally by them∣selves, Separate both from the mind of God and all singular Beings, according to which, as so many patterns, all Singulars are form'd. As for instance, that a Man, not this or that in particular, but a universal Man, or a Man in general, should exist by it self eternally, ac∣cording to which all particular Men were made. Sir, I suppose you can hardly forbear smiling at the odness of the Conceit, but as ridiculous as you may think it, 'tis said to be maintained by no less a Man than Plato, and has been thought of that moment too, that Multitudes of

great Men have set themselves very seriously to confute it as a dangerous Heresy, and have op∣posed it with as much zeal as ever St. Austin did the Manichees or the Pelagians.

3. But now, that this Opinion was not only for its Absurdity and Contradictiousness unwor∣thy of the contemplative and refin'd Spirit of Plato; but was also apparently none of his, I dare say any capable Person will be convinc'd that shall heedfully and impartially examine and compare the Works of Plato; And this A∣ristotle himself must needs have known (he having been his constant Auditour for twenty years together) but only he wanted a Shadow to fight with, and so father'd this monstrous Opinion upon his Master. And of this disinge∣nuity of Aristotle, together with other abuses, Plato himself complain'd, while alive, in these words; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as is recorded by Laertius in the Life of Aristotle.

4. And now, that the grossness of this Abuse may the more fully appear, I will in the next place present you with another Sense of Plato's Ideas, and such as by a more than ordinary ac∣quaintance with his Works, I know to be the true and genuin one. Know then that Plato considering the World as an effect of an intel∣lectual Agent, and that in the Operations of all other Artificers or rational Efficients there must be some form in the Mind of the Artificer pre∣supposed

to the VVork (for otherwise what dif∣ference will there be between a fortuitous effect and an intended one, and how comes the effect to be of this Species rather than another?) thought it necessary to suppose 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Eternal Forms, Models or Patterns, of all the Species of being in Nature existing in the Mind of God. And these he calls Ideas. I say existing in the Mind of God, for there is not the least Intimation in all Plato's VVorks of any such Ideas existing separately from the Di∣vine intellect, nor do the great Masters of Pla∣tonic Philosophy, Plotinus, Porphyrius, Procles, or any other that I know of make mention of any such Spectres and Ghosts of Entity. No, this Monster was hatch'd in Aristotle's Brain, and I believe did never enter Plato's Head so much as in a Dream. For he is not only silent about it, but does in several places expresly assert the contrary; Particularly in his Timaeus, where, of set purpose, he describes the Origin of the VVorld, he says that God made the VVorld according to that Pattern or Idea which he had in his Mind. The same you will find more am∣ply confirm'd in his Hippias, his Parmenides, and his sixth Book of Repub. and many other places. And these Ideas he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the first Intelligibles, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Mea∣sures of the things that are, implying, that as all things were form'd according to these specifical Platforms; so their truth must be measured

from their Conformity to them. And in this Sense must be taken that Common Axiom of the Schools, that the Truth of a thing is its Con∣formity with the Divine Intellect, for it is in no other Sense Intelligible, as you will discern in the Process.

5. But now, lest you should imagine, that this Platonic Hypothesis of Ideas existing in the Divine Mind should ill comport with the Sim∣plicity of God, or clash with that approved Doctrine of the Schools, Nihil est in Deo quod non sit Deus, (which is another cavil of the Anti∣platonists) you are to understand that Plato by his Ideas does not mean any real Essence distinct from the Divine Essence, but only the Divine Essence it self with this Connotation, as it is va∣riously imitable or participable by created Be∣ings, and consequently, according to the mul∣tifariousness of this imitability, so are the possi∣bilities of Being. Which is as fine a Notion as was ever framed by the Mind of Man, and that it is his, you will find, if you consult his Par∣menides. And this will serve to help us out with another difficulty, for whereas Plato makes his Divine Ideas not only the exemplary causes of things, but also (which is a consequent to the former) the measure of their Truth, this may seem to fall in with their Opinion who make all Truth dependent upon the Speculative un∣derstanding of God, that is, that God does not understand a thing so because it is so in its own

Nature, but that a thing is therefore so because God is pleas'd so to understood it. Which is an Opinion full of mischief and absurdity, as you may see compendiously, and yet evidently demonstrated, in Dr. Rust's little Discourse of Truth. Now for the clearing this Difficulty, 'tis to be observed, that the Essence of God, ac∣cording to Plato, is distinguished into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Counterpart whereof in English is Conceptive and Exhibitive. By the Mind of God Exhibitive is meant the Essence of God as thus or thus imitable or participable by any Creature, and this is the same with an Idea. By the Mind of God Conceptive is meant a reflex act of God's Understanding upon his own Es∣sence as Exhibitive, or as thus and thus imita∣ble. Now if you consider the Divine Under∣standing as Conceptive or Speculative, it does not make its Object but suppose it, (as all Specula∣tive Understanding does) neither is the Truth of the Object to be measured from its Confor∣mity with that, but the Truth of that from its Conformity with its Object. But if you consi∣der the Divine Understanding as Exhibitive, then its Truth does not depend upon its Con∣formity with the Nature of things, but on the contrary, the Truth of the Nature of things depends upon its Conformity with it. For the Divine Essence is not thus or thus imitable, be∣cause such and such things are in being, but such and such things are in being, because the

Divine Essence is thus and thus imitable, for had not the Divine Essence been thus imitable, such and such Beings would not have been pos∣sible. And thus is Plato to be understood when he founds the Truth of things upon their Con∣formity with the Divine Ideas, and thus must the Schools mean too by that foremention'd Axiom concerning Transcendental Truth, if they will speak Sense, as I noted above.

6. And now, Sir, from Plato's Ideas thus ami∣ably set forth, the Transition methinks is very natural to Love. And concerning this I shall account in the same Method, first, by pointing out the popular Misapprehensions about it, and then by exhibiting a true Notion of it. Pla∣tonic Love is a thing in every bodies Mouth, but I find scarce any that think or speak accurately of it. The mistakes which I observe are chiefly these. Some of the grosser Understanders sup∣pose that Plato by his Love meant 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Love of Males, but the Occasion of this Con∣ceit was from a passage in his Convivium, where he brings in Aristophanes speaking favourably that way. But he that shall from hence con∣clude Plato a prostitute to that vile Passion, may as well conclude a Dramatic Poet to be an A∣theist or a Whore-master, because he represents those of that Character. But that Divine Pla∣to intended nothing less than to countenance any such thing, is evident from the whole scope and purport of that Dialogue, and from other

places where he expresly condemns it, and re∣jects it with great abhorrence; particularly in the first of his de legibus, where he calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an unnatural attempt. Others by Platonic Love understand the Love of Souls, and this indeed has somthing of truth in it, only it is much too narrow and particular.

7. Others take Platonic Love to be a desire of imprinting any excellency, whether moral or intellectual, in the Minds of beautiful young men by Instruction, and so likewise of enjoy∣ing your own Perfections reflected from the Mind of another, mix'd with and recommend∣ed by the Beauty of the Body. According to the usual saying, Gratior è Pulchro, &c. And thus Socrates was said to love his beautiful Pu∣pils Phaedrus and Alcibiades. Others measure the Nature of Platonic Love, not from the Ob∣ject (to which they suppose it indifferent) but from the manner of the Act. And according to these, that man is said to love Platonically, that does Casso delectamine amare, love at a di∣stance, that never designs a close fruition of the Object what ever it be, whether Sensual or In∣tellectual, but chooses to dwell in the Suburbs, pleasing himself with remote Prospects, and makes a Mistress of his own Desire. And this is the receiv'd Notion, and that which Peo∣ple generally mean when they talk of Platonic Love. But this too is far enough from the right, for tho Platonic Love does not aim at

the fruition of sensual Objects, yet it designs the fruition of its own Object as much as a∣ny other Love does. That therefore which distinguishes Platonic Love, is not the manner of the act above-mention'd, but the peculia∣rity of the Object. And what that is must be collected from the Design of Plato in that Dialogue, where he treats purposely of it, his Convivium. Which is briefly to shew the man∣ner of the Souls ascent to God by love. For Plato makes the Happiness of Man to consist in the Contemplation and Love of God, whom he calls the Idea of Beauty. But now be∣cause this Idea of Beauty (God) is of too sub∣lime and refined excellency to be immediat∣ly fastned upon by our Love, he recommends to us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Method of Ascent, which is from loving the Beauty we see in Bodies, to pass on to the Love of the Beauty of the Soul, from the Beauty of the Soul to the Beauty of Vertue, and lastly from the Beau∣ty of Vertue, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to the immense O∣cean of Beauty, &c. For so have I observ'd a tender Infants Eye not enduring to gaze directly upon the too powerful Excellence of the Meridian Sun, chuse to entertain it self with the abatements of corrected and re∣flected Light, and take up with the feebler refreshments of lesser Beauties for a while, till at length the faculty grows more con∣firm'd,

and dares encounter the Sun in his Strength. And these are the Steps of the San∣ctuary. So that Platonic Love is the Love of Beauty abstracted from all sensual Appli∣cations, and desire of corporal contract, as it leads us on to the Love of the first origi∣nal Beauty, God; or more plainly thus, The Ascent of the Soul to the Love of the Di∣vine Beauty, by the Love of abstracted Beau∣ty in Bodies. This Love of abstracted Beau∣ty in Bodies he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Celestial Love, in opposition to that which he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is the same with that Pas∣sion commonly signify'd by the name of Love, (viz.) a desire of corporal contact a∣rising from the sight of Beauty. This last indeed is a very vile, brutish, unmanly af∣fection, and such as considering the vileness of our Bodies, one would think a man could never be charm'd into without the Magic of a Love-potion. But the former is an Angeli∣cal Affection, for certainly Beauty is a Di∣vine thing; It is (as the Platonic Author says of Wisdom) the pure Influence flowing from the Glory of the Almighty, and the Bright∣ness of the Everlasting Light: or in Plato's own Words, A Ray of God. And therefore the Love of abstract Beauty must needs be a very generous and divine Affection. Sir, I could be more large in my account, but I consider what 'tis I write, and to whom, and there∣fore

I think it high time to remit you to your own Thoughts, some of which I hope will be, that I am in a very eminent degree of Friendship,

Yours J. Norris.