Discourses upon Cornelius Tacitus written in Italian by the learned Marquesse Virgilio Malvezzi ; dedicated to the Serenissimo Ferdinand the Second, Great Duke of Thuscany ; and translated into English by Sir Richard Baker, Knight.

Vnum esse Reipublicae Corpus, atque nuius animo Regendum.

Whether an Aristocracy, or a Monarchy be the more profita∣ble for a City. The nine and thirtieth Discourse.

ASinius Gallus having too sharply spoken to Tibe∣rius, and finding his owne errour, and the Princes indignation; meant with a flattering speech, to cover the one, and pacifie the other: and therefore shewed, that for an Empire to be well governed, it was neces∣sary it should be governed by one alone. And because from this place of Tacitus many gather, that he held the government of a Monarchy to be better then that of optimates: I conceive it to be no digression from our purpose, that I shew first, according to my understan∣ding, the truth of this question; and then declare, how this place of Tacitus must be understood. And herein, no man need to marvell, that I vary from the opinions, or to say better, from the approved opinions, of many excellent men, as though I meant to vilifie them; but I desire they would take into consideration, the River of Rho•…•…e, which although it seeme by his course, as though it meant to drown the legitimate sons of the Celti, yet indeed it exalts them, and gives a true testi∣mony of their legitimate birth to all that see it. So it will be no small matter, if I with my weaknesse, can make the others worth appeare the greater.

To come then to the matter: It is commonly held, and all men almost are of opinion, that a Monarchy is the better. For proving whereof, there being two waies; one, Authority: the other, Reason: in each of these, there will not be wanting meanes sufficient to make it plaine. In considering authority, the first that present themselves, are the holy Fathers, S. Chry∣sostome, Justin, Athanasius, Gyprian, S. Hierome, and finally S. Thomas in many places. Secondly, come Philoso∣phers, naturall and morall: Plato, Aristotle, Sen•…•…ca, Plu∣tarch, Herodotus, and finally amongst Poets, Homer.

If we come to reasons, there present themselves an infinite number: and first, if we consider profit, we shall finde, (as S. Thomas saith) that a more profitable government cannot be found, then that of a Monarch; seeing the profit & welfare of that which is governed, that is, of Cities and Provinces, consists in nothing but in conserving of unity, which we call peace: at which, they who governe must chiefly aime: and seeing there is no government so fit to preserve peace, as that of a King, we cannot choose but give it the name, to be the better, and the more profitable. Because peace consists in nothing but unity, which certainely is bet∣ter had in one, who is by himselfe one, as a King is; then in those that are many, as Optimates are: as we see, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thing which is hot of it selfe, is a more efficient cause of heating, then that which is but hot by acci∣dent, the state of Optimates being never good, but in as much as they who govern it, approach by accidentall union, to be one.

But laying profit aside, and entring into considera∣tion, which of them is most naturall, who sees not, that a Monarchy is the most? seeing nature governes and moves all the parts of our bodies, by one onely which is the heart: likewise the sensitive soule is governed by the rationall; and Bees naturally are governed by

one that is King: and if Artificiall things be so much the better, as they imitate nature; and the Artificers worke be so much the perfecter, as it holds similitude with nature; then certainely, must every one needs yeeld, that in the multitude of governments that State is the best, which is governed by one alone.

Againe, if we looke upon experience, we shall find, that in a house, there is but one Master; in a flocke, but one Shepheard; and in the old Testament, the Israelites were alwaies governed by one alone, whe∣ther under Kings, or under Judges.

But laying also this aside, and comming to examine the power: who sees not that a Monarchy is farre more potent then an Aristocracy, considering that of the foure Empires and powers of the World: that is, the Assyrians, the Persians, the Grecians, and the Ro∣mans; onely one of them was under Optimates.

Then if we consider order: where is it more found, then in a Monarchy? where every one is subject, but he onely that rules the rest; there being no order be∣tweene equals, but onely betweene superiour and inferiour.

If then we consider duration and stability, this cer∣tainely is most found in the government of one alone, seeing Omne Regnum in se divisum desolabitur: and every one knowes, that division fals out more easily in an Optimacy, then in a Monarchy: as experience hath made it manifest in the Monarchy of Ninus, which continued without interruption, a thousand two hun∣dred and ninety yeeres. If then we consider, which is furthest off from discords, we may take example in Rome, which was never without discords, but when it was under Kings.

But laying all these considerations aside, it will be proofe enough of this assertion, to consider the simi∣litude, that is betweene the government of God, and

that of a Monarch, because as he rules all the World, so a King rules all his subjects.

By these reasons it might be concluded, that a Mo∣narchy, as being most profitable, most naturall, most potent, most durable, most orderly, most free from discords, and finally most like to the government of God, should without comparison be better, then a State of Optimates. But seeing there are many diffi∣culties in the question, I hope I shall have leave to ex∣amine the truth of it a little better. And where it may be discoursed of in two senses; the spirituall, and the temporall: In the spirituall, it cannot be denied, a∣gainst Calvin and other hereticks, but that a Monar∣chy is the best kind of government that can be given: and of this there needs be no disputing, being as cleare as the Sunne, both by authority of Scripture, by deter∣mination of Councels, by consent of the Church, and finally by the common opinion of all the Fathers, such a Monarchy having been instituted by our Lord Christ himselfe.

But in the second case, which is, considering it in the temporall sense; I hold the Question may hold dis∣putation, and be handled politically: where we shall not find, all the reasons that were in the former: be∣cause a King, as a King, may erre a thousand times a day: but the Pope, as Pope, can never erre, as being assisted by the Holy Ghost. Whereupon, as it is un∣doubted, that in the spirituall, there cannot a bet∣ter government be then a Monarchy: so in the Tem∣porall, every one may be left to take which side he likes best. The first question being betweene an Is∣raelite, and an Egyptian, was consequently easily de∣termined by Moses; but the second betweene the Israe∣lite, and the Israelite, was very hard to be determined. And therefore as 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Gregory Nyssen well observes, by killing the Egyptian, Moses ended that strife, but for

the strife between the two Israelites, he was never able to accord them. So the strife, which we had with Heretickes may easily be determined, by killing them with the holy Scripture, but with strifes that grow between our selves, are left to every ones free liking: and therefore very hardly can be ended.

He then that would hold an Aristocracy to be bet∣ter then a Monarchy, might easily prove it by reason, and by authority. By reason, because (as S. Thomas saith excellently well) that government is the best, and the most profitable, that can best procure the unity of the Cittizens: whereupon we must necessa∣rily confesse, that an Optimacy is the best; for seeing that an univocall riseth not but from an univocall; and that the unity of the Optimates is more univocall to that unity which is required in the people, then the unity of a Monarch is; therefore also it is more fit, and able to produce it: for, the unity of the Prince, is an unity of person, and of end: unity of person, as much as to say unity of number: as being one alone, unity of end, because all his cares are directed to one sole end, which is the good of his subjects; but the unity of the Optimates, is an unity of end, in plurality of persons, I say plurality, but not disunion; because the Optimates being many persons, cannot have unity of number, but agreeing in the end which is the good of the City, in this they are one. And the unity of sub∣jects ought to be an unity of end, in plurality of per∣sons: so as by this, it manifestly appearing that the unity of the Optimates is more univocall with that of the people, then the unity of the King is; therefore consequently it must be granted, that it is more able to produce it. There being two things necessary to generation, (as Cajetan saith) first, the distinction of that which is generated, from that which generates: the second, that there be a similitude in nature, be∣tween

the one and the other, because, that which Generates, intends to introduce a thing like to it selfe, and therefore (saith he) where there is more Identity and similitude in nature, betweene that which Gene∣rates and that which is generated, there the generati∣on will be perfitter, and more easie, and from hence it comes that the Univocall generation is more excellent then the Equiuocall, and therefore, seeing the Identi∣ty, betweene the unity of the Optimates, and that of the People, is more then the unity of the Prince, and that of the People; it followes, that the generation shall be more noble, more persit and more easie, and the more, seeing that unity of a King, which is unity of number, is rather contrary to the union we speake off, because as one in number is a denying of more parts; So unity in number, is an affirming of more parts, rather that one, which is of number, is the ru∣ine of a City; as Aristotle prooves strongly against Plato, where he saith; Atqui constat, quod ea si proce∣dat, ut una fiat magis Civitas non erit. Est enim Civitas multitudo qu•…•…dam, secundum Naturam, quae dum fit una magis Domus erit ex Civitate, & homo ex Domo. Vnam e∣nim magis Domum censemus esse quam Civitatem, & homi∣nem unum quam Domum; quare etiamsi posset quis•…•…iam am hoc facere, tamen non esset faciendum, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 perimit Ci∣vitatem. So as, a City should not make it selfe one in number, but in discipline, as the said Aristotle saith, Oportet cum Civitas sit multitudo, per Disciplinam commu∣nem facere. And although, to shew that the unity of a King is better, then that of Optimates; It might be said, that the unity of number shewes Perfe∣ction; God being one by reason of Perfection: and many holding, that in every sort of Angells, there is one chiefe: as that which concernes their Perfecti∣on; yet I could easily answer with Saint Thomas: that one as it implies Negation, addes nothing to the

Perfection of being; and if we take one as excluding other things, and as in its formall sense, it signifies to be alone and solitary: This of it selfe expresseth no Perfection, but rather many times imperfection, be∣cause in God, the being alone by Essence, proceeds from Perfection; but if he should be one in Person, it should be an imperfection. So as one, if you take it for solitary; signifies not so much Perfection, as im∣perfection.

But if we come to consider the Naturalnes of this go∣vernment; we cannot then have a better thing, to make it manifest, then the government of our body, which ac∣cordingto the doctrin of Plato (with the consent of Ari∣stotle) is governed by nature Aristocratically, with three faculties, The sensitive, the Animall, and the Vitall; the sensitive consisting in the Braine, which is the Be∣ginning of all the sinewes; the vitall, in the heart, the beginning of all the Arteries; The Animall in the Liver, the Fountaine of all the veines: whereupon e∣very member containing Arteries, Nerves and veines, they consequently are governed by three, by the liver, by the heart, and by the braine; and therefore that Doctrine of the heart, which is brought in opposition, is false, which Aristotle in his workes of Physick, hath many times confuted. And their Reason, to say a house is governed by one alone, is of no force: which ra∣ther is a reason that makes for us, seeing that, as na∣ture, amongst things that are unequall, as those in a house are, hath ordained the Government of one a∣lone, so betweene those that are Equall, as it is in a Citt•…•…y, there should be an Optimacy, which by 〈◊〉〈◊〉: in the first of his Politicks, is plainly Intimated. Neither is it of any force to say, that Bees naturally are governed by one alone, or that the sensitive soule is governed by the Rationall, or that a Flock is guided by one Shepheard, seeing the King of the Bees (as

Pliny saith) is much greater then any of the other bees, & the rational faculty is so much more noble then the sen∣sitive that hardly there can be assigned any proportion: & finally, the shepheard is so beyond comparison superi∣our to the flock, that it is most reasonable & indeed most naturall, hee should command; and therefore when in a City, there is any one found, so much superiour to all the rest, as the King of the Bees is in greatnesse to the other Bees; or so much in Noblenesse, as the rationall faculty is to the sensitive, or so much in ability, as the Shepheard is to the flock, then such a one in all reason should be King; as Aris•…•…otle grants where he saith: Quicun{que} igitur di∣stant tantum quantum Animus a corpore, & homo a bestia, per hunc modum se habent: having said before, Hic imperans, illa vero parens. And in another place he saith, if any one in a City, be found so much excelling all the rest, as Jupiter excells men, that man by right should be made King: Sed siquis excellat virtute, quid de eo sit faciendum? Non enim dicendum est, ut talis vir sit de civitate pellendus: atqut neque gubernationi aliorum, talis vir erit subjiciendus, perinde enim est, ac si qui Jovem Gubernare velint. This very thing God meant to shew, when he gave to man the rule over beasts as Salomon Interprets it, when asking wisedome, to the end God should give it him, he said Et sapientia tua consti∣tuisti hominem ut Dominaretur; as though he would say, as thou hast shewed, in giving Regall Dominion to man, that hee who will governe others, should in wisdome be as much superiour to his subjects, as a man is to Beasts: so you are bound, having made me King over so many People, to give a like proportion of wisedome, as not able otherwise to deserve to be a King.

With this supposition then we may grant, that the go∣vernment of a monarch is the better, as wherof we have an example in the Pope: but this is to handle the questi∣on Secundu quid: for if we handle it simpliciter; we denyit.

If we come to consider the Power, which is requi∣red for Augmentation, I then verily thinke there is

none so ignorant, but that he knowes, how much an Optimacy is fitter for augmenting, then a Monarchie, whereof we have Example in Athens, which, assoone as it freed it selfe from the Tyranny of Pisistratus, It presently grew to be of inestimable greatnesse. And if you will not stand to this Example, then take Rome, which was no sooner freed from Kings, but that it came to so great greatnesse, that it could not be op∣pressed but by it selfe. And it availes not to say, that of the foure Empires, one onely was a Common∣wealth, that is, that of the Romanes, and that the o∣ther three were Monarchies, as that of the Assyrians, of the Persians and of the Graecians, because if this rea∣son were of any force, It would prove, that a Tyran∣ny is the best government of all, seeing it is then a Mo∣narchie, when the subjects are used, as Children, and not as the Persians and Medes did, and at this day, the Turke, who useth his subjects as servants, or to say bet∣ter, as slaves.

In comming to consider duration; I care not to prove, that Optimacy continues longer, then Mo∣narchie, seeing this would not serve to prove my intent that therefore it is better, for duration as Aristotle saith, encreaseth not goodnesse, and therefore one white thing, that continues longer then another, is not thereby whiter then the other; but rather the best things of this world, as they are hard to find, so being found, they are soonest lost, as Galen faith of bo∣dyes, that are come to the height of health; and Ta∣citus, the like of states; whereupon it is no marvell, that the Monarchie of the Assyrians continued longer, then any Common-wealth ever did, which happened, because Tyranny held a proportion with that People, seeing People that are 〈◊〉〈◊〉, are necessarily to be governed by a Monarch, and not by Optimates. And therefore our Lord God, alwayes governed the Israe∣lites by one alone, because that rude people was not

able to suffer Liberty, as liking better to live under a Tyrant, as they made appeare, when they demanded a King of Samuel; for though he threatned them, they •…•…hould have a Tyrant, yet this made them not give over their demand. So when the Senat of Rome gran∣ted liberty, to Paslagonia and Cappadocia; the Cappado∣cians saying they could not live without a King, the Se∣nat was faine to send them Ariobarzanus, to be their King; whereof Livie saith, Barbari quibus pro legibus semper Dominorum Imperia fuerunt, quo gaudent, Reges ha∣beant; and Aristotle speaking of this shewes, that they were by Nature made to serve; Obidenim (saith he) quia magis aptae sunt Natura ad serviendum Nationes bar∣barum quam Graecorum; & eorum qui in colunt Asiam: quam eorum qui Europam, per serunt servile Jugum aequo animo, & ob hoc Tyrannica sunt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Regna. And there∣fore from hence, there can no argument be drawne, that Monarchie, is a better government then Optima∣cy, seeing (as Aristotle saith) although one Forme of Common-wealth be in it selfe better; yet for some people, another that is not good, may be more pro∣fitable. There might also be brought another Rea∣son, why Tyrannies are of longer Continuance, then Aristocracies, a Reason, which hath beene intimated, by a certaine Author; and it is because they are more hard to be surprised, because where all are servants, there can be none to lend a hand, to let in strangers, as hath beene often done in France, in England, and other pla∣ces: which will alwayes happen, and hath often hap∣pened to Monarchies, because such Princes hold their subjects rather as Companions, then as slaves; and there∣fore in this point, the Turke stands secure; and if A∣lexander Magnus overcame Darius, it was his owne Act. It is indeed true, that as Monarchies are more hardly ta∣ken then Common-wealths; so more easily they are held, where common-wealths are easily taken, (all the sub∣ject Cities being male content, & consequently ready to

assist strangers; but being taken, they are hard to be held by reason of the name of Liberty; which makes them apt every minute to fall into rebellion. Tyranny then is the most durable of all kinds of states, and if the reason a∣bove alleaged were of force it would prove it also to be the best, which no man that hath braines will say. But let us come to consider the order of Optimates; which is the same, that is in an I•…•…strument of Musick, order so much commanded by all the Holy Fathers, and by all Philosophers; where many Diverse sounds make but one sound, of which order, Saint Chrisostome in ad∣miration saith Et est videre mirabilem rem: in multis unum: & in uno multa. And then, if they will consider, the unaptnesse it hath to Discords, let him take the City of Venice for an example, which for many ages together, hath never had any. And it availes not to say, that where many are, they may be at ods betweene them∣selves, but one cannot be at oddes with himselfe, for I answer with Aristotle, Quod studiosi viri sunt omnes ut Ille unus. And the Example of Rome is of no force, because when the Discord entred betweene the Nobility and the People, It was not then an Optimacy but a mixt Estate: and by reason of the predominating Element, might be called a Popular state, and if ever it were an Optimacy, it was in the beginning, in which they lived in excee∣ding great concord, untill the state came to be corrup∣ted, rnd here we must advertise, that when we compare a Monarchie with an Optimacy, wee compare them in their perfection, and not in their corruption: because it is of the Essence of an Optimacy, that all in it should be good men, for else we should dispu•…•…e Aequivocally.

But to let many other things passe, who knowes not that a City will be better governed by Optimates; then by a Monarch? seeing the most virtuous, Governes best, and a King being but one virtuous, and the Opti∣mates many vertuous, seeing many know more then

one, although that one, in some thing may exceed those many, as Aristotle excellently shewes in his Politicks, yet if you grant that the Optimates be all vertuous men; you must withall grant, that they are able to governe better, then any King whatsoever; and the rather, because a King deserves then most praise, when he is governed himselfe by good counsellours, and consequently in as much as he is ruled by many, in the manner of Opti∣mates. So our Lord God appointed Moses, that he should rule by the counsell of Iethro. And this me thinkes might serve to make men capable, that an Optimacie is better, then a Monarchie, yet there is a further Reason: For not onely an Optimacy may Governe bet•…•…er, as be∣ing more vertuous; but as being more then a King, who not being able himselfe alone, to governe all the state, Solus illud non poteris sustinere; he must of necessity com∣mit it to officers; and who knowes not, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 how much more love and Iustice the people are governed, by the Lords themselves being vertuous, then under a King by officers that are strangers; they governing their owne, and these another mans; and therefore Aristotle speaking against Plato saith; that Propriety, a thing being ones own•…•…, is a speciall cause of love, and makes the greater care be taken of it, Nam de propriis maxime Cu∣rant homines; and if men (as he shewes) use little dili∣gence, in things that are common; they will use much lesse in things that are neither common nor proper: as we see it daily, (though it be but a homely instance) that a husband-man will till land better, that is his owne possession, then that which he is hired to till; as in that, regarding his owne particular profit; in this; the Com∣mon: in the one, the present onely, in the other, the present and the future both. And if it be answered, that a King may have good officers; I say, that when we grant the government of a King, to be good, wee 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that he be good himselfe; but it followes not,

that a good King must necessarily have good Officers, seeing it is not a thing essentiall to him: and though we should grant it to be essentiall, yet it is not consti∣tuent, but onely consequent; though I rather thinke it is neither one nor other; but for the present, let it it be as it will: This is most certaine, that in Optimacy, for all to be good, is both essentiall and constituent; for otherwise (as I have said) we shall but labour in Aequivocals.

Also secrecy gives an Optimacy right to be prefer∣red before a Monarchy: for proofe whereof, the ex∣ample of onely the Venetians may suffice, who (as Guicciardine relates) have alwaies kept their counsels secret: a thing which Princes cannot doe; who being to consult with persons, not interressed in the affaires that are handled, can never be sure, but that they may reveale them. And though none of these reasons were sufficient to winne perswasion to this opinion, yet this certainly must needs be sufficient, to shew, how much the government of God, is more like to an Op∣timacy, then to a Monarchy: and this will be easily shewed, because our Lord God operates Immediatione virtutis; and is, in all things, I•…•…diatione suppositi: to which kind of operating and being, the Optimates approach neerer, then the Monarch; who must of ne∣cessity make use of Officers, as not able being but one, to be himselfe in all places: whereby it often happens, that a State is more governed by the Officers vertue, then by the vertue of the Prince. But the Optimates being many, may all together doe that of themselves, which a Prince doth together with officers, and may governe the State by their owne vertue, and conse∣quently operate Immediatione virtutis: yet I meane it, in the manner, that a second cause can operate: know∣ing well, not onely in Theologicall verity, but also in Philosophicall doctrine, that all vertue proceeds from

Heaven: as Aristotle in his Meteors teacheth us, where he saith, Oportet hunc mund•…•…m inferiorem, superioribu•…•… lationibus esse contiguum: and therefore in a certaine manner, the government of Optimates is more like to that of God. And it availes not to say, that our Lord God is but one alone, that governes the whole world; because in him is one Essence, indeed one Will, one Soule, one Intellect onely; but then in three Persons really distinct, in three Suppositi, in three Hypostases, in three Substances; (as substance is distinct from Acci∣dents, which are In alio tanquam in subjecto.) And finally in three Subsistences, as subsistence signifies Essentiam per se subsistentem: which three Persons, doe in such sort governe the universe, that although the workes of Creation be attributed to the Father, the workes of Wisedome to the Sonne, the workes of Love and Grace to the Holy Ghost; yet all the three concurre equally in all workes ad extra, which are common to them all. The Universall therefore is governed by three Persons with one will alone: and the Divine Unity, is an unity of end in plurality of Persons, such as we have shewed the unity of Optimates to be. And this is that unity, which our Lord Christ, desires should be in us, as being like his owne, as he sheweth in S. John, where he saith, Pater Sancte serva eos in nomine tuo (spea∣king to his Father) quos dedist•…•… mihi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sint unus sieuti & nos. And a little after, Non pro eis rogo tantum, sed & pro eis qui crediture sunt per verba 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in me; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 omnes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sint, sicut tu Pater in me, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in te. So this is a cleere Text, and by every one interpreted to be meant of that unity, which ought to be in all the faithfull, which our Lord God would have to be like the unity of the Divine Persons: and as in them there is a reall distinction of persons in unity of Essence; so in the many faithfull, there ought to be one Spirit, one love, one will. They then that have plurality of persons

in one will, are in that manner one, as the Father, the Sonne and the Holy Ghost are, as in the Gospell our Lord Christ expounds it.

And now who is he, that by the force of so many reasons, will not confesse, that an Optimacy, as being more profitable, more Noble, more potent, more naturall, more secret, more concordant: and finally more like to the government of God, is farre a better kind of state then Monarchy.

As for authorities, I commonly make no great reckoning, but only of those which I am bound to be∣leeve, by commandement of the holy Church; other authorities must convince by reason: and this leave S. Austin gives me, where he saith, Neque quorum libet disputationes quamvis Catholicorum & laudatorum homi∣num velut Scripturas Canonicas habere debemus; ut nobis non liceat, salva Honorificentia, quae•…•…illis debeatur homini∣bus, aliquid in eorum scriptis improbare, atque respuere, si forte invenerimus quod aliter senserint, quam veritas habet, divino adjutorio, ut ab aliis intellecta •…•…nobis. Talis ego sum in scriptis alionum, quales volo esse intellectores meorum. And in another place he saith, Sacrae Scripturae est ad∣hihenda fides, alios autem Scriptores licet nobis impugnare. But because it becomes not my youth and weaknesse, to stand in defiance with so many excellent and wor∣thy men; I will endeavour to make it appeare, that some of the Authours cited before for the contrary, spake not in our sence; and that some of them speake of our side; some of them irresolutely, and some again, with passion.

Beginning then with the holy Fathers, I say, they spake in another sence, meaning it of the spirituall Monarchy: and though many times they speake gene∣rally, which may reach as well to a temporall Monar∣chy, yet this they did to the end, that Heretickes see∣ing it granted them, in the government of Cities, an

Optimacy to be better then a Monarchy, should not from hence take occasion to affirme the like of the spi∣rituall Monarchy, And this is a course, that hath been much used by the holy Fathers, who sometimes have not yeelded to things most cleere and evident, onely because they would not give hereticks occasion, by ill interpreting them, to make simple people encline to their opinions. It is a matter cleere and evident, and granted by all Divines, that in God there are three Hypostases, and yet many of the holy Fathers, and particularly S. Hierome, have not been willing to grant it; for no other reason, but least Gatholicks granting three Hypostases, heretickes should thereupon make simple people beleeve, that in God there were three Essences: and this interpretation is made of it, by all the Doctours upon S. Thomas.

Leaving then the opinion of these Fathers, who speake in another sense, let us come to Philosophers: where I cannot but account my assertion safe; having Aristotle, Plato, and Pythagoras of my side. And it availos not to say, that Aristotle in his Ethicks understands it one way; and in his Metaphysicks another: seeing Aristotle when he speakes of the same things in divers Bookes, speakes of them diversly; and Arts and Scien∣ces consider oftentimes the same things, and yet not in the same manner. A Philosopher and a Physitian, both of them consider the same body; but a Physitian considers it as it is capable of healing, and a Philoso∣pher as it is capable of motion. So as I never make reckoning of the authority of Aristotle; but in places, where he handles Ex professo; because many times, he discourseth in one manner morally in his Ethicks: and in another manner diversly in his Politickes; so in his Rhetoricks, he speakes of felicity in one manner, and in his Ethicks in another. In his Physicks he discour∣seth as a Philosopher one way, another way in is Pro∣blemes.

The authority then of Aristotle in matters Po∣liticall, must be taken from his Politicks; where I am much deceived, but he is of my opinion: though all men cite him for the contrary; I know not how he could possibly speake more plainely, then where in his Politicks he saith, Si ergo plurium Gubernatio bonorum autem virorum omniae Optimatium dicitur, unius autem Reg∣num, optabilius esset civitatibus ab optimis Gubernari, quam a Rege. And in a thousand other places, whereof some are cited here and there in my Discourse; and other, every one may looke out of himselfe, being all so cleere that they have no need of my interpreting them. It is true indeed, that once he was transpoted to say, that the Regall government is the best of all; because a Tyranny is the worst: but he spake then in Idaea, mea∣ning if there could be found one as much superiour to others, as God is to men: and therefore in another place, where he leaves his Idaea, and comes to Fact, he saith, that all Kings are tyrants: seeing there cannot any one be found, so much superiour to others in goodnesse, as that he should be worthy to command alone. Non fiunt nunc amplius Regna (saith Aristotle) sed si qua fiunt, Monarchiae, & Tyrannides magis sunt; Ob id quia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 spontanea Gubernatio est, ac Majorum proprie, & plurimi pares sunt, neque usque adeo praesellentes, ut ad magnitudinem, dignitatemque 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gradus se possint attol∣lere. And then that reason, which Aristotle brings, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 bona pessima, is false; and is not to be understood as men commonly take it. To prove it to be false, is easie: seeing not onely Plato, but Aristotle himselfe saith, that the government of Optimates, is better then the popular: yet in the second of his Politicks he saith, that the worst formes of government, are a Tyranny, and a Democracy; so as if that reason were true, the corruption of Optimates should be worse then that of the people. Besides I should alwaies hold, that the cor∣ruption

of an Optimacy is worse then that of a Mo∣narchy; seeing an evill is so much worse as it is multi∣plied: specially, being impossible that those few should ever be in concord. And in truth, this reason may be strongly fortified by example; seeing in the govern∣ment of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus, and in that of Le∣pidus, Anthony, and Augustus, both of them comprised under the worst forme of a few, assigned by Aristotle; the Commonwealth of Rome, was more torne and wa∣sted then under Nero, or any other Tyrant whatsoever. Then againe, the proposition is not so to be under∣stood, but thus, that an evill will appeare so much worse, as a man hath beene accustomed to a greater good, as it would be a greater evill, to a Prince who hath alwaies lived deliciously, to be cast into prison, or into servitude, then to a Husbandman that hath beene used to digging and hardnesse; because in the Prince is corrupted a greater good: but in Genere entis, the same evill is all one, to a Husbandman, and to a Prince. Thus much by way of digression.

To returne to our purpose. As concerning Plato, al∣though he be alledged for the contrary, yet seeing he is but wavering, and speakes diversly; sometimes, as in his Dialogues of a Common-wealth, that an Optima∣cy is the best; and sometimes as in his Dialogues of a Kingdome, that a Monarchy is the best: and often∣times, that a government mixt of People and Tyrant is the best: we shall doe well to waive his words, and have recourse to that he shewed in de eds, as better expressing mens minds then words. And Plato being as∣ked of Dio, how a Common-wealth might best be go∣verned, he found fault with Monarchy, and counselled him to bring in Optimacy: by which it appeares, that this indeed, was his very opinion. Now for Pythagoras, we say, The Pythagorans endeavoured all they could, to bring into Italy the government of Optimates: and

if it succeeded not, yet that happened not for want of judgement, but of forces. Then for Plutarch, if he un∣derstood it otherwise, we may say he had rea∣son, as being the Schoolmaster to an Emperour; and therefore should have shewed himselfe very simple, to blame a Monarchy. As for Homer, he no doubt is most fit to be brought in proofe of that, which I my selfe in another Discourse, have resolved; which is, that an Army indeed, should be governed by one alone, the Verse which is commonly alledged out of Homer, being spoken by Agamenmon to the Army. And lastly, Herodo∣tus also had reason to conclude, that amongst the Per∣sians, a Monarchy was a fitter government then an Aristocracy; because the Persians were a rude imper∣fect Nation, as we have shewed in another place.

But because the most of the Arguments, brought a∣gainst my opinion, are taken out of a booke of S. Tho∣mas, intituled, De Regimine Principis: I desire men would take notice, that I goe not about, to impugne the Doctrine of that Saint, of whom I have made choice for my Advocate with God, and for my Master in all Sciences: but the truth is, that booke is none of S. Thomases, as is easily proved, seeing in that booke many persons are spoken of, which lived not till long after S. Thomas his time, as in the 20. Chapter of the third Booke, De Regimine Principis, it is said, that Adul phus succeeded Ridolphus Count of Habspurg in the Empire, which hapned in the yeere 1292. full eighteen yeeres after S. Thomas was dead; and in many other places, which for brevity I omit. But let the booke be whose it will, there is nothing in it against my opini∣on; seeing he meanes onely, that a Monarchy is the better, where the people are imperfect: and this is no more, then what I have said my selfe. As in his fourth book, and eighteenth Chapter he saith, Quaedam autem Provinciae, sunt servilis naturae, & tales Gubernari debent

Principatu Despotico; Includendo in Despotico etiam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 qui autem Virilis animi, & audacia Cordis, & in Confidentia suae Intelligentiae sunt; tales regi non possunt, nisi Principatu Politico; communi nomine extendendo ipsum ad Aristocraticum. This Text sufficiently shewes the Authours opinion; and it differs not from mine.

As for the authority of Tacitus, before alleadged; it is easily answered, if we consider, that he speaks not those words as his owne opinion: but by the mouth of Asinius Gallus, who having offended the Prince before, meant afterward by flattering words to pacifie him.

In the last place I advertise, that I counsell not Peo∣ple to change their government, though it be not an Optimacy; but rather, I like that every Country should keepe the forme of government they have; Ferenda Re∣gum Ingenia (saith Tacitus) neque usui Crebras mutationes; and in another place, Vlteriora mirari, Praesentia sequi: bo∣nos Jmperatores Voto expetere, qualeseunque tolerare, because to alter the forme of government, is a mischievous thing: not onely when it is good; but even when it is bad; whereupon it is better to endure a Tyrant, then to rise up against him: for if he should prevaile, he would grow more cruell, as having beene provoked; and if he should be put downe, there would grow a thousand diffe∣rences about ordering the government: and oftentimes he, that was the forwardest to put downe the Tyrant; would be the readiest to be Lord in his place, and would then governe the more cruelly, for feare to be put downe, as his Predecessour was. And this is his Doctrin, that made the Booke De Regimine Principis. Let People therefore keepe that forme of government they have, and remember that notable Aphorisme of Hippocrates, Consueta longo tempore, etiamsi deteriora, Insuetis minus mo∣lesta esse solent.

Lastly I advertise, that governments would be pro∣portioned to the Nature of the People; and therefore in some places a Monarchie may do well, where an

Optimacy would not; whereupon, we see many Cities in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as Perugia, Florence, Siena, Bolonia, & others, which never were in peace, till they came to be under a Prince.