Father Malebranche his treatise concerning the search after truth The whole work complete. To which is added the author's Treatise of nature and grace: being a consequence of the principles contained in the search. Together with his answer to the animadversions upon the first volume: his defence against the accusations of Monsieur De la Ville, &c. relating to the same subject. All translated by T. Taylor, M.A. late of Magdalen College in Oxford.

THE DEFENCE OF THE AUTHOR OF THE TREATISE Concerning the Search after Truth, Against the Accusation of Monsieur de la VILLE.

In which is shewn, That if Particular Persons be allow'd to call in Question the FAITH of others, upon Consequences well or ill drawn from their Principles, no Man could be secure from the Imputation of Heresie.

SOME time ago came forth a Treatise, whose very Title scar'd a great many, and raised much Commotion in their Minds. Many Persons wish'd I would engage in the Quarrel, which the Author made with the Cartesians. For as, on one hand, Monsieur de la Ville, that was his Name, had done me the Honour to list me among these Philosophers, with what Design I know not; and, on the other hand, found himself Diversion, by turning me into Ridicule, they assur'd me, that if I was willing to pass for a Rash, Foolish and Extravagant Person, for a Visionist, and, in fine, an Heretick, yet I could not in Conscience desert the Cause of Truth, and leave the Enemies of our Faith, the Advantages he gave them.

I must do these Gentlemen Justice, in confessing their Reasons were very solid: But beg they would believe, that if I have not submitted to them, 'tis because, there were others of a very dif∣ferent Opinion; which to me seem'd likewise highly reasonable, and for which indeed I had greater Inclination; for I will not determine about the Weightiness of their Reasons. Besides, as Mon∣sieur de la Ville is not very tender of Integrity, I foresaw that his Work would make a greater Flash and Report, than it would do Injury to Truth. And as to my own Particular, I did not think he injur'd me by despising me: For, I can assure him, I despise my self much more than he desires. 'Tis true my Self-Contempt is not grounded on the same Ideas, as induc'd him to treat me so fastuously, as he does. But I would grant that the Reasons I had for despising my self, were not true; and would willingly consent, that all my ill Qualities were converted into those he's pleas'd to give me, provided he'll except that one of Heretick, or of a Person whose Faith deserves to be suspected.

Since I know that 'tis of most dangerous Consequence, to stir up the Passions of Men, especi∣ally on such Subjects as seem to cover from the Reproofs of Reason, the most violent and irrational: I thought my self oblig'd to continue silent, for fear of supplying with fresh Fewel those Heats I perceiv'd in their Minds. But now that this Fervency is abated, and that I cannot see any more mischievous Events to be fear'd: I think I am bound to satisfy my Friends, and content my self. I am not willing to affect an insolent and contemptuous Silence, in Regard to Monsieur de la Ville. I sincerely confess, he has sensibly offended me: For I am neither Stoick, nor Stupid; I feel when I hurt, and am not asham'd to own it. The publick Accusation of Heresie is not easie to be born, especi∣ally by Ecclesiasticks: Which though never so unjust, fails not to make the Faith of the accused suspect∣ed,

in this Age, more than any other: And no Man may be prodigal of this sort of Reputation, unless Charity oblige him to it, which seldom or never happens.

I have nothing, then, to answer to the Calumnies, where with this Author tries to blacken me. I shall not bring him before the Common Magistrate, to have publick Reparation made me; nor will I use any other ways permitted by Natural Law, for the Restitution of that which I can in Conscience give up. I am all that he will have me, a Fool, a Visionist, only I am no Heretick; nor am I suspected of Heresie at least by those that know me. But, I confess, I cannot avoid having my Faith suspected, if a Stranger may be allowed to brand me with the Name of Heretick, for Conse∣quences he is pleas'd to draw from my Principles; for 'tis not possible but Monsieur de la Ville's Book must have deceiv'd some one or other. If at present I am suspected of Heresie, 'tis a Misfortune I cannot help.

But if it be a Crime, 'tis not I that have committed it, but rather he that draws consequences from a Principle not including them. For my part I disown these consequences: I believe them false, and Heretical; and if I clearly saw they were directly inferr'd from any one of my Principles, I would forsake it: For that Principle would be false, Truths being not contrary to one another.

But be it granted that Monsieur de la Ville's Reasonings were just, and that Heretical Consequences were perfectly well deduc'd from their Principle; yet neither I, nor many others, that he ill-uses, saw before he wrote his Book, that they were contain'd in it. So that his Conduct is indefensible, which way soever we examine it. For in fine the Articles of Faith depend not on the Quickness and Reach of thought of any Particular Divine, as I indeavour to show; and though we should be certain that some principles included impious Consequences, yet no Man has right to treat the Main∣tainers of these principles as Hereticks.

I have seen in the Fathers, and chiefly in St. Austin, the principle I have advanc'd, but never observ'd Monsieur de la Ville's there. To me it appear'd a common Notion, that if God had Anni∣hilated all the extension in the World, all the matter, the World is made up of, would be Annihilated. I had consulted several Persons about it, to know whether they had the same Idea as my self of the matter, whose answers confirm'd me in my Opinion. I concluded, for the Reasons I shall give anon, that we could no longer have any direct and Natural Demonstration, that the Soul is distin∣guish'd from the Body, or that she is Immortal, if that principle be laid aside. I said in the Search after Truth that I did not believe any consequence could be inferr'd from this principle repugnant to Faith, which same thing was defended in the Sorbon, before my maintaining it, in the publick Theses. Nay, I proceeded to say, That if it were requisite, I would explain how this Opinion might be reconcil'd with what the Fathers, and Councils have left us touching our Faith, about the mystery of Tran∣substantiation. Lastly, I renounc'd all Heretical Consequences, and even the Principle, if it con∣tain'd them, which I could not believe, nor can I to this hour.

What ought I to say more, to clear my Faith from the suspicion of Heresie, even to the malicious? Could I imagine any Man would have the boldness to rank St. Austin, and other Fathers, among the Calvinists, by condemning in the Person of the Cartesians and Gassendists, the Sentiment of that Holy Doctor, as contrary to Transubstantiation? No, doubtless. For either Monsieur de la Ville durst do it, save in a collateral manner. St. Austian in an hundred places advances as undeniable, the principle now in dispute. He never goes to prove it, because it does not appear that any Man in his time doubted of it. For indeed 'tis a principle that ought to be look'd on as a common Notion with all those, whose mind is not prepossess'd with false studies. Whence this Father concludes, That the Soul is immortal; That she is more noble than the Body; That she is a distinct substance from it; with many other like Truths of the utmost importance. And yet Monsieur de la Ville, under Ambiguous Terms, advances that this Principle is not to be found in St. Austin: He answers but one single passage of that Father's Works, and to explain it, makes that learn'd Man argue at an Extra∣vagant rate. Lastly, he opposes to his constant Doctrine, only the Book of Categories, as if he knew not that Book to be none of St. Austin's, and that it belongs rather to Logick, than to Physicks.

I will not stand to prove this in particular; for I see no necessity of answering Monsieur de la Ville's Book: And I design to keep inviolably to the resolution I made, and have declar'd at the end of the Preface to the Second Vol. of the Search after Truth, viz. That I would answer none of those who oppos'd me before they understand me, or whose Discourses gave occasion to believe, they were made from some other motive than the Love of Truth. As for the rest, I shall indeavour to content them. I have no delight in disquieting Mens Minds, and troubling my own repose by contentious Books, or Works absolutely useless to the discovery of Truth; and only proper to violate Charity, and scandalize our Neighbours. And if I now put Pen to Paper, 'tis because I ought not to suffer my Faith to be call'd in Question, and that I desire to make it clearly understood, That no Man is permitted to charge me with Heresie for consequences deducible from the Principles I have establish'd.

Which is not as if I thought it possible to inferr directly, any Heresie, or even Error from the Book concerning the Search after Truth. I am ready to answer with Charity and Respect, all those who shall do me the honour to make their Animadversions without Passion; and I shall always be glad to follow Truth, as soon as any Man can discover it to me. I disown all principles from which may be concluded any falshood. But I offer to prove, That we cannot justly treat as Here∣ticks, even obstinate Defenders of such Principles, as Divines may inferr impious Conclusions from, (provided the Embracers of these Principles disown the consequences:) Since, if it might be allow'd, no Writer whatever could escape the Imputation of Heresie. My proofs of my assertion are as fol∣low:

Which I do not deduce from that which is least Reasonable in the common Opinions of Phi∣sophers, with design to make them Odious, or Ridiculous; but choose to take for the subject of what I offer to prove, universally receiv'd Opinions, upon which the Peripateticks are so bold and presuming, as to insult perpetually over their Adversaries.

ARGUMENT I.

The Peripateticks, and almost all Men, believe that Beasts have Souls, and that these Souls are nobler than the Bodies which they Animate. 'Tis an Opinion receiv'd in all times, and in all Na∣tions, that a Dog suffers Pain when he is beaten; That he is susceptible of all the Motions of the Passions, Fear, Desire, Envy, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, and even that he knows and loves his Master. Yet from this Opinion consequences may be drawn directly opposite to what we are Taught by Faith.

The first Consequence opposite to Faith. That God is Vnjust.

Beasts suffer Pain, and some of them are more miserable than others. Now they never sinn'd, or made an ill use of their Libirty, since they have none: Therefore God's Vnjust, in Punishing them, and making them Miserable; and unequally Miserable, since they are equally Innocent. There∣fore this Principle is false, That under a Righteous God, a Creature can be miserable without deserving it, a Principle nevertheless imploy'd by St. Austin, to Demonstrate Original Sin against the Pelagians.

Moreover there is this difference between the condition of Men and Beasts, that Men after Death may receive an Happiness which may countervail the Pains endur'd in Life. But Beasts at Death lose all; they have been miserable, and innocent, and have no Future Retribution. There∣fore, though God be Just, yet Man may suffer in Order to Merit; but if a Beast suffers, God is not Just.

It may be said, perhaps, that God may do with the Beast as he thinks fit, provided he observes the Rules of Justice, with respect to Man. But if an Angel should think in like manner, that God could not punish him without some Demerits; and that he was not oblig'd to do justice unto Man, should we like that thought? Certainly God renders Justice to all his Creatures; and if the mean∣est of them are liable to Misery, they must needs be capable of being Criminal.

The second Consequence contrary to Faith. That God Wills Disorder, and that Nature is not corrupted.

The Soul of a Dog is substance more noble than the Body Animated by it. For according to St. Austin , 'tis a spiritual Substance more noble than the noblest Body. Besides which, reason demon∣strates that Bodies can neither Know, nor Love; and that Pleasure, Pain, Joy, Sorrow, and the other Passions, cannot be Modifications of Bodies. Now 'tis believed that Dogs know, and Love their Masters, and that they are susceptible of Passions, as of Fear, Desire, Joy and Sorrow, and many others: The Soul of a Dog therefore is not a Body, but a Substance nobler than Bodies. But the Soul of a Dog is made for his Body, and has no other End, or Felicity, than the enjoyment of Bodies: Therefore God makes the more noble for the less noble: Therefore God Wills disorder: Therefore Man's Nature is not corrupted: Concupiscence is no disorder. God might make Man for the enjoyment of Bodies, and subject him to the Motions of Concupiscence, &c.

It may be still said perhaps that the Soul of Beasts is made for Man: but 'tis hard to escape by this subterfuge. For whether my Dog, or my Horse, has, or has not a Soul, is indifferent to me. 'Tis not my Horse's Soul, which carries, or draws me, but his Body. 'Tis not the Soul of a Chicken which nourishes me, but its flesh. Now God might, and ought consequently to create Horses, to perform all their functions which we need, without a Soul, if it be true that he has made them only for our use. Again, the Soul of an Horse is more valuable than the noblest Body: God therefore ought not to create it for the Body of Man. Lastly, God ought not to have given Souls to Flies which Swallows feed upon. Swallows are of very little use to Man, and they might have fed upon grain, as other Birds.

What need then of so innumerable a number of Souls to be Annihilated, to preserve the Bodies of these Birds, since the Soul of a Fly is more worth than the Body of the perfectest Animal? Wherefore in affirming that Beasts have Souls, that is to say, substances, more noble than Bodies, we deprive God of Wisdom, make him act without Order, destroy Original Sin, and consequently overthrow Religion, by taking away the necessity of a Mediator.

The third Consequence contrary to Faith. The Soul of Man is Mortal, or at least the Souls of Beasts pass from one Body to another.

The Soul of a Beast is a Substance distinct from its Body. This Soul is Annihilated, and there∣fore Substances may naturally be Annihilated. Therefore though the Soul of Man be a Substance distinct from his Body, it may be Annihilated, when the Body is destroyed: And thus the Immor∣tality of the Humane Soul cannot be Demonstrated by Reason. But if it be own'd to be most cer∣tain, That no Substance can be naturally reduc'd to nothing, the Soul of Beasts will subsist after Death; and since they have no reward to hope for, and are made for Bodies, they must at least pass out of one to another, that they may not remain useless in Nature: Which seems to be the most reasonable Inference,

Now 'tis Matter of Faith, That God is just and Wise, That he Loves not Disorder, That Na∣ture is corrupted, That the Soul of Man is Immortal and that That of Beasts is Mortal: Be∣cause indeed it is not a distinct Substance from their Body, nor consequently capable of Knowledge and Love, or of any Passions and Sensations like ours. Therefore in the Stile of Monsieur de la Ville, who condemns Men upon Consequences that he draws from their Principles, the Cartesians may justly charge him with a Crime, and all Mindkind besides, for believing Beasts have Souls.

What would Monsieur de la Ville say, if in his way of proceeding we should tax him of Impiety, for entertaining Opinions, from whence it might be concluded, That God is not Just, Wise, or Powerful; Opinions that overthrow Religion, that are opposite to Original Sin, that take away the only Demonstration Reason can give of the Immortality of the Soul? What would he say, if we should charge him with Injustice and Cruelty for making innocent Souls to suffer, and even for Annihilating them, to feed upon the Bodies which they Animate? He is a Sinner, but they are Innocent; and yet for the Nourishment of his Body he kills Animals, and Annihilates their Souls, which are of greater Worth than his Body. Yet if his Body could not subsist without the Flesh of Animals, or if the Annihilation of a Soul should render his Body for ever Immortal; this Cruelty, as unjust as it is, might perhaps be excusable: But with what Pretence can he Anni∣hilate Substances altogether innocent, to sustain but a few days a Body justly condemn'd to Death because of Sin,

Would he be so little a Philosopher, as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the Place he lives in? But what if his Zeal should carry him into the Indies, where the Inhabitants found Hospitals for Beasts; and the Philosophers, and the better and more gentile Part of them, are so charitable to to the smallest Flies, that, for fear of killing them, by Breathing, and Walking, they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths, and fan the Ways through which they pass? Would he then fear to make innocent Souls to suffer, or to Annihilate them for the Preservation of a Sinner's Body? Would he not rather chuse to subscribe to their Opinion, who give not Beasts a Soul more Noble than their Body, or distinct from it; and by publishing this Opinion acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice, which these People would charge upon him; if having the same Principles he follow'd not their Custom?

This Example may suffice to shew, that we are not permitted to treat Men as Hereticks, and dangerous Persons, because of Irreligious Consequences that may be deduc'd from their Princi∣ples, when these Consequences are disown'd by them. For though I think it would be an infinitely harder Task, to answer the aforesaid Difficulties, than those of M. de la Ville's, yet the Cartesians would be very Ridiculous, if they should accuse Monsieur de la Ville, and others, that were not of their Opinion, of Impiety and Heresie. 'Tis only the Authority of the Church, that may decide about Matters of Faith; and the Church has not oblig'd us, and probably whatever Consequence may be drawn from common Principles, never will oblige us to believe, that Dogs have not a Soul more Noble than their Body, that they know not their Masters; that they neither fear, nor desire, nor suffer any thing, because it is not necessary that Christians should be instructed in these Truths.

ARGUMENT II.

Almost all Men are perswaded, That sensible Objects are the true Causes of Pleasure, and Pain, which we feel, upon their Presence. They believe, that the Fire sends forth that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us; and that our Aliments Act in us, and give us the Welcome Sensations of Tasts. They doubt not but 'tis the Sun which makes the Fruits necessary for Life, to thrive; and that all sensible Objects have a peculiar Vertue, by which they can do us a great deal of Good and Evil. Let us see, if from these Principles we cannot draw Consequences contrary to Religion and Points of Faith.

A Consequence opposite to the first Principle of Morality, which obliges us to love God with all our Strength, and to fear none but Him.

'Tis a common Notion, by which all Men Order their Behaviour, That we ought to love, and fear what has Power to do us Good and Harm, to make us feel Pleasure and Pain, to render us hap∣py or miserable; and that this Cause is to be lov'd▪ or fear'd, proportionably to its Power of Act∣ing on us. But the Fire, the Sun, the Objects of our Senses, can truly Act on us, and make us in some manner happy or miserable. This is the Principle suppos'd; we may therefore Love and Fear them. This is the Conclusion which every one naturally makes, and is the general Principle of the corrup∣tion of Manners.

'Tis evident by Reason, and by the First of God's Commandments, That all the motions of our Soul, of Love or Fear, Desire or Joy, ought to tend to God; and that all the Motions of our Body may be Regulated and Determin'd, by encompassing Objects. By the Motion of our Body we may approach a Fruit, avoid a Blow, fly a Beast that's ready to devour us. But we ought to Love and Fear none but God; all the Motions of our Soul ought to tend to Him only; we are to Love Him with all our strength; this is an indispensible Law. We can neither Love or Fear what is be∣low us, without disorder and corruption: Freely to fear a Beast ready to devour us, or to fear the Devil, is to give them some honour; to Love a Fruit, to desire Riches, to rejoyce in the light of the Sun, as if he were the true cause of it; to Love even our Father, our Protector, our Friend, as if they were capable of doing us good, is to pay them an Honour which is due to none but God, in which sense it is lawful to Love none. But we may, and ought to Love our Neighbour, by wis••∣ing and procuring him, as Natural or Occasional Cause, all that may make him happy, and no o∣therwise. For we to Love our Brothers, not as if able to do us good, but as capable to enjoy to∣gether with us the true Good. These Truths seem evident to me; but Men strangely obscure them, by supposing that the surrounding Bodies can Act on us as True Causes.

Indeed, most Christian Philosophers acknowledge, That the Creatures can do nothing, unless God concur to their Action; and that so, sensible Objects being unable to Act on us without the Efficacy of the First Cause, must not be lov'd or fear'd by us, but God only, on whom they depend.

Which Explication makes it manifest, That they condemn the consequences, which I have now deduc'd from the Principle they receive: But if in imitation of Monsieur de la Ville's Conduct, I should say 'twas a slight and subterfuge of the Philosophers, to Cloak their Impiety▪ if I should urge them with the Crime of supporting Aristotle's Opinions, and the prejudices of Sense, at the expence of their Religion; if piercing too into the inmost recesses of their Heart, I should impute to them the secret desire, of debauching Men's Morals by the defence of a Principle, which serves to justifie all sorts of disorders, and which by the consequences I have drawn from it, overthrows the first Principle of Christian Morality. Should I be thought in my Senses whilst I went to con∣demn most Men as impious upon the strength of the inferences I had deduc'd from their Premises?

Monsieur de la Ville will no doubt pretend that my Consequences are not rightly inferr'd; but I pretend the same of his; and to ruine them all, I need but explicate some Equivocal Terms, which I shall sometime do, if I find it necessary.

But how will Monsieur de la Ville justifie the common Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes, and by what sort of concourse will he ascribe to God all that is due to Him? Will he make it clearly appear, that one individual Action is all of God, and all of the Creature? Will he demonstrate that the Power of the Creature is not useless, though without its Efficacy, the sole Action of God would produce the same effect? Will he prove that Minds neither ought to Love nor Fear Bodies, though the latter have a true Power of Acting on the former; and will he make multitudes of Converts hereupon, among those whose Mind and Heart are taken up with sensible Objects, from a confus'd Judgment they make that these Objects are capable of making them Happy or Miserable? Let him confess then, That if we might treat as Hereticks, and profane Persons, all that hold Principles, from which Heretical and Impious Consequences may be drawn, no Man what ever could secure his Faith from being suspected.

ARGUMENT III. The Consequence of the Principle propos'd by Monsieur de la Ville, as a Point of Faith, viz. That the Essence of Body consists not in Extension. This negative Principle overthrows the only demonstrative and direct Proof we have of the Soul's being a distinct Substance from the Body, and conse∣quently of her Immortality.

When this truth is receiv'd, which I presume, with many other Persons, to have demonstrated; which Monsieur de la Ville impugns as contrary to the decisions of the Church, viz. That the Es∣sence

of matter consists in Extension in Length, Breadth, and Thickness. It is easie to comprehend that the Soul, or that which is capable of Thought, is a distinct substance from the Body. For it's manifest that Extension, whatever Division and Motion be conceiv'd in it, can never arrive to Rea∣son, Will or Sense. Wherefore that thinking thing which is in us, is necessarily a substance distinct from our Body.

Intellectual Notices, Volitions, and Actual Sensations, are Actually Modes of some substances Ex∣istence. But all the Divisions incidental to Extension can produce nothing but Figures: Nor all its various Motions, any thing but Relations of Distance: Therefore Extension is not capable of other Modifications. Therefore our Thought, Desire, Sensations of Pleasure, and Pain, are Modes of a Substances Existence, which is not a Body. Therefore the Soul is distinct from the Body, which being conceded, we thus demonstrate her Immortality.

No substance can be Annihilated by the Ordinary strength of Nature. For as nature cannot pro∣duce something out of nothing: So she cannot reduce something into nothing. Modifications of Beings may be Annihilated; Rotundity of a Body may be destroy'd; for that which is round may become square. But this roundness is not a Being, a Thing, a Substance; but only a Relation of E∣quality of distance, between the terminating parts of the Body, and that which is in the Center. Which relation changing, the Roundness is destroy'd, but the substance cannot be reduc'd to no∣thing. Now for the foremention'd Reasons the Soul is not a Mode of a Body's Existing. There∣fore she is immortal; and though the Body be dissolv'd into a Thousand parts of a different Na∣ture, and the structure of its Organs broke to pieces, since the Soul consists not in that structure, nor in any other Modification of matter, 'tis evident that the dissolution, and even the Annihilati∣on of the substance of an humane Body, were that Annihilation true, could not Annihilate the substance of our Soul. Let us add to this another proof of the immortality of the Soul, grounded upon the same Principle.

Though the Body cannot be reduc'd to nothing, because it is a substance, it may notwithstand∣ing die, and all its parts may be dissolv'd: Because Extension is divisible. But the Soul being a sub∣stance distinct from Extension, cannot be divided. For we cannot divide a Thought, a Desire, a Sensation of Pain, or Pleasure, as we may divide a square into two or four Triangles. Therefore the substance of the Soul is indissoluble, incorruptible, and consequently immortal, because unextended.

But if Monsieur de la Ville supposes that the Essence of Body consists in something besides Exten∣sion, how will he convince the Libertines that she is neither material nor mortal. They will main∣tain, that something wherein the Essence of Body consists, is capable of thinking, and that the sub∣stance which thinks is the same with that which is extended. If Monsieur de la Ville denies it, they'll show that he does it, without Reason, since according to his Principle, Body being something else than Extension; he has no distinct Idea of what that can be, and consequently cannot tell but that un∣known thing may be capable of Thought. Does he think to convince them, by saying as he does in his Book, that the Essence of Body is to have Parts without Extension? Certainly they will not take his Word for it; for finding it as hard to conceive parts without Extension, as indivisible Atoms, or Circles, without two Semi-circles, they must have more deference for him, than he has for God himself. For Monsieur de la Ville, in the last part of his Book, pretends that God him∣self cannot oblige us to belive contradictory things, such as are the Parts of a Body, without any Actual extension.

But the Libertines on their part would not fail of probable Reasons to confound the Soul with the Body. Experience, they'll say, teaches us, That the Body is capable of Feeling, Thinking, and Reasoning. 'Tis the Body which is sensible of Pleasure, and Pain. 'Tis the Brain which thinks and reasons. The weight of the Body makes heavy the Mind. Madness is a true distemper; and those who have most Wisdom lose it, when that part of the Brain, where it resides, is diseas'd. The Essences of Beings are unknown to us, and therefore Reason cannot discover of what they are susceptible. So that reason refers us to Experience, and Experience confounds the Soul with the Body, and teaches us, that this is capable of thinking: Such would be their Reasons.

And in Truth those who assure us, That the Essences of Being are unknown; and make it Cri∣minal for Philosophers to demonstrate Extension no Modification of Being, but the very Essence of Matter; would do well to consider the mischievous Consequences, deducible from their Principles; and not go to overthrow the only Demonstration we have, for the Distinction between the Soul and Body. For, in fine, the Distinction of these two Parts of our Selves, prov'd by clear Ideas, is the most Fruitful and necessary of all Truths in point of Philosophy, and perhaps of Divinity, and Chri∣stian Morality. But this Distinction is likewise exactly demonstrated in many Places of the Search after Truth . And I undertake to Monsieur de la Ville, notwithstanding his Answer fraught with Ambiguities, Figures, and Contradictions; or rather, I undertake to the Libertines, for as for him, I believe him so setled in his Faith, as not to want such sort of Proofs. I undertake, I say to the Libertines, That they will never find any Sophism in my Demonstration, That 'tis impossible to conceive it clearly and distinctly, without embracing it; and that all the Proofs they offer, to confound the Soul with the Body, are drawn from Senses; that they are obscure and confus'd, and can never perswade such as Judge of things by clear and distinct Ideas.

From this Principal, That the Essence of Body consists not in Extension, and that the Essences of things are unknown; I could still draw many other Consequences opposite to Faith: But that is not necessary; and I would rather, if it were possible, reconcile all false as well as true Philosophies with Religion. However impious and Heretical would be the Consequences I could deduce from

the Opinions of Philosophers, I should think I wanted the Charity which I owe them, if I endea∣voured to make their Faith suspected. So far am I from imitating the Conduct of Monsieur de la Ville, who leaving a Principle demonstrated in all its Strength, and receiv'd by all Ages, lays out himself in drawing Heretical Consequences from it; tho' of no use but to strengthen the Calvinists, and encrease their Number, and to disturb the Faith of the Orthodox: I would, on the contrary, that no one should think on these Consequences; or disown them as false, and wrong-inferr'd from the Principal.

All Truths hang in a Chain together; and no false Principle can be held, but those who are any thing vers'd in the Art of Reasoning, may infer from it abundance of Consequences repugnant to Religion. So that if it were permitted to blacken the Faith of others, upon Consequences drawn from Principles believ'd by them, since there is no Man but Errs in something, we might treat all the World, as Heretical. Wherefore the allowing Men to Dogmatize, and to make others Faith suspected, who are not of their Opinion, would be opening a Gap to infinite Quarrels, Schisms, Disturbances, and even Civil Wars; and all Mankind is concern'd to look upon the Abettors of such a Conduct, as Slanderers and Disturbers of the publick Peace. For, in short, the different Parties in Religion, which are almost always form'd from such like Consequences, produce strange Events in a State; which all Histories abound with. But the Liberty to Philosophize, or to reason upon Common Notions, is not to be denied Men; it being a Right which is as natural to them as to breath. Divines ought to distinguish Theology from Philosophy, Articles of our Faith from Opinions of Men. Truths, which GOD imparts to all Christians by a visible Authority, from those which he bestows on some particular Persons, in Recompence of their Attention and Industry. They should not confound things that depend on so different Principles. No Question Humane Sciences ought to be made subservient to Religion; but with a Spirit of Peace and Charity; without condemning one another, so long as we agree about Truths which the Church has determin'd: For this is the way for Truth to shine out, and all Sciences to be brought to greater and greater Perfection, by the Addition of New Discoveries to the Ancient.

But the Imaginations of most Men cannot be reconcil'd to New Discoveries, but even Novelty in Opinions, never so advantageous to Religion, frights them; whilst they easily inure themselves to the falsest and obscurest Principles, provided some Ancient has advanc'd them. But when once these Principles are grown familiar, they find them evident, though never so obscure: They believe them most useful, though extremely dangerous; And they are so well us'd to say and hear what they do not conceive, and to slurr a real Difficulty by an imaginary Distinction, that they are ever well satisfy'd with their false Idea's, and can't endure to be talkt to in a clear and distinct Lan∣guage; like Men coming out of a dark Room, they are fearful of the Light, which strikes too violently on their Eyes, and they imagine we go to blind them, when we try to dissipate the invol∣ving Darkness.

Thus though I have shown by many Consequences, that 'tis dangerous, for Example, to main∣tain that Beasts have a Soul more noble than the Body; yet since this Opinion is ancient, and most Men are accustom'd to Believe it, whilst the contrary bears the Character of Novelty; Those who judge of the Harshness of Opinions rather by the Fear they produce in the Imagination, than by the Evidence and Light they shed in the Mind, will be sure to vote the Cartesians Opinion danger∣ous; and will condemn these Philosophers, as rash and presumptuous, rather than those who make Beasts capable of Reasoning.

Let a Man but say in Company, with an Air of Gravity, or rather with a Look, into which the Imagination, scar'd with something extraordinary, forms the Face: Really the Cartesians are strange People; They maintain, That Beasts have no Soul. I am afraid in a little time they will say as much of Man: And this will be enough to perswade a great many, that this is a dangerous Opinion. No Reasons can prevent the Effect of this Discourse upon weak Imaginations; and unless there happen to be some brisk Wit, that with the gayety of Carriage, shall re-embolden the Company from the Fear they had conceiv'd, the Cartesians might tire themselves to Death, before they could by their Reasonings obliterate the Character that had been given of their Persons.

And yet 'tis but placing the definition instead of the thing defin'd, to shew the extravagance of this Discourse. For if a Man should say seriously, the Cartesians are strange sort of Men, they affirm, That Beasts have neither Thought nor Sense; I fear, in a short time, they will say as much of us. Certainly we should conclude this Man's apprehensions but ill-grounded. But the generality of Men are un∣able to extricate the least Ambiguity, especially when their Imagination is frighted with the No∣tion of Novelty, which some represent to them as dangerous. Besides that the Air and exteriour Manners easily persuade, but Truth is not discover'd without some application of Thought, where∣of the greatest part of Mankind is incapable.

Certainly Men that have most Light and Understanding, whose Opinions are implicitely em∣brac'd by the Vulgar, ought not to be so easie to condemn their Brethren, at least before they have examin'd their Sentiments with a serious Attention; nor ought they to possess their respectful Hearers with disadvantageous Notions of their Neighbour, this being contrary to the Rules of Charity and Justice.

But the Cartesians, you'll say, admit Principles which have mischievous Consequences; and I grant it, since you'll have it so. But they disown these Consequences: They, it may be, are so gross and stupid, as not to see these Consequences are included in their Principles. They think they can separate one from the other, and do not suppose other Philosophers are to be believ'd up∣on their bare Word: They break not their Charity with those who hold Principles which they

think big with impious Consequences, and as contrary to Religion, as sound Sense. For it may be concluded from the dangerous Consequences I have drawn from those very Principles, which flush the Peripateticks even to the triumphing over their Adversaries; How many, and how much worse than these I might infer, if I should give my self liberty to choose out of the Body of their Philoso∣phy that which was most exceptionable? But whatever the advantage is in Theological Disputes, as well as in Field-Battles, to be the Aggressors; I had rather defend my self weakly, than con∣quer and triumph by assaulting. For, in short, I do not conceive how Men delight in making He∣reticks, and prophane Persons of those who submit to all••the decisions of the Church, upon Conse∣quences which they disavow. The Victory methinks is very fatal, which spills but the Blood of our own Country-Men.

Nevertheless, I do not believe I have advanc'd in the Search after Truth, any Principle of Philo∣sophy productive of dangerous Consequences; on the contrary, I have left M. des Cartes in some places, and Aristotle almost in all; because I could not reconcile the Former with Truth, nor the Latter with Truth or Religion; this I leave to Men of more Wit and Invention than my self. I said that the Essence of Matter consisted in Extension, because I thought I had, evidently, demonstrated it, and thereby given clear and uncontroverted proofs of the Immortality of the Soul, and her distinction from the Body: A Truth which is essential to Religion, and which the Philosophers are oblig'd by the last Lateran Council to prove. But I never thought this Principle so fecund with Truths advantageous to Religion, was contrary to the Council of Trent: Monsieur de la Ville ought not to affirm it, for that will do but mischief. This is the Conduct of the Protestants in Holland, Vitichius, † Poiret, and several others. I say not this to make his Faith suspected, but I am under strong apprehensions, least his Conduct may give them occasion to affirm, That we own in France a Man cannot be a Catholick without believing that the parts of a Body may be without any Actual Extension, since a Book Dedicated to the Bishops, publish'd with all the Ceremonies, with Approbation and Privilege, treats the Cartesians as Hereticks on that particular: I fear, least by his probabilities, he may shake the Faith of several Persons, who know not precisely what is ne∣cessary to make an Article of Faith. But I am still more apprehensive least the Libertines should strengthen themselves in their Opinions, That the Soul is Corporeal, and consequently Mortal; That a thinking Substance is the same with an extended One, because Extension with them, and Monsieur de la Ville, being but the Mode of a Being, whose Essence is unknown to us, we have no Argument from Reason, that this Being is not capable of Thinking; and we have many Argu∣ments from Sense which, though never so false, are yet convincing, and even Demonstrative with those who will not be at the pains of Reasoning.

And upon these grounds I think I am oblig'd to affirm, with all the confidence afforded me by the view of the Truth I have Demonstrated That Extension is not a Mode of Being; but a Being, a Thing, a Substance, in a Word, Matter or Body, and that many Answers are to be seen in the Search after Truth, to those proofs of Sense by which the Libertines confound the two Substances, that Man's compos'd of. I maintain farther, That Monsieur de la Ville has not shown that Opini∣on of the Essence of Matter to be contray to Transubstantiation; that he has propos'd only those Answers which are easie to be resolv'd, That we may more easily triumph over his Adversaries: That he has not impugned mine, and probably not so much as known them, and that in the Hu∣mour I see him, I think not my self obliged to acquaint him with them; Lastly, That he has added to the Council of Trent, more Articles of Faith, or Explications, than any private Person has Right to give after express Prohibitions contain'd in the Bull, which confirms the said Council .

As to what regards my own Particular, I desire the Reader not to believe Monsieur de la Ville, upon his Word, but to examine with Caution and Distrust, even those Matters of Fact which he vouches with the greatest Confidence. He boasts himself upon his Sincerity and Ingenuousness, and I am far from disputing him those Qualities, which are indispensable to every honest Man; but I cannot help saying in the Defence of Truth, and my own Justification, that he has often forgotten himself in his Book; of which here follows a sufficient Proof.

In the Frontispiece of his Work he has inserted an Advertisement, which has a Look of Integri∣ty; for 'tis compos'd only to make a kind of Reparation: These are his Words; He says, He met with a Copy of the Search after Truth, of the Strasbourgh-Edition, in the Year 1677. which obliges him to signifie to his dear Reader, that I have in the Impression retracted and Errour, which I had advanc'd in the First. But it is so true, that I am either little skill'd in Divinity, or very daring, that I could not recant that Errour, without advancing Two others. His whole Advertisement is only to make me a charitable Reparation.

However it is false, First, That I have retracted that pretended Errour about Original Sin: The same Proposition being found in the same Words, in the Eddition he cites, and in all those that are Printed at Paris.

Secondly, That Proposition is not my peculiar Opinion; since it is the common Doctrine of the Schools. But though it were not at present taught, yet 'tis certainly no Errour, much less a most pernicious one, as he elsewhere stiles it .

The two Errours he supposes me to substitute, in the Room of this recanted one, are Two things I never said; and which he puts upon me. 'Tis but reading his own Words relating to the Question, to discover the Truth of what I say; and therefore I shall not stand to prove it; especially since 'tis done sufficiently by an unknown Hand. I could only wish this un∣known Person had alledg'd the Reasons which I had for saying, That an Infant at the time of Baptism was justified by an Actual Love, and which I have given in the Illustration upon Original Sin.

Let a Man judge then, after he has examin'd the candid and sincere Advertisement of Monsieur de la Ville, whether I have not reason to require the Equitable Readers not to credit him, on his bare Word. For if we believe him, he is the most sincere and courteous Man in the World; but we cannot find all the Marks of Sincerity and Candour, when we carefully examine him. At the End of his Advertisement, he protests, he has endeavour'd, as much as possible, to observe all the Moderation which he ought, that he has no ill Will but to the Errours of his Adversaries, and for their Persons all Esteem and Respect: Whilst yet one cannot consider that Advertisement, without discovering at least the Symptoms of a disingenuous Spirit, and a Malign Temper, which surprizes and irritates Mens Minds. I pray God to pardon him his Outrages, to Regulate his Zeal, and to inspire him with the Spirit of Meekness, Charity and Peace towards his Brethren. I know not whether he finds Pleasure in abusing me so hainously as he does; but I desire to assure him, That it is Matter of much Sorrow, and Trouble to me, That I am forc'd in the Defence of Truth, to give some Suspicion of his Probity; and that I should, on the contrary, be extreamly joyful, if he could know how sincerely I honour, respect, and love him, in Him in whom we all are Brethren. No∣verit quam eu•• non contemnam, & quantum in illo Deum timeam, & cogitem caput nostrum in cujus cor∣pore fratres sumus. Aug. ad Fortunianum, Epist. 3.

FINIS.

Notes

• Ep. 3. Ch. 2.28. Ch. 2.57. Ch. 6. con∣tra Epist. Manichei. Ch. 16. de Tran. l. 10. & alibi.
• Part 2. Ch. 3. Art. 6.
• De Quan∣titate ani∣mae, Ch. 31, 32. &c. Lib. 4. de anima, & ejus origi∣ne, Ch. 12. & alibi.
• Lins. c. 37.
• Book IV. Chap. 2. Book VI. Part II. Chap. 7. Book III. Part II. Chap. 8.
• Sess. 8.
• Th. Pac. ch. 4.
• †

  L. 3. ch. 13. Cog. Nat.
• By that Bull it is forbidden under Pain of Excommunication, to give any Explication of the Decrees of the Council. Vlium omnino interpretationis genus super ipsius Concilii decretis quocunque modo edere, &c. That Power is reserv'd to the Pope.
• Edit. Strasb. p. 190. Par. Edit. 1. p. 172. in the second, p. 190. in the third, 187▪ in the fourth 95.
• Pag. 90.