Father Malebranche his treatise concerning the search after truth The whole work complete. To which is added the author's Treatise of nature and grace: being a consequence of the principles contained in the search. Together with his answer to the animadversions upon the first volume: his defence against the accusations of Monsieur De la Ville, &c. relating to the same subject. All translated by T. Taylor, M.A. late of Magdalen College in Oxford.

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Title
Father Malebranche his treatise concerning the search after truth The whole work complete. To which is added the author's Treatise of nature and grace: being a consequence of the principles contained in the search. Together with his answer to the animadversions upon the first volume: his defence against the accusations of Monsieur De la Ville, &c. relating to the same subject. All translated by T. Taylor, M.A. late of Magdalen College in Oxford.
Author
Malebranche, Nicolas, 1638-1715.
Publication
London :: Printed by W. Bowyer, for Thomas Bennet at the Half-Moon, and T. Leigh and W. Midwinter at the Rose and Crown, in St. Paul's Church-yard,
1700.
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Subject terms
Le Valois, Louis, 1639-1700 -- Early works to 1800.
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800.
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800.
Psychology -- Early works to 1850.
Light -- Early works to 1800.
Color -- Early works to 1800.
Cite this Item
"Father Malebranche his treatise concerning the search after truth The whole work complete. To which is added the author's Treatise of nature and grace: being a consequence of the principles contained in the search. Together with his answer to the animadversions upon the first volume: his defence against the accusations of Monsieur De la Ville, &c. relating to the same subject. All translated by T. Taylor, M.A. late of Magdalen College in Oxford." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A51674.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 5, 2024.

Pages

ANSWER.

Do not we see that there is this difference between God and the Humane Soul, that God is Being without restriction, Universal, Infinite Being, and the Soul is a sort of particular Being? ['Tis a property of infinite to be at the same time one, and yet all things; compos'd as we may say of infinite per∣fections, and yet so simple that every perfection he possesses, includes all the other without any real distincti∣on; for as every Divine perfection is infinite, it constitutes the whole Divine Essence; But the Soul since a limited Being cannot have extension in her without becoming material.] God includes in himself Bo∣dies in an intelligible manner. He sees their Essences or Ideas, in his Wisdom; and their Exi∣stence in his Love, or in his Wills. This must necessarily be said, since God has made Bodies; and he knew what he made before any thing was created. But the Soul cannot see in her self what she does not contain: Nor can she see clearly what she does contain, but only has a confus'd Sensa∣tion of it. I explain my self.

The Soul does not include Intelligible extension, as one of her modes of Being: Because this ex∣tension is not any mode of Being but a true Being. We can conceive that Extension separately from any thing else, but we cannot conceive any modes of Being without perceiving the Subject, or Be∣ing whereof they are the modes. We perceive this extension without thinking on our mind, and we cannot conceive it to be any modification of our mind. This extension when circumscrib'd makes some figure, but the Limits of the mind cannot be figured. This extension having parts may be divided, at least in one sence, but we see nothing in the Soul that is divisible. This exten∣sion therefore that we see is no mode of the minds Existence, and therefore the mind cannot see it within it self. How can we see it in one species of Being all sorts of Beings? In one particular and finite Being, a Triangle in general, and infinite Triangles? For in fine, the Soul perceives a Tri∣angle, or a Circle in general, though it be a Contradiction for the Soul to have a modification in general. The Sensations of Colour which the Soul ascribes to figures make them particular, because no modification of a particular Being can be general.

Surely we may affirm what we clearly conceive. But we clearly conceive that the Extension which we see is something distinct from our selves, therefore we may affirm, that this extension is not a modification of our Being, and that 'tis something actually distinct from us. For we must observe, that the Sun for instance that we see is not that we look upon. The Sun and all we see in the ma∣terial World is not visible of it self, as I have formerly prov'd. The Soul can only see the Sun to which she is immediately united. But we have a clear Perception, and a distinct Sensation, that the Sun is something different from us. Therefore we speak against our Light, and against our Consci∣ence, when we say the Soul sees all surrounding Bodies in her own modifications.

Pleasure, Pain, Savour, Heat, Colour, all our Sensations, and Passions, are the modifications of our Soul. But though they be so, do we clearly know them? Can we compare Heat with Savour,

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Odor with Colour? Can we discover what Relation there is between Red and Green? Or even be∣tween Green and Green? 'Tis not so with figures, we compare them with one another, we find out exactly their Proportions: We know precisely that the diagonal of a Square, multiplied into it self, makes a Square, that's double to the former, what Analogy is there between these in∣telligible Figures, which are most clear Ideas, with the modifications of our Soul, which are only confus'd Sensations? And why must it be pretended, that intelligible Figures cannot be perceived by the Soul, unless they be her modifications, since the Soul knows not any of her modifications by a clear Idea, but only by Conscience or internal Sense? As I have elsewhere prov'd, and shall prove again in the next Illustration. If we could not see the figures of Bodies, except in our selves, they would be on the contrary unintelligible to us: For we do not know our selves, but are darkness to our selves; and we must cast our Eye outward if we would behold our selves! And we shall never know what we are till we shall contemplate our selves in him who is our Light, and in whom all things become Light. For no where but in God material Beings are perfectly intelligible; but out of him the most Spiritual Substances are utterly invisible. The Idea of Extension, which we see in God, is most clear. But though we see not in God the Idea of our Soul, we are very conscious that we exist, and are sensible of what we actually have. But 'tis impossible to discover what we are, or any of the modifications we are capable of.

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