The immortality of the soul, so farre forth as it is demonstrable from the knowledge of nature and the light of reason by Henry More ...

CHAP. XII.

1. An Answer to an Objection, That our Ar∣guments will as well prove the Immortality of the Souls of Brutes, as of Men. 2. Ano∣ther Objection inferring the Praeexistence of Brutes Souls, and consequently of ours. 3. The first Answer to the Objection. 4. The second Answer consisting of four parts. 5. First, That the Hypothesis of Prae∣existence is more agreeable to Reason then any other Hypothesis. 6. And not onely so, but that it is very solid in it self. 7. That the Wisdome and Goodness of God argue the truth thereof. 8. As also the face of Pro∣vidence in the World. 9. The second part of the second Answer, That the Praeexistence of the Soul has the suffrage of all Philoso∣phers in all Ages, that held it Incorporeal. 10. That the Gymnosophists of AEgypt, the Indian Brachmans, the Persian Magi, and all the learned of the Jews were of this Opinion. 11. A Catalogue of particular famous persons that held the same. 12. That Aristotle was also of the same minde. 13. Another more clear place in Aristotle to this purpose, with Sennertus his Interpretation. 14. An Answer to an

evasion of that Interpretation. 15. The last and clearest place of all out of Aristotles Writings.

1. HAving thus discovered the Nature of the Soul, and that she is a Substance distinct from the Body; I should be in readi∣ness to treat of her Separation from it, did I not think my self obliged first, to answer an envious Objection cast in our way, whereby they would make us believe, that the Ar∣guments which we have used, though they be no less then Demonstrations, are meer Sophisms, because some of them, and those of not the least validity, prove what is very absurd and false, viz. That the Souls of Brutes also are Substances Incorporeal, distinct from the Body: from whence it will follow, that they are Immortal. But to this I have answered already in the Appendix to my An∣tidote, &c. Cap. 10. and in brief concluded, That they are properly no more Immortal then the stupid Matter, which never perishes, and that out of a terrestrial Body they may have no more sense then it. For all these things are as it pleases the first Creatour of them.

2. To this they perversly reply, That if the Souls of Brutes subsist after death, and are then sensless and unactive, it will neces∣sarily

follow that they must come into Bo∣dies again. For it is very ridiculous to think that these Souls, having a Being yet in the world, and wanting nothing but fitly-prepared Matter to put them in a ca∣pacity of living again, should be always neg∣lected, and never brought into play, but that new ones should be daily created in their stead: for those innumerable Myriads of Souls would lie useless in the Universe, the number still increasing even to infinity. But if they come into Bodies again, it is evident that they praeexist: and if the Souls of Brutes praeexist, then certainly the Souls of Men doe so too. Which is an Opinion so wilde and extravagant, that a wry mouth and a loud laughter (the Argument that every Fool is able to use) is sufficient to silence it and dash it out of countenance. No wise man can ever harbour such a conceit as this, which every Idiot is able to confute by con∣sulting but with his own Memory. For he is sure, if he had been before, he could remem∣ber something of that life past. Besides the unconceivableness of the Approach and En∣trance of these praeexistent Souls into the Matter that they are to actuate.

3. To this may be answered two things. The first, That though indeed it cannot be well denied, but that the concession of the

Praeexistence of the Souls of Brutes is a very fair introduction to the belief of the Praeexistence of the Souls of Men also; yet the sequel is not at all necessary, but one may be without the other.

4. The second is this, That if the sequel were granted, that no Absurdity can be de∣tected from thence in Reason, if the preju∣dices of Education, and the blinde suggesti∣on of unconcerned Faculties, that have no right to vote here, be laid aside. To speak more explicitely, I say, This consequence of our Souls Praeexistence is more agreeable to Reason then any other Hypothesis what∣ever; has been received by the most learned Philosophers of all Ages, there being scarce any of them that held the Soul of man im∣mortal upon the meer light of Nature and Reason, but asserted also her Praeexistence; That Memory is no fit Judge to appeal to in this Controversy; and lastly, That Tradu∣ction and Creation are as intricate and un∣conceivable as this opposed Opinion.

5. I shall make all these four parts of my Answer good in order. The truth of the first we shall understand, if we compare it with those Opinions that stand in compe∣tition with it, which are but two that are considerable. The one is of those that say, the Soule is ex traduce; the other of those

that say it is created, upon occasion. The first Opinion is a plain contradiction to the notion of a Soul, which is a Spirit, and there∣fore of an Indivisible, that is of an Indiscer∣pible, Essence. The second Opinion implies both an Indignity to the Majesty of God, (in making Him the chief assistant and actour in the highest, freest, and most par∣ticular way that the Divinity can be concei∣ved to act, in those abominable crimes of Whoredome, Adultery, Incest, nay Bugge∣ry it self, by supplying those foul coitions with new created Souls for the purpose:) and also an injury to the Souls themselves; that they being ever thus created by the immediate hand of God, and there∣fore pure, innocent and immaculate, should be imprisoned in unclean, diseased and dis∣ordered Bodies, where very many of them seem to be so fatally over-mastered, and in such an utter incapacity of closing with what is good and vertuous, that they must needs be adjudged to that extreme calamity which attends all those that forget God. Where∣fore these two opinions being so incongru∣ous, what is there left that can seem pro∣bable, but the Praeexistency of the Soul?

6. But I shall not press the Reasonable∣ness of this Opinion onely from comparing it with others, but also from the concin∣nity

that is to be found in it self. For as it is no greater wonder that every particular mans Soul that lives now upon Earth should be à mundo condito, then the particu∣lar Matter of their Bodies should (which has haply undergone many Millions of Altera∣tions and Modifications, before it lighted into such a contexture as to prove the en∣tire Body of any one person in the world, has been in places unimaginably distant, has filed, it may be, through the triangular passages of as many Vortices as we see Stars in a clear frosty night, and has shone once as bright as the Sun (as the Cartesian Hypothesis would have all the Earth to have done) in so much that we eat, and drink, and cloath our selves with that which was once pure Light and Flame;) so that de facto they do bear the same date with the Cre∣ation of the World, that unavoidable cer∣tainty of the Praeexistence of the Souls of Brutes does, according to the very con∣cession of our Adversaries, fairly insinuate.

7. But this is not all. Both the Attri∣butes of God, and Face of things in the world, out of which his Providence is not to be excluded, are very strong Demonstra∣tions thereof to Reason unprejudiced. For first, if it be good for the Souls of men to be at all, the sooner they are the better. But

we are most certain that the Wisdome and Goodness of God will doe that which is the best; and therefore if they can enjoy them∣selves before they come into these terre∣strial Bodies (it being better for them to en∣joy themselves then not) they must be be∣fore they come into these Bodies; that is, they must be in a capacity of enjoying them∣selves without them for long periods of time, before they appeared here in this Age of the World. For nothing hinders but that they may live before they come into the Body, as well as they may after their going out of it: the latter whereof is acknow∣ledged even by them that deny the Praeexi∣stence. Wherefore the Praeexistence of Souls is a necessary result of the Wisdome and Goodness of God, who can no more fail to doe that which is best, then he can to understand it: for otherwise his Wisdome would exceed his Benignity; nay there would be less hold to be taken of his Goodness, then of the Bounty of a very benign and good man, who, we may be well assured, will slip no opportunity of doing good that lies in his power, especially if it be neither da∣mage nor trouble to him; both which hin∣derances are incompetible to the Deity.

8. Again, the face of Providence in the World seems very much to suit with this

Opinion; there being not any so naturall and easy account to be given of those things that seem the most harsh in the affairs of men, as from this Hypothesis, That their Soules did once subsist in some other state; where, in severall manners and degrees, they forfeited the favour of their Creatour. And so according to that just Nemesis that He has interwoven in the constitution of the Uni∣verse, and of their own natures, they undergoe several calamities and asperities of fortune, and sad drudgeries of Fate, as a punishment inflicted, or a disease contracted from the severall Obliquities of their Apostasie. Which key is not onely able to unlock that recon∣dite mystery of some particular Mens almost fatal aversness from all Religion and Ver∣tue, their stupidity and dulness and even invincible slowness to these things from their very child-hood, and their uncor∣rigible propension to all manner of Vice; but also of that squalid forlorneness and brutish Barbarity, that whole Nations for many Ages have layen under, and many doe still lye under at this very day. Which sad Scene of things must needs exceedingly cloud and obscure the wayes of Divine providence, and make them utterly unintel∣ligible; unless some light be let in from the present Hypothesis we speak of. It is

plain therefore that there are very weighty Reasons may be found out, to conclude the Praeexistence of Soules. And therefore this Opinion being so demonstrable from this Faculty, and there being no other that can contradict it, (for that the verdict of Memory in this case is invalid I shall prove anon) we are according to the Light of Nature undoubtedly to conclude, that the Soules of Men doe praeexist, by Axiome 5.

9. And as this Hypothesis is Rationall in it self, so has it also gained the suffrage of all Philosophers of all Ages, of any note, that have held the Soule of Man Incorporeal and Immortall. And therefore I am not at all sollicitous what either the Epicureans or Stoicks held concerning this Matter; this contest being betwixt those onely that agree on this Truth, That the Soule is a Substance Immateriall. And such amongst the Philosophers as held it so, did unani∣mously agree that it does Praeexist. This is so plain, that it is enough onely to make this challenge; every one in the search will satifie himself of the Truth thereof. I shall onely adde, for the better countenance of the business, some few instances herein, as a pledge of the Truth of my generall Con∣clusion. Let us cast our Eye therefore into what corner of the World we will, that

has been famous for Wisdome and Lite∣rature, and the wisest of those Nations you shall find the Assertours of this Opi∣nion.

10. In Egypt, that ancient Nurse of all hidden Sciences, that this Opinion was in vogue amongst the wise men there, those fragments of Trismegist doe sufficiently wit∣ness. For though there may be suspected some fraud and corruption in severall pas∣sages in that Book, in reference to the in∣terest of Christianity; yet this Opinion of the Praeexistency of the Soule, in which Christianity did not interest it self, cannot but be judged, from the Testimony of those Writings, to have been a Branch of the Wisdome of that Nation: of which Opinion not onely the Gymnosophists and other wise men of Egypt were, but also the Brachmans of India, and the Magi of Babylon and Persia; as you may plainly see by those Oracles that are called either Magicall or Chaldaicall, which Pletho and Psellus have commented upon. To these you may adde the abstruse Philo∣sophy of the Jewes, which they call their Cabbala, of which the Soules Praeexistence makes a considerable part; as all the lear∣ned of the Jewes doe confess. And how naturally applicable this Theory is to those three first mysterious chapters of Genesis,

I have, I hope, with no contemptible success, endeavoured to shew in my Conjectura Cab∣balistica.

11. And if I should particularize in per∣sons of this Opinon, truly they are such, of so great fame for depth of Understanding and abstrusest Science, that their testimony alone might seem sufficient to bear down any ordinary modest man into an assent to their doctrine. And in the first place, if we can believe the Cabbala of the Jewes, we must assign it to Moses, the greatest Philo∣sopher certainly that ever was in the world; to whom you may adde Zoroaster, Pythago∣ras, Epicharmus, Empedocles, Cebes, Euri∣pides, Plato, Euclide, Philo, Virgil, Marcus Cicero, Plotinus, Iamblicus, Proclus, Boe∣thius, Psellus, and severall others which it would be too long to recite. And if it were fit to adde Fathers to Philosophers, we might enter into the same list Synesius and Origen: the latter of whom was surely the greatest Light and Bulwark that antient Christianity had; who unless there had been some very great Matter in it, was far from that levity and vanity, as to entertain an Opinion so vulgarly slighted and neg∣lected by other men: and the same may be said of others that were Christians, as Boe∣thius, Psellus, and the late learned Marsilius

Ficinus. But I have not yet ended my Ca∣talogue: that admirable Physitian Johannes Fernelius is also of this perswasion, and is not content to be so himself onely, but dis∣covers those two grand Masters of Medi∣cine, Hippocrates and Galen, to be so too; as you may see in his De abditis rerum cau∣sis. Cardan also, that famous Philosopher of his Age, expresly concludes, that the Rationall Soule is both a distinct Being from the Soule of the World, and that it does prae∣exist before it comes into the Body: and lastly Pomponatius, no friend to the Soules Immortality, yet cannot but confess, that the safest way to hold it, is also therewith to acknowledg her Praeexistence.

12. And that nothing may be wanting to shew the frivolousness of this part of the Objection, we shall also evince that Aristotle, that has the luck to be believed more then most Authors, was of the same opinion, in his Treatise De Anima Lib. 1. Cap. 3. Where he speaks of the necessity of the qualification of the Body that the Soule is to actuate; and blaming those that omit that consideration, sayes, that they are as careless of that Matter, as if it were possible that, according to the Pythagorick fables, any Soule might enter in∣to any Body. Whenas every Animall, as it has its proper species, so it is to have its pe∣culiar

form. But those that define otherwise, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith he, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. They speak as if one should affirm that the skil of a Carpenter did enter into a Flute or Pipe; for every Art must use its proper In∣struments, and every Soule its proper Body. Where (as Cardan also has observed) Ari∣stotle does not find fault with the opinion of the Soules going out of one Body into another, (which implies their Praeexistence:) but that the Soule of a Beast should goe into the Body of a Man, and the Soule of a Man into a Beasts Body; this is the Ab∣surdity that Aristotle justly rejects, the other Opinion he seems tacitely to allow of.

13. He speaks something more plainly in his De Generat. Animal. Lib. 3. Cap. 11. There are generated, saith he, in the Earth, and in the moisture thereof, Plants and living Creatures; because in the Earth is the moi∣sture, and in the moisture Spirit, and in the whole Universe an Animal warmth or heat; insomuch that in a manner all places are full of Soules, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Adeò ut modo quodam omnia sint Ani∣marum plena, as Sennertus interprets the place: Aristotle understanding by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the same that he does afterwards by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that Principle we call Soule, according to the nobility whereof he asserts, that Ani∣mals are more or less noble; which assertion therefore reaches Humane Soules as well as these of Beasts.

14. Nor can this Text be eluded by being so injurious to Aristotle, as to make him to assert that there is but one Soule in the world, because he sayes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For the text admitting of Sennertus his ex∣position as well as this other; that which is most reasonable is to be attributed to him. Now if his meaning was, that there is but One Soule in the World that goes through all things, and makes the Universe one great Animal, as the Stoicks would have it, he need not say that all places are in a man∣ner full of this Soule, but absolutely full of it, as our Body is wholly actuated by the Soule in it. And therefore the Sense must be, that all places indeed are in a manner full of Soules: not that they have opportunity to actuate the Matter, and shew their presence there by vitall operation; but are there dor∣mient as to any visible energie, till prepared Matter engage them to more sensible actions.

15. We will adde a third place still more clear, Lib. 2. Chap. 3. where he starts this very question of the Praeexistency of Soules, of the Sensitive and Rationall especially;

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whe∣ther both kindes doe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is praeexist, before they come into the Body, or whether the Rationall onely; and he concludes thus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 i. e. It remains that the rationall or intel∣lectual Soule onely enter from without, as be∣ing onely of a nature purely divine, with whose actions the actions of this gross Body have no communication. Concerning which point he concludes like an Orthodox Scholar of his excellent Master Plato; to whose footsteps the closer he keeps, the less he ever wan∣ders from the truth. For in this very place he does plainly profess, what many would not have him so apertly guilty of, that the Soule of man is immortall, and can perform her proper Functions without the help of this terrestriall Body. And thus I think I have made good the two first parts of my answer to the proposed Objection; and have clearly proved, that the Praeexistence of the Soule is an opinion both in it self the most rationall that can be maintained, and has had the suffrage of the renownedst Philosophers in all Ages of the World; and that therefore this sequel from our arguments for the Immortality of the

Soule is no discovery of any fallacy in them.