A brief reply to a late answer to Dr. Henry More his Antidote against idolatry Shewing that there is nothing in the said answer that does any ways weaken his proofs of idolatry against the Church of Rome, and therefore all are bound to take heed how they enter into, or continue in the communion of that church as they tender their own salvation.

His Answer to the Argument from Meta∣physicks in this fifth Paragraph.

To my Metaphysical Argument that infers, that the Body of Christ will be Divisum à se, and both Unum and Multa. First he Answers to the first part; If divisum à se secundum substantiam, I de∣ny it, If divisum à se quoad locum, transeat. To the Second, That it will not be Unum & Multa, but onely Unum in Multis, one and the same in many places.

His second Answer is, that I go upon a false supposition, That essential Vnity is derived from the Vnity of local Presence, not from the Intrin∣sick Principles of the subject. For unless this be granted, Plurality of local Presence at once will not prove a thing divided from it self.

His last Answer is, That by this and my former Argument I put armes into the hands of Infide••s against the Mystery of the Holy Trinity. For it will follow, saith he, That one and the same Divine Na∣ture being in three distinct Persons at once, the same Nature will be treble to it self, as much as the

same Body being in two places at once will be double to it self. And secondly, that one Divine Nature being in three distinct Persons it will be as much Divisa à se (besides that it will not be Di∣visa ab aliis, viz. from the three distinct Persons with which it is really identified) as a Body will by being in two distinct places at once. Th••s is the bare edge and full strength of his Answers against my Metaphysical Argument. As for his Rheto∣rical Flourishes and Boasts, they are no part of any proof, and I list not to meddle with such things.

The Reply.

To the First part of his first Answer I Reply, That it is plain that it is divisum à se secundum sub∣stantiam, both quoad totum, and quoad partes, be∣cause it is separate or distant so many yards or so many miles suppose from it self, nothing of it self being between. As distant and separate as two several Individual Bodies at the same distance, that is to say, A is as many yards or miles distant from A quoad integram suam substantiam, as to its intire substance, as B is from C. But B is really distant or separate from C suppose twenty yards or miles, as to their intire substances. Ergo, A is distant or separate from A twenty yards or miles as to its intire substance, nothing of its substance being between. So that it is both present with it self and absent from it self at the same time twenty miles, and may be many thousands ac∣cording

to this impossible Hypothesis. In so much that it is plain this part of his Answer is weak and insufficient. To the other part I say, That it manifestly follows from my former Reply, (that shows plainly that A is distant and separate from A which is a plain and palpable Division of A wholly and intirely from it self) That A is not Ens unum, but Entia multa or plura, because the very definition of Ens unum is, that it be indi∣visum à se. This is perfect demonstration to any ones whose eyes are not obstructed with preju∣d••ce.

And now to his Second Answer, I deny that I go upon any such supposition, That Essential Unity is derived from the unity of local Presence. But what I contend for is this, T••at unity of local Presence is a necessary consequence of Essential Unity: Nor can any finite Essential Unity be in any m••re than one place at once, as Athanasius and Anastatius also have concluded. And there may be as ne essary and indubitable reasonings ••rom the property of a thing as from its intrin∣sick Principles. As a man may as certainly con∣clude such a Triangle to be a Rectangle Triangle from the equality of the Power of the Hypote∣nusa to the Powers of the sides including the Angle subtended by the Hypotenusa, as from the very definition of a Rectangle Triangle it self. And though the ubi of a Being be not essential to it, yet we are sure what ever is is some where, & quod nusquam est nibil est. From whence it is ap∣parent how weak my Adversaries Inference is, That

unless essential Unity be derived from the Unity of local Presence, it will not follow that the same Body being in divers places at once is divided from it self, any more than it is divided from its in∣trinsick Principles, which it can never be by Plu∣rality of local Presence, they being wholly extrin∣sick to the subject. Which is the same as if he should contend that a Man may be and yet be no where, because Vbi or Place is extrinsecal to him. Or that his Soul may be neither wiser, nor less wise, nor equally wise with others; or his Body neither taller, nor less tall, nor equally tall with others, and yet be, these being onely external re∣spects and comparisons, and not in the definition or ••ssential constitution of a Man. To all which I add, That the very intrinsick Principles of any one ••eing supposed to be in two Places are divi∣ded from themselves, that is, are distant or s••pa∣rate so many Yards or Miles, as is plain from my former Arguing. As suppose Plato were at the same time at Athens and Thebes, the intrinsick ••rinciples of Plato, to wit, his Soul and Body would be both divided from themselves at this distance, and con∣stitute two Plato's. These things are so plain, that it is a wonder to me that they can be hid from any Mans eyes, that does not wilfully wink against them; or rather that any Man can wink against them, though in humour or for ends best known to himself he may talk against them.

Now to his third and last I Answer; Who does the greater disservice to the Catholick Church he or I? I dealing bonâ fide and plainly demonstrating

that to be an errour that cannot be hid from the unprejudiced, it being in a subject so easily comprehensible to all mens perceptions, I mean the nature of a Body▪ and the impossibility of what they pronounce thereof. And it being an Opinion unknown or disown'd by the Fa∣thers of the Church, I mean this Opinion of Transubstantiation, not avowed by any Council till about four or five hundred Years ago, when as the Doctrine of the Trinity was repeatedly ratified in the Primitive times by general Councils above 1200 Years ago, with what reason is it that my Adversary will allow no greater certainty of the Mystery of the Trinity then of Transubstantia∣tion, which has such palpable and easily depre∣hensible and plainly demonstrable contradictions in it. Is not this to put weapons into the hands of In••idels with a witness? But I hope I shall easily wrest them out again by a sufficient Reply to this third Answer of my Adversary.

In the First part therefore, I say, his suppositi∣on is very gross and incompetible to the Divine Nature. As if it were in the three Persons as one hand phancyed in three distinct distanced gloves at once, or one finger in three distinct finger••stalls filling them out in several with its presence, when∣as the Divine Nature and the Persons are pro∣miscuously said to be in one another, (Iohn 17. 21.) I in thee, and thou in me; And Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity. Peter Lumbard not unskil∣fully resembles the Trinity and Divine Nature, to the Mind and the three Powers in the Mind,

Memory, and Understanding, and Love, or Will. These three, saith he, out of St. Austin, are not three Lives but one Life, not three Minds but one Mind, one Essence. He descants further on this Similitude, but it is enough to hint thus much, that from hence also it is manifest, That the Di∣vine Nature is not in the three Persons, as one finger that fits three distinct distanced finger-stalls, but as the Memory, Understanding, and Will, are adequately every-where where the Mind is by a Metaphysical Coincidency and ••ongruity, so also is the Presence of the three Persons and Divine Na∣ture every where coincident and adequate: Nor is the Divine Nature any more repeated according to the number of Persons, then the Essence of the Soul is according to the number of those three Powers, Memory, Vnderstanding, and Will. So that nothing more can be concluded then thus, That the number of the Persons are triple to the Divine Nature which is but One, as the Powers of the Soul or Mind are triple to the Soul or Mind that is but One. And what inconvenience is there in this? Do not all Men say, that there are three Persons though but One Divine Nature? But he would bring a thick Night upon Truth, that gross Errour also might find harb••ur under that Covert.

In the second part of his Answer there seems also to be a supposition as Uncatholick and false as the former. As if the Divine Nature in the three Divine Persons were as One common general Hu∣mane Nature in three Men, suppose Pythagoras,

Plato, and Socrates; when as according to St. Austin and others, The Divine Nature is to the three Divine Persons ra••her as the Rational Soul or Mind to the three Powers, Memory, Understanding, and will: ••his is as near as in this impe••scrutable Mystery we can come, speaking in a Parable with that ancient Father. And we must say so rather than acknowledge any similitude with that of the common humane nature in Pythagoras, Plato, and Socrates, least we run into that dreadfull absurdity of making more Gods than One. But now speak∣ing according to the sense of St. Austin, it is plain that that One Divine Nature being not in the three Persons as one general humane nature in three Men, but the Union and mutual inexistence being as that of the Soul and her Powers, it is plain I say, that tha•• One Divine Nature will be no more divided from it self by being thus inexistent in the three Persons, than the Soul will be divided from her self by reason of her three Powers, Memory, Understanding, and will, or M••ns, No∣titia & Amor, or Sapientia & Amor, which Peter Lumbard contends to be the proper titles of the Son and Holy Ghost; which also is very consonant to the doctrine of the ancient Phílosophy of the Jews and Greeks touching their Trinit••. And lastly as the Soul is sufficiently divisa ab aliis in a Metaphysical sense, though she be really identi••ed with her three Powers, so is the Divine Nature suf∣ficiently divisa ab aliis though it be identified real∣l•• with the three Persons. So that my Adversar•• does here nodum in scirpo qu••rere out of an ill will

to the clearness of my Arguments which he would thus obliquely obscure, and teach the Infidel to cavil against the solid Mystery of the Trinity, because neither himself nor any else can make good that false Opinion of Transubstantiation. Which how pious and warrantable an act of him it is, let any man judge. This is onely to cast dust into the eyes of the Vulgar to dishearten them from en∣deavouring to see the Truth.