An account of Mr. Lock's religion, out of his own writings, and in his own words together with some observations upon it, and a twofold appendix : I. a specimen of Mr. Lock's way of answering authors ..., II. a brief enquiry whether Socinianism be justly charged upon Mr. Lock.

A SPECIMEN OF Mr. LOCK's Way of Answering Persons: Out of his ESSAY, l. 1. c. 3. §. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.

MR. Lock, in the Third Chapter of the First Book of his Essay, hath twice set these Words in his Margin, Lord Herbert's innate Principles exa∣min'd, perhaps because he would have it taken no∣tice of that he durst undertake to grapple with so great a Person. I have therefore taken more especial Notice of that which he saith against that Excel∣lent Writer, and also represented it at length to the Reader's View, that he may likewise take the more Notice of it; the rather, because it will afford him a Specimen of Mr. Lock's Way of Answering Authors.

Mr. Lock, in his Essay. l. 1. c. 3.

§. 15. When I had writ this, being inform'd that my Lord Herbert had in his Books de Veritate assign'd

these innate Principles, I presently consulted him, hoping to find in a Man of so great Parts something that might satisfie me in this Point, and put an end to my Enquiry. In his Chapter de Instinctu Naturali, p. 76. Edit. 1656. I met with these six Marks of his Notitiae Communes, 1. Prioritas, 2. Independentia, 3. Universalitas, 4. Certitudo, 5. Necessitas, i. e. as he explains it, faciunt ad hominis conservationem, 6. Modus conformationis, i. e. assensus nulla inter∣posita mora. And at the latter end of his little Treatise de Religione Laici, he says this of these innate Principles, Adeo ut non uniuscujusvis Reli∣gionis confinio arctentur, quae ubique vigent, verita∣tes. Sunt enim in ipsa mente caelitus descriptae, nul∣lisque traditionibus five scriptis five non scriptis ob∣noxiae, p. 3. And Veritates nostrae Catholicae, quae tanquam indubia Dei effata in foro interiori descripta. Thus having given the Marks of the innate Princi∣ples or common Notions, and asserted their being im∣printed on the Minds of Men by the Hand of God, he proceeds to set them down, and they are these: 1. Esse aliquod supremum numen, 2. Numen illud coli debere, 3. Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam op∣timam esse rationem cultus divini, 4. Resipiscendum esse a peccatis, 5. Dari praemium vel poenam post hanc vitam transactam. These, tho' I allow them to be clear Truths, and such as, if rightly explain'd, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving his Assent to, yet I think he is far from proving that they are innate Impressions in foro interiori descripta: For I must take leave to observe,

§. 16. First, that these five Propositions are either not all, or more than all, those common Notions writ on our Minds by the Finger of God, if it were rea∣sonable to believe any at all to be so written. Since there are other Propositions which even by his own Rules have as just a Pretence to such an Original, and may be as well admitted for innate Principles, as at least

some of these Five he enumerates, viz. Do as thou wouldst be done unto, and perhaps some Hundreds of others when well consider'd.

§. 17. Secondly, That all his Marks are not to be found in each of his five Propositions, viz. his first, second, and third Marks agree perfectly to neither of them; and the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth Marks agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth Propositions: For besides that we are assur'd from History of many Men, nay, whole Nations, who doubt or disbelieve some or all of them; I cannot see how the third, viz. That Vertue join'd with Piety is the best Worship of God, can be an innate Principle, when the Name or Sound Ver∣tue is so hard to be understood, liable to so much Un∣certainty in its Signification, and the thing it stands for so much contended about, and difficult to be known. And therefore this can be but a very uncertain Rule of Humane Practice, and serve but very little to the Conduct of our Lives, and is therefore very unfit to be assign'd as an innate practical Principle.

§. 18. For let us consider this Proposition as to its meaning (for it is the Sense, and not sound, that is and must be the Principle or common Notion,) viz. Vertue is the best Worship of God, i. e. is most ac∣ceptable to him; which is Vertue be taken, as most commonly it is, for those Actions, which according to the different Opinions of several Countries are ac∣counted laudable, will be a Proposition so far from being certain, that it will not be true. If Vertue be taken for Actions conformable to God's Will, or to the Rule prescribed by God, which is the true and only Measure of Vertue; when Vertue is us'd to sig∣nifie what is in its own Nature right and good, then this Proposition, That Vertue is the best Worship of God, will be most true and certain, but of very lit∣tle use in Humane Life, since it will amount to no more but this, viz. That God is pleased with the doing of what he commands; which a Man may cer∣tainly

know to be true, without knowing what it is that God doth command, and so be as far from any Rule or Principle of his Actions as he was before. And I think very few will take a Proposition which amounts to no more than this, viz. That God is plea∣sed with the doing of what he himself commands, for an innate moral Principle writ on the Minds of all Men, (how true and certain soever it may be,) since it teaches so little. Whosoever does so, will have Reason to think Hundreds of Propositions in∣nate Principles, since there are many which have as good a Title as this to be receiv'd for such, which no body yet ever put into that Rank of innate Principles.

§. 19. Nor is the Fourth Proposition, viz. Men must repent of their Sins, much more instructive, till what those Actions are that are meant by Sins are set down: For the Word Peccata, or Sins, being put, as it usually is, to signifie in general ill Actions, that will draw on Punishment upon the Doers, what great Principle of Morality can that be to tell us we should be sorry, and cease to do that which will bring Mis∣chief upon us, without knowing what those particular Actions are that will do so. Indeed this is a very true Proposition, and fit to be inculcated on and re∣ceiv'd by those who are suppos'd to have been taught what Actions in all kinds are Sins; but neither this nor the former can be imagin'd to be innate Princi∣ples, nor to be of any use if they were innate, unless the particular Measures and Bounds of all Vertues and Vices were engraven in Mens Minds, and were innate Principles also, which I think is very much to be doubted: And therefore I imagine it will scarce seem possible that God should engrave Principles in Mens Minds in Words of uncertain Signification, such as are Vertues and Sins, which amongst different Men stand for different things: Nay, it cannot be in Words at all, which being in most of these Princi∣ples very general Names, cannot be understood, but

by knowing the Particulars comprehended under them. And in the practical Instances, the Measures must be taken from the Knowledge of the Actions themselves, and the Rules of them abstracted from Words, and antecedent to the Knowledge of Names; which Rules a Man must know what Language soever he chance to learn, whether English or Japan, or if he should learn no Language at all, or never should understand the use of Words, as happens in the Case of dumb and deaf Men. When it shall be made out, that Men ignorant of Words, or untaught by the Laws and Cu∣stoms of their Country, that it is part of the Worship of God not to kill another Man, not to know more Women than one, not to procure Abortion, not to expose their Children, not to take from another what is his, tho' we want it our selves, but on the contra∣ry to relieve and supply his Wants; and whenever we have done the contrary, we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so no more: When, I say, all Men shall be proved actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such Rules, all which come under these two general Words made use of above, viz. Vertues and Sins, there will be more Reason for admitting these and the like for common Notions and practical Principles; yet after all, universal Consent (were there any in Moral Principles) to Truths, the Knowledge whereof might be attain'd otherwise, would searce prove them to be innate: which is all I contend for.

Thus far Mr. Lock, and this is all that he an∣swers to the Lord Herbert; it remains that I briefly reply to it.

Ad. §. 15. Here in his Text Mr. Lock speaks of the Lord Herbert's assigning innate Principles, gi∣ving Marks of these innate Principles, and saying so or so of them: Also in his Margin he hath these Words, Lord Herbert's innate Principles examined;

and the very same Words are found again in his Margin ad §. 19. And yet I do not observe that the Lord Herbert, either in his Treatise de Veritate, or in that which he intitles Religio Laici, doth as much as once mention either the Expression Innate Principles, or the Word Innate; nor doth Mr. Lock direct us to any Place in either of those Treatises where he doth mention them. 'Tis true, that in his Treatise de Veritate there is frequent mention of Communes Notitiae, and in his Religio Laici of Veri∣tates Catholicae, and we may suppose that Mr. Lock took these common Notions or Notices, and Catholick Verities, to be the same with his innate Principles: In which, if he be mistaken, he both makes the Lord Herbert to say that which he doth not; and withal, while he goes about to prove that those Catholick Verities are not innate Principles, he says nothing at all against that Honourable Person, who never affirm'd them to be so.

If it be said that the Lord Herbert affirms these Catholick Verities to be written by God upon the Hearts of all Men, which is the same with their being innate; I answer, that it is very true that he doth say more than once, that they are in foro in∣terno, or in foro interiori descriptae, & in mente humana a Deo O. M. descriptae; but I question whe∣ther it will be for Mr. Lock's Advantage to say, that the being written by God in the Heart, and being in∣nate, are the same; for it may endanger the Over∣throw of all that he says concerning innate Principles, and force him to quit his darling Opinion that there are none: For if the Question be put whether there be any Principles written in the Hearts of Men, St. Paul seems to resolve it affirmatively that there are, Rom. 2. 14, 15. When (says he) the Gentiles not having the Law do by Nature the things of the Law, these not having the Law are a Law to themselves; who shew the Work of the Law written in their

Hearts, their Conscience bearing witness, and their Thoughts accusing or excusing one another. By the Work of the Law here may be understood either, 1. That Work which the Law prescribes, or the Duties that are required by it; or, 2. The Effect of the Law, or that which it effecteth, i. e. the Know∣ledge of our Duty, or of that which we ought to do, as also of the contrary, i. e. of that which we ought not to do, as the Apostle says expresly, Rom. 3. 20. By the Law is the Knowledge of Sin; or, 3. By the Work of the Law we may understand (as Origen, Theodoret, and several others, seem to do) the Law it self, i. e. not the Letters and Syllables of the Law, but the Sentence, Summ and Substance of it. Which soever of these Expositions we follow, the Sense is in effect the same; so that when St. Paul says that the Gentiles had the Work of the Law written in their Hearts, his Meaning is, that they had the Sentence and Substance of the Law, or ma∣ny of the Duties prescribed by it, and the Know∣ledge of them ingraven or imprinted in their Hearts. And is it not as clear from hence as any thing possi∣bly can be, that they had some Principles or Com∣munes notitiae written in their Hearts? And there∣fore if the Lord Herber. only say that there are some common Principles or Catholick Truths written in the Hearts or Minds of Men, he says no more than the Apostle doth; and Mr. Lock, from the Apostle's saying that the Work of the Law was written in the Hearts of the Gentiles, may infer, that he held in∣nate Principles, with as good Reason as he doth from the Lord Herbert's affirming some Truths to be writ∣ten in the Hearts or Minds of Men, that he held such Principles. And the Truth is, there have not wanted some Prudent and Learned Persons who have expounded these Words of the Apostle of innate Notices or Principles. Quod inquit Paulus Opus scriptum in cordibus, significat has notitias naturales

dona esse attributa naturae, & nobiscum nascentia; they are the Words of Melancthon in loc.

Mr. Lock having transcrib'd five of the Lord Her∣bert's Notitiae Communes, adds, These, tho' I allow them to be clear Truths, and such as, if rightly ex∣plain'd, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving Assent to; yet I think he is far from proving them innate Impressions in foro interiori descriptae: Where I shall not stand to ask Mr. Lock what answers to the Word These, but I must desire the Reader to bear in Mind that he allows all the five Notitiae Communes to be clear Truths, and such as, if rightly explain'd, a rational Creature can hardly avoid gi∣ving his Assent to: For this intimates that there is something of them written in the Heart, which is the Reason why we can hardly avoid assenting to them so soon as they are propos'd to us, and we un∣derstand the Terms of them. To that which he says farther, that he thinks that the Lord Herbert is far from proving them innate Impressions, I briefly an∣swer, that as Mr. Lock hath not shewn, so I have not found that the Lord Herbert any where uses the Phrase Innate Impressions. It is true that he says that his Catholick Verities are in foro interiori descriptae; and if it be said that Mr. Lock thinks that he is far from proving them to be so, I reply, that it will best appear whether he be far from proving it or no, by examining the Reasons of Mr. Lock's thinking so; which we may expect to find, if any where, in the following Sections.

Ad §. 16. Here Mr. Lock observes, that the Five Propositions set down by the Lord Herbert are either not all, or more than all the common Notions writ on our Minds by the Finger of God, if it were reaso∣nable to believe any at all to be so written. To which I answer, If Mr. Lock could prove that the five Pro∣positions mention'd by the Lord Herbert, are more than all those common Notions writ in our Minds

by the Finger of God, it would follow, that some of them are not such Notions, and that would make directly against the Lord Herbert. But Mr. Lock hath not proved this, and if he had, it would not be for his Advantage, unless he could prove farther that none of them are such Notions; for his known Tenet is, that there are no Notions or Principles at all that are so written in Mens Hearts. On the other hand, if Mr. Lock can prove that these Five are not all those common Notions writ in our Minds by the Finger of God, this makes not at all against the Lord Herbert, who never said or thought that they were all; as Mr. Lock might have seen if he had given himself leisure seriously and deliberately to peruse his Treatise de Veritate. He would have found that he very frequently names other common Notions, and particularly he takes notice that there are many Notitiae Communes in Mathematicks, which they call Postulata, (p. 181. Edit. 1633.) and speaks of tota notitiarum communium series, p. 206. He would also have found, that where the Lord Herbert sets down those five Propositions, he is not speaking of common Notions in general, but of those only which concern Religion; Notitiae communes circa Religio∣nem is the Title: Yea, in setting down those five he did not design to give us all the common Notions that concern Religion. He himself plainly tells us this, Notitias communes solenniores circa Religionem praemittendas curavi, says he, p. 207. he did not take care to premise all the common Notions that con∣cern Religion, but only the Solenniores. Yea, p. 227. he makes all the Ten Commandments to be Notitiae communes. Mr. Lock says, that this, Do as thou wouldest be done unto, and perhaps some hundreds of others may as justly pretend to be Notitiae com∣munes, as at least some of those five. To which I answer, 1. The Lord Herbert never design'd to ex∣clude Do as thou wouldest be done unto from being

Notitia communis, for he more than once mentions it as such, viz. p. 54, and 57, and 106. 2. When Mr. Lock says Perhaps some hundreds of others, tho' possibly he intended it only as a Rhetorical Flight, yet I question whether the Lord Herbert would have deny'd that there are hundreds of Notitiae communes. However, I think it is plain that there is nothing in this Section that makes against that honourable Per∣son, and if Mr. Lock had carefully read his Treatise de Veritate, I believe he would have wholly omit∣ted it.

Ad §. 17. This Section begins thus, All his (i. e. the Lord Herbert's) Marks are not to be found in each of his five Propositions, viz. his first, second, and third Marks agree perfectly to neither of them. Thus Mr. Lock. Now 'tis impossible to make Sense of these last Words, To neither of them; and therefore I conclude that it is a false Print, but know not what Words to substitute instead of them. Per∣haps in the Copy it was thus, His first, second, and third Marks agree perfectly to neither of the two first. If this was his Meaning, that we may judge the bet∣ter of the Truth thereof, we are to know that the six Marks assign'd by the Lord Herbert, are to di∣stinguish the common Notions which we have by natural Instinct from those that we have not with∣out the Help of Discourse. The former are distin∣guish'd from the latter by, 1. Priority, 2. Independen∣cy, 3. Universality, 4. Certainty, 5. Necessity, 6. The Manner of Conformation. Thus the Lord Herbert. Now (if I do not mistake in correcting the Errour of the Press) Mr. Lock says, that the three former Marks do not perfectly agree to the two first Pro∣positions, viz. 1. That there is a God, 2. That he is to be worship'd: Whereby he more than seems to intimate that the three latter Marks do agree perfect∣ly to them. And if so, yea, if only the last of all, i. e. the manner of Conformation, doth agree

perfectly to them, the three first Marks must agree likewise to them. If the Minds of Men assent to them without delay as soon as they hear them, and consequently without the Help of any Reasoning or Discourse, this Assent must be, 1. before Discourse, 2. independent upon it, 3. there must be an univer∣sal Consent to them.

It follows in this Section, that the first, second, third, fourth and sixth Marks agree but ill to his third, fourth and fifth Propositions. As before he did not say that the first, second and third Marks do not agree at all to the first and second Proposi∣tions, but only that they do not agree perfectly; so here he does not say plainly the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth Marks do not agree to the three last Propositions, but only that they agree but ill with them. But I would ask Mr. Lock whether the fourth Mark, viz. Certainty, doth not perfectly agree to them? Did he not, §. 15. allow them to be clear Truths? And can they be clear Truths, and yet not certain?

But Mr. Lock gives a Reason why five of the six Marks agree so ill to the three last Propositions: For (says he) besides that we are assur'd from History of many Men, nay whole Nations, who doubt or dis∣believe some or all of them, I cannot see how the third, viz. that Vertue join'd with Piety is the best Worship of God, can be an innate Principle, when the Name or Sound Vertue is so hard to be under∣stood, liable to so much uncertainty in its Signification, and the thing it stands for so much contended about, and difficult to be known. Thus Mr. Lock. Now to the former part of this Reason there needs no other Answer than this, that tho' Mr. Lock says that we are assur'd from History, yet he doth not ac∣quaint us what or whose History it is that gives us the Assurance. If he had given us the Names of the Historians, or their Words, and the Places where

they are to be found, we might have examin'd them, and so judged whether they were to his Purpose or no, as also of what Authority his History-writers were. The Lord Herbert, in his Treatise de Veritate, p. 214. tells of one that had said that in a certain remote Country there was no Form of Religion to be found, but adds, that he was confuted by ano∣ther, who objected to him his Ignorance of the Lan∣guage of that Country; and certainly if a Man be not skill'd in the Language of a Country, it is not an easie thing for him to know the Religion and Man∣ners of it. But let us suppose that which Mr. Lock says to be true, that History assures us that many Men, nay whole Nations, doubt or disbelieve some or all of the three last Propositions, what will he gain by this? For the Question is not whether some Men may doubt of, or disbelieve these Truths, or some of them; but whether there be any that have not some Notion of them: Even of those that pro∣fess themselves Christians, some may possibly doubt of or disbelieve these Truths, but it cannot be said that they have no Notion of them. Lastly, if no∣thing else could be said against this Part of the Rea∣son, it only shews that the third Mark, viz. Uni∣versality, doth not agree to the three last Proposi∣tions, it doth not at all affect the other Marks.

I pass to the latter Part of the Reason, and that is, that Mr. Lock cannot sec how the Third, viz. that Vertue join'd with Piety is the best Worship of God, can be an innate Principle. And I do not see how this can be any Reason of that which hath gone be∣fore, tho' the word For (unless it be here one of Mr. Lock's privileged Particles) plainly tells us that it was intended for such. Should it be put into Form, how strangely would it look? The third Proposition, viz. That Vertue join'd with Piety is the best Worship of God, cannot be an innate Prin∣ciple; therefore the first, second, third, fourth, and

sixth Marks agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth Propositions. What Cement can be found to join this Antecedent and Consequent together I know not. But let us hear the Reason why Mr. Lock can∣not see how the third Proposition fore-mention'd can be an innate Principle. It is because the Name Ver∣tue is so hard to be understood, liable to so much Un∣certainty in its Signification, and the thing it stands for so much contended about, and difficult to be known. Now tho' it is true that the Word Virtus hath va∣rious Significations, (which may be seen in our Di∣ctionaries,) yet in the Proposition so often mention'd it is easie to be understood, its Signification is cer∣tain, and the thing it stands for is easie to be known, and there can be no Contention about it. Yea, Mr. Lock himself, who here speaks of its being hard to be un∣derstood, could understand it easily enough when he writ the 15th. Section of this Chapter. There he allows this Proposition to be a clear Truth; but how could he pronounce it to be a clear Truth, if he did not understand the Terms of it? He saith farther, that it is so clear a Truth, that, if rightly explain'd, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving his Assent to it; which clearly shews that he knew then the right Explication of it, or when it is right∣ly explain'd: How then comes that which he under∣stood so easily then, to be difficult to be understood now when he writ the 17th. Section?

Mr. Lock concludes this Section thus, And there∣fore this can be but a very umcertain Rule of Hu∣mane Practice, and serve but very little to the Con∣duct of our Lives, and is therefore very unfit to be assign'd as an innate Practical Principle. But I must conclude contrariwise, seeing the Signification of the Terms of this Proposition is so certain, it can∣not but be a very certain Rule of Humane Practice, and of excellent Use for the Conduct of the Lives of Men, and very fit to be assign'd (if not as an

innate Practical Principle, yet) as a Practical Prin∣ciple written in Mens Hearts, which is as much as the Lord Herbert affirms.

Ad §. 18. When the Truth of a Proposition is so clear, that the Answerer cannot but see and acknow∣ledge it, the usual way is to add to it, or leave some Words out, or substitute others in the Place of them, and so to mould it into another Form, till he thinks that he can say something to it which may pass for a Confutation with the unwary Reader. Mr. Lock thought it necessary to take this Course, and so he here leaves out the Words join'd with Piety, and represents the Proposition thus, Vertue is the best Worship of God, i. e. (says he) is most accepta∣ble to him. But this, according to the Lord Her∣bert's Sense of the Word Vertue is most false; for Vertue join'd with Piety is more acceptable to God than Vertue alone, not having Piety its Associate, is. Let the Proposition then stand as it ought to do, and as it is in the Lord Herbert, Vertue join'd with Piety is the best Worship of God, and let us see what Mr. Lock offers.

1. If (says he) Vertue be taken for those Actions, which according to the different Opinions of several Countries are accounted laudable, the Proposition will not be true; i. e. If Vertue be taken for that which is not Vertue, the Proposition will not be true; but if it be taken for that which really is Vertue, (and so the Lord Herbert took it, as Mr. Lock knew very well) it is most certainly true, and confess'd by him a little before to be a clear Truth. How vain then is it (if not contradictious) here to make a Suppo∣sition of its being taken in a Sense, which would render the Proposition not true. He says here, that Vertue is most commonly taken for those Actions, which, according to the different Opinions of Countries, are accounted laudable; but he only says it, he does not alledge as much as one Author who takes it so.

Withal, if it was true that it is most commonly ta∣ken so, yet it is not to the purpose, since Mr. Lock knew that the Lord Herbert did not take it so.

2. If (says he) Vertue be taken for Actions con∣formable to God's Will, or to the Rule prescribed by God, then this Proposition will be most true and cer∣tain: And I do readily grant that it is here taken for Actions conformable to the Will of God, and Rule prescrib'd by him; but it is to be observ'd, that in this Proposition it is distinguished from Piety, and therefore as the Actions conformable to God's Will, and the Rule prescrib'd by him, which relate to God, are comprehended under Piety, so under Vertue are comprehended all other Actions that are conformable to the Divine Will and the Rule pre∣scrib'd us, whether they relate to our Duty towards our Neighbour, or that toward our selves. And this being manifestly the Sense of the Word which the Lord Herbert intended, the Proposition, Vertue joined with Piety is the best Worship of God, must be acknowledged to be most true and certain: But (says Mr. Lock) however true and certain it may be, it is of very little use in Humane Life; and there∣fore I think very few will take it for an innate moral Principle writ on the Hearts of all Men. To which I answer, that if it depend upon this, I must look upon Mr. Lock's Cause as desperate; for I am so far from granting that this Proposition is of very lit∣tle use in Humane Life, that contrariwise I positive∣ly assert that it is impossible that any general Rule should be of greater use than it is. I challenge Mr. Lock to name any general Rule which is of greater Force to incite Men to the Study and Pra∣ctice of true Piety and Vertue than this, That Vertue join'd with Piety is the best Worship of God.

But what Reason doth Mr. Lock give of this his strange Assertion, that the fore-mention'd Proposition is of very little use in Humane Life? His Reason

is as strange as his Assertion, because it amounts to no more than this, that God is pleas'd with the doing of what he commands. To which I answer, 1. Sup∣pose this was true, that it amounts to no more, it would not follow that it is of very little use in Hu∣mane Life: For ought not this, that God is pleased with it, be an especial Motive to and Enforcement of that great Duty of taking care to do God's Com∣mandments? 2. We may admire that Mr. Lock should say that it amounts to no more than this. Doth this, that it is the best Worship of God, amount to no more than this, that God is pleased with it? Surely it can amount to no less than this, that it is the Worship that best pleases him; as also, that by it we best express our inward Veneration of him, our Belief of his Promises, and Desire to please him, and by it most honour him, &c. He that offereth Praise honoureth me, Psal. 50. ult. and so he that performeth any other Action of Piety, or any ver∣tuous Action, honours or glorifies our Father which is in Heaven; as also, he provokes others, and gives them an Occasion to glorifie him, St. Matth. 5. 16. We see then that it amounts to much more than this, that God is pleas'd with the doing that which he commands.

Mr. Lock adds, A Man may certainly know this to be true, (viz. that God is pleas'd with the doing of what he commands,) without knowing what it is that God doth command, and so be as far from any Rule or Principle of his Actions as he was before. But whether this be true or no, I am not at all con∣cern'd to enquire; it is certain that we cannot know this Proposition (Vertue join'd with Piety is the best Worship of God) to be true, without knowing some∣thing of what it is that God commands, for he commands the Practice of the very things express'd in it, viz. Vertue and Piety; yea, these two are the greatest and weightiest things of the Law, or, if

you will, the two Commandments on which hang all the Law and the Prophets, St. Matth. 22. 40. And we may observe that the Lord Herbert in his Ap∣pendix ad Sacerdotes de Religione Laici, sets down this third common Notion or Proposition more large∣ly thus, Virtutem & Pietatem una cum fide in Deum amoreque ejus intimo conjunctam, esse praecipuam par∣tem cultus Divini. So that here is added express Mention of Faith in God, and an hearty Love of him, which are also things commanded by God. Here is nothing more in this Section that deserves Consideration. As to his Rhetorical Flight concern∣ing Hundreds of Propositions, it hath been touch'd upon before.

Ad §. 19. Here Mr. Lock passes to the Lord Herbert's fourth common Notion or Proposition, That Men must repent of their Sins if they expect or desire to have them forgiven. He grants that it is a very true Pro∣position, and fit to be inculcated; and otherwhere, (viz. in Reasonab. of Christian. p. 256.) he tells us, that the Light of Nature reveal'd to the Heathens this way of Reconciliation, this Hope of Atonement, that God would forgive them, if they acknowledged their Faults, disapproved the Iniquity of their Trans∣gressions, begg'd his Pardon, &c. So that even ac∣cording to Mr. Lock's Doctrine, this Proposition, Men must repent of their Sins if they would have God atoned and their Sins forgiven, bids fair for being a common Notion or Principle writ in the Hearts of Men. But Mr. Lock says that this fourth Proposition is not much more instructive than the third. To which I answer, That if it be but as in∣structive as the third, it is very fit to be receiv'd as a common Notion writ in the Hearts of Men: And then surely it is fit to be receiv'd as such when it is acknowledged by Mr. Lock to be more instructive, yea much more instructive when it is set down what those Actions are that are meant by Sins.

I took notice a little before, that Mr. Lock says that this Proposition is fit to be inculcated: But on whom is it to be inculcated? His Words are these, Fit to be inculcated on and received by those who are suppos'd to have been taught what Actions in all kinds are Sins. But if it is fit to be inculcated on and receiv'd by none but those who are taught what Actions in all kinds are Sins, I fear that it is fit to be inculcated on and received by very few: For I doubt there are few that know what Actions in all kinds are Sins. Perhaps Mr. Lock himself has not attain'd to know this; there are perhaps some A∣ctions that are Sins, and yet he doth not think them to be so.

But he proceeds farther, and asserts confidently enough, that neither this (fourth Proposition) nor the former (i. e. the third,) can be imagin'd to be innate Principles, nor to be of any use if they were innate, unless the particular Measures and Bounds of all Vertues and Vices were engraven in Mens Minds, and were innate Principles also, which I think is very much to be doubted. Thus Mr. Lock. Now this seems very high, that no Man can ima∣gine them (or either of them) to be innate Princi∣ples, when according to him the Lord Herbert did imagine them to be such; and that they should be of no use, when he himself had intimated before that they are of use: For when, §. 18. he says of the third Proposition that it is of very little use in Humane Life, and that it teaches little, this implies that it is of some use, and teacheth something. And §. 19. when he saith of the fourth Proposition, that it is not much more instructive than the third, he grants that it is more instructive, tho' not much more. Mr. Lock says, that they cannot be imagin'd to be of any use, unless the particular Measures and Bounds of all Vertues and Vices were engraven in Mens Minds, and were innate Principles also. But

uppose the particular Measures and Bounds of some Vertues and Vices only were engraven on Mens Hearts, and innate Principles, would not these Pro∣positions be of excellent use for inciting us to pra∣ctise those Vertues, and eschew those Vices? And therefore is not Mr. Lock too severe in pronouncing them to be of no use at all, unless the particular Measures and Bounds of all Vertues and Vices were innate Principles? But the Truth is, he will not allow that any Measures of Vertue and Vice are in∣nate Principles.

Mr. Lock's next Words are, And therefore I ima∣gine it will scarce seem possible that God should en∣grave Principles in Mens Minds in Words of uncer∣tain Signification, such as are Vertues and Vices, which amongst different Men stand for different things. But how the Words And therefore come here I know not; for I cannot see how this can be drawn as a Conclusion from that which hath gone before. He had said a little before, that the word Sins is usually put to signifie in general ill Actions that will draw on Punishment upon the Doers. So that here he makes the Signification of the word Sins to be certain, and can he inferr thence that it scarce seems possible that God should engrave Princi∣ples in Mens Minds in Words of uncertain Signifi∣cation, as the word Sins is? As to the other word Vertue, I have shew'd above in answering the 17th. and 18th. Sections, that the Signification of it is not uncertain. But does not Mr. Lock give a sufficient Proof that both the Words are of uncertain Signi∣fication, when he says that among different Men they stand for different things? I answer, No; for tho' some may say, This is a Vertue, when others may account it a Vice; and this is a Sin or Vice, when others may say that it is a Vertue; yet by the words Vertue and Sin they mean the same thing, viz. by Sin an ill Action, by Vertue a laudable one.

Mr. Lock proceeds, and says, Nay it cannot be suppos'd to be in Words at all, viz. that God engraves Principles in Mens Minds: And to the same Pur∣pose he had said before, in the Beginning of §. 18. It is the Sense and not the Sound that is and must be the Principle or common Notion. But against whom doth he say this? Not against the Lord Herbert, who is for our having little regard to Words and Names as much as he can be: Non tam nomina (quae si neglexerimus, magnum in sapientia progres∣sum faciemus) quam res ipsas respicientes consensum illum universalem tanquam veritatem indubiam am∣plectamini; so he de Veritate, p. 40. And there∣fore he much varies the Words of these two Pro∣positions, viz. the third and the fourth. In the third Proposition, instead of Virtutem cum Pietate conjunctam, (as he expresseth it in his Religio Laici,) he in his Appendix ad Sacerdot. de Relig. Laici, hath Virtutem & Pietatem una cum Fide in Deum, Amo∣reque ejus intimo conjunctam; and in his de Veritate, p. 215. Probam facultatum conformitatem; and in the same de Veritate, p. 220. Vitae sanctitatem. So his fourth Proposition, in his Religio Laici he ex∣presses thus, Resipiscendum esse a peccatis; but in his de Veritate, p. 217. more largely thus, Vitia & scelera quaecunque expiari debere ex poenitentia. Hence it most plainly appears that the Lord Her∣bert made not Words but the Sense to be the No∣titia communis.

We are come at last to Mr. Lock's Conclusion, which he begins thus, When it shall be made out that Men ignorant of Words, or untaught by the Laws and Customs of their Country; but he doth not tell us what is to be made out concerning them; for there is no Verb for this Nominative Case, Men ig∣norant of Words, &c. But I suppose that it is to be supply'd out of that which follows; so that his Meaning is this, When it shall be made out, that

Men ignorant of Words, or untaught by the Laws and Customs of their Country, and all Men whatso∣ever, do actually know and allow that it is part of the Worship of God not to kill a Man, not to know more Women than one, not to procure Abortion, not to ex∣pose their Children, not to take from another what is his, tho' we want it our selves, but on the contrary relieve and supply his Wants; and whenever we have done the contrary, we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so no more: When, I say, all Men shall be prov'd actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such Rules, all which come under these two general Words, Vertues and Sins, there will be more Reason for admitting these and the like for common Notions and practical Principles. Thus Mr. Lock, who seems to deal very hardly with the Lord Herbert's third and fourth Propositions, in that he will not admit them to be common Notions, or as much as practical Principles, until it be prov'd that all Men in the World, even those that are ig∣norant of Words, and untaught by the Laws and Customs of their Country, do actually know and also allow of all these and a thousand other such Rules. Methinks if all Men did actually know these, and but half a thousand other such Truths, we might see very great Reason for admitting those two Propositions to be of great use for directing our Practice, and consequently to have a good Ti∣tle to be accounted practical Rules or Principles. St. Paul, Rom. 1. instanceth in many things, which the Gentiles actually knew to be ill Actions, that will draw on Punishment upon the Doers, and con∣sequently (according to Mr. Lock) Sins; for ha∣ving enumerated them, from v. 24. to v. 32. he says v. 32. that they knew that those who do such things are worthy of Death. Now must not every one con∣fess that the Lord Herbert's fourth Proposition, That Men must repent if they would have those Sins for∣given,

and escape the Punishment due for them, would have been of very great use to them? Yea, if Men have but Means to know that many things are Vertues or Vices, the two fore-mention'd Pro∣positions must not be deny'd to be practical Princi∣ples, and such as might be very useful in Humane Life, because through their own Default many do not actually know that they are Vertues or Vices. The Lord Herbert makes that golden Rule, St. Matth. 7. 12. Whatsoever things ye would that Men should do unto you do ye so to them, to be a common Notion writ in the Hearts of Men; and would they but call it frequently to mind, and apply it to particular Actions, by the Light of this they might know whe∣ther they have the Nature of Sin or no. The Ap∣plication of this Rule to particular Actions would help us to the Knowledge of a great part of our Duty toward our Neighbour; and therefore our Sa∣viour says, that this is the Law and the Prophets: All my Duty toward my Neighbour depends upon it, the whole Law concerning that is fulfill'd in it; it is the Foundation of all Justice and Charity to Men. Hence it was that the Emperour Severus A∣lexander having heard this Sentence from the Jews or Christians (we may rather think Christians) caus'd it to be proclaim'd by the Cryer, and to be writ on the Palace, and on Publick Works; see Jul. Capi∣tolinus in Alexandro Severo. To conclude then ac∣cording to the Lord Herbert, as that Proposition, They must repent of their Sins, if they would have God aton'd to them, is writ upon the Hearts of Men; so also is this Sentence, All things whatsoever ye would that Men should do to you do ye likewise to them: By which (if they be not wanting to themselves) they may know in a great measure what particular Actions are Sins, and what they ought to do; so that if that Proposition be not useful and instructive to them, it is their own Fault.

Mr. Lock having said, that when all Men shall be prov'd actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such Rules, there will be more Reason for admitting these for common Notions, lest this Concession should be too liberal, adds, Yet after all universal Consent (were there any in Moral Princi∣ples) to Truths, the Knowledge whereof might be attain'd otherwise, would scarce prove them to be in∣nate; which is all I contend for. Thus Mr. Lock. But I do not well understand the meaning of the last words, which is all that I contend for. Doth which relate to that which is here express'd, viz. that universal Consent to Truths, the Knowledge whereof might be attain'd otherwise, will scarce prove them to be innate, so that this is all that he contends for? Or doth it refer to something not ex∣press'd, Mr. Lock having a Privilege to use Words otherwise than ordinary Persons are allow'd to do. To this latter I incline, that it is his meaning, that he contends for no more than this, that the Lord Herbert's Propositions are not innate, tho' this is not express'd. But let the one or the other be his meaning, unless we were certain that by his Notitiae communes or Catholick Truths written in the Minds of Men, the Lord Herbert meant the same that Mr. Lock doth by his innate Principles, we cannot say that that honourable Person is at all concern'd, or that Mr. Lock's Conclusion doth contradict any thing that he hath deliver'd.

Thus I have consider'd all that Mr. Lock hath said in these five Sections, wherein he hath to do with the Lord Herbert. And now must it not seem strange that he should take upon him to examine what is written by a Person so eminent for his Parts as well as his Quality, and after all have so little to say against him? He only toucheth very slightly upon three of his Propositions, or Notitiae communes,

viz. the first, second and fifth; and as to the third and fourth, he had done better if he had pass'd them by as slightly, unless he had said something more to the purpose. Yea, he is so far from confuting, that he comes very far up toward the confirming all that the honourable Person design'd. For he says plainly, §. 15. that all the five Propositions are such Truths, as, if rightly explain'd, a rational Creature can hard∣ly avoid giving his Assent to. Now of such things, as so soon as they are alledged, all Men acknow∣ledge them to be true or good, they require no Proof or farther Discourse to be assured of the Truth or Goodness of them, we need not fear to say, that they seem to have a good Title, to be receiv'd for common Notions or Catholick Truths written in the Hearts of Men; which is all that the Lord Herbert contends for.

The Reader may also observe Mr. Lock's way of Answering Persons.

How often doth he complain of others, that they make him to say that which he doth not, bidding them shew where it is that he says or pretends such a thing? And may we not likewise ask him where it is, that the Lord Herbert mentions Innate Principles or Innate Impressions?

Another way very frequently us'd is, to single out one or two Particulars, and pretend to say some∣thing to them; and then the unwary Reader must believe that the whole is answer'd: So Mr. Lock singles out the third and fourth of the Lord Herbert's Propositions, pretending to say something to them, but takes little or no notice of the other three.

A third way is, to say the same thing that their Adversary doth, and yet to pretend that he is con∣futing him all the while: And thus doth Mr. Lock, §. 18. and 19, when he inculcates that it is the Sense (and not the Words) that is the Principle or com∣mon Notion.

There is a fourth way, which I have set down at large in the Beginning of my Answer to §. 18. and shall not need to repeat.

The last way, most usual with Mr. Lock, is, to pretend that he doth not understand that which he doth; as here it is apparent, that when he writ the 15th Section he knew well enough the Signification of the Word Vertue in the Third Proposition; and yet §. 17. he says it is hard to be understood; and §. 19. pretends it may either have this or that Sense.