Machivael's [sic] discourses upon the first decade of T. Livius, translated out of the Italian. To which is added his Prince. With some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors. By E.D.

CHAP. L.

The power of stopping the publique actions of the city, should not be given into the hands of one council, or one magistracy.

TItus Quincius Cincinnatus; and Cneus Iulius Mentus were Consuls together in Rome, who upon a quarrel arisen between them two, made a stay in all the actions belonging to the Republique: which the Senate seeing, per∣swaded them to create a Dictator, to the end that might be done, which, by reason of their discord, was hindred. But the Consuls disa∣greeing in every thing else, in this alone were of accord both of them, not to make a Dicta∣tor: so that the Senate finding no other help, desir'd assistance from the Tribuns, who with the Senates authority forc'd the Consuls to o∣bey. Where the profitable use of the Tribunate is in the first place remarkable, which serv'd to good purpose to bridle the great mens am∣bitions exercis'd not onely against the Common people, but also among themselves: in the next place, that it should never be so ordain'd in a city, that a few should resolve of those things that are the ordinary maintenance of a Common-wealth. For example, if thou givest the power to one Consul to make a distribution of honors and profits, or to a Magistrate to dispatch some busi∣ness to be done, it is fit to impose a necessity on him, that he do it in any case, or so provide that another might and should do it: otherwise the order would be defective, and perilous, as we see it was in Rome, unless they could have oppos'd the Consuls obstinacy with the Tribuns authori∣ty. In the Commonwealth of Venice the great council bestows both the honors and the profits.

It sometime chanc't, that the universality upon some disdaine conceiv'd, or by reason of some false suggestion did not make choice of any successours to the Magistrates of their Cities, nor to their Ministers of State abroad, which was a very great disorder; for all at once, their Townes and Cities wanted their lawfull Iudges; nor could any thing be obtained while the universality were appeased, or were no longer deceived. And this inconvenient would have brought those Cities to ill termes, had not some discreet Citizens otherwise taken order for them. Who having layd hold of a fit occasion, made a law, that all the Magistrates within or without the Citie should continue still in their offices, till new choice were made, and their successours appointed. And thus they tooke away from that counsell all opportunity of enabling them, with the Commonwealths danger, to stop the publique actions.