Machivael's [sic] discourses upon the first decade of T. Livius, translated out of the Italian. To which is added his Prince. With some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors. By E.D.

About this Item

Title
Machivael's [sic] discourses upon the first decade of T. Livius, translated out of the Italian. To which is added his Prince. With some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors. By E.D.
Author
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527.
Publication
London :: printed for G. Bedell, and T. Collins, and are to be sold at their shop at the Middle-Temple Gate in Fleetstreet,
1663.
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Subject terms
Livy -- Early works to 1800.
Political science -- Early works to 1800.
Cite this Item
"Machivael's [sic] discourses upon the first decade of T. Livius, translated out of the Italian. To which is added his Prince. With some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors. By E.D." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A50322.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 2, 2024.

Pages

Page 108

CHAP. XXXIII.

When an inconvenient is much grown, either in a state, or against a state, it is better to beare with it for a while, then presently to struggle with it.

WHen the commonwealth of Rome grew in reputation, force, and rule, the neighboring people, who at first were not aware of the harme this new Republique might do them, began, though late, to know their fault; and desiring to remedy that which at first they had neglected, nigh fourty several people were joyned together aainst Rome; whereupon the Romans, among the remedies they were wont to make use of in their extreamest dangers, betook them to create a Dictatour, that is, to give power to one man, that without calling any Coun∣cil he might resolve, and without any appeal, he might execute his resolutions. Which reme∣dy, as then it serv'd to purpose, and was the occasion they overcame those eminent dan∣gers: so it was alwaies exceeding profitable in all those occasions, which in the grow'th of the Empire at any time did rise against the Repub∣lique. Upon which accident we are first to discourse, how that, when an inconvenient that rises either in a Commonwealth or against a Commonwealth, caus'd by an inward or an outward cause, is become so great, that it begins to make every one afraid, the safer course is, to temporise with it, then strive forth∣with to extinguish it. For most commonly it proves, that they who indeavor to quench it

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kindle it much more, and suddenly pluck down that mischief upon their heads, which was then but fear'd from thence. And of such like accidents many arise in the Commonwealth, oftner upon inward oceasions then outward. Where oftentimes, either a citizen is suffered to lay hold of more forces then is reasonable; or else some law begins to be corrupted, which is the very nerve and life of liberty. And this error is suffer'd to pass on so far, that there is more danger in the remedy, then in the evil. And so much the harder is it to know these in∣convenients at their birth, by how much more it seems to agree with mens natures, alwaies to favor things in their beginnings: and these favors are of more force, rather then in any thing else, in those works that seem to have somewhat of vertue in them, and are done by young men. For if in a republique any young noble man put forward himself, having in him extraordinary vertue, all the citizens begin to cast their eyes on him, and agree together without any consideration to honor him; so that if he hath any touch of Ambition, meeting with those favors nature affords him, and this accident coming suddenly in place, before the Citizens perceive the errors they are in, it falls out that they have small means to help themselves. And when these, that have the remedies in their powers, would put them in practise, they do but with haste augment his authority. Hereof we might alleadge sundry examples; but I will give onely one out of our own city. Cosmus of Medici, from whom the house of Medici in this city took the beginning of their greatness, came into such reputation, through the favor that his

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own wisdom and the other citizens ignorance gave him, that he began to make the state somewhat afraid of him, so that some citizens held it very dangerous to offend him, and others as dangerous to let him alone. But Nicholas of Ʋizzano living at the same time, who was esteem'd a very expert man in civil affairs; and being that the first error was made is not knowing the dangers that might arise upon Cosmus his reputation, while he liv'd, would never suffer, that they should make the second, which was, that they should indeavor to put him down; judging that such an assay would be altogether the ruine of their state, as in effect it came to pass, which was after his death. For those citizens that were left, not following this advice, made themselves strong against Cosmus, and chas'd him out of Florence. Whereupon it follow'd that his faction resenting the injury, a while after recall'd him, and made him Prince of the Commonwealth; to which step he could never have climb'd, without that manifest opposition. The selfsame befell Rome with Caesar, whose vertue being favor'd by Pompey and others, at length came to change their favor into fear, whereof Cicro witnesses, saying, that Pompey had late begun to fear Cae∣sar. Which fear caus'd them to think upon the remedies, and the remedies they us'd ha∣sten'd the ruine of their Commonwealth. I say then, that seeing it is a hard thing to know these evils when they arise, this diffi∣culty being occasion'd by a deceit, where∣with most things in their beginning do de∣ceive, the wiser way is to dissemble them, when they are knowne, then to oppose them. For temporizing with, them they either

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are extinguish'd of themselves, or at least the evill is put off for a longer time. And in all af∣faires Princes ought to be well advis'd, who in∣tend either to suppresse evills, or to oppose their forces and their invasions, that in liew of hurt they do them not good; and thinking to thrust on forward a businesse, they draw it not after them; or instead of choaking a plant, they water is not. And they should well consider, wherein the greatest force consists, and when they find their powers sufficient to heale what is a∣miffe, they should then apply their strongest re∣medies; or otherwise, let it alone, nor in any case meddle with it; for it would fall out as before hath bin said, and as it befel the neighbours of Rome; for whom it had bin better, after that Rome was so growne in strength, with treaties of peace to indeavour to quiet it and so yet keep it backward, rather then by making a strong warre against it, to force it to new courses, and new defences. For to what other purpose serv'd their conspiracy, then to make them more lively, and to thinke upon new wayes, whereby in a farre shorter time they much inlarg'd their power? Among which, was the creation of a Dictatour, by which, new order they not onely overcame the dangers that hung over their heads, but it was an occasion to stop very many misischiefes, which without that remedy the commonwealth must needs have incurr'd.

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