The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

CHAP. VII.

The Authors reasons for the occurrences in the Battel.

Fabr.

WHat do you think now, have we not got the Victory very fortunately; but we would have had it with more advantage, had I been permitted to have put all things in execution. You see there is no necessity of making use either of the se∣cond or third order; because our Van was sufficient to overcome the Enemy; so that I am enclined to speak no farther upon this Subject, unless it be to resolve any doubt that may arise in your mind.

Luigi.

You have gain'd this Victory with so much courage and gallantry, that I fear my transport will not give me leave to explain my self, whether I have any scruple or not. Nevertheless presuming upon your quickness, I shall take the boldness to tell you what I think. First, therefore let me desire you to inform me, why you made use of your Artille∣ry but once? why you caused them to be drawn off into your Army, and made no men∣tion of them afterward? It seems to me that you placed the Enemies too high, and ordered them as you fancied; which might possibly be true; but if their Cannon should be so pla∣ced (as I do not question but many times they are) as that they should play among your Troops, I would fain understand what remedy you would prescribe; and since I have begun to speak of the Artillery, I shall propose all my scruples in this place, that I may have no occasion to mention them hereafter. I have heard many persons find fault with the Arms and orders of the ancients, as things of little or no use in our days, in respect of the fury of our Cannon; because they break all ranks, and pierce all Arms at such a rate, that it seems to them no less than madness to oppose any ranks or orders of men against them, and to tire your Souldiers with the carriage of Arms that will not be able to defend them.

Fabr.

Your demand consisting of many heads, requires a large answer. 'Tis true, I caused my Artillery to play but once, and I was in doubt whether they should do that; and the reason is, because it concerns a man more to keep himself from being hurt, than to mischief his Enemy. You must understand, that to provide against the fury of great Guns, it is necessary to keep where they cannot reach you, or to place your self behind some wall or bank that may shelter you, for there is nothing else that can secure you; and then you must be sure that either the one o•• the other are able to protect you. Those Generals who put themselves into a posture to give battel, cannot place their Armies behind a wall or a bank, or at a distance where the Enemies Cannon cannot reach them; and therefore seeing they have no way to defend themselves absolutely, the best course is to secure them∣selves as well as they can, and that is by possessing their Cannon with as much speed as is possible.

The way to possess themselves of it, is to march up to it suddenly, and in as wide an or∣der as is convehient; suddenly, that they may fire but once; and wide, that the execution may be the less. This is not to be done by a band of Souldiers in order; for if they march any thing wide, they disorder themselves; and if they run on in a huddle, it will be no hard matter for the Enemy to break them. And therefore I ordered my Battel so, that it might do both the one and the other; for having placed 1000 of the Velites in the wings, I commanded that as soon as our Artillery had fired, they should advance with the light Horse, to seize upon their Cannon; for which reason our Artillery was shot off but once, and that the Enemy might not have time to charge the second time, and fire upon us again; for we could not take so much time our selves, but they would have had as much to do the same; wherefore the reason why I fired not my Cannon the second time, was, that if the Enemy fired once, they might not have leisure to fire any more. To render therefore the Enemies Artillery unserviceable, the best remedy is to attack it with all possible speed; for if the Enemy deserts it, 'tis your own; if he undertakes to defend it, he must advance be∣fore it, and then being betwixt it and us. they cannot fire but upon their own men. I should think these reasons sufficient without farther examples; yet having plenty of them from the ancients, I will afford you some of them. Ventidius being to fight the Parthians, (whose strength consisted principally in their bows and arrows) was so subtil as to let them come up close to his Camp before he would draw out his Army, which he did, that he might charge them on a sudden, before they had leisure to shoot their arrows. Caesar tells us, that when he was in France, being to engage with the enemy, he was charged so brisk∣ly, and so suddenly by them, that his men had not time to deliver their darts according to the custom of the Romans. You see therefore that to frustrate a thing in the field which is to be discharged at a distance, and to prevent its doing you any hurt, there is no better way than to march up to it with all speed, and possess it if you can. Another reason mo∣ved me likewise to fire my Artillery no more, which may seem trivial to you; yet to me it is not so contemptible. There is nothing obstructs an Army, and puts it into greater con∣fusion than to take away, or hinder their sight; for several great Armies have been broken and defeated by having their sight obstructed either with the dust or the Sun: now there is nothing that causes greater obscurity, or is a greater impediment to the sight, than the smoke of Artillery; and therefore I think it more wisdom to let the Enemy be blind by himself, than for you to be blind too, and endeavour to find him. These things consi∣dered, I would either not fire my Artillery at all, or else (because that perhaps would not be approved, in respect of the reputation which those great Guns have obtained in the World) I would place them in the wings of my Army, that when they fire, the smoke might not fly in the faces of my front, which is the flower and hopes of my Army. And to prove that to trouble the sight of an Enemy, is a thing of more than ordinary advan∣tage; I need bring no more than the example of Epaminondas, who to blind the eyes of his Enemy, before he advanced to charge them, caused his light horse to gallop up and down before their front to raise the dust, and hinder their sight; which was done so ef∣fectually, that he got the Victory thereby. As to your opinion that I placed the Enemies Cannon, and directed their bullets as I pleased, causing them to pass over the heads of my Foot, I answer, that great Guns do without comparison oftner miss the Infantry, than hit them, because the Foot are so low, and the Artillery so hard to be pointed, that if they be placed never so little too high, they shoot over; and never so little too low, they graze, and never come near them. The inequality of the ground does likewise preserve the Foot very much; for every little hill or bank betwixt the Artillery and them, shelters them ex∣ceedingly. As to the Horse, especially the Men at arms, because their order is closer than the order of the light horse, and they are to keep firmer in a body, they are more obnoxious to the Cannon, and are therefore to be kept in the rear of the Army, till the Enemy has fir'd

〈…〉〈…〉 This is most certain, your small Field-pieces, and your small shot does more execution than your great pieces, against which the best remedy is to come to 〈◊〉〈◊〉-blows as soon as you can; and though in the first some men fell, (as be sure there always will); yet a good General and a good Army are not to consider a particular loss, so much as a General; but rather are to imitate the Swissers, who never refused a Battel for fear of great Guns, but punished them with capital punishment who for fear of them forsook their ranks, or gave any other sign or expression of fear. I caused my Artillery to be drawn off as soon as I had Fired them, that they might leave the Field clear for my Battalions to advance; and I made no mention of them afterwards, as being quite useless when the Armies were joyned. You have said likewise, that in respect of the violence and impetuosity of those Guns, many do judge the arms and the orders of the ancients to be altogether useless; and it seems by that, that the people of late have found out arms and orders which are sufficient to secure them: if you know any such thing, you will oblige me to impart it; for as yet I know none, nor can I believe that there is any to be found: So that I would know of them why the Infantry of our times do carry Corslets of Iron upon their breasts, and the horse are arm'd Cap a pied; for seeing they condemn the ancient way of arming as useless in respect of the Artillery, they may as well condemn what is practised now-a-days. I would understand likewise why the Swizzers, according to the custom of the ancients, make their Battalions to consist of six or eight thousand foot; and why other Nations have imitated them, seeing that order is exposed to the same danger (upon account of the Artillery) as others are. I think it cannot easily be answered, yet if you should propose it to Souldiers of any judgment and experience, they would tell you first, that they go so arm'd, because though their arms will not defend them against great Guns, yet they will secure them against small Shot, and Pikes, and Swords, and Stones, and all such things. They would tell you likewise, that they keep that close order like the Swisses, that they may more easily engage the Enemies Foot, that they may better sustain their Horse, and put fairer to break them.

So that we see Souldiers are afraid of many things besides Artillery, against which they are to provide by their arms, and their orders: from whence it follows, that the better an Army is 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and the closer and stronger it is drawn up, the safer it is. So that who∣•••••• 〈…〉〈…〉 opinion, is indiscreet, or inconsiderate: for if we see that a small part of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the ancients which is used at this day, (as the Pike) and a small part of their or∣•••••• (〈◊〉〈◊〉 are the Battalions of the Swissers) have been so serviceable, and contributed 〈…〉〈…〉 to our Armies, why may we not believe that the other Arms and orders which 〈…〉〈…〉, might have been as beneficial and useful? Again, had we no regard to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in placing our selves in that straight close order like the Swissers, what other or∣•••••• ••••uld make us more fearful? No order certainly can make us more fearful of the Ar∣tillery, than that which keeps men firm and close together. Besides, if I be not frighted by the Artillery of the enemy when I encamp before a Town, where they can fire upon me with more security, because I cannot come at them by reason of the wall, nor hinder them, bu••••by my own Cannon, which will be a business of time; if I be not afraid, (I say) whore they can multiply their Shot upon me as they please, why should I fear them in the Field where I can run upon them, and possess them immediately? So that I conclude Ar∣tillery, in my opinion, is no sufficient impediment why we should not use the methods of our ancestors, and practise their virtue and courage. And had I not discoursed formerly with you about this subject, I should have enlarged more; but I shall refer my self to what I said then.

Luigi.

We have heard (or at least it is our own faults if we have not) what you have discoursed about the Artillery; and that the best course that can be taken against it, is to make our selves masters of it with as much expedition as we can, if our Army be in the Field, and drawing up ready to engage. Upon which I have one scruple, because to me it seems possible that the Enemy may place his Artillery in the flanks of his Army, so as that it might offend you more, and yet be more capable of being defended. You have made (if you remember) in the ranging of your Army for a Battel, a space of four yards from Company to Company, and another space of twenty yards from the Battalia's to the Pikes extraordinary: if the Enemy should draw up his Army in your own way, and place his Cannon in those intervals, I believe from those places they might gaul you exceedingly, and with great difficulty, because you could not enter into the Enemies body to possess them.

Fabr.

Your scruple is rational, and I will endeavour to discuss it, or apply a remedy. I have told you that those Battalia's are in continual motion, either for a battel, or a march, and do naturally so straighten and close themselves, that if you make your intervals nar∣rower where you place your Artillery, they will be closed up in a short time, so as they will

not be able to do any execution. If you make your distances large, to avoid one danger, you incur a greater, by giving the Enemy opportunity not only to possess himself of your Cannon, but to rout your whole Army. But you must understand it is impossible to keep your Artillery among your Squadrons, especially those which are upon Carriages, because being drawn one way, and their mouths lying the other, it is necessary to turn them be∣fore you can fire upon the Enemy, and to turn them takes up so much space, that fifty of those Carriages are enough to disorder a whole Army. So that it is necessary the Artillery be placed without their Squadrons; and being so, they may be attacked, as is said before. But let us suppose it might be placed within the squadrons, and that a way might be found out of retaining it in the middle, and that it should not hinder the closing of their bodies, nor leave a way open to the Enemy. I say that even in that case the remedy is easie, and that is by making spaces and intervals in your Army for the bullets to pass; by which means the fury of their Artillery will become vain: and it will be no hard matter to do this, because the Enemy being desirous that it may be secure, will place it behind in the far∣thest part of the intervals, so that to prevent their shot from doing mischief among their own men, it is necessary that it pass always in a right line, so that by giving place on your side, it is easily avoided. For this is a general rule, we must give place to any thing that we are not able to resist, as the Ancients did to the Elephants, and forked Chariots. I believe, and am assured that you think I have ranged the Armies, and won the day; yet let me tell you, (if what I have told you already be insufficient) it would be impossible for an Army so armed and ordered, not to beat in the very first encounter any other Army that should be arm'd and ordered according to the method of our times; which many times affords but one front, without any bucklers, and so ill arm'd, that they are not able to defend them∣selves against any Enemy that is near them.

And for their way of drawing up, they do it in such manner, that if they place their Battalia's in the flank one of another, they make their Army too thin; if they place them behind one another, not having the way of receiving them into one another, they are all in confusion, and their ranks easily broken. And though they give three names to their Armies, and divide them into three Bodies, the Van-guard, Battaile, and Rear-guard, yet they serve only upon a march, and for distinction of quarters; but in a Fight they are all at the mercy of fortune, and one small charge defeats the whole Army.

Luigi.

I have observed by the description of the Battel, that your horse were repulsed by the Enemies Horse, and retired to your Pikes extraordinary, by whose assistance they not only sustained the enemy, but beat him back again. I believe as you say, the Pikes may keep off the Horse in a close and gross body like that of the Swizzers; but in your Army you have but five ranks of Pikes in the front, and seven in the flank, so that I cannot see how your Foot should be able to sustain them.

Fabr.

Though I told you formerly that in the Macedonian Phalanx six ranks of Pikes could charge at one time, yet you must understand, that if a Battalion of Swizzers should consist of a thousand ranks, there could charge at once not above four or five at the most; because their Pikes being nine yards long, a yard and an half is taken up betwixt their hands; so that in the first ranks they have free seven yards and an half. In the second rank (besides what is taken up betwixt their hands) a yard and half is consumed betwixt one rank and the other, so as there remains but six yards that can be used. In the third rank for the same reasons there remains but four yards and an half; in the fourth, three yards; and in the fift but one and an half. The other ranks therefore are not able to reach the Enemy, yet they serve to recruit the first ranks, as we have said before, and are as a rampart and bulwark to the other five. If then five of their ranks are sufficient to sustain the Ene∣mies horse, why may not five of ours do as much, having other ranks behind to reinforce them, and give them the same support, though their Pikes be not so long? And if the ranks of extraordinary Pikes which are placed in the flanks should be thought too thin; they may be put into a square, and disposed in the flank by the two Battalia's which I place in the last squadron of the Army, from whence they may with ease relieve both the front or the rear, and give assistance to the horse as occasion requires,

Luigi.

Would you always use this order when-ever you were to give the Enemy Battel.

Fabr.

No by no means; for the form of your Army is to be changed, according to the situation of the place, and the strength or number of the Enemy, as I shall shew by exam∣ple before I finish my discourse. But this form or model is recommended to you not as the best, (though in effect it is so) but as a rule from whence you may take your other orders, and by which you may understand the other ways of drawing up an Army; for every Science has its Generalities upon which it is most commonly founded. Only one thing I

would press upon you to remember, and that is, That you never draw your Army up so; as that your front cannot be relieved by your rear; for whoever is guilty of that error, renders the greatest part of his Army unserviceable, and can never overcome, if he meets with the least opposition and courage.

Luigi.

I have a new scruple that is risen in my mind. I have observed that in the dis∣posing of your Battalia's, you make your front of five Battalia's drawn up by the sides one of another; your middle of three, and your rear of two; and I should think it would have been better to have done quite contrary; because in my opinion an Army is broken with more difficulty, when the Enemy which charges it finds more firmness and resistance the further he enters it; whereas it seems to me, that according to your order, the farther he enters it, the weaker he finds it.

Fabr.

If you remembred how the Triarii (which were the third order of the Roman Legions) consisted only of 600 men, you would be better satisfied, when you understood they were placed always in the rear: for you would see that I, according to that example, have placed two Battalia's in the rear, which consist of 900 men; so that I choose rather in my imitation of the Romans to erre in taking more men than fewer. And though this example might be sufficient to content you, yet I shall give you the reason, and it is this: The front of the Army is made thick and solid, because it is that which is to endure the first shock and insult of the Enemy; and being not to receive any recruits from elsewhere, it is convenient that it be well man'd, for a few would leave it too weak, and the ranks too thin. But the second Squadron, being to receive its friends into it, before it is to en∣gage with the Enemy; it is necessary that it has two great intervals, and by consequence must consist of a less number than the first: For should it consist of a greater number, or be but equal to the first, either there must be no spaces or intervals at all, which would occasion disorder; or by leaving of spaces, they would exceed the proportion of the first Squadron, which would make your Army look very imperfect. As to what you say touching the impression of the Enemy, That the farther he enters your Army, the weaker he finds it, it is clearly a mistake; for the Enemy cannot engage the second body, before the first is fallen into it; so that he finds the middle Battalion rather stronger than weaker, being to fight both with the first and second together. And it is the same thing when the Enemy advances to the last Squadron; for there he has to encounter not only two fresh Bat∣talia's, but with all the Battalions united and entire: And because this last Battalion is to receive more men, it is necessary the distances be greater, and by consequence that their number be less.

Luigi.

I am very well satisfied with what you have said; but pray answer me this; If the five first Battalia's retire into the three Battalia's which are in the middle, and then those eight into the two Battalia's in the rear, I cannot conceive it possible that the eight Battalia's first, and afterwards the ten, can be comprehended (when eight or ten) in the same space as when they were but five.

Fabr.

The first thing I answer is this, That the space is not the same; for the five Batta∣lia's in the front were drawn up with four spaces in the middle, which were closed up when they fell in with the three Battalia's in the midst, or the two in the rear. Besides there re∣mains the space betwixt the Battalions, and that also which is betwixt the Battalia's and the Pikes extraordinary; which space altogether, do give them room enough.

To this it may be added, That the Battalia's take up another place when they are drawn up in order before their retreat, than they do after they are pressed; for in their retreat, they either contract or extend their Orders. They open their orders, when they fly: they contract them when they retreat; so that in this case it would be best to contract. Be∣sides the five ranks of Pikes in the Van, having received the first charge, are to fall back thorow the Battalia's into the rear of the Army, and give way to the Scudati or Shields to advance; and those Pikes falling into the rear of the Army, may be ready for any Service in which their Captain shall think fit to employ them; whereas, did they not retire after the Battel was joyned, they would be altogether useless. And by this means the spaces which were left to that purpose, are made big enough to receive all forces that are remain∣ing. And yet if those spaces were not sufficient, the flanks on both sides are men and not walls, which opening and enlarging their ranks, can make such distances as will be able to receive them.

Luigi.

The ranks of Pikes extraordinary which you place in the flank of your Army, when the Battalia's in the front fall back into the Battalia's in the middle, would you have them stand firm, and continue, as two wings to the Army, or would you have them retire with the Battalia's? If you were willing they should, I do not see how it was possible, having no Battalia's (with intervals) behind them to give them reception.

Fabr.

If when the Enemy forces the Battalia's to retire, he does not press them too hard, they may stand firm in their order, and flank the Enemy when the Battalia's in the front are retired. But if they be charged (as may be reasonably expected) and the Ene∣my be so strong as to force the other, they may retire with them, and that without diffi∣culty, though there be no Battalia's behind with spaces to receive them; for the Body in the midst may double to the right, and thrust one File into another, as we shall show more at large when we speak of the manner of doubling of Files. 'Tis true, to double in a retreat you must take another way than what I have described, for I told you the second Rank was to enter into the first, the fourth into the third, and so on: But here in this case we must not begin in the Front, but in the Rear, to the end that by doubling our Ranks we may retreat, and not advance.