The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

THE DISCOURSES OF Nicholas Machiavel, CITIZEN and SECRETARY OF FLORENCE, Upon The First Decade of LIVY TO ZANOBI BVONDELMONTI, AND COSIMO RVCELLAI.

LIBER II.

The Preface.

IT is the common practice of Mankind, to commend the ancient, and condemn the pre∣sent times; but in my judgment not always with reason; for so studiously are they de∣voted to things of antiquity, that they do not only admire what is transmitted by old Authors, but applaud and cry up when they are old, the passages and occurrences in their youth. But my opinion is, This their way of computation is many times false, and that upon several accompts. First, because of such very ancient things we can have no absolute knowledge; for most commonly in the Narrative of affairs, what is infamous, or ill done, is pretermitted in silence, whilst what is well done, and honourable, is related with all the Arts, and amplifications of Rhetorick; for so much are Historians accustomed to attribute to the fortune of the Conqueror, that to encrease his praise, they do not only exspatiate upon his Conduct, and Exploits, but they do likewise so magnifie and illustrate the very actions of the Enemy, That they who come after beholding things at a great di∣stance, have reason to admire those times, and those men, and by consequence to love them. Besides it being envy or fear which disposes people to hatred; neither of those passions ex∣tending to what cannot possibly hurt them, two great causes are wanting of finding fault with Antiquity; for as things so long passed cannot any way prejudice, so they cannot

provoke to envy or discontent: But present things which are obvious to our own sence, are universally known, and no circumstance that passes (whether good or bad) that can be totally conceal'd; from whence it proceeds, that observing with the excellence and vir∣tue of our present affairs, whatever is concomitant of imprudence or vice, we are in a man∣ner compelled to postpone them to things of antiquity, where the good only is displayed, and the bad passed by, though perhaps the present things are more worthily glorious. I do not intend any thing hereby of the Arts and Sciences of our predecessors, so highly im∣proved and illustrated, that 'tis not in the power of time either to add any thing, or sub∣stract. I only speak of the manners and civil conversations of men; in which indeed we have not so many virtuous examples, as were to be found among our Ancestors: So that it is not altogether unjustly if antiquity be prefer'd; yet are not our present transactions to be always condemn'd as worse than the former, as if antiquity had no errors at all. Hu∣mane affairs are in perpetual fluctuation, and have their times of decrease, as well as ad∣vancement. A City or Province founded by some excellent person upon good Principles and Laws, not only stands, but flourishes and increases a long time in honour, authority, and wealth; and those persons whose happiness it is to be born under those governments whilst they are glorious, and powerful, are apt to prefer their old Customs, to the disparage∣ment of the new; yet they are in an error, and for the reasons abovesaid. But those who are born when the State is in its declension, do not so much transgress when they commend what is pass'd, and decry what is present; which things (having seriously considered with my self) I conceive to be caused, because the world has been always the same, and made up promiscuously of good things and bad; yet these good and bad things have varied some∣times, and as it were transmigrated from one City, and one Province to another; so that in those places where virtue has been a long time predominant, vice has stoln in by degrees, and supplanted it; which is evident by the revolutions of Kingdoms and Empires, where virtue and justice has had its time, and been transfused afterwards into other Countries. However the world was the same, though its virtue and magnanimity was unstable, remo∣ving and shifting from the Assyrians first, to the Medes, from the Medes to the Persians, and from them to the Romans; and if after the Roman Empire, there has been no go∣vernment so great as to comprehend and ingross the virtue of the whole world; yet the same virtue that was of old among the Romans is not extinct, but dispersed and branched out into several Kingdoms and Provinces, as the Kingdom of France, the Kingdom of the Turks, the Kingdom of the Soldan, the Empire of the Germans, and the Sect of the Sa∣racins, which conquered so many Provinces, and committed such devastations, as were the ruine of the Empire of the East. In these Kingdoms rent and divided from the Empire of the Romans, the old Roman virtue is diffused, and retains still something of its pristine lustre, so that it may without injustice be admired in some places: Which being so, he who is born in those Provinces where the Roman virtue and discipline is still in being (but declining) if he applauds his old Country-men, and blames his Contemporaries, his error is not great: But he that is born in Italy, and is not in his heart a Tramontan, or in Greece, and is not a Turk, must needs bewail his own times, and cry up his Predecessors, in which he will find many things well worthy his admiration; whereas in these there is nothing but wickedness and obloquy, no Religion, no Laws, no Discipline, but all things impure and brutish, and they are the more detestable and deplorable, by how much the same persons who would be imitated, and are set aloft to command all, and correct those that are vitious, are most dissolute, and most vitious themselves.

But to return to our discourse, I say, That though humane judgment is frail, and may be mistaken in its Character of such things as by reason of their antiquity, cannot fall so perfectly under ones Cognizance; yet that will not excuse old men for preferring the tran∣sactions in their youth, because both the one and the other were equally liable to their knowledge; nor would they be of that opinion, if men had the same sentiment and appe∣tite as long as they lived; but our affection altering, and our rational Soul being otherwise disposed than formerly, we judge otherwise of things, though the times be the same; for how is it possible the same things should please in our youth and old age, when their Stu∣dies, and delights are so different and remote? For (to say no more) as the quickness and vigour of the body decreases in old men, so their judgment and prudence increase propor∣tionably; and thence it follows that the same things which seemed tolerable in their youth grow insupportable when they are old; so that the fault is more in their judgment, than the age, for supposing those things to be good, which, being wiser, by experience, they find to be otherwise. To which it may be added, that the desires of mankind are immense, and unsatiable; that naturally we are covetous of every thing, whereas fortune allows us but little; That from thence it happens that no ••an is contented, every man despises what he

is already possessed of, commends what is passed, condemns what is present, and longs for what is to come, though induced by no reasonable occasion. Things being thus, I cannot resolve my self whether ever I may not be of that number, who in these my discourses have so highly magnified the old times and exploits of the Romans, to the diminution of our own: and truly, were not the vertue of that age as clear as the Sun, and the wicked∣ness of ours as manifest as that, I should have been more moderate, and feared to have run into the same error which I have condemned in other people.

But things being so evident, I may with boldness deliver my opinion of both times, to the end that the minds of such young persons, as shall peruse my conceptions, may be ad∣monished to avoid those vices which are so prevalent now, and prepared to imitate the vir∣tue of our Ancestors, when-ever occasion shall be offered. For it is the office of a good man to recommend that to other people which he thinks for the interest and honour of his Country, though perhaps the adversity of his fortune, and the malignity of the times will not suffer him to practise it himself; that by his instructions so many, at least some one may be so fortunate as to be able to follow him.

Wherefore having in may first Book done with what I proposed about the original in∣stitution of Government, and what was in my judgment necessary to preserve them: I shall now in this second, discourse of what the Romans did abroad for the inlargement and augmentation of their Empire.

CHAP. I.

Whether the vertue or fortune of the Romans was the occasion of the greatness of their Empire.

MAny have thought, and Plutarch (a grave Author) among the rest, that the people of Rome where more beholding to their fortune than virtue, in the acquisition of their Empire; and among other reasons, he infers it from their own silent confession, in having erected more Temples to Fortune than to any of their Gods. Livy seems to be likewise of the same opinion; for he seldom introduces a Roman speaking any thing of virtue, but immediately it is followed with fortune, with which nevertheless I can by no means comply, nor believe it will hold water; for though no Commonwealth be to be found that has made such progress as the Roman, why should it be rather imputed to their good Fortune than the solid constitution of their Laws? the courage of their Armies, and the excellent conduct of their Emperors, extended their Empire; and then their own just measures, and the wise institutions of their first Legislator preserved what they got, as we shall hereafter more largely discover. it is objected, that the Romans were never at one time involved in two considerable wars, (which is imputed rather to their fortune than wisdom) for they had no quarrel with the Latins till they had subdued the Samnites, and were forced to make war in their defence; they had no controversie with the Tuscans till they had beaten the Latins, and with their frequent victories almost extinguished the Sa∣bines, whereas if two of these States had confederated, and joyned their powerful Armies against them, no doubt but the affairs of the Romans would have been in very great dan∣ger. But be it as it will, this is most certain, they never had two great wars upon their hands at a time; but they began one when they ended the other, or the end of the first was the beginning of the second; and this may be observed in the series of their wars, for (to pass by their quarrels before Rome was taken by the French) whilst the Aequi and Volsci were powerful and strong, they had no enemies but they; when they were conquer∣ed, their war broke out with the Samnites; and though before that was perfectly conclu∣ded, the Latins rebelled; yet before it could be brought to a war, the Samnites had made their peace, and joyned their Army with the Romans, to reduce the Latini. That war be∣ing finished, the war with the Samnites revived, and was the occasion of much mischief to the Samnites; after which, the Romans began with the Tuscans, and that being composed, the Samnites broke out again upon the passage of Pyrrhus into Italy, who being repulsed in∣to Greece, they had opportunity for their wars with the Carthaginians, and their first war with that State was no sooner determined, but the French, and the inhabitants on this and the other side of the Alps conspired so effectually against them, that betwixt Popolonia and Pisa (where the Tower of St. Vincent is at this day to be seen) the confederates were routed with a very great slaughter.

This war being concluded, for twenty years together they had no considerable war, for they had no body to fight with but the Ligures, and the resicts of those French who were remaining in Lombardy. In this posture they continued till the second Punick war, which lasted 16 years, and perplexed them exceedingly. That war being ended with a great deal of honour, their next enterprize was against the Macedonians; after which their war hap∣pened with Antiochus in Asia, and when he was overcome, there was not a Prince or State in the whole World, which by it self, or conjunction with the rest, was able to contend with the Romans. But before this last victory, who-ever considers the method of their wars, and their manner of proceeding, shall find great virtue and wisdom intermixed with their good fortune, so that the reason of their good fortune is easily discovered; for this is most certain, when a Prince or Commonwealth arrives at that height of reputation that no neighbour-Prince or people dares venture to invade him, (unless compelled by in∣dispensible necessity) he may do what he pleases, 'tis in his Election with whom he will make war, and with whom he will be at peace; for his neighbours being afraid of his power, are glad to be his friends; and those Potentates who are farthest off, and have no commerce with them, look on as unconcern'd, as if the consequence could have no re∣flexion on them; and in this error they do many times continue till the calamities be brought home to their own dores; and then, when 'tis too late, they have nothing but their own private force to oppose, which is too weak when the enemy is grown so strong. I will not enlarge upon the Samnites, nor recount how they stood still, and look'd on, while the Romans conquered the Aequi and the Volsci; but to avoid prolixity, I shall pass to the Carthaginians, who were of great power and authority when the Romans were at war both with the Somnites and Tuscans; they had the command of all Africk, and were supreme in Sicily, Sardinia, and great part of Spain. Blinded with their power, and (as they thought) secure in their distance, it never, came into their heads to invade them at that time, or to give any assistance to the Samnites or Tuscans; but (according to the practice of the World with things that are new, and encreasing) they rather sided with them, and desired their friendship, not so much as perceiving their error, till the Romans had conquered all the intermediate States, and began to contend with them for the Em∣pire of Sicily and Spain. And what hapned to the Carthaginians, hapned likewise to the French, to Philip of Macedon, and to Antiochus; each of them believing (whilst the Ro∣mans were employed in their wars with other people) that they would either be overcome, or that they themselves should have time enough to make peace or war with them, as they saw it most for their advantage: so that considering what is good, I am of opinion that the same fortune and prosperity may be expected by any Prince or State which exercises the same virtue and industry as the Romans have done before them. And here we might very properly discourse of the Roman method in the invasion of other Provinces, but we have done that at large in our Treatise called the Prince; yet this I shall say in short, that the Romans made always sure of some friend or other in the Provinces against which they design'd, that might be a means to admit them, and gave them enterance, and help after∣wards to keep what they had been instrumental in getting. So by intelligence with the Capuans they invaded Samnium; by the help of the Camertines they got into Tuscany; by the Mamertines into Sicily; by the Saguntines into Spain; Massinissa gave them enterance into Africk, the Etoli into Greece, Eumenes and other Princes into Asia, and the Massilien∣ses and Hedai into France; and as by their correspondence they conquered most of those Countries, so by their interest they preserved them; which way, if diligently observed by other people, it will be found that their prosperity depended less upon fortune than those States who observed not that course: but to illustrate what we have said, and make it so plain and perspicuous that every one may see how much more their virtue than their for∣tune contributed to their Empire; in our next Chapter we will consider what those peo∣ple were whom the Romans subdued, and with what obstinacy they defended their li∣berty.

CHAP. II.

With what Nations the Romans contended, and with what obstinancy those Nations resisted.

NOthing made it so difficult for the Romans to conquer their Neighbours, and some other remoter Provinces, as the love which the people of those times did bear to their liberty: for in defence of that, they were so indefatigably studious, that nothing but singular and extraordinary virtue could have subdued them: and this is demonstrable by the many and great dangers to which they exposed themselves, sometimes to preserve, and sometimes to recover it; as also by the severity of their revenge upon those who had usurp'd it. 'Tis evident likewise in History what detriment the People and Cities have suffered whilst they were in servitude and subjection; and whereas now a-days there is but one Province which can boast of free Cities, in ancient times there was not one Province but had plenty. In Italy from the Alps (which divide Tuscany and Lombardy) to the ex∣tremest part of that Country, there were many free States; as the Tuscans, the Romans, the Samnites, and others; nor is there mention of any King (but what reigned in Rome) besides Porsena King of Tuscany, the extinction of whose Line, though not set down in History, yet it is manifest that Tuscany was free at the time when the Romans encamped before Veii; so well satisfied with their liberty, and so abhorring from the very name of a King, that the Veientes having for their better defence created one in their own Town, and sent to the Tuscans to implore their assistance against the Romans, after a grave and solemn debate, it was resolved, no assistance should be sent whilst they were under the dominion of a King; as thinking it unfit to engage in the defence of a Country that had betraid it self, and prostituted to the dominion of a single person. Nor is this universal af∣fection to liberty so wonderful in the people.

Experience tells us, that no Cities have augmented their Revenues, or enlarged their Territories, but whilst they were free and at liberty: and certainly 'tis a prodigious thing to consider to what height and grandeur in an hundred years time the City of Athens ar∣rived, after it had freed it self from the tyranny of Pisistrates; but much more to consider the greatness of Rome upon the expulsion of her Kings; and the reason of all is, because in Common-wealths private wealth and emolument is not so much aim'd at as the im∣provement of the publick; nor is there any where so much care of the publick as in free States, where what-ever is equitable, and for the common advantage, is decreed and execu∣ted, without respect to particular persons, who may perhaps be sufferers thereby; whereas in Cities that are governed by a Prince it falls out quite contrary; for there, what makes commonly for the advantage of the Prince, is prejudice to the publick: so that when a free-State degenerates into a Tyranny, the least mischief that it can expect, is, to make no further advancement in its Empire; and no farther encrease either in riches or power; but for the most part it goes backward, and declines: and if it should so happen that the Tyrant should be a virtuous man, and one who by his courage and military discipline should enlarge his Dominions; yet what-ever he took would be converted to his own private use, without any benefit to the publick. For he dares not advance any of those Citizens (how worthy and honest soever) left he should have occasion to suspect them afterwards. Nor can he make those Cities which he subdues, dependant or tributary to that where he is absolute; for 'tis not the interest of a Tyrant to make his Subjects powerful or united; but to keep them low, and divided, that every Town, every Province may depend wholly upon himself; so that the Conquests of an Usurper may turn to his own profit, but never to the publick; to which purpose many things are very handsomely written by Xenophon in his Treatise of Tyranny; and things being thus, no body is to admire if our Ancestors had so great a zeal for their liberty; and the very name of a Tyrant was so odious to them, that when long since news was brought to the Army of the assassination of Hieronymo the Nephew of Hiero of Syracuse, and the whole Camp was in an uproar against the Conspira∣tors; yet when it was told them that they had proclaimed Liberty, and a free Government, they laid by their indignation against the Tyrannicids, and being pacified with the very name of Liberty, fell into consultation how it was to be preserved. Nor is it to be won∣dred at then, if their revenge be so violent and extraordinary upon those who would violate it; of which, though there be many examples, I shall instance only in one, but that most remarkable and horrid; and hapning in Corcirca a City in Greece: for all Greece be∣ing divided, and consisting of two Factions, one of them under the protection of the Athe∣nians,

and the other of the Spartans; and in Corcirca the Nobility prevailing, and ha∣ving usurped upon the liberty of the people, it hapned that the people being reinforced by the assistance of the Athenians, overpowred the Nobility, and conquered them again. Ha∣ving restored their liberty, and shaked off their servitude, they clap'd up all the Nobility in a large prison, and bringing them forth by ten at a time, as if they were to be banished, they put them to death with most exquisite torments; which severity coming by degrees to the ears of the remainder, they resolved to do what was possible to defend themselves against it, upon which they stood upon their guard, and would suffer none of the Officers to come in; whereupon, in a great fury, the people ran thither, pull'd off the covering of the house where they were, and throwing down the walls, buried them all in the ruines: and of this sort of cruelty there were many other examples in that Province; for the people are usually more impetuous in revenging the loss of their Liberty, than in defen∣ding it.

But it may (not unfitly) be admir'd in this place what should be the cause that the anci∣ents should be more zealous for publick liberty than we in our days: if my opinion may pass, I think it is for the same reason, that in those times men were more robust, and stron∣ger than now; which proceedeth much from the diversity betwixt their Education, their Religion and ours: for whereas our Religion gives us a just prospect and contemplation of things, and teaches us to despise the magnificence and pomp of the World; the Ethnicks valued them so highly, and believing them their chiefest happiness, it made them more fierce and busie to defend them, and this may be collected from several of their customs; for if the sacrifices in their days be compared with the sacrifices in ours, theirs will be found magnificent and horrid; ours delicate and neat, but neither so magnificent nor cruel. They wanted not pomp nor formality in those ceremonies, and yet to make them the more venerable and solemn, they added blood and slaughter to them, offering up infinite numbers of beasts, which being slain before the people, made them more hard-hearted and cruel. Moreover the Religion of the Gentiles did not place their beatitude any where but upon such as were full of worldly glory, and had done some great action for the benefit of their Country. In our Religion the meek and humble, and such as devote themselves to the contemplation of divine things, are esteemed more happy than the greatest Tyrant, and the greatest Conquerer upon Earth; and the summum bonum, which the others placed in the greatness of the mind, the strength of the body, and what-ever else contributed to make men active, we have determined to consist in humility, abjection, and contempt of the World; and if our Religion requires any fortitude, it is rather to enable us to suffer than to act. So that it seems to me, this way of living, so contrary to the ancients; has rendred the Christians more weak and effeminate; and left them as a prey to those who are more wicked, and may order them as they please, the most part of them thinking more of Paradise than Preferment, and of enduring than revenging of injuries; as if Heaven was to be won rather by idleness than arms: but that explication of our Religion is erro∣neous, and they who made it were poor and pusillanimous, and more given to their case than any thing that was great: for if the Christian Religion allows us to defend and exalt our Country, it allows us certainly to love it, and honour it, and prepare our selves so as we may be able to defend it. But that lazy and unactive way of education, and interpreting things falsly has been the cause that there are not so many Commonwealths as formerly in the World, nor so many Lovers and Champions for their Liberty: and yet I believe the greatness of the Roman Empire contributed something, by reducing all the free States and Republicks under their Dominion.

Nevertheless when that great Empire was broken and dissolved, very few of those poor States could recover their liberty: but when it began first to encrease and extend it self, no Country was without them, and where-ever the Romans carried their Arms, they found little Commonwealths banding and confederating against them, and defending their li∣berties with all imaginable constancy; which shews that the Romans were a people of more than ordinary courage, or they could never have subdued them. The Samnites alone will be example sufficient, who (as Livy reports) were so powerful, and so hearty defenders of their liberty, that for 46 years together they maintained War with the Romans; and though they had received many losses, and such devastations had been committed in their Country, yet they could never be wholly reduc'd before the Consulship of Papyrius Cursor, the Son of the first Papyrius. But 'tis a spectacle worthy of any mans pity, to see a Country so full (formerly) of brave Cities, and brave men, and all of them free; now desolate and uninhabited, and scarce any body left; to which condition it could have never been re∣duced but by the discipline, and diligence, and courage of the Romans: but all this pro∣ceeded from diversity of Constitution, for all Cities and free States whatsoever, encrease not

only in riches and authority, but in the numbers of their men: for who is it that had not rather procreate and have children where he may marry and enrich himself freely, than where there is danger that what he gets painfully, and lays up carefully for his children, may be ravished from them by a Tyrant.

In a free State you may be sure your children shall be no slaves, and that if they behave themselves virtuously, they shall be sure of preferment, and perhaps come to be Princes; riches encrease there faster, and that not only by tillage and agriculture, but by traffick and arts; and people do naturally throng to those places where they may get what they law∣fully can, and keep securely what they have got. The quite contrary happens in Coun∣tries that are servile, and their condition is worse, as their servitude is greater: but there is no servitude so severe as to depend upon a Commonwealth, and that for two reasons; first because it is more durable, and less hopes of recovering their liberty; and secondly, because it is the practise of all Commonwealths to impoverish and weaken what-ever they conquer, to fortifie themselves; which with Princes is not the way, unless they be very bar∣barous indeed, and like the Eastern Princes, who not only ruine whole Countries, but destroy all human conversation: but where Princes are well instituted, they know better things, and do many times indulge their new Conquests as much as their own Territories, leaving them the exercise of their Arts, and the enjoyment of their Laws; so that though they cannot encrease their wealth as where they are free; yet they are not so subject to be ruined as where they are slaves: I speak now of servitude to a foreign Prince, for the usurpation of a Citizen I have spoken before. All which being considered, no wonder if the Samnites whilst they enjoyed their liberty were so couragious and strong, and when it was once lost grew so abject and contemptible. Titus Livius tells us in his History of the Punick War, that the Samnites were so overlaid and cowed by one single Legion of the Romans at Nola, that they sent Embassadors to Hanibal to beg his assistance, and that the said Am∣bassadors in their Oration to Hanibal, the better to move his compassion, had this expres∣sion, We are the People who for an hundred years together waged War with the Romans with our own private Forces, and bore up many times against two Armies and two Consuls at once; but now our misery is so great, and our spirits so low, we are unable to defend our selves against one pitiful Legion.

CHAP. III.

It contributed much to the grandeur of the City of Rome, that they ruined the neighbouring Cities, and admitted strangers to their own dignities and priviledges.

CRescit interea Roma, Albae ruinis; The ruine of Alba was the rise of the Romans. 'Twas the saying of Livy, and 'tis true; for who-ever would make any City great, and apt for dominion, must endeavour with all industry to throng it with inhabitants, otherwise it will be impossible to bring it to any great perfection. And this is done two ways, by love and by force: the first by giving passage and security to all persons that will come and in∣habit there, that every man shall be free; the second by destroying the neighbour Cities, and forcing the people to come and dwell in yours. The Romans observed both ways, and grew so numerous upon it, that in the time of their sixth King they had 80000 men in the Town able to bear Arms, proceeding in some respects like the Country-man, who to make his plant larger, and more fruitful, cuts off its first shoots, that the juyce and virtue which otherwise would dilate into the branches, being kept close to the trunk, might break out with more vigor afterwards, and make it more beautiful and fertile. And that this way is necessary for the propagation of the strength and authority of a City, appears by the example of Athens and Sparta, which Cities, though they were both free, numerous in Men, and happy in their Laws; yet they could never arrive at the grandeur of the Ro∣mans, though Rome seemed more tumultuous, and not so well governed as they, and all for the reason abovesaid: for Rome having by both those ways encreased the number of their Citizens, was able to set out an Army at one time of 280000 men, whereas Sparta and Athens could never exceed 20000. which is not to be attributed to the excellence of the situation of Rome; but to the diversity of their Conduct; for Lycurgus the Founder of the Spartan Commonwealth, conceiving nothing could be more pernitious to it, nor more easily abro∣gate his Laws, than intermixing with new inhabitants, he provided with all possible in∣dustry that his Citizens should have no commerce or conversation with strangers. To

that end he not only prohibited the admission of foreigners, and their marrying with them, but that there might be no encouragement or occasion of entercourse betwixt them, he put out a certain Mony of Leather, so pitifully inconsiderable, that he presumed no Mer∣chants would trouble themselves to import any foreign Commodities for it; by which means that City was never in a capacity of being very populous: And because all human affairs do hold some proportion and analogy with Nature; and it is impossible that a slen∣der trunk, should bear vast and ponderous branches, it is not to be expected that a small Commonwealth consisting of a small number of Citizens, should subdue, or at least keep and maintain greater and more populous States than themselves; and if it should happen that they should conquer them at any time, upon every slight accident they would be sub∣ject to lose them, like the tree it would be too weak for its boughs, and every puff of wind apt to blow it down. And thus it fell out with Sparta, though it had conquered all Greece, made it self absolute thorow that whole Province; yet Thebes no sooner rebelled, but all the rest of the Cities revolted, and having lost its great Empire in a moment, it remained like a Tree destitute of its Branches. But with Rome it was otherwise, its Root and Trunk was strong enough to support its Branches how heavy and spacious soever; and this was the great cause of the greatness of the Roman Empire, which Livy expressed in two words, when he said, Crescit interea Roma, Alvae ruinis.

CHAP. IV.

There are three ways which Commonwealths have taken to enlarge their Territories.

HE who has read and observed the History of our Ancestors must find, That Common∣wealths had generally three ways of enlarging their Empire. One is that which was observed of the Tuscans of old, who entred into a League of Confederacy with several other Commonwealths, with condition of Equality, that no particular should have any degree or authority above the rest, and that comprehension should be left for all their new Conquests to come in, not much unlike the practice of the Swizzers in our times, and the Achaians, and Aetolians of old. And because the Romans had in those times much controversie with the Tuscans and their Confederates, I shall enlarge my self something in the explanation of their affairs, of which, though there be but little Monu∣ment in History, yet we are assured, that before the greatness of the Romans, the Tuscans were very powerful both by Sea, and by Land; of which power it is no small argument, their sending a Colony into the Mare superum to a place called Adria, which grew so con∣siderable and famous, that it denominated that whole Sea, and it has been called the Mare Adriaticum ever since. It is known likewise that their Empire extended from the Tyber to the foot of the Alps, which comprehends the greatest part of Italy at this day; though 200 years before the Romans came to any considerable strength, the Tuscans received a great defeat by the Gauls; who under the Command of Bollovesus, either in quest of new quar∣ters, or tempted by the pleasantness of the Country, having passed the Alps, possessed themselves of that Province called Lombardy, and gave it the name of Gallia Cisalpina; after which they turn'd out the Natives, settled themselves there, and built several Cities, which they enjoyed, till in process of time, they also were supplanted by the Romans. And this was the method of the Tuscans proceeding, and the manner of their confederating with their Neighbours, which was no less than XII Cities; of which Clusium, Veii, Fe∣sulae, Aretium, and Volterra were the chief; but yet with all their assistance they could not exceed the limits of Italy, nor indeed conquer all that, for reasons which we shall mention hereafter. Another way of extending your Empire, is by associating with several Cities, but so as that the dignity of the Command, the seat of the Empire, and the honour of the Enterprize may remain with you; which was the way observed by the Romans. The third is the way of the Spartans and Athenians, who entertained no Confederates, but what ever Territories they Conquered, they annexed them to their own: which way is undoubt∣edly the worst of the three, as appeared by the two said Republicks, who were ruined upon no other account, but because they had grasped more Dominion than they were able to hold. For it is a thing in it self very arduous and difficult, to keep a City in subjection by a con∣tinued force, especially if ever it was free; wherefore unless your Citizens be very nume∣rous, and your associates very considerable, by whose assistance you may be able to keep what you conquer, it will never be in your power to enlarge your dominion very much,

and the Spartans and Athenians miscarrying in their way, miscarried likewise in their end, and all their great conquest came to nothing: The Romans took the second way, and succeeded to that vast and extraordinary power, by associating equally in many things, with many States, but reserving always to themselves the Seat of the Empire, and the chief command in their Wars, by which means it came to pass, that their Confederates (ere they were aware) subjected themselves to the Romans, at the expence of their own labour, and blood. For after they had carried their Arms out of Italy; reduced several Kingdoms into Provinces, and the Inhabitants being accustomed to live in subjection, without much diffi∣culty submitted, the Romans bearing the name of the War, and the Nations that were con∣quered knowing nothing of their Allies, submitted to their dominion, and would own no body else: whereby it happen'd that their associates in Italy being over-powred by the multitude of provinces which had submitted to the Romans, and by the strength and popu∣lousness of Rome, began to find their error by degrees, but too late, and when they had no way left to defend themselves; for if any of them conspired, they were quickly sup∣pressed, and made Subjects of Associates. This way of administration, and enlarging their Empire was peculiar to the Romans; no other people observed it, and certainly no bet••er is to be found. The next way of confederating (which was practised by the Tus∣cans, Achaians, and Aetolians in old time, and by the Swizzers of late) is the best way next to that of the Romans; for though it cannot arrive at any great Empire, the Confede∣racy consisting of so many free Cities, which being all to be consulted, makes their resolu∣tions very tedious, besides, the Citizens are not so vigorous in a War, where the prize is to be divided into so many parts; yet for these reasons it has two advantages of the third. First, whatever it gains, it keeps a long time, and loses very hardly; and secondly, it engages not so rashly in War, but enjoys with more ease and felicity the blessings of peace: for they are longer in their consultations and debates, where there is to be a general Dyet and Convention, than where things are to be dispatched within the Walls of one City, Be∣sides experience tells us that this way has certain bounds, which have not been exceeded by any example we can find. For after XII or XIV Cities have confederated, they admit no more into the League, as holding themselves enough, and sufficient for their defence, nor are they much solicitous of extending their Empire, because they are under no necessity of making themselves stronger; and their conquest would be of little advantage to every par∣ticular State, for they would be forced upon one of these two rocks, either to incorporate them into their League, and then the multitude would breed confusion, or make them their Subjects which they will hardly continue: When therefore they are got to such a number in their association, as that they seem safe against foreign invasion, and strong enough to defend themselves; They take one of these two ways, either they receive their Neighbour States or Cities into their protection (by which means they draw vast sums of Mony sometimes, that are easily distributed) or else they ••ight for other people, and receive pay from this or that Prince, as the Swizzers do now, and other Nations have done of old. To this purpose Titus Livius gives us an account That at a conference betwixt Phi∣lip of Macedon and Titus Quintus Flaminius, an Aetolian Praetor being present, there happening some words betwixt the said Praetor and King Philip, King Philip reproached him by the avarice, and inconstancy of his Country, as a people that were not ashamed to take pay on one side, and send supplies to the other, by which means it was frequently seen that in both Armies the Aetolian Colours were displayed; from whence we may con∣clude that this way of proceeding by League and Confederacies, has been always the same, and has had the same effects. The third way of subjecting your conquests and annexing them to your own dominions, is very incommodious, and instable; and if it were so to a Commonwealth well constituted and armed, it must needs be much worse to a Government that is weak, as most of the Italian States are at this day; but the Roman way is the best, and most to be admired; for there is no example of any body that made use of it before them, nor has any body imitated them since; and as to the practice of the Tuscans, and Aetolians in their Confederations, there is no body follows it now a days, but the Swizzers, and the Suevians: Which being so, and so many brave things performed by the people of Rome as well for the conservation, as the augmentation of their Empire, it is not strange our affairs succeeded no better, and that we have been a prey to whoever would invade us; for (to say nothing of the rest) it has doubtless becom'd the Tuscans if they could not have imitated the Roman Discipline, nor followed their measures in extend∣ing their Empire, at least to have follow'd the example of their own Ancestors, who though they brought not their Empire to that Grandeur and immensity as the Romans; yet they enlarged it as far as they thought good, and as far as consisted with the Nature of their Government; and by doing so, they kept it a long time, with immortal honour to

their memory, till they were first shaken by the Gauls, and afterwards so totally ruined by the Romans, that there is scarce the lest token left, that there was ever any such thing; which having brought it into my mind to consider what may be the causes of this oblivion of things, I shall discourse of them in the following Chapter.

CHAP. V.

The variation of Religions and Languages, with the accidents of Deluges and Plagues have been the cause that many great things have been forgotten.

IN my judgment it may be objected to those Philosophers who hold the world to be Eternal, that if so long a course of antiquity was true, it would be but reasonable that the memory of some of their affairs should have lasted above five thousand years: yet there may be some reasons given for that oblivion of things, and they seem twofold, partly from the Nature of Man, and partly from the influence of the Heavens; the me∣mory of great things are abolished from the nature of Man, by the variation of their Reli∣gion, or Language; for when a new Religion is introduced, the first care of him that would propagate it, is to explode, and extinguish whatever was memorable in the old, to give the greater credit to his new innovation; and if it fall out that the introducers of this new Sect, be of a different language, all goes to wreck, and whatever was before, is easily forgotten. And that this is so, appears by the institution of the Christian Religion, whose first establishers did principally intend the cancelling and extirpation of all old Ethnick Customs, Ceremonies, and Theology; and if there remained any memory of their affairs, it was because there was no new language introduced with it, the Christians being constrain'd to explain themselves in Latine; whereas could they have done it in a new tongue (considering their other persecutions) we may conclude there would have been no memory left of their Religion or Worship: For so diligent and zealous was Saint Gregory, and other Moderators of the Christian Religion, in abolishing the superstitions of the Gentiles, that they caused the works of all the Poets and Historians to be burn'd, which made any mention of them; they threw down their Images and Idols, and destroy'd all that might afford the least memory of Paganism; to which diligence of theirs, if a new language had been added, in a short time all would have been utterly forgotton; what therefore was done by the Christians for the extirpation of Gentilism, it is not improbable but the Gentiles might have done of old for the extirpation of the Religion before. And because in five or six thousand years, Religion may be twice or thrice changed, no wonder if what was before be so entirely lost, that if there remains any thing of it, it is looked upon as fabulous and incredible, as it hapned to the Histories of Diodorus Siculus, which gives an account of 40 or 50000 years, and are not unworthily accounted false. As to the Coelestial causes from the influence of the Heavens, they are such as destroy mankind in general, or reduce it to a very small number, as great Mortalities, Famines, and inunda∣tions of Water, but especially the last, because the mischief is more universal, and if any be saved, it is only the Mountaneers, which being commonly barbarous, have no know∣ledge of antiquity, and by consequence can convey nothing of it to their posterity; and if it so happens that among them which are preserved, some one man may be more learned than ordinary, and have some knowledge of affairs, to give himself a name and reputation afterwards, he conceals, preverts, and transmits them as he pleases; so that there remains to posterity no more than he thought fit to communicate. Nor do I believe it is doubted but these accidents happen, and Famine, and Pestilence do sometimes rage in the world, seeing all Histories mention them, and this oblivion of things is a certain effect of them: Nor is it unreasonable to think that the great Universe has its way of evacuation, as well as the Microcosm; for as in that, when the humours are redundant, and the body unable to digest them, Nature exerts, and finds out some way to throw them off, without which the person must certainly miscarry; so it is in the other, when all Countries are repleat, and no room left for those that are to come; when the Cunning and Malignity of man∣kind is at the height, there is a necessity the world should be purged by some of those three ways, that men being reduced in their numbers, and humbled under the considera∣tion of their Mortality, may (if possible) become better: which being so, no wonder if the Tuscans formerly so famous for their administration both in War and in Peace, so eminent for their Courage, and so venerable for their Religion, should be oppressed by the Romans, and so totally abolished, that (as is said before) there remains nothing of them but the name.

CHAP. VI.

How the Romans proceeded in making of War.

WE have already discoursed of the way of the Romans in extending their Empire; we shall now speak of their Customs in the management of their Wars, by which it will appear with what wisdom they deviated from the common ways of the world, and by what easie methods they arrived at that Supremacy and Grandeur. He who makes War at his own choice (and is under no constraint) or else by ambition, has doubtless this end; To get what he is able, and to keep it whilst he can, and rather to enrich than impo∣verish his own Country: for such a one it is necessary to have regard to his charge, and to see that neither the conquering nor maintaining are more expensive to him, than will con∣sist with his revenue. This the Romans observed very strictly, by coming strong and sud∣denly into the field; for by that one practice, all their Wars with the Latini, Samnites, and Tuscans, were dispatched in a short time. And whoever considers their Wars from the beginning of Rome, to the Siege of the Veientes, will find that they were determined in a very short time, some in six, some in ten, and some in twenty days. For their Custom was, upon the first appearance of a War, immediately to draw out their Army, and seeking out the Enemy, they did what they could to bring him to a Battel; having beaten him (by reason of the surprize.) The Enemy (that his Country might not wholly be har∣rassed) for the most part proposed an agreement, in which the Romans were sure to insist upon some part of their Territory; which either they converted to their particular profit, or consigned to some Colony which was to be placed there for the security of their Fron∣tiers; by which means the wars being ended in a short time, their Conquests were kept without any considerable expence, for the Colony had that Country for their pay, and the Romans had their Colonies for their security. Nor could there be any way more advan∣tagious and safe; for whilst there was no enemy in the field, those guards were sufficient; and when any Army was set out to disturb them, the Romans were always ready with ano∣ther in their defence, and having fought them, they commonly prevailed, forced them to harder conditions, and returned when they had done: by which means they gained daily upon the enemy, and grew more powerful at home: and in this manner they proceeded till their Leaguer before Veii, where they altred their method, and allowed pay to their Souldiers for the better continuation of the war, whereas before that, their wars being short; there was no necessity of paying their Armies. Nevertheless, though they paid their Soul∣diers from that time, and maintained war at greater distance, (whereby they were obliged to continue longer in the field) yet they left not their old custom of dispatching it as soon as they could, with respect to the circumstances of place and time; for which reason they continued their Colonies: and besides their old custom of shortning their wars as much as they were able, the ambition of their Consuls contributed exceedingly; for their Consul∣ships being but for a year, and six months of that to be spent in their employments at home, they were as diligent and vigorous as possible, because they were not capable of tri∣umphing till the war was concluded: and then for continuing their Colonies; the great ad∣vantage and convenience that resulted from them, was sufficient to prevail. This practice therefore was observed perpetually among the Romans in the management of their wars; only they varied something about the distribution of the prey, in which formerly they were more liberal than in after-times; either because they thought it not so necessary when the Souldiers were paid; or else because their spoils being greater than before, they thought convenient that the publick should have its share; that upon any new enterprize they might not be constrained to lay new taxes upon the people; and by this way their Coffers were filled in a short time. So that by these two ways, by the distribution of their prey, and the setling of Colonies, Rome grew rich by its wars, whereas other Princes and States (without great discretion) grow poor: and so great was every mans ambition of enriching the Aerarium, that by degrees it came to that pass, no Consul was permitted to triumph, un∣less he returned with a vast quantity of silver or gold, or some other inestimable commodity, and put it into the treasury. So that the designs of the Romans tended wholly to this, to finish the war quickly, by forcing the enemy to a Battel; or else to harrass and tire them with frequent excursions, that thereby compelling them to dishonourable conditions, they might make their advantage, and become more powerful and rich.

CHAP. VII.

What proportion of Land the Romans allowed to every man in their Colonies.

I Think it no easie matter to set down the exact proportion of Land, which the Romans assigned to every single person in their Colonies; for I believe they gave more or less ac∣cording to the barrenness or fertility of the soil; and that in all places they were sparing enough. And the first reason that induces me, is, that thereby they might send more men and by consequence their frontiers be better guarded: another is, because living at home in∣digent themselves, it is not to be supposed they would suffer those whom they sent abroad to grow too opulent and rich: and in this I'am much confirm'd by Livy, where he tells us that upon the taking of Veii, the Romans sent a Colony thither, and in the distribution of the Land allotted every man no more than three acres, and a little more according to our measure.

They might consider likewise that their wants would not be supplyed by the quantity so much as the improvement and cultivation of their Land. Yet I do not doubt but they had publick Pastures and Woods to sustain their Cattel, and supply themselves with firing, without which a Colony could hardly subsist.

CHAP. VIII.

What it is that disposes some people to leave their native Countries, to dispossess other people.

SEeing I have spoken already of the Military Discipline of the Romans; and how the Tuscans were invaded by the French; it follows properly enough that we say some∣thing of their several kinds of War, which are two: one sort of commenced upon the am∣bition of some Prince or commonwealth, in hopes to extend, and enlarge his Empire; as those wars which were made by Alexander the Great, by the Romans, and by one Prince against another: which wars, though dangerous, are not yet so pernicious as to supplant the inhabitants, and drive them out of their Country; for the Conqueror contents him∣self with his Victory, and the submission of the people allows them their own Laws, and many times their Estates. The other kind of war is much more dangerous and destru∣ctive, and that is when an entire Nation with their Wives and their Children, compelled either by hunger, or war, leaves its own Country, to fix themselves somewhere else, not to extend their dominion, or exercise any authority, (as in the other) but to kill or expel all the Natives, and possess themselves of their Estates.

This war indeed is most bloody and dreadful, as Salust shews very well in the end of his Bellum Iugurthinum, where, after Iugurtha was beaten, speaking of the invasion of the Gauls he tells us, Cum caeteris Gentibus a populo Romano de imperio tantum fuisse dimicatum, cum Gallis, de singulorum hominum salute; With other Nations the Romans fought only for Em∣pire and Dominion, with the Gauls they fought for their Country and Lives. For when a Prince or Commonwealth invades a Country according to the first way, it is sufficient, if those who are at the Helm be removed or destroyed; in this every mans life is in danger; for when a whole Nation transplants, and invades a new Province, not only the Colonies, but the Natives must be extinguished, that they may fix themselves upon their Lands, and possess themselves of their Goods: and by these kind of people the Romans were three times invaded. First by the Gauls, who took Rome, and (as I said before) drove the Tuscans out of Lombardy; of which invasion Titus Livius gives two reasons: one was the pleasant∣ness of the Country, and the delicacy of the Wine, wherewith (being then but ill provi∣ded in France) they were infinitely taken: the other was, the Country was grown so ex∣ceedingly populous, that it was not able to sustain its own natives; whereupon the Princes of those parts judging it necessary to find them new quarters they appointed which were to transplant, and putting Bellovesus and Sicovesus (two French Princes) at the head of them they sent one part of them into Italy, and the other into Spain: it was Bellovesus lot to in∣vade Italy, and he did it so effectually, that he possessed himself of all Lombardy, and made the first war upon the Romans that was ever made upon them by the French. The second

time they were invaded in this manner was likewise by the French, and it was after the first Punic war, in which invasion the Gauls lost above 200000 men betwixt Pisa and Piombino: the third and last was by the Germans and Cimbrians, who having defeated several Armies of the Romans, were at last themselves defeated by Marius. From whence we may ob∣serve the great courage and constancy of the Romans of old, that could not only bear up against three such dangerous invasions, but overcome them at last; whereas afterwards their courage began to fail, and they were not able to resist the inundation of those Barbarians; for when the Goths and the Vandals invaded, they possessed themselves of the whole Western Empire, without any considerable opposition. The reasons which move these Nations to transmigrate (as I said before) is necessity, and that necessity proceeds either from famine, or from wars and disturbances at home; and when they undertake these Expedi∣tions with vast and innumerable numbers, they invade with irresistible violence, put all the Natives to the sword; possess themselves of their Estates; establish a new Kingdom, and change the very name of the Province, as Moses did of old, and the Barbarians since, who possessed themselves of the Roman Empire.

From hence are all the new names in Italy and elsewhere imposed by their several Con∣querors: Lombardy was called anciently Gallia Cisalpina, Francia (from the Franks) was called anciently Gallia trans Alpina, Sclavonia was called Illyria, Hungaria, Pannonia, An∣glia, Britannta; Moses gave the name of Iudea to that part of Syria which he conquered, and many other Countries have changed their names upon the same occasion, which would be too long to recount. And because I have said before, that sometimes these kind of peo∣ple are forc'd out of their Country by intestine troubles and disturbances, I shall present you with one example of the Maurusians an ancient people of Syria, who foreseeing the invasion of the Hebrews, and knowing themselves unable to oppose them, thought it more wisdom to forsake their Country betimes, and preserve themselves, than to expect their coming, and lose both; whereupon they pack'd up their goods, and with their wives and children removed into Africk, where they drove out the inhabitants, and setled in their Country: so that they who were too weak to defend their own Province, were strong enough to force out another people. To this purpose Prooopius who writes the wars of Bellisarius against the Vandals (who had setled themselves in Africk) tells us, that upon certain pillars in the houses where these Maurusians had lived, he himself read these words, Nos Maurusii qui fugimus a facie Iesu latronis filii Navae; We Maurisians fled hither from Iesus the Usurper, who was the son of Navi. By which we may perceive the occasion of their departure out of Syria. And certainly these Nations forc'd out of their own Country by irresistible ne∣cessity, are more than ordinarily dreadful, and not to be opposed but by a potent and well disciplin'd people: but when they move in small numbers, their danger is not so great, be∣cause they dare not use that violence, but are put to their wits, and to possess themselves of some quarters by cunning and insinuation, which they are to keep afterwards by ways of amity and friendship, as Aeneas did, and Dido, the Massilians and others, who by the as∣sistance and friendship of their neighbours, made good what they had possessed. But the people that came out of their own Countries the most numerous and strong, were the Scy∣thians; for their Country being barren and cold, and the natives too numerous to be su∣stained in it, they were forced abroad, as having nothing to preserve them at home. And if now for five hundred years and upwards we have not heard of any such transmigration, I conceive the reasons may be several: the first may be the great evacuation in those Coun∣tries, from whence the Roman Empire was invaded. A second may be, because Germany and Hungaria (from whence those inundations came) is better cultivated and improved, so as they can live plentifully at home, without rambling abroad: another reason may be, that the Germans, Poles, Cimbrians, and other Nations which border upon the Scythians, being martial people, and continually at wars with them, are as it were a Bulwark to these parts, and keep the Scythians from all new invasions. The Tartars likewise have been many times upon their march with very great Armies, but they have been always encountred and repulsed by the Poles and Hungarians, which has given them occasion frequently to boast, that were it not for their arms and resistance, not only Italy, but the very Roman Church had been many times sensible of the barbarity of the Tartars.

CHAP. IX.

What those occasions are which do most commonly create War among Princes.

THe occasion of the War betwixt the Samnites and the Romans, who had been a long time in league together, was the common cause betwixt all Princes and Governments, and was either fortuitous, or designed. The war betwixt the Samnites and the Romans was fortuitous; for when the Samnites made war upon the Sidicins, and afterwards upon the Campani, they intended not any controversy with the Romans; but the Campani being beaten, and betaking themselves to the Romans for relief, (contrary to the expectation both of the Romans and Samnites) the Romans being in league with the Samnites, could not, without violence to the said league, give them protection; upon which (having no other way to secure themselves) the Campani submitted to the Romans, and made themselves their subjects; and the Romans, how unjust soever they thought it before to assist the Campani (whilst they were but associates) against the Samnites, their old friends, yet now they were become their subjects, and had incorporated with their State, the case was altred, and they thought it very reasonable, supposing, that if they should refuse to defend them, they should discourage all others that had an inclination to do the like, which would have been contrary to the great design of the Romans to propagate their Glory and Empire. The same accidental cause gave occasion to their first War with the Carthaginians, upon the Romans protecting the Massinenses in Sicily. But their second war with the Carthaginians, was designed; for Hanibal the Carthaginian General fell upon the Saguntins in Spain, (who were in alliance with the Romans) not so much out of malice to the Saguntins, but that the Romans being provoked to their defence, should give the Carthaginians occasion to transport the war into Italy.

This way of provoking and hedging in a War has been always practised among Poten∣tates, especially where they had any faith or respect for other people; for, that the peace which has been a long time betwixt them upon articles of alliance may seem firm and in∣violate, they will not meddle with him against whom they do principally design, but turn their arms upon some of his friends and confederates that he is most particularly obliged to receive into his protection, knowing, that if he appears in their defence, they must have oc∣casion to fight him; if he does not, but disowns his allies, they publish his weakness and infidelity to the World, and by either of those ways they do their business. This example of the Campani is of singular importance, as well to those who would make war upon any body, as those that are in distress; for when you are unable to defend your self, and unwil∣ling to fall into their hands that invade you, the best and most safe way is to put your self in subjection to some neighbouring Prince, as the Campani did then, and the Florentines af∣terward when they found themselves too weak to support against the power of Castruccio of Lucca; for finding that Robert King of Naples would not protect them as friends, they threw themselves into his arms to be defended as his subjects.

CHAP. X.

That, according to the common opinion, mony is not the sinews of War.

BEcause it is easie to begin war as a man pleases, but harder to end it; every Prince be∣fore he undertakes an enterprize is obliged to consider his own strength well, and to re∣gulate by it. But then he must be so wise too as not to make a wrong judgment, and that he will certainly do as oft as he computes it by his Bags, by the situation of his Towns, or the affection of his Friends, rather than by his own proper Power and Arms. Mony, and Towns, and Friends are all good, when in conjunction with a strong Army of your own, but without it they do nothing: without Men, to what purpose is either Mony or Towns? and the affection of your subjects will hold no longer than you are able to defend them. There is no mountain, no lake, no streight inaccessible, where there is no force to defend it. Vast sums of mony are not only incapable of protecting you, but they expose you to more danger; nor can any thing be more false than that old and common saying, That mony is the sinews of the war: Quintus Curtius was the first author of it in the war betwixt Antipater of Macedon, and the King of Sparta, where he tells us, that for want of monies the Spar∣tans

were forced to fight, and were beaten; whereas, could they have protracted but some few days, they had had the news of Alexander's death, and got the victory without fighting a blow; but wanting mony, and apprehending their Army would moulder, they were con∣strained to come to a Battel, and were defeated; which was the occasion of that A∣pophthegm, That mony is the sinews of war: which saying is now a-days in every Princes mouth, but improperly, in my judgment: for relying wholly upon that Maxim, they think their treasure is sufficient to defend them, not considering that, if that would have done it, Darius would have conquered Alexander; the Grecians the Romans; Duke Charles the Swizzers: and of late the Pope and Florentines united, would not have found it so hard to have mastered Francesco Maria (Nephew to Iulius 2d.) at the Battel of Urbin. But these whom I have mentioned, presuming more upon the multitude of their bags than the goodness of their men, were all beaten and overcome. Craesus the King of Lydia car∣rying Solon into his Treasury, and shewing him an immense quantity of riches, ask'd him what he thought of his power; to which Solon replyed, I think it never the greater for this; for War is carried on, and Battels are fought more with iron than gold; and it might happen for ought he knew, that some body might come with his iron and take it all from him. Again, when after the death of Alexander the Great, a great Army of Gauls transplanted into Greece, (from whence they passed afterwards into Asia) before they be∣gan their march, the Gauls sent Embassadors to the King of Macedon to treat an accord; which being almost concluded, to make the Embassadors more plyable, the said King shews them his treasure, which consisted of a vast quantity of silver and gold, which the Embas∣sadors had no sooner seen, but longing impatiently to be at it, they broke of the treaty, and brought their Army into his Country; so that that very thing in which he had re∣posed his great confidence and security proved his ruine and destruction. The Venetians not long since had their Coffers well stor'd, yet they lost all, and their wealth was not able to defend them. So that I do affirm 'tis not mony, (as the common opinion will have it) but good Souldiers that is the sinews of war: for mony cannot find good Souldiers, but good Souldiers will be sure to find mony; had not the Romans done more in their wars with their iron than their gold, the treasure of the whole World would not have been suf∣ficient for them, considering their great enterprizes abroad, and their no less difficulties at home; but fighting with iron, they had no want of gold, for those who were afraid of their Armies supplyed them. And if the King of Sparta was forced to run the hazard of a Battel, and was beaten for want of monies, it was no more than what has hapned to others, and might have hapned to him upon other occasions: for it falls out of many times that for want of provisions an Army is forc'd either to fight or to starve; in which case there is no General so weak but he will choose that which is most honourable, where for∣tune has some power to befriend him. Again, a General having news of supplies that are coming to the enemy, considers with himself whether he had not better engage them as they are, than attend till their recruits come up, and then fight them with more disadvan∣tage: sometimes likewise it falls out, (as it did to Asdrubal in the Country of the Piseni, when he was surprized by Claudius Nero, and the other Roman Consul) that a General is either forc'd to fight or to fly, in which case it is incomparably more safe to hazard all in a Battel, than to lose all in a Flight. Which being so, we see there are many causes that con∣strain a General to fight upon disadvantage; among which, if want of mony be one, there is no more reason we should therefore call that the sinews of war, than any of the rest which do the same thing: so that mony is not so much the snews of war, as good souldiers: 'tis true, mony is requisite for the carrying on of a war, but not principally, and in the first place; for good souldiers have many times been contented without it, though it is but seldom they want it, for 'tis as impossible for good souldiers to want mony, as it is for mony alone to make good souldiers. And this is clear by the testimony of Historians in a thou∣sand places. Pericles persuaded the Athenians to a war with all Peloponnesus, and assured them of success, upon consideration of their industry and riches; the Athenians undertook the War, and for some time prospered with their industry, but at last it appeared that the conduct and discipline of the Spartans was too hard for the Athenians industry and treasure. Livy desides this controversie the best of any man, where, in his comparison of Comman∣ders, enquiring what would have been the event if Alexander the Great had turn'd his Arms against the Romans, he declares that in war there are three things fundamentally ne∣cessary, good Souldiers, good Officers, and good fortune; and then arguing whether Alex∣ander or the Romans were more considerable in those three points, he concludes, without the least mention of mony. It is not improbable but the Campani, (of whom we have spoken in the former Chapter) when they undertook the assistance of the Sidicins against the Samnites measured their power more by their mony than their men; from whence it hapned that'

being defeated in two Battels, they were forced to submit, and become tributary to the Romans.

CHAP. XI.

'Tis not discretion to enter into strict amity with a Prince, whose reputation is greater than his strength.

THe Sidicins were in a great error to desire the assistance of the Campani against the Samnites, as being (by reason of their luxury) unable to assist them, but the error of the Capuans was greater, in not knowing their own weakness and incapacity to defend them: both their errors Livy has very well described in these words, Campani magis nomen in auxilium Sidicinorum, quam vires ad praesidium attulerunt; The Capuans made a great noise, but they brought no force to the relief of the Sidicins.

And here it is not unseasonable to consider, that the leagues which are made with Prin∣ces whose distance is too great, or power too little to relieve one, are more honourable than safe, and give more reputation than security to the person that desires them. This was experienced by the Florentines in the year 1489, when the Pope and King of Naples in∣vaded them; for they were at that time confederate with the King of France, yet they had more reputation than assistance thereby. The same would happen likewise to such of the Italian Princes as should confederate with Maximilian the Emperor, and in confi∣dence of his alliance, undertake any great enterprize, because that alliance would be one of those that bring more reputation than relief. So then, as it was a great error in the Ca∣puans, when they were unable to defend themselves, to undertake the protection of the Sidicins, so it is and will be the same in whoever follows their example. It was the same case with the Tarentini, who would needs interpose betwixt the Samnites and the Ro∣mans, to mediate a peace: for when both Romans and Samnites were in the field, and their Armies preparing for an engagement, the Tarentini sent Embassadors to the Consul, to let him know from the Senate of the Tarentini, that they would have peace betwixt them and the Samnites, and that they were resolved to take Arms against them which refused it. But the Consul smiling at their imprudence, in the presence of the said Embassadors, caused a charge to be sounded, and immediately marching his Army against the enemy, he let them see by his proceedings what answer they deserved.

Thus you have seen to what errors Princes are subject, who undertake the protection of other States; I shall now in the next Chapter remonstrate what ways are most convenient for their own proper defence.

CHAP. XII.

Vpon an apprehension of being invaded, whether it be better to make war, or expect it.

AMong wise men, and very good Souldiers, I have heard it often disputed, whether when two Princes are of equal strength, and one of them designing war (visibly) against the other) it be better for that Prince which is like to be invaded, to sit still, and expect him at home; or to begin with him, and make the first inroad himself? There are arguments on both sides, and they who think it best to be the aggressor, and fall upon the Enemy first, may alledge the Counsel which Craesus gave to Cyrus, when being with his Ar∣my upon the Frontiers of the Massageti, Thamyris Queen of that Country sent to him to take his choice whether she should fight him within her Country, or upon the Frontiers: if he desired to advance, she would stand still and expect him; if he had rather fight where he was, she would be with him immediately: when it came to be debated in Counsel, Craesus, contrary to the opinion of the rest, was for marching to her; and the reason he gave, was, because if she should be beaten at any distance, Cyrus would get but little of her Country, for she would have time to recruit, whereas, if she were beaten at home, he would be able to sit so close upon her skirts, that she being never capable of rallying, or bringing another Army into the field, must of necessity lose her whole Kingdom: Hanibal gave the same Counsel to Antiochus, assuring him that if the Romans were any way to be

conquered, it was by carrying the war into Italy, for by so doing he might have the benefit of their Arms, their Wealth, and their Allies; but whilst the war was abroad, and Italy undisturbed, he would leave the man inexhaustible magazine that would supply them with what and wheresoever they had occasion; and at last Hanibal concluded that Rome was to be taken more easily than the Empire, and Italy it self, than any of its Provinces. Aga∣thocles being unable to resist the Carthaginians at home, invaded their borders, and forc'd them to a peace; and Scipio in the same manner to remove the war out of Italy, transpor∣ted it into Africk. Those who are on the other side do argue as stifly, that there can be nothing more dangerous than to hazard an Army in an enemies Country, at a great distance from their own; and they produce the Athenians for an instance, who, whilst they kept themselves upon the defensive part, and expected their enemies at home were always vi∣ctorious; but when they began to make war at a distance, and send Armies into Sicily they lost their liberty, and everything else. They produce also the Fable of Antius King of Lybia, who being invaded by Hercules the Egyptian, was invincible whilst he kept him∣self within his own borders but being inveigled out by the subtility of his enemy, he lost both his Kingdom and Life; upon which occasion that story was raised of Antius; that being born of the earth, (as they pretended) so oft as he touch'd it, so oft he received new vigour from his Mother, which Hercules perceiving, got him up in his arms, crush'd him to death.

They produce likewise more modern examples. Every body knows that Ferrand King of Naples was esteemed a wise Prince in his time, and hearing two years before his death that King Charles viii of France was preparing to invade him, he let him alone; but falling sick afterwards, as he lay upon his death-bed, he called his Son Alphonso to him, and among other things, charged him that he should expect the King of France upon his Frontiers, and fight him there, but that by no means he should be tempted beyond them; and it had been better for Alphonso to have follow'd his Counsel, for neglecting it afterwards, and sending an Army into Romagna he lost both Army and Kingdom without striking a blow: But besides these arguments on both sides, it is urged in behalf of the Aggressor, that he invades with more confidence and courage than his Adversary receives him (which is a great advantage and enhancement to his Army) That he brings many inconveniences upon the person whom he invades, to which he would not be liable, if he expected him at home. For when the enemies Country is wasted, and their Houses plunder'd, his Subjects are not much to be trusted, nor can any more Taxes be laid upon them, without great difficulty, by which means (as Hanibal said) their Magazines will be spent and their fountain dryed up that was to supply them with all Provisions for War. Besides, if your Army be in the Enemies Country, it will be under a greater necessity of fighting, and by consequence will fight more desperately than at home. But to this it is answered on the other side, That it is more for your advantage to attend your enemy in your own Country, than to seek him abroad; for thereby you may furnish your self with Victuals and Amunition, and all other necessaries without any inconvenience, and distress him by driving the Country. You may likewise with much more ease incommode and frustrate his designs, by your better know∣ledge of the Country, and what places are more proper to attack him in; as also you may attack him with your whole force at once, or give him battel as you please, which out of your own Confines is not to be done: Moreover if Fortune should be adverse, and it be your chance to be beaten; more of your Men will escape where their refuge is so near, and you will sooner rally them again: In short, if you fight at home, you venture your whole force, and not your whole fortune: but if you fight abroad, you venture your whole fortune with but part of your force: Others there have been, who with design to weaken the Enemy, and fighting him afterwards with more ease and advantage, have suffered him quietly to march several days Journey into their Country, and possess himself of several Towns; but whether they did well or not, I will not determine, only I think this distinction is to be considered, whether my Country be strong in Fortresses, and Men; as the Romans were of old, and as the Swizzers at this day; or whether it be weak and unfortified, as the Territory of the Carthaginians formerly, and France and Italy now. In this case the Enemy is by all means to be kept at a distance, because your chief strength lying in your Mony, and not in your Men, whenever you are interrupted in raising or re¦ceiving of that, your business is done; and nothing interrupts you so fatally, as an Ene∣my in your Country. And of this the Carthaginians may be an example, who whilst they were free at home, were able by their Revenue and Taxes to wage War with the Ro∣mans themselves; whereas afterwards when they were assaulted, they were not able to contend with Agathocles. The Florentines, when Castruccio of Lucca brought his Arms into their Country, could not support against him, but were forced to put themselves un∣der

the Dominion of the King of Naples, to procure his protection; but Castruccio was no sooner dead, but they were agog again, and had the confidence to invade the Duke of Milan, and to attempt the beating him out of that Province; so couragious were they in their foreign War, and so abject at home. But when Countries are in a posture of defence, and people Martial and well disciplin'd (as the Romans of old, and the Swizzers at this day) 'tis better to keep off; for the nearer they are to their own Country, they are the harder to overcome, because they can raise more force to defend themselves, than to invade another people. Nor does the opinion of Hanibal affect me at all; for though he persua∣ded Antiochus to pass into Italy he did it as a thing that would have been more for his own, and the Carthaginian than for Antiochus his advantage; for had the Romans received those three great defeats which they received of Hanibal in Italy, in the same space of time, in France or any where else, they had been ruined irrecoverably, for they could neither have rallyed, nor recruited so soon. I do not remember any foreign Expedition by the Romans for the Conquest of any Province, in which their Army exceeded the number of 50000. But upon the invasion of the Gauls, after the first Punick war, they brought 118000 Men into the Field for their defence: Nor could they beat them afterwards in Lombardy, as they did at first in Tuscany, because it was more remote, and they could not fight them with so much convenience, nor with so many men. The Cimbri repulsed the Romans in Germany, but following them into Italy, they were defeated, and driven out again them∣selves; and the reason was, because the Romans could bring more forces against them: The Swizzers may without much difficulty be over-powered abroad, because they seldom march above 30 or 40000 strong; but to attack and beat them at home, is much more difficult, where they can bring into the field 100000 and more. I conclude therefore that that Prince whose people are in a posture, and provided for War, does wisely if he expects a Potent and dangerous Enemy at home, rather than to invade him in his own Country: But that Prince whose Country is ill provided, and whose Subjects are ill disciplined, does better if he keeps the War as far off as he can: and by so doing, each of them (in his several degree) will defend himself best.

CHAP. XIII.

That from mean to great fortune people rise rather by fraud than by force.

I Have found it always true, that men do seldom or never advance themselves from a small beginning, to any great height, but by fraud, or by force (unless they come by it by donation, or right of inheritance). I do not think any instance is to be found where force alone brought any man to that Grandeur, but fraud and artifice have done it many times, as is clear in the lives of Philip of Macedon, Agathocles the Sicilian, and several others, who from mean and inconsiderable extraction, came at length to be Kings. Xenophon in his History of Cyrus insinuates the necessity of fraud when he represents (in his first Expe∣dition against the King of Armenia) how all Cyrus his actions and negotiations were full of fallacy and deceit, and that it was that way he conquered his Kingdom, and not by bravery and force, by which he implyes that no Prince can do any great matters without that art of dissembling Besides he represents him jugling, and playing of tricks with his own Unckle by the Mother-side, the King of the Medes, and shows that without that excellence, he had never been King; and indeed I am of opinion that from a mean and base fortune never any man came to be very great by down-right generosity and force; but by fraud alone there have been many, as particularly Iohn Galeazzo, who by that alone wrested the Government of Lombardy out of the hands of Messer Bernardo, his Unckle. And the same courses which Princes are forced to in the beginning of their authority, the same courses are taken by Commonwealths at first, till they be settled in their government, and have force sufficient to defend themselves. Rome (which either by change or election took all ways to make it self great) was not without this; and what greater cunning or artifice could it use in the beginning of its greatness, than what it did take, and is men∣tioned before. For by their fair carriage and insinuation, they got several Cities into con∣sideration, and under that name, they subjected them insensibly, and made them their slaves. The Latins, and other Neigbouring, people were of this sort, by whose Arms and Alliance, the Romans having conquered their Enemies, they were rendered so powerful that they began to handle them now, not as Associates, but Subjects; nor could the Latini

be convinced of their servitude, till they saw the Samnites twice over-thrown, and forced to accept of their Conditions. Which Victories, though they gain'd the Romans great reputation abroad, among remote Princes, who understood more of the name, than the power of the Romans, yet they created envy and jealousie among those who were nearer and more sensible of their greatness; and this jealousie and apprehension was so great, that not only the Latins, but the Colonies in Latium and Campagnia (which had been sent thither not long before) confederated against the Romans, and resolved to make War upon them. And this War was commenced in the same manner (as I have said before) most other Wars are commenced. Not by down-right denunciation of War against the Romans, but by defending the Sidicins against the Samnites, who made War by allowance from the Romans. Nor was there any other reason of their Conspiracy, but because the Confe∣rates began to smell out their cunning, and to be sensible that under that false title of Allies, they were in great danger of being made slaves, which Annius Selinus (a Latin Praetor) in an Oration to the Counsel expressed very properly in these words, Nam si etiam nunc sub umbra faederis aequi, servitutem pati possumus, quid obest quin proditis Sidicinis, non Ro∣manorum solum, sed Samnitium dictis pareamus? For if even now under the shadow of an equal Confederacy, we can endure servitude: What hinders but that we betray the Sidicins, and put our necks under the feet not only of the Romans, but the Samnites. Which things being so, it is manifest the Romans wanted not at the beginning of their rise, that dexterity of cheating that is so necessary to all people that are ambitious of raising themselves to a great height, from an inconsiderable beginning; which artifice is always the less scandalous, by how much he that does practise it, understands better how to disguise it by some hono∣rable pretence, as the Romans did very well.

CHAP. XIV.

Many People are mistaken, who expect with meekness and humility to work upon the proud.

IT falls out many times that humility and modesty towards such as have any picque or prejudice to you, is so far from doing good, that it does a great deal of mischief and of this the debate and consultation of the Romans about the preservation of their peace with the Latins, is an example, from whom they were in expectation of a War. For the Samnites complaining to the Romans that the Latins had invaded them, the Romans (un∣willing to exasperate them more, who were already too prone to be quarrelling) return'd this answer, that by their league with them, the Latins were not tyed up from making War as they pleas'd. The Latins were so far from being satisfied by the mildness of their answer, that it made them more insolent; insomuch that not long after they profess'd themselves their Enemies, as appears by that speech of the aforesaid Annius in the Council aforesaid, where he tells the Latins, Tentâstis patientiam negando militem: Quis dubitat exarsisse eos? Pertulerunt tamen hunc dolorem. Exercitus nos parare adversus Samnites foe∣deratos suos audiêrunt, nec moverunt se ab urbe. Unde haec illis tanta modestia, nisi a con∣scientia virium, & nostrarum, & suarum. You tried their patience before, in refusing them supplies; who doubts but they were netled? yet they swallow'd it: They had notice of our preparations against the Samnites their Confederates, and stirred not in their defence. Whence comes this mighty modesty, and good nature? from nothing but a sence of the disparity betwixt our strength, and their own. From hence it is clear, the patience and civility of the Romans, augmented the arrogance of the Latins: and that it is the interest of all Princes to be very cautious of condescending from their dignity, or stooping willingly to any thing that may give the Enemy an opinion of his weakness or pusillanimity; for it is better to lose any thing bravely and by open War, than to part with it poorly in hopes to prevent it; and it many times happens that those who part so easily with their Lands or Monies to prevent a War, do rather excite, than satisfie the Enemy, whose nature commonly is such, that upon the discovery of their impotence or fear, his desires encrease, and new things are succes∣sively demanded; nor will your friends be so ready to assist, if they find you timorous and irresolute. But if as soon as you have notice of the designs or insolence of the Enemy, you immediately prepare to correct him; he will not invade you so boldly, though he be stronger than you, and then your friends will come in more freely to your assistance, who, had you abandoned your self, would certainly have forsaken you. This is intended only where you have but one Enemy; where you have more, the best way is to give

and promise what you think fit, that if possible, you may draw off some or other of them from their Confederacy, and so break their League by dividing them.

CHAP. XV.

Weak States are irresolute and uncertain in their Councils, and slow Councils are most commonly pernicious.

FRom these occasions and beginnings of the War betwixt the Latins and the Romans, we may observe, that in all consultations, it is best to come immediately to the point in question, and bring things to a result, without too tedious an hesitation and suspence. And this we may learn from the Council which the said Latins took at that time when their war with the Romans was in debate. For the Romans, suspecting the defection of the Latins, for their better information, and that they might reduce them (if possible) without blows, sent to them to send over eight of their Principal Citizens to Rome, to consult with them about keeping of the Peace. The Latins being conscious to themselves of many things which they had acted against the pleasure of the Romans, call'd a Council to consider of the persons that were to go, and what their Comissioners should say when they came there. The Council being divided, one man proposing one thing, and another man another, An∣nius the Praetor had this expression, Ad summam rerum nostrarum pertinere arbitror, ut cogi∣tetis magis, quid agendum nobis, quam quid loquendum sit, facile erit explicatis Consiliis, accommodare rebus verba. I conceive it more pertinent to our business, That you consider rather what is to be done, than what is to be said; for when you are come to a resolution, it will be no hard matter to accomodate your words. Which saying was doubtlesly true, and ought to be regarded by all Princes and Commonwealths. For whilst we are ambiguous, and uncer∣tain what is to be done, we cannot tell how to adapt and accommodate our language; but when we are come to a resolution, and have decreed what is to be done, it is not so diffi∣cult. I have inserted this passage the more willingly, because I my self have known this irresolution do much mischief, to the detriment and dishonour of our State; and it is a fault peculiar to all weak and improvident Princes and Governments to be slow and tedious, as well as uncertain in their Councils, which is as dangerous as the other, especially when the debate is about the relief or protection of a friend; for your slowness does no good to him, and exposes your self. These uncertain or tedious resolutions proceed either from want of courage and force, or from the crossness and malevolence of the Counsellors, who carried away by some private passion of their own, will rather ruine the State, than not accomplish their revenge, so that instead of expediting and pushing things to a conclusion, they impede and obstruct whatever is before them. For your good Citizens (though the vogue of the people runs the more dangerous way) will never hinder the coming to a result, especially in things that will not dispense with much time. Girolamo a Tyrant in Syracuse being dead, and the War betwixt the Romans and Carthaginians very hot, a Council was called by the Syracusans, and it was debated which side they should take. The question was canvas'd with such order by both parties, that it remained in ambiguo, and nothing was resolved, till at length Appolonides (one of the Principal in that City) in a grave and prudent Oration remonstrated, That neither they were to be blamed who had spoken for the Romans, nor they who adhered to the Carthaginians, but the length and uncertainty of their debate; for that irresolution would be the occasion of certain ruine; but if they came to a conclusion, with which side soever they joyn'd, they might hope for some good. Titus Livius could not better have displayed the danger of this kind of suspence, than in this case of the Latins; whose assistance against the Romans being desired by the Lavinians, they were so long in their debate, that when at last they came to a reso∣lution, their supplies were scarce gone out of their Gates, before they had news that their Confederates were beaten. Whereupon Milonius the Praetor said very wittily, This little ground which we have marched, will cost us very dear to the Romans; and this hapned to them for the tediousness of their Councils; for they should either have assisted, or denyed them out of hand; had they denyed them, the Romans had not been disgusted; had they complyed, they might have supported their Associates, and have kept them from being ruined; but doing neither, they destroyed their friends, and hazarded themselves. Had this precept of bringing things to a speedy resolution, been followed by the Florentines, they had prevented many mischiefs and damages which they met withal upon the coming

of Lewis XII into Italy against the Duke of Milan; for the said King Lewis having resol∣ved upon the said expedition, he proposed to their Embassadors in his Court, that the Florentines should not interpose or concern themselves in the quarrel, upon which terms, he would receive them into his protection, and defend them from any harm; the Embas∣sadors agreed, and a Months time was allowed for ratification from the City. But the ratification was deferred (by the imprudence of some persons who favoured the Duke of Milan's interest) till the French had almost conquered all, and being offered then, it was refused by the King of France (who knew well enough that the Florcntines were then forced to what they did; and desired his amity more out of fear, than affection) which piece of delay cost the Florentines a good round Sum of Mony, and might well have been their ruine; as just such an accident was afterward. And this indiscretion of theirs was the greater, because they were no way serviceable to the Duke of Milan; who, if he had prevailed, would doubtless have shown himself a greater Enemy to them, than the King of France. Of this slowness, and uncertainly of Councils, I have spoken before, but new occasion presenting it self, I have discoursed of it again, as a thing worthy the observation of all Commonwealths, especially like ours.

CHAP. XVI.

How much the Soldiers of our times do differ from the Discipline of the Ancients.

THe Battel which the Romans fought with the Latins, in the Consulships of Manlius Torquatus, and Decius, was the greatest and most important that ever they had in any War, with any other Nation. For as the Latins lost all by losing the Victo∣ry, and the Romans got the Dominion of them: So the Romans had they lost the Battel, must have lost their liberty with it, and turn'd Subjects to the Latins. Livy tells us the same thing, for (says he) the Latin Army was in nothing inferiour to the Romans; their courage the same, their constancy the same, and their numbers the same; if the Romans had any advantage, it was in their Generals, which indeed were better than the Latins, and it is expressed by several, both Latins and Romans who have left an account of that Battel to posterity; that where-ever Manlius had been, that side would certainly have conquered. In this Battel there were two things very exemplary and remarkable: One of the Consuls, to keep his Souldiers firm in their obedience, and preserve their Military Discipline, caused his own Son to be slain for transgressing his Orders, though he gain'd the Victory by the means. The other devoted himself freely to death, for the good of his Country; for the dispute was like to be very hard, fighting against the Latins, who (as Livy tells us) had the same Language, the same Customs, the same Arms, the same Discipline with the Romans; the Soldiers, the Captains, the Tribunes both in one Army and the other, had been Come∣rades and served formerly together, not only in the same Army, or Garison, but in the same Company and Band. It was necessary therefore, being equal in their numbers, and equal in their courage, that something extraordinary should be done, that might render the Sol∣diers fiercer, and more obstinate to overcome, upon which fierceness and obstinacy the whole hopes of the victory did depend; for whilst there is any such in the breasts of the Soldiers, they never think of running, but press still on for victory and prize; and be∣cause there was more of this constancy and fortitude in the breasts of the Romans, than in the breasts of the Latins, partly the destiny, and partly the bravery of the Consuls effected that for the good success of their Army, and the preservation of their Discipline, Torquatus killed his Son, and Decius himself. Titus Livius in his description of the equality of their force, gives us an exact account of the Orders which they observed in their Armies and Fights, and he has done it so largely, I need not repeat it all, but shall only select what I think most particularly remarkable, and what, if observed by the Generals of our days, might have prevented very great disorders. I say then that according to Livy's description, their Armies were divided into three principal Schieri or Squadrons. The first consisted of their Hastati, which were most of them young men in the flower of their age digested into Ma∣nipuli or small parties, and disposed at a certain distance with Pikes or Darts in their hands, from whence they were called Hastati. The second Squadron was as numerous as the first, and divided into as many Manipuli, but their distance was something greater, and it con∣sisted of choice men, from whence they were called Principes. The third and last Squa∣dron was the biggest of the three, and had almost as many in it as both the other: and

this was made up of the ancientest and most experienced Soldiers, whom they called Triarii. They too had their certain distances, but something greater than in either of the other. In their Battels, the Hastati were in the Van; the Principes behind them, and the Triarii in the Rear. To every one of these Squadrons there was a body of Horse, which being drawn up in two divisions, and disposed one of the right, and the other on the left hand of the Army, represented two wings, and were therefore called Ala. These three Squadrons preceded and followed one another exactly, but the Hastati in the first Squadron were drawn up closer, That, being to receive the first impetus of the Enemy, they might en∣dure it the better. The Principes that followed them was not in such close order, but were disposed at more distance, to the end that if the Hastati should be forced to retire, they might be received into that Squadron without disorder or confusion. But the Triarii were drawn up with greater spaces and intervals than both the other, and for the same rea∣son, that if they were repulsed, that might fall back among them, and make an entire Body together: Being drawn up in this order, the Hastati began the sight; if they were over-powred by the Enemy and forced to give ground, they fell back to the Principes, and uniting with them, renewed the fight in one body; if they were both of them too weak, and unable to bear up against the Enemy, they retreated gradually into the spaces betwixt the Triarii, and then all the three Squadrons being joyned, the whole Army charged in a body, and if they were beaten, farewel, there was no more reserves, but the Battel was lost; and because whenever the Triarii was engaged, the whole Army was in ••••nger, this Proverb grew very frequent, Res reducta est ad Triarios. Things are now at the Extremity. The Generals of our times, having laid aside all the old discipline of the Romans, have neglected this among the rest, to their no little prejudice. For he that draws up his Army in a posture with two such reserves, must be beaten three times before he can be utterly defeated; whereas once beating will do the Enemies business. But he that trusts only to the first shock (as the Christian Armies do generally now) may easily be broken, the least disorder, or relaxation of courage, puting all to the rout. And that which is the reason why our Armies are so quickly defeated, is, because they have lost the old way of falling back one body into another, and rallying three times. For whoever draws up his Army according to Modern Custom, does it with one of these two inconve∣niences, He either draws up his several Squadrons shoulder to shoulder, and by enlarging his Ranks, makes his Files very thin (which weakens his Army very much by leaving the distance so small betwixt the Front, and the Rear) or else he draws them up deeper, ac∣cording to the manner of the Romans; but then their Files are so close, that if the Front be beaten (there being no spaces in the Battel to receive them) they entangle and confound one another; so as the Front being repulsed, falls foul upon the middle Squadron, and both of them upon the third, whereby they are embarrassed, and hindred from advancing or receiving the Enemy in any order, and the whole Battel is lost. The Spanish and French Armies at the Battel of Ravenna (where Monsieur de Foix the French General was slain) fought very well, being drawn up according to the mode of our times, with their Fronts so extended, that their Battalions were much more in wideness than depth and his was done in respect of the ground, which in that place was very spacious and large; for being sensible that retreats are more difficult where the Files are too deep, they drew them up large in the Front to prevent it as much as possible: But when they are straightned for room they are forced to be contented, and draw up as well as they can, for there is no remedy. They are subject likewise to the same disorders in their Marches and Incursions into the Enemies Country, whether to forrage, or upon some other design. In the War betwixt the Florentines and Pisans (upon their Rebellion after the King of France's passage into Italy) coming to a Battel at Santo Regolo, the Florentines were defeated by their own Horse, which being drawn up in the Front of the Army, and charged smartly by the Enemy, were put into disorder, and forced to fall foul upon their Foot, which broke the whole Army. And I have been many times assured by Monsieur Griacus de Burgo (an old Officer of Foot in the Florentine Army) that their Foot had not fled that day, but for the disorder of their own Horse; The Swizzers (the best Soldiers of our times) when they are drawn up with the French, will be sure to be drawn up in the Flanks, that if their Horse should be beaten, they may not be driven in among them. And though these things seem easie to be understood, and more easie to practise, yet there has not been one of our late Generals that has found the way of imitating this old method, or correcting the new; for though they also have their Armies divided into three Squadrons, which they call the Van-guard, the Body, and the Rear; yet they use them only in their Marches, and Incampments; but when they come to a Battel, it is seldom seen but they are drawn up as abovesaid, and altogether run

the risk of one shock, and no more. And because some people to excuse their igno∣rance, pretend the Execution of the Cannon, will not suffer them to make use of the old order, I shall examine in the next Chapter whether that can be a just impediment, or not.

CHAP. XVII.

How the Armies of our times are to judge of Artillery, and whether the general opinion of it, be true.

WHen I consider with my self how many Field Battels were fought by the Romans in several times, it falls into my thoughts to examine what many people have believed, that had there been great Guns in those days, as there are now, the Romans could never have over-run Provinces, nor made them tributary so easily, nor have done so many great things as they did; for by reason of these fire-arms, Granadoes, and such kind of Engines, people are sooner terrified, and cannot show their valour so freely as heretofore; To which it is added, that Armies come with more difficulty to a Battel, and that their Orders and Ranks are not so easily kept, so that in time the whole business of War will be dispatched by the Cannon. Not thinking it improper to enquire into these opinions; to examine whether Artillery have added or substracted from the strength of our Armies, and taken away, or given more occasion to our Captains of doing brave things; I shall begin with their first opinion, that the Romans would not have made those vast Conquests, had there been Artillery in those days: In answer, I say, that War is twofold, defensive, or offensive; and it is first to be considered, which of these two Wars it does most mischief or good; and though it may be said it does great mischief in both, yet I am of opinion, it is much more prejudicial to him that is upon the defensive, than him that is upon the offensive part. The reason is, because he who defends himself, is either blocked up in some Town, or straightned in his Camp: If in a Town, it is either small (like your Citadels) or large: In the first case the besieged is lost; for the force of those Guns is such, that no wall is so thick, but in a few days they will beat it down: So that if he has no retreat, nor time to stop up the breaches, or throw up new works within, the Enemy enters pell mell at the breach, and the Cannon of the Town does the Garison very little good; for this is a Maxim, where people can fall on in a crowd, and run head∣long in their fury to a storm, great Guns do never repel them. Wherefore the fierce assaults of the Tramontani are not so easily sustained, as the attacks of the Italians who fall not on with that fury and impatience as the other, but march up cooly and quietly to the Battel, and do rather skirmish, than storm. Those who enter a breach in this gravity and state, are sure to go to pot, for the Artillery does certain execution upon them: But those who fall on briskly, and crowd one another into the breach (if there be no new works or retrenchments thrown up within) enter as they please without any great preju∣dice by the Cannon; for though some of them may be killed, yet they cannot be so many as to hinder the taking of the Town. That this is true, we find by many instances in Italy, and among the rest in the Siege of Brescia, the Town revolted to the Venetians, only the Castle stood firm for the French. That the Town might receive no prejudice from the Castle, the Venetians fortified the great Street that comes down from the Castle with great Guns in the Front, Flanks, and every where, so that they thought themselves secure not only from sallies within, but from relief without. But Monsieur de Foix made no reckon∣ing of them; for marching thither with a Body of Horse, he alighted, and charging boldly thorow the said Street, relieved the Castle, without any considerable loss. So that he who is shut up in a small place, his walls battered down, and has nothing left but his Artillery to defend him, is in very great danger, and can hardly escape: If the place you defend be a large Town, where you have room enough to retire, and throw up new works; yet your disadvantage is great, and the Enemies great Guns shall do more mischief upon you, than yours upon him. For first you must be forced to advance your Cannon, and raise them to some higher place; for whilst they are level with the ground, every blind, or small work that the Enemy throws up, is sufficient to secure him; and being forced to plant them higher, either upon the top of some Wall, or Church, or Mount (erected on purpose) you fall under two inconveniences; One is, that you cannot bring such large Guns upon those places, as he can bring without, because in those little places, great Guns are not to be managed; The other is, that if you could get them up, they cannot be so

easily secur'd, because they cannot have the convenience of works or baskets to defend them, as the Enemy has whose Guns are planted as he pleases. So that it is almost im∣possible for him that is besieged, to keep his Cannon long upon a high place, without being dismounted, if the Enemy without has any store of Artillery; and to keep them upon the ground, is to have little or no use of them, as I said before: so that when all is done, the best way to defend a Town is as they did of old, by their small shot, and the courage of the Soldier: And yet though small shot be of some use to the besieged, it cannot counter∣vail the dammage which they receive from the Enemies great shot, for by them their walls are battered, and beaten down into the Ditches, so that when the Enemy comes to storm (which he may do with more ease when the Ditches are filled up with the ruines of the walls) the besieged are under great disadvantage. Wherefore, as I said before, those Guns are more beneficial to the besieger, than the besieged. And if you do not defend your self either in a great Town or a little, but shall choose rather some strong and convenient place, where you may encamp and entrench, so as not to be forced to an Engagement, but with advantage to your self; I say that in this case you have no better way now, than the Ancients had of old, and that many times your great Guns are more inconvenient, than otherwise; for if the Enemy falls upon your back, with any advantage of ground, as may easily happen; That is, if he gains by accident any eminence that commands your Camp, or surprizes you before your intrenchments are finished, he quickly dislodges you, and compells you to fight. This was the case with the Spaniards before the Battel of Ravenna, who entrenched upon the River Roncus, but made their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 too low, whereupon the French having the advantage of the ground, with their great Guns played so furiously over them into their Camp, that the Spaniards 〈…〉〈…〉, and forced afterwards to give them Battel. And if you shall choose such a place to ••••trench in, as commands the whole Country, and fortifie it so well, that the 〈…〉〈…〉 you, yet the Enemy will have the same ways of provoking and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 you, as were practised of old, that is, by making inroads, and plundring your Country; by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 your Roads, and intercepting your Convoys, and a thousand other 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dities which he will put upon you, against which your Artillery will 〈…〉〈…〉. So that considering what has been said, and that the Roman Wars 〈◊〉〈◊〉 most 〈◊〉〈◊〉 offensive; they would have had advantage by them, and in probability 〈…〉〈…〉 their conquests, had there been any Artillery in their times. As to the 〈…〉〈…〉, that by reason of those great Guns, men could not show their valour so much as an ancient times; I answer, it is true, and the danger is greater when they come to place their ••ad∣ders, and make an assault dully and heavily, and rather one by one, than in a body; their Officers being in the same hazard, and liable to be killed at greater distance, nor can the strongest guards, nor choicest men about them, secure them; yet for all these great dangers, no memorable instance can be produced of any great dammage that ever was received. For Towns are not taken usually by storm, or assault; but by way of Leaguer as formerly; and in those that are taken by storm, the danger is not much greater than it was then; for even in those times, whoever undertook the defence of a Town, had his Machines and instruments of War, which though not discharged with such force, did the same execu∣tion. And as to the reaching of Commanders at a distance, and killing them in the midst of their Reserves, there have been fewer of them slain (since great Guns came up) in 24 years Wars in Italy, than there was in any ten years in the time of the Romans; for unless it were Count Lodovic della Mirandola (who was killed in Ferrara, when the Venetians invaded that State) and the Duke of Nemours who was killed at Cirignuola, there has not been one great Officer slain; for Monsieur de Foix at Ravenna dyed by the Sword. So that if men show themselves not so couragious as formerly; it is from the weakness and ill order of their Armies, rather than the Artillery: And whereas it is said that these great Guns are an impediment to their fighting, and that the decision of Battels will by degrees be left to the Artillery; I reply, That that opinion is clearly a mistake, and has been judged so by all those who are for the old way of Discipline. For he that would have his Soldiers good, must exercise them well, and with frequent Alarms (true or false, 'tis no matter) accustom them to the Enemy, bring them to handy-stroaks, and as it were to take one ano∣ther by the beards; by which means they will come to a greater dexterity in handling their weapons, and grappling with the Enemy; and for the same reason, the Foot are rather to be relyed upon than the Horse; for if your Foot be nimble and good, you may fall with more security upon an Enemy perplexed and embarrassed with a train of Artillery, than you could of old when they had their Elephants, their Chariots with Cythes, and such other devices. And if the Romans could find out remedies daily against such daily inventions, no question but they would have found out some or other against great Guns; and so much

the more easily, because the danger of the Guns is sooner over, than the danger of the other: for the execution which is done by the Cannon, is done before the engagement be∣gins; The execution by the Chariots and Elephants, during the whole fight; besides the Cannon is easily avoided by the Infantry, either by posting themselves behind some bank, or clapping down upon their bellies; and yet of this so easie and obvious an evasion, expe∣rience tells us there is seldom any necessity; for it is a hard matter to point your great Guns so exactly, but that either they will be mounted too high and shoot over you, or too low, and never come at you: And when the Battel is joyn'd, 'tis as clear as the day, that neither great nor small shot is of any advantage; for if the Artillery be placed before the Army, 'tis odds but it is taken; if behind, the execution it does, is upon themselves; and on either side it can gaul you but little, before you get to it, and either cloy, or secure it, and if an example be required, we have one ready in the Swizzers, who at Navarre in the year 1513. without Horse or Artillery, or any such thing, fell upon the French Camp, and overcame them, though they were as strong as Trenches and Artillery could make them; and another reason is (besides what has been urged before) because Artillery ought to be guarded (if you would have it do service) with walls or ramparts, or some such thing as may secure it from being taken, otherwise it will be of no use, as when in field fights, it has nothing to defend it, but the Bodies of men. In the Flanks they are of no use, more than the old Roman Engines in those days who were placed out of their Squadrons, that they might be managed with more dexterity, and (when-ever overlaid by the Horse or any thing else) they were received into their Legions: and if there be any way of making ad∣vantage of Artillery in a field fight, it is this; He that uses it otherwise, understands not very well, and puts his confidence in that which may easily deceive him: The Turk indeed by the help of his great Guns-obtained two or three Victories against the Sophy, and the Soldan; but if produced more from the novelty of the noise, and the terror it brought upon their Horse, than any great execution they did. I conclude therefore that Artillery may be good, in an Army that is stout; but where they are used in an Army that is raw and inexperienced, they are of little advantage, if the Enemy be either couragious or strong.

CHAP. XVIII.

How by the authority of the Romans, and the universal Discipline of the Ancients, the Foot are more serviceable than the Horse.

BY many Arguments and Examples, it may be proved that the Romans in their Military exploits had greater estimation for their Infantry, than their Horse; and how all their principal designs were executed by their Foot: This appeared in their Wars with the Latins, when the Roman Army being over-powered, and giving ground in that great Battel near the Lake of Regillum, the Roman General caused his Cavalry to dismount, and fight on foot, and by so doing, they recovered their ground, and got the Victory; by which it is manifest the Romans thought them more serviceable on foot than on horse-back, and in that posture placed more confidence in them. The same thing they practised in many other fights, and always with good success: nor can the raillery of Hanibal be ob∣jected against this, who when news was brought him at the Battel of Cannas, that the Consuls had caused all their Horse to dismount, resolving to fight it out on foot, cryed out in derision, Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent Equites. They might as will have bound them, and delivered them to me, Which expression though coming out of the mouth of an excellent person, yet his single authority is not to be put in the ballance against the judg∣ment of the whole Roman Commonwealth, and the experience of so many brave Captains as had been educated under it; and if it were, there are reasons to defend it: The Foot can get into several places, where the Horse cannot get: The Foot keep their ranks better than the Horse, and in any disorder, are sooner rallyed, and in a posture again, whereas the Horse are more unmanageable, and when once out of order, with great difficulty to be rallyed. Besides (as it is among men) so it is among Horses, some are high spirited and couragious, others are untoward and dull; and it frequently happens, that a mettled Horse, has a cowardly Rider, or a mettled Rider a dull Horse; be it which it will, the disparity is inconvenient. A body of Foot well order'd and drawn up, will easily be too hard, for the same number of Horse; but the same number of Horse, will have hard ser∣vice to break a Body of Foot, if there be any thing of proportion betwixt them; and this

opinion is confirmed not only by ancient and modern examples, but by the relations and constitutions of Legislators, and whoever else have left any rules and directions for the Government of an Army; for though they tell us, indeed, That at first, Horse were in greatest reputation, because the way of ordering of Foot was not known; but as soon as the way of managing them was found out, and their usefulness was discovered, they were preferred to the Horse. Not but that Horse are very necessary in an Army to scout abroad, make incursions into the Enemies Country, pursue the Enemy when he runs, and con∣front their Horse when they come to a Battel, yet the hopes and strength of an Army lies more especially in the Foot, and if any one error in the Conduct of our Italian Princes has contributed to the enslaving of their Country, it is their neglecting to improve themselves in the management of Foot, and addressing themselves wholly to the Horse. And this fault proceeded from the malignity of the Officers, or the ignorance of those who govern'd the State: For this last 25 years, the Commands of the Italian Militia being in the hands of Reformades and Soldiers of fortune, who had no setled Estates, they made it their de∣sign to preserve their Commands by all possible means, though with never so much preju∣dice to their Masters: And because a great Body of Foot, was not like to be long paid (nor would there always be occasion to use them) and a little one would not turn to account; they applyed themselves wholly to the Discipline of Horse; for 200 or 300 Horse was a fair Command, and maintained the Officers in a good reputation; nor was the charge so great, but their Governors could pay them. For the better insurance therefore of their places, they began to undervalue and decry the Foot service, in such manner, that by de∣grees, they were almost wholly laid aside; so that in the greatest of their Armies, there were very few Foot; the unhappiness of which practice, with other irregularities in our days, has made the Italian Militia so weak, it has not been able to defend it self against the insults, and depredations of foreigners. So then the Foot is with more confidence to be rely'd upon, than the Horse; and that this was the judgment of the Romans, appears by another example. The Romans were encamped before Sora, and a party of Horse sal∣lying out of the Town to beat them from some post, was met by a Roman Captain at the Head of his Troop, who charging his adversary, it was their fortune both of them to be slain. However, their Troops continued the fight, though their Officers were dead, and the Romans to facilitate their Victory, dismounted in the middle of the fight, and forced the Enemy to do the same, if they had a mind to defend themselves; so that the nature of the fight was changed; the Foot service was preferred, and the Samnites were routed. Nothing can be more plain, that the Foot were preferred, than this case; for though upon other occasions the Consuls many times dismounted their Troops, yet it was to reinforce and bring off the Foot, that were overlaid by the Enemy; but here they dismounted not to relieve their own Foot, or to engage with the Enemies, but fighting Horse against Horse, and finding their Victory doubtful, they thought, though they could not master them on Horse-back, they might do it on foot, and accordingly they alighted: I conclude there∣fore, that a Body of well ordered Foot is very hardly to be broken, but by another Body of the same. Crassus and Marcus Antonius, with a small Body of Horse, but a good Army of Foot, over-run and harrassed the whole Country of the Parthians for several days toge∣ther, though the Parthians had a vast Army of Horse to defend it. Crassus 'tis true mis∣carried in the Expedition, but it was more by the falshood, than gallantry of the Enemy; for relying too much upon their promises, he was reduced to such distress for Provisions, that he and his whole Squadron were lost; nevertheless in the midst of these exigences, being in an open and Champian Country, where there were no Mountains, no Woods, no Rivers to shelter or ease them, far from all relief, and nothing left to sustain them, the Foot brought themselves off under the command of M. Anthonie, and behaved themselves so well in the opinion of the Parthians themselves, that their vast Army of Horse durst not venture upon them: But to what purpose do we trouble our Reader with examples so remote, we have testimony nearer home that will do it effectually. We have known in our time 9000 Swizzers at Novara attack 10000 Horse, and as many Foot (being most Gascoignes) they never regarded: After this 26000 Swizzers set upon the King of France in Milan, who had with him 20000 Horse, 40000 Foot, and a hundred pieces of Artillery, and though they did not vanquish him, as at the Battel of Novara, yet they fought him bravely for two days together, and though worsted at last, yet the greatest part of them got off. Marcus Regulus Attilius, placed such confidence in his Foot, that he not only opposed them to the Enemies Horse, but to their Elephants; and though his success did not answer his expectation, yet it hindered not, but that as great matters might have been expected from his Foot. So then whoever would defeat a Body of Foot well ordered, must do it with another Body better ordered than they, or it is never to be done.

In the time of Philip Visconti Duke of Milan, 16000 Swizzers having made a descent in∣to Lombardy, Carmignuola the said Dukes General marched against them with about 1000 Horse and some Foot; for not being acquainted with their way of fighting, he thought they would have been sufficient, but having fallen upon them with his Horse, and been repulsed with loss, being a wise man, and one that knew how to frame himself to every accident, he recruited very well, marched against them again, and coming to an engage∣ment, caused all his Cuirassiers to dismount, and at the Head of his Foot, fall on upon the Swizzers, who were not able to resist them. For the Cuirassiers being compleatly arm'd, forced their way into the Body of the Swizzers without any loss, so as their whole Army was defeated, and cut off, and none left alive, but what were preserved by the humanity of Carmignuola. I do not doubt but many people are well enough satisfied in their judg∣ments, that Foot are more serviceable than Horse, yet such is the infelicity of our times, that neither ancient nor modern examples, nor the confession of those who have tryed them are sufficient to prevail with our Princes to correct this Error, or to believe that to give reputation to the Arms of a Province, it is necessary to revive this Order, countenance their Foot, and see them well pay'd; and then doubtless they will repay him by their noble Exploits. But they deviate from this way, as they do from the rest, and therefore no wonder if their Conquests be more to the detriment, than augmentation of their State.

CHAP. XIX.

The Conquests of Commonwealths that are ill governed, and contrary to the Model of the Romans, do conduce more to the ruine, than advancement of their affairs.

THese false opinions of the use and excellence of Horse and Foot, are so rooted in the minds of men, and so confirmed with ill Examples, that no body thinks of refor∣ming our late errors, or restoring the old Discipline of the Romans. Thirty years since who could have persuaded an Italian that 10000 Foot could have assaulted 10000 Horse, and as many Foot, and have beaten them? Yet this was done by the Swizzers at Novara. For though all Histories ring of it, yet none of our people will believe that it is possible to do now, what was anciently done. They object the excellence of our Horse, and say they are so well arm'd, that they are able to repulse not only a Body of Foot, but even a Mountain or Rock; and by these kind of fallacious Arguments, they deceive themselves, not considering that Lucullus with a few Foot defeated 150000 of Tigranes Horse, and yet they had a sort of Cuirassiers among them like ours. This Exploit of Lucullus we have seen acted over again by the Germans in Italy, as if on purpose to convince us of our error. Which if Princes and Common-Wealths could be persuaded to believe, they would commit fewer faults, be more strong against the insults of the Enemy, and not place all their hopes in their Heels, as they do at this day; and those who had the Govern∣ment of any Civil State, would know better how to conduct and manage themselves, ei∣ther as to the enlargement, or conservation of their Dominion, and find, that Leagues and Confederacies, rather than absolute Conquests; sending Colonies into what they had conquered; making publick feuds of the spoils of the Enemy; to infest and perplex the Enemy rather with Excursions, and Battels, than Sieges; to keep the publick rich, and the private poor, and with all possible caution to keep up the Discipline of the Army, are the ways to make a Common-Wealth formidable and great. These are the true ways of enlarging, an Empire; all the rest are uncertain, or pernicious; and if thereby any to whom these ways are not pleasing, they are by any means to lay aside all thoughts of ex∣tending their Dominion; to think only of regulating their Laws at home and providing for their defence, like the little States in Germany, which by so doing have lived in peace and tranquillity for many years together. But how industrious and careful soever we are, in abstaining from injury, or using violence to our Neighbour, some body or other will be injuring us, and it will be impossible to live always in quiet; from which provocation will arise, not only a desire in us, but a necessity of vindicating our selves, and retaliating upon them; and when this desire is once kindled, if our Neighbors do not supply us, with oc∣casion, we can find it at home, as will inevitably fall out where Citizens are opulent and strong. And if the Cities of Germany have continued free, and at peace a long time, it proceeds from a peculiar disposition in that Country, which is scarce to be found any

where else. That part of Germany of which I now speak (like France and Spain) was subject to the Empire of the Romans: But when afterwards that Empire began to decline, and the title of the Empire was removed into that Province, Those that were the wealthiest and most powerful of the Cities (taking advantage of the pusillanimity or distresses of their Emperors) made themselves free, paying only a small annual Rent for the redemption of their Liberties; which being permitted, by degrees all those Cities which held immedi∣ately of the Emperour, and had no dependance upon any body else, redeemed themselves in that manner. Whilst these Cities were imployed in this Traffick with the Emperour, it fell out that several Corporations that belonged to the Duke of Austria, rebelled, and having established their Liberty, they encreased so fast in reputation and wealth, that in∣stead of returning to their subjection to the Duke, they became terrible to all people about them. From hence it is, that in our days this Province is said to consist of the Swizzers, the free Towns, the Princes, and the Emperor. And if in the diversity of their constitu∣tions, no Wars do arise, or at least continue any time, it is from their universal respect and defence to the Emperour, who, though his force be not great, has such reputation among them, that upon any controversie betwixt them, he can easily compose it, and this it is that has kept them quiet so long, that in man's memory they have had little or no trou∣bles, but what hapned betwixt the Swizzers and the House of Austria; and though for many years past, the title of Emperour, has been in the said House; yet has it not been a∣ble to reduce the pertinacy of the Swizzers, though it has attempted it very solemnly. Nor did the rest of the Princes and free Towns in Germany contribute their assistance against the Swizzers, partly because they were favourers of Liberty, and partly because being poor themselves, they had no mind the House of Austria should be rich. Germany being constituted in this ballance, and aequilibrium, it rather reverences than fears the Authority of the Emperour, and is quiet and at peace, because the particular Princes, and States being contented with their own moderate Dominions, and in awe one of another, do forbear those injuries and encroachments which are common in other places; whereas if its constitution was otherwise, the people would certainly think of enlarging as well as their Neighbors, and by consequence interrupt that happy tranquillity which at present they enjoy. In o∣ther Countries where there is not that exact proportion and equality of power betwixt the Princes and free Towns, 'tis not so easie to preserve them in peace; so that those Com∣monwealths which have an ambition of extending their Empire, must do it by confede∣ration, or by the ways of the Romans, and whoever takes any other course, rather ruines, than advantages himself; for new Conquests are prejudicial a thousand ways, and, espe∣cially when your force does not encrease with your Territory, and you are not able to keep what you conquer; and this happens when the expence of an Enterprise is greater than the profit, though it succeeds. This was the case with our Florentines, and the Venetians, who after they had conquered Lombardy and Tuscany, were much weaker than before, when one of them was contented with the Dominion of the Gulf, and the other with a territory of six miles about. We all think of getting what we can, but take no care which way we shall keep it; which is the more inexcusable, because we have the Roman example before our eyes, which we may follow if we please, whereas they had no such ad∣vantage, but wrought all out by their own industry, and wisdom. But there is another way by which new Conquests do a great deal of mischief, and especially to a well ordered Commonwealth; and that is when the City or Province that is conquered, is voluptuous, or effeminate; as it hapned first to the Romans, and then to Hannibal in the Con∣quest of Capua, where the contagion of their ill manners spread it self so suddenly among the Soldiers, that had Capua been farther off, the remedies not so near, or the Romans in the least measure corrupted themselves, that Conquest would have been the ruine of their State: For it was true what Livy told us in these words, Iam tunc minime salubris mili∣tari disciplinae Capua, instrumentum omnium voluptatum, delinitos militum animos aver∣tit a memoria patriae. Capua at that time was no place for Military Discipline; for be∣ing the instrument and contriver of all sorts of sensuality, it debauched the minds of the Sol∣dier from the memory of his Country. And certainly such Cities and Provinces do revenge themselves of their Conqueror without effusion of Blood; for diffusing their ill manners among his people, they become so weak and enervated thereby, that they are at the mer∣cy of whoever assails them: which Iuvenal has excellently well expressed, when he tells us that by their conversation among strangers, the Roman manners were so changed, that instead of their old temperance and parsimony, they were given up wholly to luxury and excess.

—Stevior armis Luxuria incubuit, victum{que} ulciscitur Orbem.

What by the Conquer'd world could never be Reveng'd by force, is done by luxurie.

Things being thus, and even the people of Rome, notwithstanding the excellence of their constitution and discipline, being subject to suffer, and be corrupted by their new acquisi∣tions; what will become of those who have no such virtue nor education to defend them? but besides all the errors above-mentioned, are guilty of another as dangerous as the rest, and that is, by making use in their Wars, not of their own Subjects or Soldiers, but of Auxi∣liaries, and Hirelings.

CHAP. XX.

No Prince, or Commonwealth without manifest danger, can employ foreign Forces, either Auxiliary, or Mercenary.

HAd I not discoursed at large in another place about the inconvenience of Auxiliary or Mer•••••••••••• Forces, in respect of ones own, I would have taken this opportunity to have spoken more of it here, than I shall do now: but having done it already, I shall only touch upon it at present, which I cannot forbear, upon a new occasion which I have met withal in Livr. I call those Forces Auxiliaries, which a Prince or Confederate sends to your assistance under his own Officers, and pay. Of this sort were the two Leg••ons which after the defeat of the Samnites, upon the importunity of the Capu•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 left with them for the security of their City. But those Legions which were intended for the defence of that City, languishing in ease, and wallowing in luxury, began to forget the Disciplne of their Country, and their Reverence to the Senate, and contrive how they might make themselves Masters of the Town, conceiving the Inhabitants unworthy to enjoy those pos∣sessions which they were unable to defend. But this Conspiracy was di••covered in time, and not only prevented, but punished by the Romans, as we shall shew more largly here∣after: At present I shall only say this, that of all Soldiers, none are employed with so much hazard, as your Auxiliaries. For first, neither Soldiers nor Officers receiving pay from you, but from the Prince or State by whom they are sent, they have but little regard either to your interest or authority; but when the War is done, give themselves wholly to pillaging and mischief, and that not only with the Enemy, but their Friends; moved some∣times by their own, and sometimes by the avarice of their Prince. The Romans when they left those Legions at Capua, had no thoughts of breaking their league, or offering them any injury; but the Souldiers being depraved by the licentiousness of the place, and encouraged by the pusillanimity of the Inhabitants, took occasion to conspire, and doubtlesly had they not been prevented, had seized upon the Town. This we could enforce with several other examples, but the case is so plain, I shall content my self with this, and that of the Regini, whose Inhabitants were not only rob'd and dispossessed, but murther'd by a Legion which the Romans sent to them for their security. So then in prudence a Prince or Common∣wealth is to take any course, rather than to bring himself into a necessity of employing Auxiliaries, especially when he is to rely wholly upon them; for no treaty or accommoda∣tion can be made with the Enemy, but shall be more for his advantage, than to entertain such Forces. And if old passages be consulted, and considered together with the new, it will be found that for one time in which they ever did good, there are hundreds in which they have done harm: Nor can an ambitious State or Prince have a more commodious occasion to possess himself of a City or Province, than when he is invited in this manner for its assistance and defence. Wherefore, he whose indiscretion is so great as to make use of such Armies, not only for his defence, but his conquests of other people, takes a course that must necessarily undo him; for he aims at the acquisition of what he cannot keep any longer than his Auxiliaries will give him leave, for they can take it from him when they please: But such is the unhappiness of human ambition, that fixing their eyes only upon present satisfaction, they never think of inconveniences that will follow, whereas if they would reflect upon ancient examples, they would find that the less injurious they

were to their Neighbours, and the more generosity they shew towards them, the more ready would they be to throw themselves into their Arms, as shall be shewn in the next Chapter, by the example of the Capuans.

CHAP. XXI.

The first Praetor which the Romans ever sent out of their own City, was to Capua, and that was 400 years after they began first to make War.

THe People of Rome (as we have said many times before) in the management of their Wars, and the enlargement of their Empire differed much from the methods of our times: For the Cities which they conquered (if they did not think fit to demolish them) were left free, with the exercise of their own Laws, as before, and that without any other mark of subjection, than the subscribing certain Articles of Agreement, and whilst they kept them, they kept their old Priviledges and Dignity. And this Custom they observed till they carried their Arms into Foreign Countries, and began to unravel the Govern∣ments where they conquered, and reduce whole Kingdoms and States into Provinces: This will be clear'd, if we consider that the first Praetor which was ever sent abroad by the Romans, was to Capua; not out of any ambitious design, but at the request of the said Capuans to rectifie and compose some differences, which they could not do among them∣selves. The Antiates following the example of the Capuans, and moved by the same necessity, desired a Praetor likewise, because at that time, as Livy tells us, Non solum arma, sed jura Romana pollebant. Not only the Arms, but the Laws of the Romans were victorious. And this way of lenity in their Government, contributed exceedingly to the enlargement of their Empire; for those Cities or States which have been accustomed to their own Li∣berty and Laws, do more easily submit to a Dominion that seems remote and at a distance (though indeed it may have something of servitude in it) than to that which is always be∣fore their Eyes, and keeps them in perpetual apprehension of slavery; and there is this ad∣vantage besides, That if in the administration of Justice, or the management of publick affairs, any thing be acted to the displeasure of the people, it has less infamous reflection upon the Prince who leaves them to their own Customs and Laws, than upon him who sets up Magistrates of his own, and dispatches all things by them; and this way takes off a great deal of hatred and calumny from the Prince, which would otherwise fall heavily up∣on him. Of the certainty of this opinion, we have a fresh instance in Italy; every body knows that Genoua was oftentimes in the possession of the French, and that that King (excepting of late years) used always to send thither a Governor of his own; at present, (the necessity of his affairs requiring it) he has given them the election of their own Go∣vernor, and it is constantly a Genouese. No body questions but this way is most pleasing to the City, and by consequence their affections must be much enlarged to the King. For it is the Nature of Mankind (and inseparable from it) to trust those with more frankness, who are least like to oppress them; and to fear those least, who are most merciful and humane. This gentleness and familiarity in the Romans prevailed so far upon the Capuans, that they made it their solemn request, that they would send them a Praetor, which if the Ro∣man austerity had but pretended to have done, they would not only have refused, but used all means to have freed themselves from them. But what need we go to Rome and Capua for examples, when we have them at home? Every one knows how long it is since Pistoia threw it self voluntarily into the Arms of the Florentines: Every one knows the jealou∣sies and emulations that were betwixt them and the Florentines, Pisans, Lucchesi, and Sa∣nesi: and this diversity of humours proceeded not from any neglect in the Pistoians of their affairs, or from any disesteem they had of their liberty, more than the others; but from an ancient experience they had had of the affection and tenderness of the Florentines, and that was the true cause why they threw themselves under their protection; whereas carrying themselves more severely to the rest, they were so far from coming in, and sub∣mitting to their jurisdiction, that they did what they could, and tryed all ways possible to disclaim it. And doubtless had the Florentines, by their Leagues, or supplies comported themselves with more kindness to their Neighbors, and not incensed them by their austeri∣ties, they had been Masters of all Tuscany at this hour; Not but that Arms and Severity are to be used upon occasion, but mild ways are to be tryed first, and extremities only in extremity.

CHAP. XXII.

How uncertain the judgments of most People are, in things of greatest importance.

HOw false and erroneous the opinions of men are, all persons can testifie who have any conversation in their Counsels; which unless managed by persons of more than ordinary sagacity, are for the most part contrary to the truth. And because men of these excellent qualifications, in corrupted States (especially in times of peace) by reason of the envy or ambition of other people, are subject to be hated; such Counsels are fre∣quently followed, as the deluded Commons think best, or such as are recommended by those who are more solicitous of the favour, than the benefit of the people: But their errors being discovered in the time of their adversity, necessity directs them to those per∣sons whom in the time of prosperity they dispised, as shall be shown at large in conve∣nient place. Moreover humane consultations are subject to certain accidents by which men are frequently deluded, unless their experience be more than ordinary, which acci∣dents are apt by their likelyhood and probability to persuade people to whatever they de∣sire. This I mention, in consideration of the advice of Numisius the Proetor (after the Latins were defeated by the Romans) and of what was not long since generally believed when Francis I. of France invaded Milan, which was defended by the Swizzers. For Lewis XII. being dead, and Francis d' Angolesme succeeding in that kingdom, he had a great design of recovering Milan, which not many years before had been taken from them by the Swizzers, at the encouragement of Iulius II. To facilitate his Enterprize, he made it his business to gain a party in Italy, and having made sure of the Venetians, he addressed himself to the Florentines, and Pope Leo X. conceiving it would be a great corroboration to his affairs if he could make them, seeing the Forces of the King of Spain were in Lom∣bardy, and the Emperours at Verona. Pope Leo could not be brought to consent, being persuaded (as is said) by his Counsel, that if he kept himself Neuter, he should be cer∣tain of Victory; for it was not for the interest of the Church, that either the King of France, or the Swizzers should be too potent in Italy; but he who would restore it to its ancient Liberty, must deliver it from the servitude both of the one and the other: And because both of them together were not to be dealt withal, nor indeed either of them a∣part, as things stood then; occasion was to be expected, and they were to attend till the King of France and Swizzers had fought, and one of them beaten the other, and then before the Conquerour had recruited, or recovered what he had lost in the Battel, the Pope and his Friends should fall upon him, and so both of them be expulsed. It was impossi∣ble he should ever have a fairer opportunity; for the Enemy were both of them in the Field, and the Popes Army strong upon the borders of Lombardy (under pretence of secu∣ring the Territories of the Church) where it might attend the event of the Battel, which the vigor, and strength of both Armies portended would be bloody, and when they had destroyed one another, and were both of them weaken'd, then might his Army fall securely upon them, possess it self of Lombardy, and govern all Italy as he pleased himself. These were the Counsels which were given his Holiness, and at first they seemed solid enough, but how vain they prov'd afterwards, the event did clearly demonstrate; for the Swizzers after a long and bloody Fight being defeated the Popes and the King of Spains Forces were so far from taking that opportunity of falling upon the French (as they had promised them∣selves) That they prepared to run away, nor would that have secured them, had not they been befriended by the humanity (not to say laziness) of the King of France, who con∣tenting himself with one Victory, never regarded a second, but strook up a Peace with the Pope: And truly at a distance these Counsels seem'd not unreasonable, though in reality they were irrational and idle; for the Conqueror seldom loses many men, what he loses is in the Fight, and the greatest part of the execution is in the pursuit; but grant a Battel is a long time before it be decided (which notwithstanding happens but seldom) and that many are slain and disabled of the conquering side, yet the reputation of Victory gives the Con∣queror such esteem, and strikes such awe and terror into all people, as transcends the consi∣deration of any loss he can sustain: so that he is in an egregious error, who thinks a victo∣rious Army may be the more easily overcome by reason of the prejudice it received in the Fight; for 'tis madness to attempt such an Army with a less number, than you would have engaged it before; because their late fortune will add to their courage. This appeared by

the experience of the Latins; by the Counsel of Numisius the Praetor; and by the losses of the people who followed it. For the Romans having beaten the Latins with much ado, and such slaughter of their own men, that they seemed to have got nothing of a Victory but the Name; Numisius proclaimed it up and down, that then was the time to recover their liberty, and that if with new Forces they fell suddenly upon the Romans, before they were recruited, or had any expectation of being invaded, they would certainly be over∣thrown: Upon which the Latins believing him, raised a new Army, and fell upon the Romans, but they were presently defeated, and suffered the inconvenience, to which all people are subject that follow such Counsels.

CHAP. XXIII.

How the Romans upon any accident which necessitated them to give judgment upon their Subjects, avoided always the mid way.

JAm Latio is status erat rerum, ut ne{que} bellum ne{que} pacem pati possent. The Latins were now in such a condition, that they were neither fit for War nor Peace. And what Livy said of Latium, is true every where else; That Prince or Commonwealth is at the highest pitch of unhappiness, which is in such a condition, as that he can neither receive Peace, nor maintain War: And this happens, when people are conquered, and necessitated to submit upon such hard terms as in their hearts they disdain, or else (to go on with the War) are constrained to implore their assistance, who will make them a prey. The ways by which we are brought into so sad a condition, are commonly ill Counsels, for want of just consideration of our affairs, both as to Mony and Men. For that Commonwealth or Prince who takes right measures in those, shall very hardly fall into the d••••••resses of the Latins, who accepted the condition of the Romans when they should have refused them; and declared War against the Romans when they should have desired a Peace; so that as they ordered the matter, the enmity and amity of the Romans did equally afflict them. The first that overcame them was Manlius Torquatus, and after him Camillus, who seized upon all their Cities, and putting Garisons in them, return'd to Rome, and in his account to the Senate acquainted them, that the whole Country of the Latins was then in their hands. And because the Sentence and Judgment of the Senate at that time upon the Latins is more than ordinarily remarkable; That it may be readier for the imitation of Princes when occasion is offered, I shall set down the ••••rds which Livy makes Camillus speak, which confirm what we have said about the ways which the Romans observed in the enlargement of their Empire; and shows, that in their determinations in matters of State, they left the middle ways, and followed only the extreams. For Government is nothing but keeping Subjects in such a posture as that they may have no will, or power to offend you. And this is done either by taking away all means from them of doing you any hurt; or by obliging and indulging them so, as they may not in reason hope to better their for∣tune; all which will appear, first by Camillus his Speech to the Senate, and then by their resolution upon it. His words were these, Dii immortales ita vos potentes hujus Consilii fecerunt, ut sit Latium, an non sit, in vestra manu posuerint. Ita{que} pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos attinet, parare in perpetuum, vel soeviendo, velignoscendo potestis. Vult is crudeliter consulere in debitos victos{que}? licet delere omne Latium. Vultis exemplo Majorum augere rem Romanam, victos in Civitatem accipiendo? Materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppet it. Certe id firmissimum imperium est, quo obedientes gaudent. Illorum igitur animos dum Ex∣pectatione stupent, seu poen••, seu beneficio praeoccupari opportet. The Gods have put it into the power of this Reverend Council, to determine whether the Latins shall be a people, or not. As to them, your peace will be perpetual, which way soever you take; Are you disposed to severity, and will destroy those poor people that are conquered, and your Prisoners? They are at your mercy, and you may extinguish their very name. Are you disposed according to the example of your Ancestors to propagate your interest by receiving them into your City? You have an opportunity of doing it with the highest advantage and glory. Certainly no Empire is so firm, as where Subjects exsult in their obedience. It will be expedient therefore, whilst they are in amazement and suspence, to settle their minds one way, either by punishment or pardon. According to the Consuls proposal, the Senate came to an issue, and gave sentence Town by Town, according to the Nature of their deserts; but all in extreams, without any me∣diocrity; for some they not only pardoned, but loaded them with benefits, made them f••••e of their own City, and gave them many other priviledges, and exemptions, and the•••• ••y

secured them not only from Rebelling, but from ever conspiring again. The rest whom they thought fit to make examples, were brought Prisoners to Rome, punish'd with all kind of severity, Their Houses destroyed, their Lands confiscated, their Persons dispersed, so as it was not possible for them any way to do any mischief for the future. This was the way the Romans took in the settlement of Latium, which ought to be observed and imitated by all wise Princes and States; and if the Florentines had followed it in the year 1502. when Arezzo and the whole Valley of Chiana rebelled, they had continued their Authority, aug∣mented their State, and supplyed themselves with those Fields which they wanted for their subsistance. But they took the middle way (betwixt the extreams of rigour and remis∣sion) which is always most dangerous; they kept the City, removed the Magistrates, de∣graded the great Men, banished some, and executed others. If any in their Councils ad∣vised to have the City demolished, it was answered, It could not be done without dishonor and rexection upon their own; as if Florence was so weak and inconsiderable, it was not able to keep a Garrison in Arezzo. This Argument was of that sort which carry some appearance, but are not really true. 'Tis much as if we should argue a Parricide or Felon, or other egregious Malefactor, is not to be put to death, lest it should be thought the Prince or Republick was too impotent to restrain them any other way. But those who are of that opinion are to consider, that when a private person, or whole City offends so highly against his Prince, or his Government; To make them examples to other people, and bridle them so as they may be sure to be no more guilty for the future, the surest way is utterly to destroy them; and it is more honourable for a Prince to extirpate them quite at once, than to endeavour to preserve them with a thousand difficulties and dangers: For whoever he be that knows not how to punish his delinquents according to the merits of their offences, and so as to secure himself for the future, is either a weak, or a poor spirited Prince. To con∣firm what is said, we may produce another example of the Romans, in their Sentence upon the Privernates; from whence (as Livy says) two things are to be concluded; one is, that Rebels are to be pardoned frankly, and obliged; or utterly extinguished. The other that generosity of mind, and steddiness and constancy in our answers when given to wise men, make strangely for our advantage. The Roman Senate was assembled to give Sentence up∣on the Privernates who had been in Rebellion, and being reduced by force of Arms, had sent several of their chief Citizens to implore the mercy of the Romans: being brought into the Senate (where every body was persuading according to his inclination, some for mercy, and some for severity) one of the Senators (before they could come to a resolution) ask'd one of the Petitioners, Quam poenam meritos Privernates censeret. What punishment he thought his fellow Citizens deserved: To which he replyed, Eam quam merentur qui se libertate dignos censent, The same that they deserve, who desire to be free. The Senator continuing, Quid si poenam remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vobiscum speremus? If we should pardon you this time, what peace could we hope for from you? To which he answer∣ed, Si bonam dederitis, & fide lem & perpetuam; si malam, haud diuturnam. If it be upon good terms, it will be firm and perpetual; if upon ill, it will hardly last long. Upon which the better part of the Senate (though some opposed it) declared, Se audivisse vocem liberi & viri; nec credi posse illum populum aut hominem deni{que} in ea conditione cujus eum paeniteat, diutius quam necesse sit mansurum. Ibi pacem esse fidam, ubi voluntarii pacati sint, ne{que} eo loco ubi servitutem esse velint, fidem sperandam. That he had spoke like a man, and like a Free-man. That it was not to be imagined any people or private person would submit to a condition that oppress'd him, longer than by necessity he was constrained. That if any peace be lasting and inviolable, it is where the parties do voluntarily subscribe, not where servitude and slavery is imposed. And thereupon it was decreed, that the Privernates should be Civitate donati, and enjoy all the Priviledges of the Romans, concluding, Eos qui nihil praeterquam de libertate cogitant dignos esse qui Romani fiant. That they deserved to be Ro∣mans, whose liberty was the greatest part of their care. And this frank and generous way of answering, took mightily with those grave men, as knowing that whatever they had said otherwise, would not have been from the heart, but with compliance and submission to their fortune and distress. And this is most certain, whoever speaks otherwise (especially if either he has been or but thought himself free) does but equivocate, and he that be∣lieves him, takes wrong Counsels, such as are neither good for himself, nor satisfactory to them, which many times produces Rebellion, and the ruine of the State, And things being so, we conclude, according to our proposition in the beginning of our discourse; That upon any great Sentence to be given against a people or City that has been formerly free, the surest way is, to wave all moderation, and either to caress or extinguish them. He that proceeds otherwise, will find himself in an error, as the Samnites were, when ha∣ving enclosed the Romans ad Turcas Caudinas, they neither discharged them freely, nor

put them to the Sword, as one of their grave Citizens advised; but abused them, and pil∣laged them, and dismissed them sub jugum when they had done. But not long after, they were made sensible of their error, and that the old Citizen was in the right; as we shall show more at large hereafter.

CHAP. XXIV.

That in the generality, Castles and Citadels, do more mischief than good.

TO the States-men of our times, it may perhaps seem indiscretion or inadvertancy in the Romans, that being desirous to keep Latium, and Privernum in subjection, they built neither Castles nor Citadels to secure them: and indeed they differed exceedingly from our Florentine Politicians, who are of opinion that not only Pisa, but all other Cities whatever are to be kept under that way, and surely had the Romans been like us, they would have been of the same opinion; but differing in their courage, their judgment, and their power, they differed likewise in their resolutions. Nor during all the time of their liberty, were the Româns known to build any Castle or Citadel to keep any City in awe, or any Province in peace; only some indeed which were fortified before, they garrisoned, and continued; which being so, and quite contrary to the Sentiment of our times, I think it not amiss, if in this place I inquire whether such things be profitable or unprofitable to the persons who build them. It is therefore to be considered, that such Fortresses are erected, either to repel an Enemy, or restrain a Subject, and keep him in obedience. In the first case I do pronounce them unnecessary; in the second dangerous. They are dangerous, and do rather obstruct than promote obedience in the Subject; because the great danger of Rebellion proceeds from hatred which the people have conceived against their Prince, that hatred proceeds from his injustice to the people, and he is said to be unjust when he governs them arbitrarily, and by force, which is never so manifest, as when he builds such Ca∣stles and Citadels among them, that no man might be able in any manner to oppose him. Which being so, those kind of Fortifications are not only useless and improper to keep the Subject in subjection; but dangerous, seeing by presumption upon them, Princes are en∣couraged to treat their Subjects worse than otherwise they would do, by which they con∣tract the odium of the people; and what is the consequence? Rebellion and Blood, and Confusion: Neither when troubles arise, and Wars break out, is there that defence or security in them, as is now adays imagined; for there are only two ways of keeping a conquered people in obedience, you must either have a standing Army (as the Romans had) always ready to subdue them; or you must divide, disperse, or destroy them in such manner, that they may never get together again to disturb you: For though you impo∣verish and plunder them never so much, Spoliatis arma supersunt, They will find Arms to revenge themselves; and if you disarm them never so carefully, Furor arma, ministrat. Their fury will supply them. If you cut off their Commanders, like Hydra's, others will succeed, and do as much mischief: If you build these Castles, in time of Peace they may be serviceable, and make you more bold, and secure against your Subjects; but when War comes, and both your Subjects and Enemies infest you, it is impossible they should defend you against both. And if ever they were useless, it is now since the use of Artille∣ry is known, against the fury of which no little Fort (from whence other Guns cannot play with security again, and where they want ground for repairing their breaches, or ma∣king new retrenchments upon occasion) can possibly stand: and being so, consider serious∣ly with your self whether these kind of Fortresses are like to keep your old Subjects, or your new Conquests in obedience? If your Territory be hereditary, and you have received it from your Ancestors, to build Castles to keep your own natural Subjects in obedience, will be to little purpose, for the reasons abovesaid, seeing they will be but a means to make you and your posterity the more Tyrannical, and by consequence expose you to the hatred of the people, against which they will be afterwards unable to defend you. So that for these reasons, that neither he himself nor his heirs may have occasion to entrench too much upon the people; and the people have no occasion to abhor him, a wise Prince will never build Citadels; and though Francesco Sforza Duke of Milan was reputed a wise Man, and built a Citadel at Milan to secure his Usurpations, yet his wisdom did not appear in that, for it proved afterwards the ruine of his posterity. For presuming upon that, they took the more confidence to oppress the people, which incensed them so highly, that they re∣volted upon the first approach of an Enemy, and turned their Prince out of that Province.

So that that Citadel did him no good in time of War against the incursions of the Enemy; and in time of Peace, making him more insolent, it did but expose him to the hatred of the people; whereas if no Citadel had been built, and yet they had been so indiscreet as to have behaved themselves insolently to their Subjects, some or other of them who had been injured would have remonstrated to their Prince, the danger of his courses, before he had contracted the general odium; by which there would have been a possibility that he might have reform'd, and reconciled himself to his Subjects; and had he done so, he would have better defended himself against the French with the affections of his people, and no Citadel; than with a Citadel, and no affections of the people. Besides there are many ways of losing these Citadels; by force, by fraud, by corrupting the Governour, by starving, and by storm. And if you have lost a City, which you are in hopes of recovering by the favour of the Citadel, which still holds out for you; it will require an Army as much as if there were no Citadel at all; and so much the stronger, by how much 'tis probable the people may be more incensed from the mischief which they have received out of the Castle, than they would have been, had there been no Castle at all. Experience it self has since taught us that that Citadel of Milan was of no advantage, either to the Dukes of Milan, nor French in time of their adversity; but in time of Peace did them much prejudice, by hindring them from taking such ways as might have obliged the peo∣ple, and rendered them well affected to their Government. Guido Ubaldo Son to Fred••ric Duke of Urbin, was a great Captain as any in his time, being driven out of his Country by Coesar Borgia (Son to Alexander VI.) and recovering it afterwards by an accident, he caused all the Fortresses in the whole Province to be dismantled, and destroyed; as things which he had found by experience were more to his prejudice than security. For being beloved by the people, he would not do them the injury to put Garisons in them; and if he had, upon any invasion from the Enemy, he could not have kept them without a field Army to relieve them. Iulius the Pope, having driven the Bentivogli out of Bononia, built a Citadel there, and put in such a Governour as partly by his own ill nature, and partly by the instructions o•• his Master, killed many of the Citizens, and committed seve∣ral cruelties, which provoked the Bononians so exceedingly, that they rebelled, and reco∣vered the Citadel, which had the Governour been more moderate, might have been longer in his power. Nicolo de Castello Father of the Vitelli, (returning into his Country, from whence he had been banished by the Popes) immediately demolished two Fortresses which had been raised by Sixtus IV. as judging the hearts of the people more like than those Castles, to secure him. But of all, there is no example, evinces the unusefulness of these kind of Garisons, and the convenience of taking them away, more than that which hapned lately at Genoa; for the said City revolting from Lewis XII. of France, in the year 1507. Lewis came with a strong Army into Italy, and having reduced it, built a Castle of greater strength and capacity than any of that time; for it was built upon a promontory that Com∣manded the Sea called Godefa, the Harbour, and the Town, so that by all people it was held inexpugnable. But the French being driven out of Italy in the year 1512. Genoa rebelled (notwithstanding the Castle) and Ottanio Fegosa taking the Government upon him, in sixteen months brought the Castle to such extremity, that it was forced to surren∣der; whereupon, though he was advised to keep it as a refuge in case of any disaster; yet being a wise man, and knowing well that a Prince is in nothing so safe, as in the affections of his Subjects, he caused it to be demolished, and he found the benefit of that Counsel, for by it he has held that Government to this day; and that so strongly, that whereas be∣fore, the appearance of a thousand Foot was sufficient at any time to have carried it; his adversaries assaulted it with ten thousand, and could do him no wrong. So that we see the demolishing de Fegosa no hurt, and the making it did the King of France no good; for when he was able to bring an Army into Italy, he was able to recover Genoa without the help of the Castle; but when he could bring no Army, he could not keep it, though the Castle was for him: From whence it follows, that as the building of it, was a great expence, and the loss of it a great dishonour to the King of France; so the taking of it was great glory to Ottaviano, and the ruining it, a great advantage. And it is the same thing with those who build them in their new Conquests, to keep their new subjects in obedience, which if the example of Genoa and the French should be insufficient to prove, the Cities of Florence and Pisa, will do it effectually. The Florentines built a Citadel at Pisa, and several other Fortresses to keep it in aw; not considering that a City which had been free, and in continual emulation of the Florentine greatness, was not any other way to be kept to its duty, unless (according to the practice of the Romans) they made a fair and honourable league with it, or utterly subverted it. But how much those Fortresses answered their designs, appeared when Charles VIII. made his Expedition into Italy, to

whom they were generally surrendered, either thorow the fear or falshood of their Go∣vernors. So that had not they been built, the Florentines had never relyed so much upon them for the keeping of Pisa, but had thought of some safer way to have secured it against the King of France. I conclude then, that to keep ones own Native Country in subje∣ction, Fortresses are dangerous, and to keep new Conquests, they are ineffectual: To prove that the authority and practice of the Romans ought to be sufficient, who whenever they had a mind to restrain the power, and bridle the fury of the people, did it not by erecting new Fortresses, but by demolishing the old. If it be objected that Tarentum of old, and Brescia of late years were recovered by the fidelity of the Castles, when the Towns had revolted. I answer, that as to the recovery of Tarentum, the Castle contributed no∣thing, for the Consul Quintus Fabius was sent thither with an Army strong enough to have retaken it, had there been no Castle at all: and, what advantage was it to the Romans that the Castle held for them, if the recovery of the Town required a Consular Army, and the presence of so great a Soldier as Fabius Maximus; and that they might have retaken it without the help of the Castle, is clear in the example of Capua, which they recovered, when there was no Castle to befriend them. In the case of Brescia, the circumstances were very extraordinary; for it seldom happens that when a City revolts, and the Castle holds out for you, That the Castle has a field Army hard by, and ready to relieve you. Monsieur de Foix General for the King of France, being with his Army at Bologna, and understanding the desection of the Brescians, marched immediately to recover it, and in three days time (by the help of the Castle) was Master of it again. So that it was not wholly by the benefit of the Castle that Brescia was recovered, but by the presence and dextery of Mon∣sieur de Foix and his Army. And this example may be sufficient to ballance all others to the contrary; for we see daily in our times, multitudes of Castles taken and retaken, and following the fate of their Cities, and that with no more difficulty or variety of fortune, than when there are none at all; as has been visible in Lombardy, Romagna, the Kingdom of Naples, and all other quarters of Italy. And as to those Citadels which are built in your new Conquests, to defend you from your Enemies abroad; they also are absolutely unnecessary, where you have an Army in the field; and where you have none, they are of no use. A good Army without any such Forts, is sufficient to defend you. And this has been found by experience by all those who have been thought excellent in the Arts of War, or of Peace; and particularly by the Romans and Spartans: The Romans never erected any new Castles, and the Spartans never suffered any old; but what Cities soever they conquered, down went their Walls; nay, even in their own Cities they would not permit any fortification, as believing nothing so proper to defend them as the virtue and courage of their Citizens. A Spartan being demanded by an Athenian, Whether the Walls of Athens were not very beautiful? Yes, says the Spartan, if it was but inhabited by Women. A Prince therefore who has a good Army in the field, may have some benefit by his Castles, if they be upon the Frontiers of his Country, or in some places upon the Coast, where they may ••etard and entertain an Enemy for some time till the Army can come up: But if the Prince has no Army on foot, let his Castles be where they will, upon the Frontiers or elsewhere, they are either unserviceable or dangerous: dangerous, because they are easily lost, and made use of by the Enemy against you; or if they be too strong to be taken, yet the Enemy marches on, and leaves them unserviceable behind him. For an Army that has no Enemy in the field to confront it, takes no notice of Cities or Castles, but passing by as it pleases, rambles up and down, and ravages the whole Country; as may be observed both in ancient History and new. Francesco Maria not many years since invaded the Dutchy of Urbin, nor concern'd himself at all, though he left ten of his Enemies Cities behind him. Wherefore that Prince who has a good Army, need not stand upon Castles; and he that has no Castles, need not trouble himself to build any; all that he is to do, is, to fortifie the Town of his own residence as well as he can, and accustom the Citizens to Arms, that he may be able to sustain an Enemy, at least for a while, till he can make his conditions, or procure relief; All other designs are expensive in times of Peace; and unprofitable in time of War; so that he who considers what has been said, must acknowledge that as the Romans were wise in every thing else, so more particularly in their affairs with the Latins, and Privernates, in not thinking of Castles and Fortresses, but of more noble and generous ways of securing their allegiance.

CHAP. XXV.

To attempt a City full of intestine divisions, and to expect to carry it thereby, is uncertain and dangerous.

THe divisions in the Commonwealth of Rome were so great betwixt the People and the Nobility, that the Veientes and Hetrusci, taking the opportunity, conspired its destruction, and having raised an Army, and harrassed their whole Country, the Senate sent out G. Manlius, and M. Fabius against them; whose Army encamping near the Enemy, were so provoked by the insolence of their language, that the Romans laid aside their private animosities, and coming to a Battel overthrew them; by which we may ob∣serve how easily we erre in our Counsels, and how we lose things many times the same way by which we intended to gain them. The Veientes thought by assaulting the Romans whilst they were embroil'd in their intestine divisions, they should certainly overcome them; and their invading them at that time, united the Enemy, and ruined themselves; and not without reason, for the occasion of discord and faction in a Commonwealth is idleness, and peace; and there is nothing unites like apprehension, and War. So that had the Veientes been wise as they should have been, they should have forborn making War upon them at that time, and have tryed other artificial ways to have destroyed them. The surest way is to insinuate, and make your self a Mediator betwixt them, and to take upon your self the arbitration, rather than they should come to blows. When it is come to that, you are privately and gently to supply the weaker side; to foment and continue the War, till they consume one another; but be sure your supplies be not too great, lest both parties begin to suspect you, and believe your design is to ruine them both, and make your self Prince. If this way be well managed, it will certainly bring you to the end which you desired; for when both sides are weary, they will commit themselves to your arbitration. By these Arts, the City of Pistoia returned to its dependance upon Florence; for labouring under intestine divisions, the Florentines favouring first one side, and then the other (but so slily that no occasion of jealousie was given to either) brought them both in a short time to be weary of their distractions, and throw themselves unanimously into their arms. The Government of the City of Siena had never been changed by their own domestick dissentions, had not the Florentines supplied both parties under-hand, and fomented them that way, whereas had they appeared openly and above board, it would have been a means to have united them. I shall add one example more, Philip Visconti Duke of Milan made War many times upon the Florentines, hoping by the dissentions of the City to have con∣quered them the more easily, but he never succeeded. So that complaining one time of his misfortunes, he had this Expression, The follies of the Florentines have cost me two millions of Mony, to no purpose. In short, as the Veientes and Tuscans found themselves in an error (when they thought by help of the differences in Rome, to have mastered the Romans) and were ruined themselves for their pains. So it will fare with whoever takes that way to oppress or subvert any other Government.

CHAP. XXVI.

He who contemns or reproaches another person, incurs his hatred, without any advantage to himself.

I Look upon it as one of the greatest points of discretion in a man, to forbear injury and threatning, especially in words: neither of them weakens the Enemy, but threatning makes him more cautious, and injury the more inveterate, and industrious to revenge it. This is manifest by the example of the Veienti (of which I discoursed in the foregoing Chapter) for not contenting themselves with the mischiefs that they brought upon them by the War, they added contumely and opprobrious language, which so provoked and enflamed the Roman Army, that whereas before they were irresolute, and seemed to decline it, they now fell upon them unanimously, and over-threw them. So that it ought to be the principal care in an Officer that neither himself nor his Soldiers do incense and exaspe∣rate his Enemy by ill language; for that makes him but the more so, does not at all hinder him from revenging himself, but does the Author more mischief than the Enemy. And

of this we have a notable example in Asia. Gabades the Persian General having besieged Amida a long time, without any considerable progress; weary of the tediousness of the Leaguer, and hopeless of success, he resolved to draw off and be gone; but as he was raising his Camp, the Garison perceiving it, got all upon the Walls, and with the basest and most provoking circumstances imaginable upbraided them with Cowardize; which nettled Gabedes in such manner, that he changed his Counsels, sate down again, and ply'd it with that industry and indignation, that he took it in few days, and gave it up to the fury of the Soldier. The same thing hapned to the Veienti (as I said before) who not co••tenting themselves to make War upon the Romans, went up under their very Noses to reproach them; and what followed? they irritated them so, that they settled the courage, and united the animosities of the Roman Army, and put them into so high a sit of impa∣tience, that they forced the Consul to a Battel, in which the Veientes received the reward of their contumacy. He therefore who is General of an Army, or Governour of a Com∣monwealth, and commands or governs discreetly, ••hkes particular care that such ill lan∣guage be not used either in the City or Army, to one another, nor to the Enemy: For to an Enemy, they make him but worse, unless such remedies be applyed, as are practised by wise men. The Romans having left two of their Legions at Capoua, they conspired against the Capouans (as shall be described more largely hereafter) which occasioned a great sedition, but it was afterwards appeased by Valerius Corvinus, and among other things necessary in that juncture, an Act of Oblivion was passed, with great penalty to any man that should upbraid any of the Soldiers by their Sedition. Tiberius Grachus having the command of a certain number of Servants (in the time of Hanibal's Wars) which the scarcity of men, had forced the Romans to Arm, made it no less than death for any man to reproach them by their servitude. So mindful were the Roman Officers always of pre∣venting such exprobration, as knowing that nothing provokes and incenses a man so high∣ly as to have his imperfections rip'd up, whether in earnest, or in jest, 'tis the same thing. Nam facetiae asperae, quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem sui memoriam relinquunt; for biting, raillery, especially with a tincture of truth, leaves an ill impression upon the Memory.

CHAP. XXVII.

Wise Princes, and well governed States ought to be contented with victory; for many times whilst they think to push things forward, they lose all.

THat we use our Enemy with rude and dishonorable language, proceeds either from in∣solence upon some victory past or extraordinary confidence of obtaining it, which being false, perplexes our understanding, and makes us err not only in our words, but our actions. For from the time that error seizes upon our judgments, it makes us many times lose the occasion of a certain good, in hopes of a better that is but uncertain, which is a point not unworthy our consideration, seeing thereby our reason is disturbed, and our State many times brought in danger of ruine; and this I shall demonstrate by examples both ancient and modern, because arguments cannot do it so distinctly. Hanibal after he had defeated the Romans at Cannas, sent Messengers to Carthage with the news of his Vi∣ctory, and to desire Supplies. The Senate was a long time in Counsel what was to be done, Annon, a grave and solid Citizen being present, advised them to make wise use of their Victory, and think of making Peace with the Romans, which they might do upon better conditions, now they were Conquerors, than they were in reason to expect upon any disaster. That the Carthaginians had satisfied the whole world that they were able to ba∣lance the Romans; for they had fought with them, and beaten them; and having gone so far with honour and success, they ought not (at least in his judgment) expose what they had got, and by hoping for more, run a hazard of losing all: But this Counsel was not followed, though afterwards, when too late, it was found to be the better.

Alexander the great had conquered all the East, when the Commonwealth of Tyre (a great Town situate like Venice in the water) amazed at the grandeur of Alexander, sent Embassadors to him to offer him their obedience and subjection upon what terms he pleased, only they were unwilling either himself, or any of his Army should come into their Town. Alexander disdaining to be excluded by a private City, to whom the whole world had opened their Gates; rejected their offers, sent their Embassadors back, and went im∣mediately to besiege it. The Town stood in the Sea, and was well provided both with

Victual and Ammunition; insomuch as at four months end Alexander began to consider that that single Town had deprived his glory of more time, than many other of his Con∣quests of much greater importance: Whereupon he resolved to come to an agreement with them, and to grant them the conditions which they demanded at first; but the Tyrians transported with pride, not only refused his proffers, but put his Messengers to death; upon which in a rage Alexander caused it to be assaulted immediately, and it was done with that fury, that the Town was taken and sack'd, and part of the people put to the Sword, and the rest made slaves. In the year 1512. a Spanish Army came into the Dominions of the Florentines to restore the Medici in Florence, and tax the City; and they were called in, and conducted by the Citizens themselves, who had promised, that as soon as they appeared in those parts, they would take Arms, and declare for them; being entered in the plain, and finding no body to joyn with them, or supply them, scarcity of provisions prevailed with the Spaniard to think of a Treaty, and propose it to the Enemy, but the Florentines were too high, and re••used it, which was the loss of Prato, and the ruine of their State. So then a Prince that is attack'd by another Prince more potent than himself, cannot be guilty of a greater error, than to refuse an agreement, especially when it is offered; for it can never be so bad, but it shall have in it something of advantage for him who accepts it, and perhaps contribute to his Victory. It ought therefore to have satisfied the people of Tyre, that Alexander accepted of the conditions which he had formerly denyed them; and it had been Victory enough for them, that with Arms in their hands they had forced so great a Conqueror to condescend. It was the same case with the Florentines; they ought to have been contented, and thought it honour enough that the Spanish Army complyed, and was reduced to a condition of granting part of their desires, though they would not gratifie them in all; for it was plain, the design of that Army was to change the Govern∣ment; to break their league with the French; and to raise what Money upon them they could. Though of these three points, they had obtained the two last, and the first alone had remained entire to the Florentines (that is to say, the Government of the City) every Citizen (besides the security of his life) would have had some honour and satisfaction, without concerning themselves so much for the loss of the other two. And though by the posture of their affairs their success seem'd to be certain; yet they ought not to have ex∣posed things to the discretion of Fortune, seeing their all was at stake, which no wise man will hazard but upon inevitable necessity. Hanibal having left Italy, where he had been sixteen years together with a great deal of honour, being called home to the relief of his own Country, found Asdrubal and Siphax defeated; the Kingdom of Numidia lost; The Carthaginians retired, and coop'd up within the circumference of their own walls, so as they had no hopes but in Hanibal and his Army. Hanibal being sensible that this was the last cast, and that if he miscarried, his Country was quite lost, resolved to put nothing to a hazard, till he had tryed all other ways; and was not ashamed to make the first overture of a Peace, as knowing that if there was any hopes left for his Country, it was in that, rather than War; but being refused, he resolved to fight (though with very little hopes) supposing he might possibly win the day, or if he did lose it, it should not be without leaving some testimony of his courage and generosity. If then Hanibal, a person of that great Experience and Conduct, at the head of a great Army, chose rather to have had things determined by treaty and accommodation, than Battel; upon the loss of which, the wealth and liberty of his Country depended: what is he to do, who has not his courage nor experience? But men are subject to strange and imaginary hopes, upon which reposing with too much confidence, they take their measures amiss, and are many times ruined.

CHAP. XXVIII.

How much it is for the interest of all Governments that all injury be punished, whether against the publick, or particular persons.

IT is easily known to what men are often transported by choler and indignation, by what hapned to the Romans, when they sent the three Fabii Embassadors towards the Gauls, who were entered into Tuscany, and had laid siege to Clusium. For the Clusians being besieged, sent to the Romans to relieve them, and the Romans sent to the French to require them in the name of the people of Rome, to withdraw their forces out of Tuscany; The Roman Embassadors arrived at the Army, but being better Soldiers than Orators,

when the Armies came to engage, they put themselves at the head of the Clusians, to fight against the French, which being observed by the French, turn'd all their former hatred to the Tuscans, upon the Romans, which was much encreased after they had sent Embassa∣dors to complain of it at Rome, and to require that those who had committed that fault, might be delivered up into their hands, to make satisfaction for their offence. But instead of granting their demands, or punishing their delinquency themselves, they were created Tribunes with Consular authority. Which coming afterwards to the Ears of the French, finding those persons advanced, who ought rather to have been punished, they interpre∣ted it as done in affront to them, and being enflamed with anger and disdain, they marched directly to Rome, assaulted and took it, all but the Capitol, which hapned to them for nothing, but that the Romans (when their Embassadors had contra jus gentium, fought against the French) had been so far from doing them justice, that the said Embassadors were advanced and preferred. For which reason, a Prince and Commonwealth is to take care that no such injury be done, not only to a Nation, or Commonalty, but to any particular person; for if a man be highly offended either by a State, or private person, and has not the satisfaction he desires, if it be in a Republick, he ceases not to pursue his revenge, though with the ruine of the State. If it be under a Monarchy, and he finds himself touched in point of honour, if he has the least spark of generosity in him, he will never be quiet till he be revenged, though with never so much prejudice to himself, of which case we cannot have an apter and truer example, than in Philip of Macedon, the Father of Alexander the great. Philip had in his Court a young Gentleman of very ex∣quisite beauty called Pausanias, with whom Attalus (a great favourite of the said Phi∣lips) was enamoured; having tempted and solicited him many times to satisfie his passion, and found him always averse, he resolved to do that by force or surprise, which he could not do otherwise: To this purpose he made a solemn feast, and invited Pausanias, and several other great persons: when they had filled themselves will with their good cheer, he caused Pausanias to be taken from the Table, and carried to a private place, and not only satisfied his own lust, but caused him to be vitiated by several others. Pausanias com∣plained heavily to King Philip, who having kept him for some time in hopes of doing him justice, instead of performing, he advanced Attalus to the Government of a Province in Greece: Which Pausanias resenting; in great anger that his adversary against whom he had so long, and so earnestly solicited, should now be preferred, he began to turn his in∣dignation upon the King, who had refused to right him, rather than upon the person who had done him the wrong: Insomuch that the very morning his Daughter was married to Alexander of Epirus, as Philip was going to the Temple to celebrate the Nuptiality with his Son Alexander on one hand of him, and his new Son-in-Law on the other, Pausanias assaulted and slew him. This example is much like that of the Romans, and is to be ob∣served by any man that governs; who is never to despise any body so as not to believe but he who is injured will revenge himself some time or other, though with never so much danger and detriment to himself.

CHAP. XXIX.

Fortune casts a mist before peoples eyes, when she would not have them oppose her designs.

IF the course of humane affairs be considered, it will appear, that many accidents, arise, against which the Heavens do not suffer us to provide: And when this hapned at Rome, where there was so much Virtue, and Piety, and Order, well may it happen more frequently in those Cities and Provinces where there are no such things to be found. And because the place is remarkable, to show the influence which the Heavens have upon human affairs, Titus Livius has discoursed of it largely and efficaciously, telling us, That the Stars to make us sensible of their power, first disposed the said Fabii (who were sent Embassa∣dors to the French) to fight as abovesaid, to the end that upon that occasion, they might make War upon Rome. In the next place, they besotted the Romans so, as they did no∣thing worthy of the name of Romans in order to their defence, having banished Camillus (the only person capable of standing them in stead) to Ardea. Again, when the French were upon their march towards Rome, those who to repel the inroads of the Volsci, and other bordering Enemies, had made Dictators many times, and with very good success, made none upon the approach of the French. They were so slow likewise, and so remiss in

the raising of Men, and so tedious in furnishing them with Arms, that they could scarce draw out any considerable force against them, till the Enemy was as far as the River Allia which is within ten miles of Rome, and when their Army was come thither, it was not encamped by the Tribunes with the usual diligence and discretion, they having neither chosen a good place, nor drawn their line, nor fortified themselves with Trenches, nor Stoccadoes as formerly, nor done any thing for their security, either humane, or divine: When they came to fight, they drew up their men so awkwardly and untowardly, that neither Soldier nor Officer did any thing worthy of the Discipline of the Romans, so that the Battel was lost without any effusion of Blood, the Romans running at the very first charge, the greatest part of them to Veii, the rest to Rome, and in such consternation, that they fled directly to the Capitol before they went home to their houses. So that the Senate without so much as thinking to defend their City, any more than the rest, never caused the Gates to be shut, but part of them fled away, and part into the Capitol. There, it is true they began to observe better orders than before, and managed things with less confusion; They discharged all those that were unserviceable, and furnished themselves with what provision they could get, that they might be able to hold out. The greatest part of those useless people which were turn'd out of the Capitol, as old Men, Women, and Children, fled into the Neighbouring Cities; the rest continued in Rome, and were a prey to the French. So that if a man should have read their Exploits in former times, and compared them with their actions then, he would not have believed them to be the same people; and Titus Livius gives the reason after he had described all the disorders aforesaid in these words, Adeo obcaecat animos fortuna, cum vim suam ingruentem refringi non vult. So strangely does fortune blind other people, when she would not be obstructed in her designs; and there can be nothing more true. Wherefore men are not so much to be blamed or commended for their adversity or prosperity; for it is frequently seen, some are hurried to ruine, and others advanced to great honour by the swing and impulse of their fate, wisdom availing little against the misfortunes of the one, and folly as little against the felicity of the other. When fortune designs any great matter, she makes choice of some man of such courage and parts, as is able to discern when she presents him with an occasion: and so on the otherside, when she intends any great destruction, she has her Instruments ready to push on the wheel, and assist to her designs; and if there be any man capable of obstructing them in the least, she either rids him out of the way, or deprives him of all authority, and leaves him without any faculty to do good. And this is abundantly cleared by this place, where Fortune, to amplifie Rome, and bring it to that Grandeur to which it arrived afterwards; thought fit to debase it, (as we shall show at large in the beginning of our third Book) but would not utterly destroy it: For which reason, though she permitted Camillus to be banished, she would not suffer him to be killed; though she let Rome be taken, she preserved the Capitol: Though she intimidated the Romans, and would suffer them to do nothing wisely for the safety of the City, yet she left them so much wisdom as secured the Capitol: That Rome might be taken, she caused the greatest part of the Army that was defeated upon the Allia, to retire to Veii, thereby cutting off all ways for the defence of Rome: But in the midst of her Career, when she seem'd in such haste, and so impatient of its destruction, she prepared every thing that was necessary for its preservation; having conveyed a good Army to Veii, and Camillus to Ardea, that once again they might make head under a General whose repu∣tation was never fully'd with the ignominy of such a loss, but stood clear and entire for the recovery of his Country: And here we might bring store of modern examples to prove what is said, were not this sufficient without them. Yet this I shall assert again (and by the occurrences in all History there is nothing more true) That men may second their fortune, not resist it; and follow the order of her designs, but by no means defeat them: Nevertheless men are not wholly to abandon themselves, because they know not her end; for her ways being unknown and irregular, may possibly be at last for our good; so that we are always to hope the best, and that hope is to preserve us in whatever troubles or distresses we shall fall.

CHAP. XXX.

Princes and Republicks that are truly magnificent, do not make their Leagues and Alliances with Money, but by their virtue, reputation, and force.

THe Romans were besieged in the Capitol, and though they were in expectation of relief from V••ii and Camillus, yet Famine constraining them, they proposed a par∣ley with the French, and were to pay a certain Sum of Money for their liberty; The Arti∣cles were sign'd, all things concluded, and Commissioners sent in to receive the Money, when on a sudden Camillus appears with his Army, as if fortune had done it (says Livy). Ut Romani auro redempti non viverent. That it might not be said the Romans had ever been ransom'd: Which point is not only observable in this place, but in the whole progress of the affairs of that Commonwealth, where it may be seen that they never got Town, nor never made Peace with their Money; whatever they did, was bravely, and with their Arms, which I think is more than can be said of any other State in the world. One of the great marks of the puissance of this Commonwealth, was the manner of her living with her Neighbors. When things are so managed in a Government, that the Neighbors purchase its amity, and make themselves its Pensioners; 'tis a certain sign of the potency of that Government: But when the Neighbors on the contrary receive Money from it, 'tis as infallible a sign of its weakness. If one reads the Roman History, he shall find the Massilians, the Edui, the Rhodians, Hiero of Syracuse, and Massi••issa, as they were Neigh∣bors, so they were Tributaries to the Romans, contributing to their expences, and Taxes as there was occasion, without expectation of any other recompence, but protection. Where a Prince or Commonwealth is weak, it is otherwise, as it appeared by our own City of Florence, which in former times when it was in its greatest reputation, paid annual stipends to most of the little Governments in Romania, besides what was received by the Perugians, Castellans, and all their other Neighbors; whereas had it been strong, and well Armed, it would have been quite otherwise, and all the rest would have given Flo∣rence Money for her protection. Nor were the Florentines singular in this case, the Vene∣tians did the same, and so did the King of France, who notwithstanding the greatness of his Kingdom, was tributary to the Swizzers, and the King of England, which proceeded from his having disarmed the people, and preferring a present opportunity of squeezing them, and avoiding an imaginary danger, before the doing those things that might have secured his State, and made it happy for ever; which practice though for some time it may produce quiet and repose, yet the end is troubles, and losses, and ruine without remedy.

It would be too tedious to recount how often the Florentines, the Venetians, and the Kingdom of France have bought off their Wars, and submitted to such dishonorable terms, as the Romans could never be brought to but once. It would be too tedious to recount how many Towns the Florentines, and the Venetians have brought with their Mony, which have been the occasion of great disorders afterwards, and prov'd that what is gotten by gold, is not to be kept with iron.

This point of generosity, and this manner of living the Romans observed very pun∣ctually whilst they were free; but after they fell under the Government of Emperors, and those Emperors grew bad, they began to degenerate too, and prefer the shadow before the Sun. They began to be Pensionaries first to the Parthians, then to the Germans, and by degrees to all their Neighbors, which was the first step to the ruine of that great Empire; and ••ll these inconveniences proceeded from the disarming of the people, and neglecting to train them up to Military Discipline, from whence a greater mischief does arise; and that is, That the nearer the Enemy approaches, the weaker, and more unable he finds you; and therefore not being strong enough of your self to repel the Enemy from your borders, you are forced to pay tribute to your Neighbors to undertake it for you; which being to be raised and extorted from your Subjects, renders them more feeble and impotent. By which means it happens sometimes that those States which are in this condition, may per∣haps make some little resistance upon the Frontiers, but if the Enemy passes that, all is gone without remedy. But all this is disorderly, and unnatural; for as nature in all ani∣mals has fortified the vital and principal, and not extream parts of the body, because the body can subsist without the one, but not without the other. So 'tis in all Governments, the heart and center is to be fortified, rather than the Frontiers: But this was very ill observed by the Florentines, for whenever an Enemy had past our borders, and took his way towards the City, there was no body in a condition to oppose him. It was the same

with the Venetians not many years since, and had not their City been as it were swadled with the Sea, it had been certainly destroyed. This indeed has not been seen so frequent∣ly in France, because it is so great a Kingdom, and too strong for most of its neighbours; nevertheless when in the year 1513 they were invaded by the English, the whole Kingdom trembled, and the King of France himself, and many others were of opinion, that if he lost one Battel, the whole Kingdom was gone. With the Romans it was quite contrary; the nearer the Enemy approached the City, the stronger he found it: this was evident in Hanibal's invasion, though he had forc'd his way into Italy, fought three great Battels with the Romans, and beat them in every one, though they had lost so many brave Souldiers and Officers, yet they were not only able to continue the War, but to conquer them atlast, and all by fortifying the heart and center of their Country, and leaving the extremities to shift for themselves: for the vitals and fundamentals of their State was the People of Rome, the Country of the Latins, the neighbouring Cities that were in League, and their Colonies from whence they drew so many Souldiers as were able to fight, and entertain the whole World. And this Hanno the Carthaginian understood very well: for when after the Bat∣tel at Cannas Hanibal sent Mago to Carthage to give them an account of the particu∣lars of the Victory, Mago having exceedingly magnified the exploits of his Brother, and debased the Condition of the Romans, Hanno interrupted him, and enquir'd whether any of the Roman Cities, or any of their Confederates had revolted? whether any of their Senators were come in to Hanibal? or whether they had sent any Embassadors to him to treat? and when Mago denied that any thing of all this had passed, Hanno replyed, Hosti∣um ergo multum superest, & bellum tam integrum habemus, atque habuimus qua die Annibal Italian est ingressus; There is work enough behind, and the War is as entire as when Hanibal passed first into Italy. It is apparent therefore, both by what is said in this Chapter, and what has been said often before, that there is great difference betwixt the present and an∣cient methods of the Romans; and if we seriously consider it, we shall not wonder that so many Towns are taken and lost, and so many Governments subverted, as we have seen in our days: for where discipline is neglected, and military virtue laid aside, all things are committed wholly to Fortune, which being various and unconstant, produces various mu∣tations; and this vicissitude and unconstancy of affairs will continue till some excellent person arises to restore the ancient discipline, and restrain fortune from giving such eviden∣ces of her power every hour of the day.

CHAP. XXXI.

How dangerous it is to believe Exiles too far.

I Think it not amiss in this place to shew how much it imports all persons not to give too much credit to those who are banished, for many times they are but the practices and stratagems of Princes and States. We have a memorable example of their inconstancy in Livy, though something improper. When Alexander the Great passed into Asia with his Army, Alexander of Epirus his Kinsman and Unckle passed with another into Italy, invi∣ted by the Exiles of Lucca, who put him in hopes that by their means he should be Master of that whole Province: but when he was come into Italy, instead of assisting him, they conspir'd against him, and slew him, upon promise of indempnity, and restitution of their Estates. From whence we may learn what faith is to be given to such as are banished out of their own Country: for as to their engagements, they are nothing; it is not to be doubted but when ever they can return by any other means, they will leave you, and be∣take themselves to any body else, notwithstanding any promise or engagement to you; and that which makes their promises and confidence the less to be trusted, is, because their ex∣treme passion and desire to come home, make them believe many things that are impossible, and pretend many things that they do not believe: so that betwixt what they believe, and what they pretend, they feed you with fair hopes, but if you depend upon them, you are undone, your expence is all lost, and your whole enterprize miscarries; I shall only give you an instance in the aforesaid Alexander, and Themistocles the Athenian; Themistocles being in rebellion against the Athenians, fled into Asia to Darius, whom he solicited with large promises to an expedition into Greece. Darius was persuaded, and passed into Greece, but Themistocles being unable to make his promises good, either for shame of what he had done, or fear of punishment for what he had not, he poisoned himself; and if Themistocles a man of that Excellence and Virtue could delude the King, and promise more than he could

perform, how little are they to be trusted, who having no such thing to restrain them, give themselves up wholly to their passion and desires? Princes therefore and States ought to be very tender of undertaking any enterprize upon the encouragement of an Exile, for they seldom succeed. And because it seldom happens that Towns are taken by intelligence within, I shall discourse of it in my next Chapter, and add what variety of ways the Romans used to come by their Conquests.

CHAP. XXXII.

How many several ways the Romans used to Conquer their Towns.

THe Romans being a martial people, and given wholly to war, they considered every thing very diligently that might any ways conduce to the facilitating their designs; whether it was matter of charge, or any thing else: for this reason they seldom attempted any Town by the way of siege, because they thought the expence and incommodity of that way would be more than could be recompenced by the taking it; so as they never tried that whilst there was any other hopes; and in all their great Wars, there are but very few examples of any long Leaguers by them. The ways which they took were common∣ly either by storm, or surrender: when they took a Town by storm, it was either by open force, or stratagem. Open force was, when they made their attaque without battering the walls, which they called Aggredi urbem cum Corona; To begirt a Town, because they drew their whole Army round the Town, and fell on in all quarters, and in this manner it hap∣pened sometimes that they carried very considerable places at one Storm, as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain. If this way was ineffectual, they battered down the walls with their Rams, and other, engines of War. Sometimes they min'd, and entred the Towns under ground, as they did at Veii; sometimes that they might fight with the Enemy upon equal terms, they built wooden Towers, or raised Mounts to the height of the walls from whence they might plague and molest them within their Works. The besieged were in most danger in the first case upon a general assault, for their walls were to be made good in all places at once, and it fell out many times, that there were not men enough to supply and relieve all parts; or if they had men enough to do that, they were not all of an equal courage, and when any gave ground, the whole Town was like to be lost, and by this means that way was often succesful. When this way miscarried, they seldom sate down before a Town, or went formally to beleaguer it, because it could not be done but with greater ha∣zard to their Army, for their quarters being to be extended, and their guards round about the Town, they must of necessity be thinner and weaker in some places, and unable to make any considerable opposition, if the Enemy should make any considerable eruption, so that the sudden and brisk way was prefer'd: when their walls were battered with their Engines, those who were in the Town defended themselves much as we do now against great Guns, by repairing their breaches as well as they could. Their way of defeating their mines was by countermining, and opposing themselves personally against the Enemy, or disturbing them with their inventions, as particularly, putting of feathers, and oyls, and other stinking stuff into barrels of wood, they set them on fire, and then tumbled them among the Enemy, that what with the fire, the smoak, and the stench, they might not be able to endure them▪ their Towers of wood, they destroyed commonly by throwing fire into them; and then for the mounts which were raised against the walls, their way was to dig under the walls, and steal away their earth, or by loosening the foundations of the mount, till it all fell to the ground. But these ways of taking a Town are not long to be tried; if they carried it not quickly, they raised their siege, and sought out some other way of prosecuting the War, as Scipio did when he went over into Africk, for having assaulted Utica, without any success, he altred his Counsels, raised his Siege, and addressed himself wholly to the bringing the Carthaginian Army to an engagement; yet sometimes they continued their Siege, as they did at Veii, Carthage, and Ierusalem: as to their way of taking of Towns by fraud and intelligence, (as they took Paloepolis) the Romans and others attempted many places after that manner, but they seldom succeeded; for those secret correspondencies are easily discovered, and the least discovery spoils the whole design, because the conspiracy is commonly discovered before it comes to execution, it either being unpracti∣cable in it self, or betrayed by the infidelity of some of the Conspirators, there being a neces∣sity of meeting and discoursing with such persons, as it is not lawful to discourse with, but

upon some specious occasion, But suppose it be not discovered in the management, there are so many difficulties in putting it into action, that it is almost impossible to overcome them; for if you come too soon, or too late, all is spoiled: if any noise be made, (as by the geese in the Capitol) the least disorder, the least error or mistake destroys the whole enterprize. Besides, these things being executed in the night, the darkness strikes a ter∣ror into the instruments, and the more, because they are commonly unacquainted with the place or people which they are to attaque, and therefore every little noise or accident is sufficient to confound them, and every trifling imagination will make them turn their backs; but no body was so daring and succesful in these fraudulent and nocturnal designs as Aratus Sicionius, though in the day-time he was but like other men, which was rather from some secret virtue in him, than any excellence in the way. And as to the taking of Towns by surrender, they either surrender freely, or by force. When they do it freely, it is done out of some extrinsick necessity, (as when Capua surrendred to the Romans, for fear of falling into the hands of the Samnites) or else out of desire to be well governed, as being taken with the administration of that Prince to whom they surrender; and thus it was with the Rhodians, the Massillians, and other Cities which gave themselves up to the Romans upon no other inducement, but that they might live more happily under the Roman Laws, and be under a better Constitution. But there are many Cities which surrender by force, which force proceeds either from the fatigues and calamities of a te∣dious Siege, or from continual excursions and depredations to which they are subject; and against which they have no other way to secure themselves. And then all the ways we have mentioned, the Romans made more use of this, carrying on their wars with their neighbours 450 years together, in this manner for the most part; for though they tried all the other, they found this the more profitable and safe. In Sieges there is delay and loss of time, in storms, hazard and danger; and uncertainty in conspiracies: but in bringing things to a Battel, it has been seen that by beating the enemies Army, they have got a whole Kingdom in a day, whereas an obstinate Town has cost them several years.

CHAP. XXXIII.

How the Romans upon any Expedition, gave their Generals general Commissions.

I Am of opinion, that to read the History of Livy, with any profit and advantage we must consider not only the actions, but the whole means and process both of the People and Senate of Rome. Among other things, it is very remarkable with what authority they invested their Consuls, Dictators and Generals of their Armies, and it was so great, that the Senate reserved to it self only the power of making Peace, or new Wars as they saw occasion; all the rest was left to the discretion of the Consul, who might fight, or not fight, assault this Town or that Town as he pleased, without any contradiction.

This may be proved by many examples, by more especially by what hapned in an Ex∣pedition against the Tuscans; for Fabius the Consul having defeated the Enemy at Sutri, resolving to pass the Forrest of Gimina with his Army, and invade Tuscany, he was so far from receiving Orders from the Senate, or consulting them in the business, that he gave them not the least notice, though the War was to be removed into another Country, and like to be very dangerous; which appeared by the resolution of the Senate in that very case; for having heard of his Victory at Sutri, and apprehending that he might fall upon such counsels, and pass his Army into Tuscany, thorow that dangerous Forrest, they sent two Embassadors to him to advise him from that Expedition; but they came too late, for he was gone before, and having over-run the whole Country, and routed the Enemy, instead of hindering his design, the Embassadors went back with the news of his Victory. This custom of the Romans, if it be seriously considered, will be found to be very solid and wise. For should the Senate have been consulted by their Generals upon every particular occasion, and have expected all their Orders from them, it would have made their Gene∣rals less circumspect, and vigorous, because the honour of the Victory would not accrew totally to them, but they must participate with the Senate. Besides, the Senate understood very well that Fortune is various, and that many accidents and advantages happen which

cannot be known or improved by any but those who are present; so that if they should desire to be consulted in things of which they can have no knowledge, they must of neces∣sity err, though they were persons of never so much experience and wisdom. Wherefore they gave their General absolute power of disposing all things at his own will, and the whole honour of the Expedition was to be his, that it might be a spur to prick on his di∣ligence, and a bridle to regulate his rashness. And this I have thought fit to insert, that I might shew how much the famous Commonwealths in our times do differ from the Ro∣mans, particularly the Venetians and Florentines, who are so strict with their General, that if a great Gun be but to be planted against a Town, the Senate must be advised, and give order how, and from whence it is to play. But this custom deserves commendation as much as the rest, which all together, have brought their affairs into that sad condition in which they are at present.