The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

LIBER. I.

COnsidering with my self what honour is given to Antiquity, and how many times (passing by variety of instances) the fragment of an old Statue has been pur∣chased at an high rate by many people, out of curiosity to keep it by them, as an ornament to their house, or as a pattern for the imitation of such as delight in that art; and with what industry and pains they endeavour afterwards to have it repre∣sented in all their buildings. On the other side, observing the most honourable and heroick actions (describ'd in History, perform'd by Kingdoms and ancient Common-wealths; by Kings, great Captains, Citizens, Legislators, and others, which have not only tired, but spent themselves in the service of their Country) are rather admir'd than imitated, and in∣deed so far shun'd and declin'd, in all places, there is scarce any impression or shadow to be seen in this age of the virtue of our ancestors; I could not at the same time but admire, and lament it; and the more, by how much I observed in all civil and personal controversies, in all diseases incident to mankind, recourse is continually had to such judgments and re∣medies as have been derived to us by our predecessors; for to speak truth, the Civil Law is nothing but the sentence and determination of their fore-Fathers, which reduc'd into order, do shew and instruct our present Lawyers which way to decide; nor is the art of the Physitian any thing more than ancient experience handed down to our times, upon which the Practiser of our age founds all his method and doctrine. Nevertheless, in the ordering of Commonwealths, in the conservation of their several members, in the Government of

Kingdoms, in the regiment of armies, in the management of War, in the administration of Justice, in the enlargement and propagation of Empire, there is not to be found either Prince, Republick, great Captain or Citizen, which repairs to Antiquity for example; which persuaded me it proceeded not so much from niceness and effeminacy our present Edu∣cation has introduced upon the world, nor from the mischief which turbulent and sedi∣tious idleness has brought forth in many Provinces and Cities in Christendom, as from our ignorance or inadvertency in History not taking the sense of what we read, or not minding the relish and poinancy with which it is many times impregnated; from whence it comes to pass, that many who read are much pleased and delighted with the variety of accidents contained in History, but never think them intended for their imitation, that being a thing, in their judgments, not only difficult, but impossible; as if the Heaven, the Sun, the Ele∣ments and Mankind were altered and dispossessed of the motion, order and power with which they were primitively invested. Being desirous to reduce such as shall fall into this error, I have Judged it necessary to write upon all those Books of Titus Livius, (which, by the malignity of time, have not been intercepted) what I (according to ancient and mo∣dern opinion) shall think useful for their further explanation; to the end, that they which shall peruse these my discourses, may extract such advantage and document as is necessary for their proficiency and improvement by History; and though my enterprize appears to be difficult, yet by the assistance of those who put me upon it, I do not despair but to dis∣charge my self so, as to leave the way much more easie and short to any man that shall de∣sire to come after me.

CHAP. I.

What have been generally the principles of all Cities, and particularly of Rome

THose who shall read the Original of the City of Rome, by what Legislators advanced and by what Government ordered, will not wonder it shall remain firm and entire for so many ages, afterwards so vast an Empire spring out of it as that Common∣wealth arrived to. Being to discourse first of its Original, it is convenient to premise, that all Cities are built either by natives born in the Country where they were erected, or by stran∣gers. The first happens when, to the Inhabitants dispersed in many and little parties, it appears their habitation is insecure, not being able apart (by reason of their distance, or smalness of their numbers) to resist an invasion, (if any Enemy should fall upon them) or to unite suddenly for their defence, without leaving their Houses and Families exposed, which by consequence would be certain prey to the enemy. Whereupon, to evade those dangers, moved either by their own impulse, or the suggestions of some person among them of more than ordinary authority, they oblige themselves to live together in some place to be chosen by them for convenience of provision, and easiness of defence. Of this sort, among many others, Athens and Venice were two: the first that built under the autho∣rity of Theseus, upon occasion of the like distance and dispersion of the natives. The other (there being many people driven together into certain little Islands in that point of the Adriatick Sea, to avoid the War which every day, by the access and irruption of new Armies of Barbarians after the declension of the Roman Empire grew intolerable in Italy) began by degrees among themselves, without the assistance or encouragement of any Prince, to treat and submit to such Laws as appeared most likely to preserve them: and it succeeded to their desire by the long respite and tranquillity their situation afforded them; that Sea having no passage at that end, and the Barbarians no ships to disturb them; so that the least beginning imaginable was sufficient to exalt them to their present authority and gran∣deur.

The second case, when a City is raised by strangers, it is done by people that are free, or depending (as Colonies) or else by some Prince or Republick to ease and disburthen themselves of their exuberance, or to defend some Territory, which being newly acquir'd, they desire with more safety and less expence to maintain (of which sort several were by the people of Rome all over their Empire) otherwise they are sometimes erected by some Prince, not for his residence so much as for his glory and renown (as Alexandria by Alexander the great). But these Cities not being free in their Original, do seldom arise to any extraordinary height more than to be reckoned the heads or chief of some Kingdom. Of this sort was Florence, for (whether built by the Souldiers of Silla, or perchance by the

Inhabitants of the Mountain di Fiesole, who presuming upon, and being encouraged by the long Peace under the Reign of Augustus, descended from their Mountain to inhabit the plain upon the River Arms) it was built under the Roman Empire, and could not upon those principles exalt it self higher than the courtesie of the Prince would permit. The Founders of Cities are free, when by themselves, or the Command of their Soveraign they are constrained upon occasion of sickness, famine, or war, to abandon their own, inquest of new Countries: and these do either possess themselves of such Towns as they find ready▪ built in their Conquests, (as Moses did), or they build them de novo, as Aeneas. In this case the power of the builder, and the fortune of the building is conspicuous and honoura∣ble, according as the cause from whence it derives its Original is more or less eminent. His virtue and prudence is discernible two ways, by the election of the Seat, and institution of the Laws; and because men build as often by necessity as choice, and the judgment and wisdom of the builder is greater where there is less room and latitude for his election; it is worthy our consideration whether it is more advantagious building in barren and un∣fruitful places, to the end that the people being constrained to be industrious, and less ob∣noxious to idleness, might live in more unity, the poverty of the soil giving them less op∣portunity of dissention. Thus it fell out in Raugia and several other Cities built in such places; and that kind of election would doubtless be most prudent and profitable, if men could be content to live quietly of what they had, without an ambitious desire of Com∣mand. But there being no security against that, but power, it is necessary to avoid that sterility, and build in the fruitfullest places can be found, where their numbers encreasing by the plentifulness of the soil, they may be able not only to defend themselves against an as∣sault, but repel any opposition shall be made to their grandeur; and as to that idleness to which the richness of the situation disposes, it may be provided against by Laws and con∣venient exercise enjoyn'd, according to the example of several wise men, who having in∣habited Countries, pleasant, fruitful, and apt to produce such lazy people improper for ser∣vice, to prevent the inconvenience which might follow thereupon, enjoyned such a necessity of exercise to such as were intended for the Wars, that by degrees they became better Soul∣diers than those Countries which were mountainous and barren could any where produce. Among whom may be reckoned the Kingdom of Egypt, which, notwithstanding that it was extreamly pleasant and plentiful, by the virtue and efficacy of its Laws produced excellent men, and perhaps such as, had not their names been extinguished with time, might have de∣served as much honour as Alexander the Great, and many other great Captains, whose me∣mories are so fresh, and so venerable among us. An who-ever would consider the Govern∣ment of the Soldan, the discipline of the Mamalukes, and the rest of their Militia before they were extirpated by Selimus the Turk, might find their great prudence and caution in exercising their Souldiers, and preventing that softness and effeminacy to which the felicity of their soil did so naturally incline them.

For these reasons I conceive best to build in a fruitful place, if the ill consequences of that fertility be averted by convenient Laws. Alexander the Great being desirous to build a City to perpetuate his name Dinocrates an Architect came to him, and undertook to build him one upon the Mountain Athos, and to recommend and inforce his proposal, (besides the goodness of the soil) he persuaded him it should be made in the shape and figure of a man (a thing which would be new, wonderful, and sutable to his greatness). But when Alexander enquired whence it was to be supplyed, the Architect replyed; he had not con∣sidered of that; at which answer Alexander laugh'd very heartily, and leaving him and his mountain to themselves, he built Alexandria, where people might be tempted to plant by the richness of the Soil, the nearness of the Sea, and convenience of the River Nile. Again, if we examine the Original of Rome, and admit Aeneas for the first Founder, it will fall in the number of those Cities built by foreigners: if Romulus, among such as were erected by the natives; either way it was originally free, without any dependance. It will appear likewise (as shall be shewn more particularly hereafter) by what Laws Romulus, Numa and others fortified and secur'd it; insomuch that neither the fertility of the Soil, the commodity of the Sea, the frequency of their Victories, nor the largeness of its Em∣pire were able to debauch or corrupt it; but it remained for several ages for piety and vir∣tue more exemplary than any other Commonwealth either since or before it. And because the great things acted under that Government, and transmitted to us by Titus Livius, were performed by publick or private Counsel within or without the City, I shall begin with what occur'd in the Town, and was managed by publick debate, (as judging that most wor∣thy our annotation) super-adding what-ever depended thereupon; and with these discourses I intend this first Book (or rather Part) shall conclude.

CHAP. II.

The several kinds of Commonwealths and under which kind the Roman is comprehended.

WAving the discourse of those Cities which in their beginning have been dependant, I shall speak of such as were originally free, and governed themselves according to their own fancies, Commonwealths or Principalities, as their own inclinations lead them. Of these (according to the diversity of their principles) their Laws and Orders were divers. Some of them at their first foundation received their Laws at one time from a single person, as the Spartans from Lycurgus. Others received them by chance, at several times, upon variety of accidents, as Rome; and that Commonwealth is doubtlesly happy, whose good fortune it is to have a person so wise as to constitute and dispose its Laws in such manner at first, that it may subsist safely and securely by them, without necessity of new modelling or cor∣rection. Of this sort was Sparta, which for more than 800 years was observed to remain entire and incorrupt, without any dangerous commotion. On the other side, that City must needs be in some measure unhappy, which, not having submitted to, or complyed with the prudence of a single founder, is necessitated of it selt to remodel and reform••, Of these kinds, that is most unhappy whose principles were at first remote and devious from the right way which might have conducted to perfection; and indeed those Common∣wealths which are in this degree, are almost impossible to be established by any accident whatsoever. But others (whose Commencements are good, and capable of improvement, though perhaps not exquisitely perfect) may become perfect afterwards by the concurrence of accidents, yet not without danger forasmuch as most men are averse, and will not easily admit of any new Law which introduces new Orders and Customs into a City, without great appearance of necessity, and that necessity arising necessarily from some danger im∣pending, it many times falls out the Commonwealth perishes before remedy can be ap∣plyed. Of this the Commonwealth of Florence is instance sufficient, which in the com∣motion of Aretz was the IIth. time reformed, and the 12.th time confounded by the se∣dition of Prato.

But being now to discourse of the State of the Roman Commonwealth, and what were the accidents and orders which advanced it to that perfection, it is convenient to premise (what has been asserted by several Authors) that there are but three sorts of Governments Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, to either of which who-ever intends to erect a Go∣vernment, may apply as he pleases. Other (of no less reputation) are of opinion the forms of Government are six, of which three are bad, and three good of themselves, but so easily corrupted, even they become fatal and pernicious. Those which are good are the three before mentioned, those which are evil are three others depending upon the three former; and carrying so near a resemblance, they many times interfere, and fall one into the other, as Monarchy into tyranny, Aristocracy into Oligarchy, and Democracy into Anarchy and Con∣fusion: insomuch, that who-ever forms his Government of one of the three former, forms it for no long time, because no care nor remedy can prevent, but it will degenerate into its contrary, by reason of the similitude betwixt virtue and vice: and these changes and va∣riations of Government happened by accident amongst men; for at the beginning of the World the Inhabitants being few, they lived dispersed after the manner of beasts: after∣wards, as they multiplyed, they began to unite and, for their better defence, to look out for such as were more strong, robust, and valiant, that they might choose one out of them to make him their head, and pay him obedience; from hence the first distinction betwixt honest and dishonest did arise: for observing that if any injur'd his Benefactor, it imme∣diately created an hatred and compassion among the rest, all people abhorring him that was ungrateful, and commiserating him that was injur'd; lest the same injustice might hap∣pen to themselves, they began to make Laws, and ordain punishments for offenders; and this was the first appearance of justice in the World; after which, being to make Election of their Prince, they did not so much respect the ability of his body as the qualifications of his mind, choosing him that was most prudent and just; but by degrees their Government coming to be Hereditary, and not by Election, according to their former way, those which inherited degenerated from their Ancestors, and neglecting all virtuous actions, began to be∣lieve that Princes were exalted for no other end but to discriminate themselvcs from their subjects by their pomp, luxury, and all other effeminate qualities, by which means they fell into the hatred of the people, and by consequence became afraid of them, and that fear en∣creasing,

they began to meditate revenge, oppressing some, and disobliging others, till in∣sensibly the Government altered, and fell into Tyranny. And these were the first grounds of ruine, the first occasion of Conjuration and Conspiracy against Princes, not so much in the pusillanimous and poor, as in those whose generosity, spirit and riches would not suffer them to submit to so dishonourable administrations. The multitude following the autho∣rity of the Nobles, took up Arms against their Prince, and having conquered and extirpa∣ted that Government, they subjected themselves to the Nobility which had freed them; and detesting the name of a single person, they took the Government upon themselves, and at first (reflecting upon the late Tyranny) governed according to new Laws devised by themselves, postponing particular profit to publick advantage, so that both the one and the other were preserved and managed with great diligence and exactness. But their autho∣rity afterwards descending upon their Sons, (who being ignorant of the variations of for∣tune, as not having experimented her inconstancy) and not contenting themselves with a civil equality, but falling into rapine, oppression, ambition, and adulteries, they changed the Government again, and brought it from an Optimacy to be governed by few, without any respect or consideration of Justice or Civility; so that in a short time it hapned to them as to the Tyrant; for the multitude being weary of their Government, were ready to assist any body that would attempt to remove it, by which means in a short time it was extinguished.

And forasmuch as the tyranny of their Prince, and the insolence of their Nobles were fresh in their memory, they resolved to restore neither the one nor the other, but conclude upon a popular State, which was regulated so as neither Prince nor Noble should have any authority: and there being no States but are reverenced at first, this Populacy continued for some time, but not long, (especially after its Founders) for it fell immediately into an irresistible licentiousness, contemning all authority both publick and private; and every man living after his own mind, a thousand injuries were daily committed, so that forc'd by necessity, by the suggestions of some good ma•• or for avoiding the like enormities, they returned to their primitive Kingship, and from thence by degrees relapsed again in the manner, and upon the occasions aforesaid. And this is the Sphear and Circle in which all Republicks have, and do move; but it seldom or never happens that they return to the same circumstances of Government again, because it is scarce possible for any of them to be so long liv'd, as to pass many times thorow the same mutations and remain upon its legs. It sometimes comes to pass likewise, that in the conflicts and troubles of a State, being de∣stitute both of counsel and force, it becomes a prey to some neighbouring Commonwealth that is better governed than it: but admitting that could not be, Governments would fall from one to another, and make an infinite circulation. For these reasons all the foresaid forms of Government are in my judgment infirm and unstable; the three good ones from the shortness of man's life and the three bad ones from their proper imperfections. Where∣upon, the wisest Legislators finding this defect, and avoiding every one of those kinds, they fram'd a Government which should consist of them all, believing it to be more permanent and stable, because, Prince, Nobles and People living in the same City, and Communicating in the same Government, they would be all of them in sight of one another, and more ca∣pable of correction. The person which in this kind has merited most praise was Lycurgus, who ordered his Laws in Sparta in such manner that giving King Nobility and People each of them their portion, he erected a Government that continued for more than eight hundred years, to his great honour, and that Cities repose.

To Solon it hapned clear otherwise, (who was the Athenian Legislator) whose aiming only at a popular Government, was the cause it was so short lived, that before he died he saw the tyranny of Pisistrates spring out of it; and though forty years after the Tyrant's Heirs were expelled, and Athens restored to its liberty, yet resuming the old model which Solon had recommended, it could not continue above an hundred years, notwithstanding many new laws were super-added to restrain the insolence of the Nobility, and the loose∣ness of the Commons. But there being no mixture and temperament of Principality and Optimacy with the other, in respect of Sparta, Athens was but of little duration. But to return to Rome, though it had not a Lycurgus to obstetricate at its birth, and supply it with such Laws as might preserve its freedom so long.

Nevertheless, the accidents which hapned upon the dissention betwixt the people and the Senate produced that in some measure which was defective at its foundation; for though in its beginning its Laws and Orders were imperfect, yet it did not altogether deflect from the right way which was to conduct it to perfection, Romulus, Numa, and all the rest of its Kings making many good laws conformable to its freedom. But their ultimate design being to perpetuate their Monarchy, though that City remained free, there were many things omit∣ted

by those Princes which were necessary for its conservation. And though it fell out their Kings lost their Dominion upon the abovesaid occasions, yet those who expulsed them, creating two Consuls in their stead, they rather drove the name than the authority of King∣ship out of the City. After which, the Government residing in the Consuls and Senate, it consisted only of two of the three sorts, Monarchy and Aristocracy: it remained now to give place only to a popular Government, and the Roman Nobility being grown insolent upon occasions which shall be mentioned hereafter, the people tumultuated, took up Arms against them, and prevailed so far, that (lest otherwise they might lose all) it was consented the people should have their share, and yet the Senate and Consuls on the other hand retain so much of their former authority as to keep up their degrees as before: and this was the beginning of the Tribunes of the people, after the creation of which, that State became better established, every one of the three sorts having a share in the Government, and for∣tune was very favourable, that though it suffered many mutations and passed from a Mo∣narchy to an Aristocracy, and from that to the people by the same gradations, and the same occasions I have mentioned; nevertheless the power was not taken from their Kings to transfer it upon the Nobles, nor from the Nobility to give it wholly to the people; but remaining mixt and compounded of all three, that Republick grew in time to be perfect, to which perfection the difference and jealousies betwixt the Senate and people contributed exceedingly, as shall be largely demonstrated in the two following Chapters.

CHAP. III.

Vpon what accidents and tumults in Rome the Tribune of the people was created, by which the Commonwealth became more perfect.

ACcording to the judgment of all Authors who have written of Civil Government, and the examples of all History, it is necessary to who-ever would establish a Govern∣ment and perscribe Laws to it, to presuppose all men naturally bad and that they will shew and exert that natural malignity as often as they have occasion to do it securely, for though it may possibly lie concealed for some time, it is for some secret reason which want of pre∣sident and experience renders invisible; but time discovers it afterwards, and is therefore justly called the Father of truth.

After the expulsion of the Tarquins there appeared in Rome a very great union betwixt the Senate and people; the Senate seemed to have deposited their old arrogance, and taken up a gentleness and humility that rendred them grateful even to the meanest mecha∣nick: in this manner they curb'd and constrained their evil designs as having no hopes of success while the Tarquins were living, who were formidable to the Nobility of themselves and would be much more, if the people by any ill usage should be animated to joyn with them, and this was the true ground of their hypocrisie. But no sooner were the Tarquins dead, and the Nobility discharged of their fear, but they began to expectorate, and spit out the venome had lain so long in their stomachs against the people using them with all ima∣ginable injury and contempt, which carriage of theirs gives good testimony to my asser∣tion, that man is naturally wicked, never does well but upon necessity; and when at any time it is at his choice, and he may follow his own genius with freedom, all things run im∣mediately into disorder and confusion; and that saying is not without reason, That Reputa∣tion and poverty make men industrious, but it is Laws which make them good: otherwise, if people did well of themselves, Laws would be useless; but where that is not to be expe∣cted, Laws become necessary. No sooner were the Tarquins removed, and the authority and terror where-with they kept the Senate in awe, but it was thought fit to find out some new invention that might restrain the Nobility, and keep them in the same circles of hu∣manity and justice as the Tarquins had done whilst they were alive: at length, after many squables and contentions betwixt the people and them, all was accommodated by the crea∣tion of a Tribune for the security of the people, which Tribune was to be invested with such authority and priviledge as might enable him to become afterwards an Arbitor betwixt them, and a stop for the future to the insolence of the Nobility.

CHAP IV.

The dissentions betwixt the Senate and the people of Rome, were the occasion that Commonwealth beame so powerful and free.

I Cannot in silence passover the tumults and commotions which hapned in Rome betwixt the death of the Tarquins, and the creation of those Tribunes. Nor can I forbear say∣ing something against the opinion of many who will needs have Rome to have been a tu∣multuous Republick, so full of mutiny and confusion, that had not its good fortune and va∣lour supplyed for its defects, it would have been inferior to any other Commonwealth whatsoever. I cannot deny but fortune and valour were the occasions of the Roman Em∣pire; but, in my judgment, they do not consider, that where the Souldier is good, the disci∣pline is good; and where the discipline is good, there is commonly good fortune: but to return to the other particulars in that City, I say, those who object against the tumults be∣twixt the Nobles and the people, do in my opinion condemn those very things which were the first occasion of its freedom, regarding the noise and clamours which do usually follow such commotions, more than the good effects they do commonly produce, not con∣sidering that in all Commonwealths there are two opposite humours, one of the People, the other of the Nobles; and that all Laws which are made in favour of liberty, proceed from the differences betwixt them, as may easily be seen in the revolutions of Rome: for from the time of the Tarquins to the Gracchi, (which was more than three hundred years) in all the tumults in Rome seldom any body was banished, and seldomer put to death: so that it is not reasonable to esteem those popular tumults so dangerous and horrible, nor to pronounce that a seditious and bloody Commonwealth, which in so long time, among all their heats and animosities sent not above eight or ten persons into banishment, executed but few, and condemned not many to any pecuniary Mulct. Nor can it be called reasona∣bly disorderly and irregular, which produced so many examples of all sorts of virtue; for good examples proceed from good Education, and good Education from good Laws, and good Laws from those tumults, which many people do so inconsiderately condemn, and who-ever examines their success, will not find they have produced any Laws or Violence to the prejudice of the Common interest, but rather on the contrary. And if any should ob∣ject their ways were wild and unusual, to heat the people roaring against the Senate, and the Senate railing against the people. To see them running tumultuously about the streets, shutting up their shops, and leaving the Town, I answer, that all Cities ought to be allowed some ways of vent and evacuation for their passions, and especially those who expect as∣sistance from their people in time of exigence and danger; in which number the City of Rome was one, and had this custom, that when the Commons had a mind to a new Law, they either committed some of the aforesaid outrages, or else refused to list themselves for the Wars, so that to appease, it was in some measure necessary to comply with them, and the desires of a free people are seldom or never destructive or prejudicial to liberty, because they commonly spring from actual oppression, or an apprehension of it; and if perhaps that apprehension should be vain, and ill grounded, there is the remedy of Conventions, in which some honest man or good Orator may remonstrate their mistake: and the people, though (as Tully says) they may be ignorant, yet they are capable enough of the truth, and do easily submit to it, when delivered to them by any person they think credible, and to be belived. So that it is an obligation upon us to judge more moderately of the Roman Government, and to consider that so many good effects as proceeded from that Republick, could not have been produced but from sutable causes: and if their tumults were the oc∣casion of the creation of the Tribunes, they were more laudable than otherwise; for be∣sides that they secured a share of the Government to the people, they were constituted as Guardians and Conservators of the Roman liberty, as shall be shewn in the Chapter ensuing.

CHAP V.

Where the Guardianship of liberty may be most securely deposited, whether among the people or Nobility: and which has greater occasion to tumultuate, he that would acquire more, or he that would defend and keep what he has.

THey who have given us the wisest and most judicious scheme of a Commonwealth, have laid down the conservation of liberty as a necessary fundamental, and according as that is more or less secured, the Government is like to be more or less durable. But for∣asmuch as all Commonwealths consist of Nobility and Populacy, the question arises, In whose hands that liberty is deposited most safely. In old times among the Lacedemonians, and in our times among the Venetians, it was intrusted with the Nobility; but among the Romans with the common people; for which reason it is to be examined which of them made the better elections.

If we look back to their Originals, there are arguments on both sides; but if we regard only their fate and conclusion, the Nobility must carry it, in respect that the liberty of the Spartans and Venetians have been much longer lived. But on the other side, (to justifie the Romans) freedom is (I conceive) most properly committed to their custody who have least appetite to usurp. And doubtless, if the ends and designs both of the Nobility and Com∣mons be considered, it will be found the Nobility are ambitious of Dominion, while the Commons have no other thoughts but to defend themselves against it; and, by consequence, having less hopes to usurp, they have more inclination to live free: so that the conservation of their liberty being committed to the people, it is but reasonable to believe they will be more careful to preserve it; and by how much they are less likely to usurp upon it them∣selves, with the more vigilance will they secure it against the incroachments of others. On the other side, he that defends the Spartan and Venetian constitution, alledges, that by put∣ting that power into the hands of the Nobility, two excellent things are performed. One is, that thereby they satisfie their ambition who have the greatest interest in the Common∣wealth. The other, that they take from the people all opportunity of exerting their na∣tural turbulency and unquietness, which has not only been the occasion of infinite dissen∣tions, but is apt likewise to enforce the Nobility upon such desperate courses as may in time produce unremediable effects. Of this, Rome it self is proposed as an example, where the Tribunes being invested with that authority, it was not sufficient to have one Plebeian Consul, but the people must have both, and not content with that neither, they would have the Censor, Praetor, and the other great Magistrates of the City chosen out of the people. Nor was this enough, but carried on with the same exorbitant fury, they began by degrees to adore such men as they saw likely to confront and beard the Nobility, which humour was the rise of Marius his greatness, and his greatness the destruction of Rome. All this considered, it is no easie matter, upon impartial deliberation on both sides, to pronounce which of the two is most safely to be trusted with the liberty, because it is no less difficult to determine which is most pernicious to a Commonwealth, he that (not satisfied with what he has) is ambitious of more, or he that is content, and would secure what he has got. He that shall examine it critically, will conclude thus; Either you argue for a Repub∣lick, whose aim is to extend and propagate its Empire, as Rome; Or one whose designs reach no further than to preserve what they have got. In the first case 'tis necessary in all things to follow the example of Rome; in the second, Venice and Sparta are rather to be imitated for the reasons aforesaid, which shall be reinforc'd in the following Chapter. But to return from whence we have stragled, and discourse of what men are most nocent in a Commonwealth, they that are impatient to get, or they that are only fearful to lose; I say, that when Marcus Menenius was made Dictator, and Marcus Fulvius Master of the Horse, (both of them Plebeians) to inquire into certain Conspiracies that were entred into at Capua, against the City of Rome, authority was given them at the same time to examine and take cognisance of such persons as, by bribery, or any other unlawful means, design'd upon the Consulship, or any other of the great offices in Rome: by which the Nobility be∣ing highly provoked, (as suspecting it to be done in opposition to them) caused it to be spread abroad, that the Nobility did not by any ambitious or irregular ways affect or de∣sign upon those great places; but the Commons, who not daring to trust their preferment to their extraction or virtue, took all extraordinary courses to advance themselves to them. In particular they accused the Dictator, and that with so much vehemence and success, he was glad to call a Council, and (having complained very much of the calumniations of

the Nobility) to lay down his Dictatorship, and submit himself to the judgment of the people, by whom the Cause being heard, he was fairly acquitted. There it was disputed very hard which was most ambitious; He that would get, or He that would preserve; for a violent appetite either in the one, or the other may be the occasion of great disturbances, which in my judgment are oftner caused by them that are in possession, because the appre∣hension of losing what they have got, produces the same eagerness and passion, as desire of acquisition does in the other, forasmuch as they seldom think themselves safe in what they have, but by new accumulation; besides, the more wealth or Territory they have, the more power or capacity they have to Usurp as they see occasion: to which may be added that their incorrigible and ambitious deportments, do provoke and kindle a desire in such as have not those dignities, to compass them if they can, and that for two reasons, to revenge themselves upon them, by stripping them of all, and to enrich themselves into the bargain by the wealth and honour which they see others manage so ill.

CHAP. VI.

Whether in Rome such a form of Government could be established, as should take away the animosities betwixt the Senate and the People.

WHat the continued jealousies betwixt the Senate and the People did produce, we have already discoursed; but because the effects of them remained till the time of the Gracchi, and were the occasion of the destruction of their liberty, it may be demanded whether Rome might not have attained that height of Authority and Grandeur under ano∣ther form of Government that might have prevented those animosities. To resolve this Question, it is necessary to look back upon those Republicks whose Fortune it has been to retain their liberty a long time without those inconveniencies, to examine what was their form, and whether it was practicable in Rome. As Examples, we may produce Sparta and Venice, the first Ancient, the latter more modern, both mentioned before Sparta was governed by a King, and a small Senate; Venice did not divide the Government into distinct Names; but all who were admitted to the administration were called Gentlemen under one common appellation; and that, more by accident, than any prudence in the Le∣gislator; for when to those Rocks upon which that City is now seated, many people did repair for the reasons abovesaid, in process of time their number encreasing so fast, that they could not live peaceably without Laws, they resolved to put themselves under some form, and meeting often together to deliberate upon that, when they found they were numerous enough to subsist by themselves, they made a Law to praeclude all new comers from the Government: and hinding afterwards their numbers encrease, and that there were multitudes of Inhabitants incapable of publick administration; in honours to the Governors they called them Gentlemen of Venice, and the others but Citizens; and this distinction might not only be instituted, but continued without tumult, because when first introduced, all the Inhabitants participating of the Government, no body could complain, and they who came after, finding it firm and established, had no reason, nor opportunity to disturb it; They had no reason, because no injury was done them; they had no opportunity, because the Government restrained them, and they were not employed in any thing that might furnish them with authority; besides those who came after were not in number disproportionable to the Governors, the latter being equally, if not more numerous than they; for which rea∣sons the Venetians were able not only to erect, but maintain their Government a long time without any revolution.

Sparta being (as I said before) governed by a King and a small Senate, might likewise preserve its Model a long time, by reason the Inhabitants were but few, strangers excluded and the Laws of Lycurgus established with great veneration, so that living by those Laws, all occasion of tumult was taken away, and they might continue united a long time; for though the Offices and Commands were conferred upon a few, yet the revenue of the Country being equally distributed, the people were not Seditious, though they were kept at a distance; nor did the Nobility provoke them by any insolence or oppression; and this proceeded from the condition of their Kings, who being environed by the Nobility, had no safer way to secure their dignity, than by protecting the people from injustice and vio∣lence, by which means the fear, and the desire of Command being taken from the people, the Emulations betwixt them and the Nobility and the occasion of tumultuating ceased, so that it was not hard for them to enjoy their tranquillity several Ages; Of the length of

their tranquillity, there were two principal causes; First, The number of the Spartans being small, there was no necessity that their Governors should be many; and next no strangers being admitted, they were not liable to be corrupted, nor to encrease to such a number, as might grow insupportable to those few who were under their Government. These things being considered, it is plain that the Roman Legislators could not have insti∣tuted a Commonwealth that should be free from Sedition and Mutiny, any other way, than by imitating the Venetians and Spartans, that is by not employing the people in their Wars, like the Venetians, nor entertaining Foreiners into their City, as the Spartans. But the Roman Legislators transgressing in both, the people grew strong, and by consequence tumultuous; and if any way the Government were to be rendered more quiet, this in con∣venience would follow, it would be rendered also more weak, and all means be taken away that might conduct it to that height of grandeur and authority, at which afterwards it arrived; so that those applications which prevented the tumults in Rome, prevented also its enlargement, and the extent of its Empire, as it happens in most humane affairs, the removal of one inconvenience is the contracting of another. For if you arm, and adapt a numerous people for the War, by their means to enlarge your Territory; you put them into a conditon of being unmanageable afterwards, and not to be kept down to your Disci∣pline and Government; whereas if you keep them disarmed, and their number but few, though you may make your self Arbitrary, you can never continue it, for your Subjects will grow so poor spirited and vile, you will become a pre to the first man that invades you. In all deliberations therefore, the inconveniences are to be considered, and that reso∣lution prefer'd, in which their are fewest; for none can be taken that are absolutely free The Romans then in imitation of the Spartans, might have set up a King for his life, and appointed a little Senate; but by so doing, they could never have laid the foundation of so vast an Empire, for an Elective King, and a small Senate would have contributed but little to their unity and peace. He then who would set up a new Commonwealth, should con∣sider whether he would have it (like Rome) extend its Dominion and Soveraignty; or keep it self within its own bounds without any dilatation. In the first case it is necessary to imitate the Romans, and give way to the tumults and publick dissentions as well as he can; for without his Citizens be numerous, and well disciplin'd and arm'd, he can never extend his Dominion; and if he could, it would be impossible to keep it. In the second, he is to frame to the Model of the Spartans, and Venetians; but because augmentation of Empire, is commonly the destruction of such Commonwealths, he is by all possible means to prohibit new acquisitions, because depending upon weak Commonwealths, they are always destructive and pernicious, as experience has shown in the Examples of Sparta and Venice. The first having subdued most part of Greece, discovered, upon a slight accident, the weakness of its foundation, for the Thebans revolting at the instigation of Pelopidas, gave opportunity to other Cities, and quite ruined the Government. In like manner Ve∣nice having conquer'd the greatest part of Italy, more by their Mony and Artifice, than Arms, presuming too much upon their force, and coming to a Battel, they were worsted, and in one day lost all which they had got. I should think therefore a Commonwealth that would stand a long time, should model it self within according to the Example of Sparta and like Venice, seat it self in so strong and inexpugnable a place, that it might not appre∣hend any sudden insult; nor make it self so great on the other side as to become formidable to its Neighbors; For the common Motives that excite people to make War upon a Com∣monwealth, are two; either to conquer it themselves, or to secure themselves against it, and by the aforesaid expedient, those two ways are totally frustrated; for if it be hard of access, and well-disposed to defend it self, it will seldom or never happen that any Body will attempt it. If it keeps within its own bounds, and by experience be found free from ambition, no body will fear it, nor will any body offend it; and questionless it would be the more safe, if by the Laws and Constitutions it was forbidden to extend, for I am clearly of opinion, that keeping things in this balance and Equilibrium, the Government would be more civil, and the peace of the City more certain. But the affairs of man being muta∣ble, and nothing in them that is durable and firm; there is a necessity that they either encrease or diminish, and that necessity does many times constrain us, to what in reason we should rather decline. Whence it happens, That if a Government be erected apt to defend it self in peace and security without extending its bounds, and necessity enforces it to en∣large, That enlargement takes away its foundation, and ruines it the sooner. So on the other side, when the Stars are so benign to a Commonwealth, as to place it in peace, without any occasion of War, that peace begets idlness, and idlness effeminacy or faction, which two things (and indeed either of them alone) will be sufficient to subvert it. Where∣fore, it being impossible, as I conceive, to keep things in this balance and mediocrity; in

the constitution of all republicks, particular care is to be had to what is most honorable; and things are to be so ordered, that if necessity should compel them to inlarge, they might do it in such manner as to be sure to keep it. But to return, a Commonwealth, in my judgment, is better fram'd to the example of Rome, than either to the Venetian or Spartan, it being so hard to hit the exact way between the one and the other; and for the emula∣tions betwixt the Nobility and the People they are to be born as inconveniences, but such as are necessary for a people that would rise to the Grandeur of the Romans; against which nevertheless (as I have shewn before) the authority of the Tribunes will be some remedy, if invested with the power of impeaching, which was given to the Tribunes in other States, as I shall shew in my next Chapter.

CHAP. VII.

How necessary it is for the conservation of a State, that any Citizen be securely accused.

THere is nothing of more importance to the safety of a State, than that permission be given to such as are set up for the conservation of its liberty, to accuse such persons to the People, the Senate, or other Magistrates, as shall any way offend against the Constitutions thereof; and this practice has two effects very profitable for the Commonwealth: the first is, the Citizens, for fear of being accused, do not attempt any thing to the prejudice of the State; and if they do, they are easily and readily suppress'd: the other is, that thereby a way is opened for the evacuation of such humours as are too frequent among the Citizens of every great City; which humours, without some legal vent, do usually recur to extra∣ordinary ways that are absolutely pernicious: wherefore there is nothing renders a Com∣monwealth more stable and firm, than the provision of some legal course for the evapora∣tion of those humors which indanger it. This may be demonstrated by several exam∣ples, but especially by that which is mentioned by Titus Livius in his discourse of Coriola∣nus. He tells us, that the Nobility of Rome being exasperated against the people, for that they thought their authority too much encreased upon the creation of their Tribunes; and it hapning at that time, that in respect of the great scarcity of provisions, the State had sent into Sicily for supplies; Coriolanus being a great adversary to the popular Faction, ad∣vised that this was a fair time to chastise the licentiousness of the people, and to take from them that power which they had assumed to the prejudice of the Nobility, to which purpose he persuaded the Senate against distributing the corn. This counsel coming to the ears of the people, they were so highly incensed, that they set upon him tumultuously as he came out of the Senate, and had certainly killed him, had not the Tribunes interposed, and cited him to appear before them in order to his defence. By which accident it is plain how much it is for the interest of a Commonwealth, that a legal way be provided to discharge the choller of the people, which otherwise will be apt to fly to extraordinary courses, and without doubt produce more mischievous effects: for if a single Citizen be cut off, (though possible unjustly) it begets little or no disorder in the Commonwealth, because execution is done without private force, or foreign assistance, (which are mortal things to a free State) and what is done by course of Law, and publick authority, is neither destructive nor dangerous. And as to ancient examples, I think this of Coriolanus sufficient; from whence every man may gather what mischief would have resulted to the Commonwealth of Rome, had he been cut in pieces by the fury of the people; it would have created private disgusts; those disgusts jealousies, those jealousies provision of defence; that combina∣tions; combinations parties; and parties destruction: but by the interposition of pub∣lick authority, all these evils were prevented. We have seen in our time what inconveni∣encies followed in Florence, because the multitude had not a legal way of spending their in∣dignations against one of their Citizens. Francesco Valori was Prince of that City, suspe∣cted by many people, as if he designed to make himself absolute, and by his haughtiness and pride to exceed those limits which the Laws had prescribed: there being in that Com∣monwealth no way to prevent it, but by setting up a faction in opposition to his, he began to look out himself, and to make a party that might defend him. The people on the other side having no legal way to suppress them, betook themselves to their Arms. And whereas, if any ordinary way had been open to have opposed him, his designs had been obviated by his single destruction; being forced upon an extraordinary, it was effected not only by his, bu•• by the ruine of many other eminent Citizens. To confirm what we have said, another

instance might be produced in the City in the case of Peter Soderini, which happened for want of a Law whereby they might impeachany Citizen that aspir'd to the Government. There were eight judges only in that commonwealth, which are not enough to administer justice against a powerful man: in States that are well constituted, 'tis necessary there be more; for where they are so few, their dispatch is but small, and they are corrupted with more ease than where they are many. If therefore there had been any such way allowed, upon his ill Government, the Citizens would have formally impeached him, without calling in an Army of Spaniards; and if his Government had been well, they durst not have ac∣cused him, lest he should have accused them again; and by that means that emulation would have been prevented which was the cause of so much mischief: from whence it may be concluded, when ever foreign assistance is called in by any party in a City, that it proceeds from the ill constitution of that Government, and that there is no legal way of purging those humours which are so natural to men; against all which, no remedy is more properly applicable, than by authorizing several persons of quality and interest to receive informa∣tions: which practice was so well followed in Rome, that in all dissentions betwixt the Se∣nate and the people, it was never known that either Senate, or people, or any private Citi∣zen what-ever had recourse to foreign assistance; for having justice at home, what need of fetching it from abroad? To these Examples aforesaid, we may add another out of Titus Livius, who tells us, that in Clusia the chief City of the Tuscans, Lucamon having vitiated a Sister of one Aruns, and Aruns being unable to vindicate her, by reason of the power of the delinquent, he addressed to the French, who at that time had the Government of Lom∣bardy, and possessing them with the profitableness of the Expedition, he prevailed with them to bring an Army to revege him of that outrage and injury which his Sister had received: and doubtless he would never have betaken himself to the relief of a foreigner, could he have hoped for reparation at home. But as liberty of just accusation is great security to a State, so toleration of calumny is as dangerous on the other side, which we shall evince in the following Chapter.

CHAP VIII.

Vnjust calumnies are no less pernicious to a Commonwealth, than legal accusa∣tions are profitable and good.

THough the valour of Furius Camillus (after he had raised their Siege, and driven the French from their Leaguer before Rome) was so universally venerable, that none of the Romans thought it diminution either to their reputation or dignity to give him prece∣dence; yet Manlius Capitolinus could not brook that so much honour should be given him, seeing, in his judgment, he had done as much towards the preservation of the City, and deserved as well, in saving the Capital, as Camillus had done in the other; and in military experience he thought himself no way inferior: so that full of envy, and unable to bear the greatness of his Competitor, finding he could make no impression upon the Senators, he turned himself to the people, and spread abroad several false reports against him. Among other things, he puts it into their heads, that the Treasure which was arised for payment of the French had not been given, but was continued in the hands of private Ci∣tizens; which mony, if reassumed, might be applyed to publick use, and either lessen the duties, or discharge the debts of the people. These pretences had great influence upon the people, insomuch as they began to talk, to murmur, to meet, to post themselves tumul∣tuously in many places in the City, which being observed, and thought very dangerous by the Senate, they created a Dictator to take cognisance of the business, and restrain the fury of Manlius. The dictator cited Manlius, and appointed him a day; Manlius appeared, and being environed by the people as the Dictator was by the Senate, silence being made, the Dictator asked Manlius in whose hands that great Treasure he spake of was detained, for he did assure him the Senators were as desirous to discover it as the people: to which Manlius made no positive answer, but by way of evasion, replyed it was unnecessary (he thought) to tell them what they knew already as well as he; upon which insolence, the Dictator commanded him to prison; from whence it may be observed how detestable such calumniations ought to be, not only in every free City, but in every civil Society, and with what care and severity they are to be suppressed; and that is done most commodiously, by allowing freedom of accusation; for as calumny is pernicious, information is beneficial to a State.

Accusation and calumny differ in this point, that any man may calumniate another where and when he pleases, without bringing testimony, or any other circumstance to prove it: but in case of accusation 'tis quite another thing, a man must bring his proofs, his wit∣nesses, and other circumstances to make good his charge. People are legally accused no where but before the Senates, the Magistrates, or the People: but they are calumniated every where, within doors and without, in the streets and the market-place, and there most where there is least accusation, and the Cities least disposed to receive them. Wherefore he who would lay the foundation State, ought principally to provide that all persons might have liberty to inform against any one, without suspicion or fear; which being solemnly provided, and faithfully observed, his next business is to secure them against scandals, and the calumniator can have no reason to complain if he be punished, when there are publick places appointed to receive the accusations of such as are abused; and if in these things particular care be not taken, great mischiefs will follow; for these kind of aspersions do not correct, but provoke their fellow Citizens, and those who are accused are not so much apt to fear the disgrace, as to hate the authors of the reports. In these cases the Romans had very good Laws, and they stood them in good stead; but we in Florence having neglected them, have suffered much by it, and he who peruses the History of our City, will see how subject to calum∣niations in all times those Citizens have been, who have employed in its most important affairs. One is charged with embezling the publick treasure; another for being corrupted, and betraying some publick enterprize; a third for ambition, and commiting one insolence or another, from whence feuds and animosities do arise on hands; and from thence divisions; from divisions parties; and from parties destruction. Whereas, if in Florence authority had been allowed for the accusation of Citizens, many mischiefs had been prevented, which followed for want of it; for those Citizens who were accused (whether condemned or ab∣solved) would have not been able to have molested the State; and the impeachments would have been fewer than the calumniations, because more people would have been calumniated than accused, in respect that the first was so much the more easie (as is said hefore) than the other. And these calumnies have advanced some Citizens to great dignity; for having great adversaries that opposed their designs, they joyned themselves with the people, and making them their friends, confirm'd the ill opinion which they had of their adversaries before. Several examples might be produced to this purpose, but I shall only instance in one.

The Florentine Army was encamped before Lucca under the Command of Giovanni Guiccardini their Commissary. By his ill fortune or conduct the Town was not taken; which of the two soever it was, Giovanni was aspersed, as having been brib'd by the Luc∣cheses, which calumny being propagated by his enemies, netled Giovanni, and almost brought him to despair; and though, in order to his justification, he offered to put himself into the hands of the Captain, yet all was to no purpose; for in that Commonwealth there was no body qualified to clear him: from hence arose great contentions betwixt Guic∣cardin's friends, (who were the greatest part of the Grandees in that City) and those who studied novelty, which contentions, and others of the like nature, encreasing daily upon their hands, brought that poor Commonwealth into a most deplorable condition. Manlius therefore spreading these false reports of the Senators about Rome, was a calumniator, not an accuser; and the Romans in his case gave manifest instruction how such people are to be punished, that is, that they be obliged publickly to accuse, and when their charge is made good, that they be rewarded or encouraged; but when it cannot be proved, that they be punished like Manlius.

CHAP. IX.

How much a single person is necessary for the establishment of a new common∣wealth, or the reformation of an old.

IT may seem to some, that I have run too far into the Roman History, having made no mention of the Founders of that Commonwealth, nor of the Orders which they ob∣served either in matters of Religion, or War. To ease them therefore of their suspence, who are desirous to hear something to that purpose, I say, that many perhaps may think it of ill example for the Founder of a State, as Romulus was, to kill his own Brother, and af∣terwards consent to the death of Titus Tatius Sabinus, who was chosen his companion in the Government, supposing that according to that president, any of his Citizens that were

ambitious of Command, might make away their adversaries or competitors, and remove any obstucle that opposed them; and it were reasonable enough, were it not to be considered to what end, and upon what motives that murder was committed.

This is to be taken for a maxim, and general rule, that it is impossible for any Govern∣ment either to be well founded at first, or will reformed afterwards, unless by a single per∣son, by whose direction all Orders, all Laws are to be made and promulged. He therefore who is the founder of a Common-wealth, if he be an honest man, and aims not at his own interest, and the raising of his Family, more than the advancement of his Country, must endeavour to get the power into his single hands, nor will any wise man ever accuse him for any action extraordinary that he shall do in order thereunto; or if the fact be to be blamed, the effect will excuse it, especially if be good, as it was in Romulus his case, for it is destructive and pernicious violence that is to be reprehended, not that which tends to set∣tlement and reformation. He is also to be so prudent and vertuous, as not to leave the authority which he assumed in inheritance to another, because men being more prone to evil than good, his success or may employ that power to the prejudice of the State, which he in his wisdom made use of to its benefit and advantage.

Moreover, though one be fittest to make Laws, yet when once made, they cannot hold long, if left upon the shoulders of a single person, but when the care and execution of them is transfer'd upon many, and many are concerned to maintain them, it is much better; for though many be not so proper in laying the foundations of a Government, because their diversity of opinions keeps them from discerning what is absolutely for its good; yet when things are once setled, and they have found it, that very diversity will be a means to preserve it. And that Romulus was excusable for what he did to his Brother and Com∣panion, and that what he did was more for the common good than his own private ambi∣tion or revenge, appears by this; that he had no sooner made them away but, he constitu∣ted a Senate, by whose advice he acted in every thing, reserving to himself only the power of calling them together, and commanding the Armies when they should resolve of a War: and of this we cannot have better evidence than that which followed after the expulsion of the Tarquins, there being nothing innovated or altered by the Romans, only in stead of one perpetual King, they created two annual Consuls; which shews that Romulus in his first Institutions aimed rather at the election of a civil and a free, than an absolute and tyrannical State. Many more examples might be produced to fortifie what is said, as those of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other Founders of Kingdoms and Commonwealths, who, by assuming a Monarchical authority, were able to frame and impose such Laws as were for the bene∣fit of the publick; but being so well known, it would be superfluous. I shall add only one, not so famous perhaps, yet worthy to be considered by those who are desirous to be good Legislators; and it is this, Agls King of Sparta observing his Citizens had lost much of their ancient virtue, and by consequence were decayed both in their power and Empire, imputing it in part to their deviation from the Laws of Lycurgus, desired very earnestly to reduce them again, but before he could bring it to perfection he was slain by the Spartan Ephori, as one who designed to make himself absolute; but Cleomenes succeeding him in the Government, having the same inclination, and perceiving by some Records and Writings which Agis had left behind, what was his intention, he found that he could not do his Country that service any way, but by making himself absolute: for by the ambition of some persons, he found that he could not do the good which he designed to the generality, by reason of the malevolence of a few, wherefore he caused the Ephori, and who-ever else he thought likely to obstruct him, to be killed, and revived the Laws of Lycurgus, which noble act might have recovered that State, and have made Cleomenes as venerable as Lycurgus himself, had it not been for the power of Macedon, and the weakness of other Commonwealths; for not long after that reformation, being invaded by the Macedonians, it proved unable to defend it self, and having no body to sustain it, was over∣come; and that just and honourable design was unhappily laid aside. Considering therefore what has been said, I conclude, that a single person is best for the institution or regulating of any sort of Government, and that for the death of Remus and Tatius, Romulus was not to be blamed.

CHAP. X.

As they are to be praised who lay the foundations of any Republick or Kingdom, so they are to be condemn'd who set up a Tyranny.

AMong all Excellent and Illustrious men, they are most praise worthy who have been the chief establishers of Religion and Divine Worship: In the second place are they who have laid the foundations of any Kingdom or Commonwealth; In the third, those who having the Command of great Armies have enlarged their own, or the Dominion of their Country; In the next, Learned Men of all Sciences according to their several studies and degrees; and last of all (as being infinitely the greatest number) come the Artificers and Mechanicks; all to be commended as they are ingenious or skilful in their Professions. On the other side, they are infamous and detestable, who are contemners of Religion, sub∣verters of Governments, Enemies of Virtue, of Learning, of Art, and in short of every thing that is useful and honourable to mankind; and of this sort, are the prophane, the se∣ditious, the ignorant, the idle, the debauched, and the vile. And although Nature has so ordered it, that their is neither wise man nor fool, nor good man, nor bad, who if it were proposed to him which he would choose of these two sorts of people, would not pre∣fer that which was to be preferred, and condemn the other; yet the generality of Mankind deluded by a false impression of good, and a vain notion of glory, leaving those ways which are excellent and commendable, either wilfully or ignorantly wander into those paths which will lead them to dishonour; and whereas to their immortal honour they might establish a Commonwealth or Kingdom as they please, they run head-long into a Tyranny, not considering what fame, what glory, what affection, what security, what quiet and satisfaction of mind they part with, nor what reproach, scandal, hatred, danger and disquiet they incur. It is impossible but all people, (whether of private condition in the Commonwealth, or such as by their Fortune or Virtue have arrived to be Princes) if they have any knowledge in History, and the passages of old, would rather choose (if private persons) to be Scipio's than Caesar's; and (if Princes) to be Agesilaus, Timolion and Dion, than Nabis, Phalaris, or Dionysius; because they must find the one highly cele∣brated and admired, and the other as much abhor'd and condemn'd; they must find Ti∣moleon, and the rest to have as much interest and authority in their Countries, as Dionysius or Phalaris had in theirs, and much more security. Nor let any man deceive himself with Caesar's reputation, finding him so exceedingly eminent in History, for those who have cryed him up, were either corrupted by his fortune, or terrified by his power, for whil'st the Empire continued, it was never permitted that any man should speak any thing against him, and doubtless had Writers had their liberty, they could have said as much of him as of Cataline, and Caesar is so much the worst of the two, by how much it is worse to effect and perpetrate an ill thing, than to designe it; and this they might judge by what is said of his adversary Brutus, for not daring to speak downright of Caesar, by reason of his power, by kind of reverse, they magnified his Enemy: After Rome also was grown to be an Empire, and the Government in the hands of a single person, it may be observed how much more happy and secure those Emperors were who lived like good Princes, according to the dictate of the Laws, than those who lived otherwise; for Titus, Nerva, Trajanus, Adrianus, Antoninus, and Marcus, had no need of Praetorian bands, nor multitude of Legions to defend them, their own excellent deportment, the benevolence of the people, and the affection of the Senate, saved them that charge: It will appear likewise how to Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and several other Tyrannical Emperors; their Eastern and Western Armies were not sufficient to secure them against the Enemies, which their irre∣gularity and ill manners had contracted; The History of which persons, if well considered, would enable any Prince to distinguish betwixt the ways of Honour and Infamy, of Security and Fear: For of XXVI Emperors betwixt Caesar and Maximinus, XVI were murdered, and but X died in their beds; and though some of those who were slain might possibly be good, (as Pertinax, and Galba) yet they were murdered by reason of the corruption and ill discipline which their Predecessors had left in the Army; and if among those who died naturally, there were any Tyrannical, (as Severus) it is to be imputed to his great Courage and Fortune, which are two things very seldom Concomitant in one man, it is legible likewise in the same History upon what Basis and foundation a Monarchy must be built, to make it solid, and permanent; for all those Emperors who succeeded by here∣ditary right were ill men, except Titus only, and those who came in by Election were

good, as Nerva and the four which succeeded him; but when the Empire became wholly Hereditary, it ran furiously to destruction. Let the times therefore from Nerva to Marcus be displayed before your Prince, and let him compare them which went before with those which came after, and then make his choice when they would have been born, or when he would have been Soveraign; He will find when good men were at the Helm, the Prince safe in the security of his Subjects; Peace and Justice flourishing in the world; The Senate in Authority; The Magistrates in Esteem; Rich men enjoying their Estates; Nobility and Virtue Exalted; and all things quiet and well; No rancour; No licentiousness; No cor∣ruption; No ambition to be found; the times were golden; Every man enjoyed his opinion, and defended it as he pleased; In a word, He will find the world triumphing in felicity, The Prince happy in the reverence and affection of the people; and the people safe in the generosity of their Prince. If then the Reigns of the other Emperors be con∣templated, they will appear full of commotion, discord, and sedition, assassinations in Peace; Cruelty in War; Many Princes murther'd; many Foreign, many domestick embroilments; All Italy afflicted; and all its Cities destroyed; Rome burnt; The Capitol by its own Inhabi∣tants demolished; The ancient Temples desolate; Religious Ceremonies prophaned; and the whole Citie full of Adulteries; The Sea covered with Exiles, and the Rocks with blood; Infinite Cruelties and Barbaris••••s committed daily in the City; And Nobility, Riches, Honour, and especially Virtue, grown to be Capital offences. Informers and Calumnia∣tors will be found to be rewarded; Servants instigated against their Masters; Children against their Parents; and those few who were so unhappy as to have no Enemies; to be destroyed by their Friends; Then it will appear what mighty obligations Rome, and Italy, and the whole world had to Caesar; and doubtless if the Prince be endued with the lest spark of humanity or good nature, he will detest the imitation of the bad, and be inflamed with an ardent propensity to the good. All which things considered, that Prince certainly which aims at glory, and reputation in the world should desire a Government, where the manners of his Subjects are corrupted and depraved, not to subvert and destroy it like Caesar, but to rectifie and restore it like Romulus, than which the Heavens, cannot confer, nor man propose to himself greater honour. And if a Prince who would regulate and re∣form a City, cannot do it, without depositing his Authority; In that case he is excu∣sable in some measure, if he dispenses; but where he can retain the one, and accomplish the other, he is altogether unpardonable; they therefore to whom the Heavens are so propitious as to present such an opportunity, are to consider that they have two ways before them, one leading to security whil'st they live, and an honourable memory when they are dead, the other to continual troubles here, and perpetual infamy here∣after.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Religion and Ceremonies of the Romans.

THough Rome should have been founded by Romulus, and owe him (as his Daughter) for her Birth, and Education; yet the Heavens foreseeing that the Constitutions of Romulus would not be sufficient for so great an Empire, put it into the heart of the Roman Senate, to create Numa Pompilius for his Successor, to the end that what was left defective by the first, might be compleated by the latter. Numa finding the people martial and fierce, and being desirous by the Arts of Peace to reduce them to civil obedience, he betook himself to Religion, as a thing absolutely necessary to the maintenance of civil policy; and he ordered things, so that for many ages together never was the fear of God so eminently conspicuous as in that Commonwealth, which was a great promotion to whatever was designed either by the Senate or Princes. And he who shall peruse the infinite actions of that City collectively, or of several Romans in particular will find those Citizens more tender of falsifying an Oath, than of violating the Laws, judging an offence against God more hainous, than an offence against Men, and God more able to punish it: Of this we have manifest Evidence in the Examples of Scipio, and Manlius Torquatus, for after the defeat which Hanibal had given the Romans at Cannas, the people tumultuating, and many of them assembling in great fear to consider of their condition; They resolved among them∣selves to leave Italy, and transplant into Sicily. Scipio having notice, repaired to them immediately, and coming in suddenly among them with his Sword drawn, he forced them to

recant, and take a peremptory Oath not to abandon their Country. Lucius Manlius Fa∣ther to Titus Manlius (who was afterwards called Torquatus) was impeached by Marcus Pomponius a Tribune of the people. Before the day arrived for the hearing of the Father, the Son coming to the Tribune and threatning to kill him, unless he would swear to with∣draw his accusation, he forced him to his Oath, and he performed as he had sworn; and so those Citizens who could not be retained by either the love of their Country, or Laws; were kept at home by an Oath which they took upon force: and the Tribune laid by his hatred to the Father, passed by the insolence of the Son, and neglected the reflection it would have upon his own honour, to be punctual in his Oath; which proceeded from no∣thing but those principles of Religion which Nama had distused. And surely it will be found by whoever considers the Roman History, how useful a thing Religion was to the governing of Armies, to the uniting of the people, to the keeping men good, and to the deterring them from being bad; so that should it fall into dispute whether Rome was most obliged to Romulus or Numa, I am of opinion, Numa would have the preheminence, be∣cause where Religion is fixed Military Discipline is easily introduced; but where Religion is wanting, Discipline may be brought in with difficulty, but never in perfection. It is to be seen likewise that for the constituting a Senate, and establishing of Laws both Mili∣tary and Civil, Romulus had no need to pretend Divine Authority; but with Numa it was otherwise, he was of necessity to pretend to it, and thereupon gave out that he had private Conference with a Nymph, who dictated to him what he was to prescribe to the people, and all was, because he had a mind to introduce new Laws and Customs into that City, which he thought his own private authority would never effect. And certainly never any man brought in new Laws, or set up any Doctrine extraordinary, but with pretence of Religion; because otherwise they would never have been admitted; for a man may be wise and know many things are good, and yet want reasons and arguments to convince other people; wherefore to remove that difficulty, prudent men do make that always their pre∣tence, and Solon, Lycurgus, and several others who had the same design, practised the same. The people (then) admiring the goodness and wisdom of Numa, submitted in all things; True it is the devotion of the age, and ignorance of the people contributed much, for thereby he was able to impress them with what new form he thought good; and questionless, he that would establish a Commonwealth at this day, would find it more easie among the rude people of the Mountains who have not been acquainted with Civility, than among such as have been educated in Cities, where their civility was corrupted; like rude unpolished Marble which is more readily carv'd into a Statue, than what has been mangled already by some bungling workman. So that all things considered, I conclude, That the Religion introduced by Numa, was one of the first causes of that Cities felicity, because Religion produced good Laws, good Laws good Fortune, and good Fortune a good End in whatever they undertook. And as strictness in Divine Worship, and Con∣science of Oaths, are great helps to the advancement of a State so contempt of the one, and neglect of the other are great means of its destruction. Take away Religion, and take away the foundation of Government; for though perhaps the goodness and fear of their Prince may sustain it for some time, and supply the want of Religion in his subjects; yet because he is mortal, and possibly but very short lived, that Kingdom can hardly out-live the virtue of its Governor: Wherefore those States which depend only upon the piety of their Princes, are of little duration, for commonly one dyes with the other, and the virtue of the Father seldom revives in the Son, as Dante has said very wisely,

Rade volte discende per li rami L' tunn ana probitate, et questo vuole Quel che la da, perche da lai si chiami.

Virtue's but seldom to the branches spread, He who bestows't, has in his wisdom said, Let him that wants, come to the fountain-head.

Things being thus, it is not sufficient for a Commonweal thor Kingdom to have a Prince who Governs it wisely whil'st he lives, but he must lay his foundation so, as it may out∣live him, and flourish when he is in his grave; and though rude, and uncultivated people are more susceptible of new Laws, or new Doctrines; yet men that are civil, and presume more upon their Education are not altogether impenatrable. The people of Florence thought themselves no fools, and they had a good opinion of their breeding; nevertheless they suffered themselves to be deluded by Frier Girolamo Savonarola into persuasion that he

had Conference with God. A person of his gravity is not to be mentioned but with reve∣rence, and therefore whether true, or not true, I will not determine, only this I shall say, many believed him, who never saw any thing extraordinary to induce them; his Life, his Doctrine, the subject of his discoursing being in their thoughts enough to convince them. Let no man therefore despair of what another man has attained, for men (as I said in my Preface) are born, live, and dye, in the same method as formerly.

CHAP. XII.

How necessary for the preservation of a State it is, that Religion be in esteem, and how much Italy has suffered for want of it, by means of the Church of Rome.

THose Princes and Commonwealths who would keep their Governments entire and incorrupt, are above all things to have a care of Religion and its Ceremonies, and preserve them in due veneration, for in the whole world there is not a greater sign of immi∣nent ruine, than when God and his Worship are despised. This is easily understood by observing upon what foundation the Religion is placed where every man is born. The Religion of the Gentiles ran much upon the answers of Oracles, upon Divinations, and Soothsaying, upon which all the rest of their Sacrifices, Rights, and Ceremonies did de∣pend; for they did not doubt but the same thing that could presage your fortune (be it good, or be it bad) could as easily confer it; and therefore they built their Temples, they made their Sacrifices, they offered up their prayers, and used all other Ceremonies that might signifie their veneration; for the Oracles of Delos, ••he Temple of Iupiter Ammon, and such other things had a strange influence upon people, and kept them in most wonder∣full devotion; but afterwards when they began to speak according to the interest or dire∣ctions of great persons, and their partiality began to be discovered; the people grew incre∣dulous, and prone to all kind of disturbance: A Prince therefore or Commonwealth ought most accurately to regard, that his Religion be well founded, and then his Govern∣ment will last, for there is no surer way than to keep that good and united. Whatever therefore occurs that may any way be extended to the advantage and reputation of the Religion which they design to establish (how uncertain or frivolous soever it may seem to themselves) yet by all means they are to be propagated and encouraged, and the wiser the Prince, the more sure it is to be done; This course having been observed by wise men, has produced the opinion of Miracles, which are celebrated even in those Religions which are false; for let their Original be as idle as they please, a wise Prince will be sure to set them forward, and the Princes authority recommends them to every body else. Of these miracles, there were many in Rome, as at the sacking of Urii, some of the Roman Soldiers entring into the Temple of Iuno, accosting her Image, and asking it Vis venire Roman, will you come to Rome; To some of them she seemed to beckon by way of consent, and, others fancied she said Yes; For those men being more than ordinary religious (as Titus Livius infers from the devotion, and reverence, and quietness wherewith they entred) they fancied they heard that answer, which 'tis possible they expected before; and Camillus and the other Magistrates of the City promoted their belief: And if this diligent care in Divine Worship were regarded by Christian Princes according to the Precepts and Instru∣ctions of him that gave it at first, the States and Commonwealths of Christendom would be much more happy and firm: Nor can any thing portend the ruine of our Church with more certainty, than that those who are nearest the Church of Rome, (which is the head of our Religion) should have less Religion than other people: and he who should consider the present practice, with the primitive foundation, would find that either utter destru∣ction, or some great judgment was hanging over our heads. And for as much as some are of opinion, that the felicity and welfare of Italy depends upon the Church of Rome, I shall set down some few reasons to the contrary, which I have fram'd to my self, two of which are in my judgment unanswerable: One is that by the corrupt example of that Court, that Province has lost all its Religion, and all its Devotion, which has been followed by many inconveniences, and disorders; for as the Religiousness of the people presuppose all well, so where they are wicked, it betokens the contrary; so then, we Italians have this Obli∣gation to the Church and its Ministers, that by their means we are become Heathenish and Irreligious; besides another (little less pernicious) and that is, that we are grown divided and factious, which must of necessity be our ruine, because never was any Province happy

or united, unless under the obedience of one Commonwealth, or one Prince, as France and Spain at this time: and the reason is, because Italy is not upon the same terms, as having no one Republick or Commonwealth to govern it, but the Church, and though the Pope has assumed a Temporal as well as Spiritual jurisdiction, yet he was never so couragious or powerful as to possess himself of all, and make himself Prince; nor was he ever so weak, but upon any apprehension of losing his Temporal Dominion, he could call in some Foreign Potentate to defend him against any man who was grown too formidable; and this has been seen anciently in many Examples, as when by assistance of Charles the Great, he repelled the Lombards who in a manner hacd made themselves Masters of all Italy; and when again in our days he retrenched the power of the Venetians by the help of the French, after which he drove out the French by the succour of the Swizzers. The Church therefore being neither so strong as to conquer all Italy, nor so weak as to suffer it to be over-run by any body else, has been the occasion that it never fell into the hands of one person, but has been cantonized into several Principalities, by which means it has been so weak and disunited, that it has been not only exposed as a prey to the power of the Barbarians, but to every one that thought good to invade it which is an unhappiness we Italians owe only to the Church: If any man suspects what is said, and would be expe∣rience inform himself of the truth, it would be necessary he should be so potent as to trans∣plant the Court of Rome and all its Authority in Italy into the Territories of the Swizzers, who are the only people at this day which live either as to their Ecclesiastical or Military, Discipline, according to the Model of the Ancients, and then he would quickly find that the wickedness and depravity of that Court, would produce more confusion and disorder in that Country than ever befell it by any accident before.

CHAP. XXIII.

How the Romans pretended Religion many times to regulate their City, to prosecute their Wars, and to pacifie their tumults.

ANd I hold it not extravagant to produce two or three Examples in which the Romans made use of their Religion both in the regulation of their City, and the prosecution of their Wars; and although in Titus Livius they be very frequent, yet I shall content my self with these.

After the people of Rome, had created their Tribunes with consular power and all of them (except one) from among the Plebeans; there hapning that year, a furious Plague, a desperate Famine, and other Prodigies besides, the Nobility in the next creation of Tri∣bunes took advantage of that occasion, and pretended that the Gods were incensed against the people, for that they had debased the Majesty of the Empire, and that there was no remedy to appease them but to reduce the Election of the Tribunes to its primitive insti∣tution; upon which the people were so frighted, they chose all their Tribunes that year, out of the Patricii. It was the same case in the taking of Veii The Romans had been before it ten years, and no great lekelihood of carrying it; but the Tenth, the Lake of Albin being miraculously swell'd; so as to drown a good part of the Country, the great Officers of the Army observing their Soldiers weary of the Siege, and impatient to be at home; feigning to have consulted the Oracles, they pretended that they had received this answer, That Veii should be taken that year that Albin overflowed; which answer reflecting upon their Devotion, the Soldiers reassumed their Courage, continued the Siege, and (Camillus being chosen Dictator) carried the Town; and thus you may see how the Romans made use of their Religion to encourage their Army against the fatigues and dangers of a tedious Leaguer, and to fright the people from entrenching upon the pri∣viledges of the Nobility in the Election of their Tribunes; without which pretence it would have been a hard matter to have persuaded either the one or the other. There was another example to the same purpose, Terentillus, a Tribune of the people, would needs make a Law (which was called Lex Terentilla, and shall be mentioned hereafter) contrary to the interest, and inclination of the Senate. The Senate resolved to oppose it, and the best means they could think of, was pretence of Religion; of which they made use two ways; they ordered the Books of the Sybils to be look'd over, and this answer to be returned, That that very year the City would be in great danger of losing its liberty, unless civil Sedi∣tion was prevented; which artifice, (notwithstanding it was discovered by the Tribunes) put the people into such a fright, they grew cool in the business, and refused to stand by them. After this, they made use of the same pretence another time; Appius Herdonius

having got together of Slaves and Exiles to the number of Four thousand men, seized upon the Capitol in the night, and brought such a terror upon the City, it might very well be feared if the Aequi and the Volsci (perpetual Enemies to the Romans) had taken their op∣portunity and marched to Rome, they would have gone near to have master'd it: However the Tribunes persisted, and nothing could serve their turns, but the Lex Terentilla must be promulged; for they affirmed the Stories of being invaded, were but suggestions and fal∣lacies, and not one word of them true: Hereupon one Publius Rubetius (a grave Citizen, and of good authority among them) came forth of the Senate, and partly by fair words and partly by foul, remonstrating the danger of the City, and the unseasonableness of their de∣mands, he play'd his part so well, that the Constrained the people to take an Oath of fidelity ••o the Consul; and in testimony of their integrity, the people ran to their Arms, and reco∣vered the Capital from Herdonius; but Publius Valerius their Consul being slain in the Conflict, Titus Quintius was chosen immediately in his place; who to keep the populace employed, and leave them no time to think of their Law Terentilla, Commanded them out of Town forthwith against the Volsci, alledging that the Oath which they had taken to be true to the Consul, obliged them to follow him; and though the Tribunes opposed it, and objected that that Oath extended no further than to the Consul that was dead; nevertheless Livy tell us, that such was the peoples tenderness and veneration for Religion, that they chose rather to follow the Consul, than to strain and presume upon their Consciences, giving this reason for it.

Nondum haec, quae nunc tenet seculum, negligentia deûm venerat, nec, interpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum, & leges aptas faciebat.

The neglect of the Gods, which has overspread this Age, was not then come to that height, nor did everyman interpret his Oaths, and accommodate his Laws, to his own interest and advantage.

Upon which the Tribunes perceiving their danger and that if they persist, they should run a hazard of being utterly extinguished; they came to an agreement with the Consul, received his Orders, obliged themselves not to insist upon the Lex Terentilla for a Twelve-month, in case the Consuls for the same time would forbear drawing out the people. And thus you see how by pretence of Religion, the Senate overcame a difficulty, which without it, it could never have done.

CHAP. XIV.

The Romans were wont to interpret their Auspices with accommodation to their own pleasures and designs; and when at any time they were forced to transgress they managed it wisely, and pretended to be very precise; and if any body rashly despised them, he was sure to be punished.

AMong the Gentiles, Auguries were a great part of their Religion (as I have said else∣where) and they contributed not a little to the well being of the Roman Common∣wealth; for which reason the Romans had them in particular care, above any other Ordi∣nance, and made use of them in the creation of Consuls, in the undertaking of Enterprizes, in drawing out their Armies, in their Battels and Engagements, and in every other business of importance, whether Military or Civil; nor would they ever begin an Expedition, till they had possessed the Soldiers that the Gods had promised them success; Among the several Orders of Auspices, they had one called the Pullarii, who were to give their presages before ever they fought with their Enemy: If the pullen, over which they had inspection, Eat, it was a good Omen, and they might with confidence engage; if they did not Eat, It was an ill sign, and they were obliged to forbear: Nevertheless, when reason told them their Enter∣prizes were practicable, they went roundly about them, though perhaps their Auspices were averse, but acted with great nicety and cunning, that it might not seem done in defiance of Religion: This was practised by Papirius the Consul before his Battel with the Samnites after which they never recovered. For being drawn up with his Army against the Samnites, with all visible advantage, and being willing to fall on, he commanded the Pullarii to try their Experiment; the Chickens refusing to peck, was a great trouble to the chief of the Pullarii, who observed the great alacrity of the Soldiers, and the great confidence of the Ge∣neral; that an occasion therefore of so signal a Victory might not be taken from the Army, he return'd answer to the Consul that the Omen was good; Papirius put his Men immedi∣ately into Battalia, and advanced against the Enemy; but some of the Pullarii having told it up and down among the Soldiers, that the Pullets did not eat, it came to the ears of Spurius

Papirius, Nephew to the Consul, who in great hast advertising his Unckle, received this answer, Spurius be you diligent, and observe your Orders; to my self and my Army the Auspi∣cia are good; if the Pullarius has told me false, the misfortune will be to him; and that the event night correspond to his Prognostick, he commanded the Pullarii to be placed in the front of the Battel; His Commands being executed, it hapned by accident as they were advancing to the fight, the chief of the Pullaru was killed by a dart from one of the Roman Soldiers, which being told to the Consul, Now (said he) all will be well, the Gods are ap∣peased, and the blood of the Author has atton'd for his lye; and so by a discreet accommoda∣tion of his designs to the Auspices, he went on to the Combat, his Army taking no notice that he had violated their Religion. Had Appius Pulcher been so ingenious in Sicily in the first Punick War, it had fared better with him when he came home, but being to fight the Carthaginian Army, he consulted the Pullarii, who informing him that the Pullen would not eat, We will see then (said he) if they will drink, and caused them to be thrown into the Sea: and coming afterwards to an Engagement, his Army was defeated, himself con∣demn'd at his return, and Papirius advanced, not so much because one had prevailed, and the the other was beaten, as because one had prudently evaded the Omen, and the other rashly defyed it: and these Auguries were invented for no other end, but that the Soldiers might go to the fight with more confidence and alacrity; for their alacrity was observed to contri∣bute much to their success; and this practice was so fortunate to the Romans, that foreign Governments began to make use of it; as I shall show by one Example in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XV.

How the Samnites in the extremity of their affairs, as their last refuge, had recourse to Religion.

THe Samnites had long War with the Romans, fought several Battels with them, and in the last fight in Tuscany, were so utterly broken, that their Army was destroyed, their chief Officers slain, and the Tuscans, Gauls, and Umbri, (their allies) uncapable of giving them any further assistance; so that Livy tells us, Nec suis, nec externis viribus jam stare poterant, tamen bello non abstinebant, adeo ne infeliciter quidem defensae libertatis taoedebat & vinci, quam non tent are victoriam Malebant. That though they were reduced to such a condition, That they could neither support themselves by their own strength, nor the supplies of their Friends, yet they continued the War; so that the unhappiness of their defence could not discourage them, but they chose rather to be conquered, than not to try for the Victory. Hereupon knowing that no Victory is to be expected, where the Soldier is diffident; and that nothing enhanses them like a Religious opinion; as their last effort, they concluded (by the Ministery of Ovius Paccius their Priest) to revive an old Ceremony, which they did in this manner; Altars being erected, and solemn Sacrifice made, betwixt the flaming Altar, and the bones of the Victims, the Officers having first sworn never upon any distress whatsoever to abandon the fight; the Soldiers were called over one by one, and in the same place (before several Centurions with their naked Swords in their hands appointed to that purpose) required to swear, first, that they would not deride any thing that they should either hear or see; after which, with execrable words, and Verses full of horror, they caused them to take their Oaths to be ready at the Command of their Generals, never to fly, and to kill any of their fellows that offer'd to turn his back: and if ever they broke them, they imprecated a judgment upon themselves, and their race. Some of them being scrupulous, and unwilling to swear, were killed upon the place, which struck such terror into the rest, that none of them refused. And that this Ceremony might be performed with more magnificence, there being 40000 Men in the field, half of them were clothed in white, with Plumes of feathers upon their Helmets, in which posture they encamped not far from Aquilonia; Papirius was sent against them, and in his Speech to his Soldiers, he had this Expression, Non enim Crist as vulnera facere, & picta, at▪ aurata scuta, transire Romanum pilum. For their feathers made no wounds, nor could the paint or glittering of their Shields protect them against the darts of the Romans. And to take off the opinion from his Soldiers, that the solemnity and Nature of their Oath, might make the Enemy despe∣rate; he told them, That that would be rather a terror, than an encouragement to them when they came to consider that by their own folly they had brought themselves in danger of the Gods, the Romans, and their Comerades. In short the Samnites wear beaten, the

Roman virtue, and the memory of their own frequent misfortunes prevailing against all the forc'd courage which either their Oath or their Religion could give them. Nevertheless their sence of it was visible, seeing they made use of it as their last remedy, when they had no other hopes to recover their spirits.

This might possibly have been better brought in among my forein discourses, but depend∣ing upon one of the ancientest and most important Ceremonies of the Roman Common∣wealth, lest I should divide my matter, and give too much occasion to look back, I thought it not improper to insert it in this place.

CHAP. XVI.

A people accustomed to the dominion of a Prince, though by accident they may acquire their liberty, yet it is with great difficulty, if they maintain it.

IF the Records of ancient History will serve our turn, it is manifest by many examples, that a people born and bred up in subjection to a Prince, cannot without great difficulty pre∣serve its liberty, if by any accident it attains it, as the Romans did upon the expulsion of the Tarquins & not without reason; for the people is like a wild beast, (which, though naturally fierce, disposed to live in the woods, and to find out dens and converts to conceal it self) yet hav∣ing been always brought up as it were in prison & servitude, if by accident it breaks its bonds and escapes out into the field, it is in a maze, knows not whither to run, where to sustain, or where to conceal it self, as having been accustomed to bondage and confinement; by which means, if worth the looking after, it is easily recovered. It is the same with a people which has lived always in subjection, who, understanding nothing of publick offence or defence, and knowing as little of Princes as Princes do of them, are with the greatest ease imagina∣ble reduced to a yoke which is commonly more grievous than what they escaped from be∣fore; and this happens to them where they are not totally debauched (for where the Mass is corrupted, they cannot subsist a moment): I speak now of those where the malignity is not so diffused, but that there are still left more good men than bad; in which case another difficulty does likewise occur, and that is, when-ever the yoke of tyrranny is shaken off, and liberty set up, it follows continually that many enemies are created, whose interest it is to subvert it, and no friends made that shall have any advantage by supporting it. By ene∣mies I mean all those privado's and favourites of Princes who have enjoyed the perferments and wealth of their Master, and cannot but be disgusted to find themselves dispossessed; wherefore they are constantly ready to take any occasion of restoring their old Prince, that they themselves might be restored to their authority and employment. And for friends whose interest it is that (upon the shaking off their Tyrant) their liberty should be preser∣ved, they are not to be expected, because in free States, honours and offices are confer'd upon such as by their virtue, some great atcheivment for the benefit of the Common∣wealth, or some other honourable action have seemed to deserve them; and when a man receives no more than what he thinks he has deserved, he ascribes it to his own merits ra∣ther than to the liberality of the State, and holds himself not obliged. Besides, the com∣mon utility resulting from a free State, though it be in their power, it is not at all in their knowledg; for who is it that considers, or takes care that every man enjoys quietly what God has given him; that their wives be not dishonoured, their children abused, nor their fellows oppressed? For who is it that will think himself bound to any man for doing him no wrong? and things being so, a free State newly acquired, never creates such friends as will be half so solicitous for its conservation, as those enemies who have been dispossessed of their fortunes and preferment▪ will be to undermine it, and restore their old Master again: and if it be enquired what course is to be taken against the inconveniences and disorders which follow thereupon; there is not a more efficacious, safer, and more necessary remedy, than to kill the Sons of Brutus, who (as History tells us) entred into a conspiracy against the State, with other young Gentlemen of Rome, for no other reason but because they could not be so loose and licentious under the Consuls as under the Kings; as if their freedoms were incompatible, and the liberty of the people was servitude to them: where∣fore he who proposes to govern a people, whether by the way of Monarchy or Republick and does not secure himself of those who are adverse to the change, must never think to effect, or at least to enjoy it long: and on the other side, it is convenient he should know the infelicity of those Princes who cannot secure their Dominion without murder and blood; by which means the multitude is incensed, and become mortally their enemies: he

who has but few enemies may secure it the better; but where the multitude is provoked, no security is to be had; and the more cruelty is used, the weaker the Government; so that when all's done the surest remedy is to indulge the people, and make them your friends. And now (though I may seem something confused and immethodical in speaking sometimes of a Prince, and then of a Republick) I shall take the liberty to do it here briefly, that I may have no occasion hereafter. A Prince therefore who, by usurping upon the liberties of the people, has made them his enemies, (if he desires to reconcile himself) is above all things to consider what the people affect, and he shall find it to consist principally in two things; one is, revenge upon those who have been instrumental in their slavery; and the other is restitution of their liberty. In the first the Prince may gratifie them fully, in the second but in part. Of the first we have an exact instance. Clearchus Governour of He∣raclia being banished for his tyranny, a controversie betwixt the Nobility and the Commons hapning afterwards in that Town, it fell out, that the Nobility finding themselves the weaker, addressed to Clearchus, and having entred into confederacy with him, they gave him admission and overcoming the people, he took away their liberties. But Clearchus perceiving himself in the clutches of the Nobility, and not only subject to their insolence, (which was neither to be satiated nor corrected) but to the rage and fury of the multitude, which could by no means digest his encroachments upon their liberty, he resolved at one blow to rid himself of his Grandees, and reconcile himself to the people, and taking his opportunity, he cut off all his Nobility with great satisfaction to the rest. The other thing which they desire with so much favour is restitution of their liberty in which the Prince cannot totally comply without degrading himself: he is therefore to examine upon what grounds the people are so fond of it, and he will find that some few indeed are zea∣lous for their liberty, in hopes of office and preferment; but the greatest part desire it only to be secure against oppression, and to live comfortably, and at ease. For in all Governments, whether Republick or Monarchical, forty or fifty men go away with all the commands and offices of importance, which number being small, it is no hard matter for a Prince to secure himself against them, by cutting them off, or by such addition to their former advantages as may in some measure oblige them.

The rest, whose aim is only to live quietly, are easily satisfied by constituting such Laws and Ordinances as may make the power of the Prince consistant with the security of the people. If a Prince does this, and be observed upon no accident what-ever to violate their Laws, the people will quickly be contented, and believe themselves safe. And of this the Kingdom of France is an example; being quiet, and at peace, because the Kings are bound by innumerable Laws, which comprehend the security of the Subject; for by the first in∣stitution of that Monarchy, the Kings have the disposition of their Revenue, and the ma∣nagement of their Armies, but in every thing else they are circumscribed by the Laws. That Prince therefore, or Commonwealth, which at its first erection secures not it self, is obliged to do it at the first opportunity, as the Romans did when they murdered the Sons of Brutus, and he that slips it will repent when 'tis too late: for the people of Rome (not yet entirely corrupted) having recovered their liberty, it was sufficient to maintain it, that they made away the Bruti, and extinguished the Tarquins, which otherwise was not to have been done, had the whole mass and body of the people been debauched, as I shall shew in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

A people wholly corrupted in their manners, may possibly recover their liberty, but they will find insuperable difficulty to maintain it.

HAd not Kings been expelled as they were in Rome, that City, in my opinion, must of necessity have declined, and its ancient virtue & the authority been lost; for if the cor∣ruption of those Kings be considered, had it been propagated but to the third succession▪ it would easily have diffused it self among the people; and that being infected, nothing could have preserved the City, much less have restored it to its former vigour and reputation; but the trunk being entire, and the distemper only in the head; by taking off that, the members were capable of being preserved. and their liberty recovered. And this may be laid down as a positive truth, that a City accustomed to the dominion of a Prince (if the manners of the people be corrupted) can never make it self free, though the Prince and his whole race be extinguished; for some new Lord or other will always spring up, unless

by accident the courage and fortune of some good Citizen concurs to its preservation; and even then its liberty will be continued no longer than the life of that person; as it hapned in Syracuse, which remained free during the lives of Dion and Timoleon, (though in different times) but when they were dead, it relapsed, and fell under the same tyranny as before: but the most evident example of all was in Rome which City having turned out the Tar∣quins, found out a way of setting up, and maintaining their liberty a long time; yet when Coesar was slain, and Caligula, Nero: and the whole race of the Caesars extirpated; the Ro∣mans were so far from maintaining it, that they could not so much as introduce the least form or appearance of liberty; and the reason of that diversity in the same City was no other, but because in the time of the Tarquins the people were not generally so vitious as afterwards in the reign of Caligula and Nero: for at the expulsion of the Tarquins, to possess the people then against tyranny, it was sufficient to tender them an oath, by which they en∣gaged never to admit single person again in Rome: whereas afterwards, upon the death of Cae∣sar and the rest, neither the authority nor rigour of Brutus, with all his Legions in the East was able to dispose the people to the assertion of that liberty which so happily had been set up by the first of Brutus his name. So strangely had the Faction of Marius diffused their poison among the Commons, of which Caesar being head, he had opportunity of blinding the people, and coaxing them into servitude so slily, they could not perceive the yoke into which they were thrusting their necks. Though this example of the Romans be pregnant enough, yet it is not brought in for any want in our own times. For in Naples and Milan the manners of the people being totally debauched, nothing could do, no opportunity could restore them to a condition of liberty. 'Tis true, upon the death of Philip Visc••nti, the Milaneses attempted, but they could never effect it. For which reason it was very happy for the Romans that their Kings discovered their depravity so soon; for by that means they were driven out before their wickedness could dilate, and spread it self among the people; which if it had done, the troubles and tumults which succeeded thereupon had never had so good end, as to make rather for the advantage than prejudice of the City: from whence it may be infer'd, that where the multitude is not corrupt, tumults and disorders do no very great mischief; where it is corrupt, Laws may be well constituted and provided, and ye do no good; unless executed by some person so severely, that the people are compelled to observe them, and by strict observation to become good; which is a thing I can neither say has hapned hitherto, or promise it ever will. For it is clear, (as I said before) that a City declining, upon the corruption of the Mass, can never recover, unless it be by the virtue and magnanimity of some active Citizen, who takes the administration of Justice into his own hands, and sees every thing faithfully performed, and even then, that good man is no sooner in his grave, but the people are in their old servitude again. Thus it fell out with the Thebans; Epaminondas, by his virtue and conduct, enabled them to keep up a form of a Common wealth whilst he was alive, but, alas, at his death it was quickly dissolved; the reason is, because no man is sufficiently long lived, to reclaim a City that has been long accustomed to licentiousness, and to reduce it to be good. So that though it happens to have such a good man among them, and he lives a long time; nay though there be two successions of good men, if the third (as I said before) be defective, all goes to wrack, it must necessarily be ruined, unless by many dangers, and great effusion of blood it happens to be preserved; because that corruption which renders it so unapt and indisposed to a free life, proceeds from the great inequality in that City and to reduce things to an equality, extraordinary ways must be used which few people know, and fewer will take, as shall be shewn more particularly in another place.

CHAP. XVIII.

A corrupt City having made it self free, how its liberty may be maintained; and not having made it self, how its liberty may be procured.

I Think I shall not be extravagant, if to what has been said already, I add another quaery Whether, in a corrupt City, a free State may be maintained (if by any accident it be set up); or, if there be no such thing already, how it is to be obtained? I answer, both of them are hard; and though a certain rule cannot be prescribed, (unless we knew the degrees of its corruption); nevertheless, it being good that every thing be fairly discust, this que∣stion shall not be suffered to pass.

I shall presuppose, that the City of which I speak is corrupt in extremity, and in that case the difficulty encreases with proportion; for no Laws nor Customs can restrain an uni∣versal depravity; because, as good Customs cannot subsist without good Laws, so good Laws cannot be executed without good Customs: besides, the Laws which are made in the minority and innocence of a Commonwealth, are not sutable or efficacious when it is grown wicked and robust; for the Laws of a City do vary upon several accidents and emer∣gencies, but the Statutes and fundamental Orders are seldom or never changed, for which reason new Laws are not so necessary afterwards, as good Statutes at first: but to illustrate it farther. By ancient Statute and Custom time out of mind, the Commonwealth of Rome was divided betwixt the Senate and the People, and all authority was derived either from the People, or Senate, or Tribunes, or Consuls; as also their creation of Magistrates, and enacting of Laws: these Customs were little (if at all) changed in all the revolutions of that State; but the Laws for punishing malefactors, and regulating enormities, were enacted or repealed as the exorbitance of the people did fluctuate and require, as the sump∣tuary Laws, the Law against adultery, ambition, and several others, instituted from time to time, as the Citizens grew corrupter. But the old customs of State being retained, (though tainted, and sharing in the corruption of the people) the reviving of old Laws, or intro∣ducing of new, was not sufficient to keep the Citizens good, but it would have contributed much, had the old Customs been reform'd when those new Laws were introduced, and a new form of Government set up: for that those ancient Customs are of no use or advan∣tage where a City is overflown with such a deluge of corruption, is apparent by their me∣thods in the creation of Magistrates, and the exhibition of Laws. The Consulship, nor any other office or dignity was never confer'd by the people of Rome upon any body but by formal application, which Custom was originally very good, because none sought for them who was conscious of being unfit; forasmuch as to be repulsed was a dishonourable thing, and to make himself sit, every man chose to be virtuous. But afterwards the manners of the people growing so fatally corrupt, this Custom lost its primitive convenience, and became not only useless but pernitious; for they who had most power, not they who had most virtue and capacity, pretended to the Magistracy; the poor and the virtuous not da∣ring to appear for fear of an ignominious repulse: but this inconvenience (like the City it self) was not the product of a day, it stole into the Commonwealth, lay concealed, en∣creased, and exerted it self by degrees, as all other inconveniencies do. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 having con∣quered Africa and Asia, and reduced the greatest part of Greece, the Romans began to hug themselves in their liberty, as not knowing any enemy they ought in reason to fear: this security and unhappy scarcity of enemies was the occasion that in their creation of Consuls the people of Rome began to regard riches and favour more than ability and virtue; prefer∣ring such persons as could entertain and treat people handsomely, before such as were grave, and could only conquer their enemies; afterwards, from those who were most plausible, they came down, and created such as were most powerful; so that persons of virtue and capacity were totally excluded. In the making of Laws, a Tribune and any one Citizen had power to propose any thing to the people which they thought of importance to the publick; before whom it was canvas'd and discuss'd, every man having free liberty to ob∣ject, or promote it (as his judgment directed) before it could pass.

And this Custom was good likewise whilst the Citizens were so too; for it was always, and is still convenient, that if any man be wiser than the rest, and can contrive any thing for the security or benefit of the publick, that he have liberty to propose it; and it is as use∣ful on the other side, every man have the same freedom to ventilate and examine it; that all being well argued, and every mans opinion heard, the best may be chosen. But as the Citizens grew corrupt, this Custom grew incommodious: none but great men proposed any thing to the people, and what they did was not for the common, but their own private interest, and which was worse, no man had the liberty to dispute it; so that the people were either circumvented, or forced to consent to their own ruine and destruction. So then, to have maintained Rome free in such an age of corruption, it was necessary, as they altered their Laws according to the prevalence of each vice, so they should have altered their fun∣damentals, in the making of Laws, and creation of Magistrates; for the same Customs are not equally convenient where the people are not equally good, no more than the forms can be alike where the matter is contrary. But 'tis worth our inquity whether these Customs be to be reform'd at a blow, as soon as their inconvenience is descried, or by degrees, before every body observes them. I say both of them are almost impossible: for to alter them by degrees, requires some wise and sagacious Citizen, that can foresee the dangers at a distance, and trace them to their first causes; but of such persons perhaps a City may never see one, or if it does, how hard is it for him to persuade other people: for people accustomed to a

way are not easily got out of it, especially when the mischief is rather in probability than prospect. And when these old Customs are to be reformed, (as appearing unprofitable and dangerous for the Commonwealth) though they be easily discovered, they are hard to be removed, especially at once; because the common mass being infected, common ways are too weak; and recourse must be had to extraordinary, as violence and arms; for before the fabrick of the Government can be changed and modelled to your desire, 'tis necessary above all things to make your self Master of the City, and to be able to dispose of it at your pleasure: and because to reform a State, and reduce it to a Civil Regiment, presup∣poses a good man; and to usurp, and make ones self Prince by violence, presupposes an ill; therefore it seldom falls out that a good man makes himself Prince by unjust means, be his ends never so good; nor will an ill man, who has made himself Prince, ever do good▪ it never falls into his thoughts to imploy that authority well which he has unjustly acquir'd. From the causes aforesaid therefore arises the difficulty (or rather impossibility) in a cor∣rupt City, to maintain a free State, much less to erect one; and if there should be any way found out to effect it, it would (in my judgment) be necessary to frame it rather according to a Regal than a Popular State; that those persons whose insolence is incorrigible by the Laws, may be bridled and restrained by some supreme Magistrate in the nature of a King; and to attempt any other way, must be either vain and temerarious, or exorbitantly cruel. For though Cleomenes (being a single person) killed the Ephori, (as is said before) and Ro∣mulus, his Brother, and Titus Tatius, and afterwards imployed their authority to the ad∣vantage of the publick; yet it is to be considered, that the subjects neither of the one or the other were so vitious or depraved as those of whom we have treated in this Chapter, and therefore they were able to do what they pleased, and excuse it when it was done.

CHAP. XIX.

Though a weak Prince succeeds an excellent, the Government may stand; but if one weak Prince succeeds another, 'tis impossible.

IF the virtue and conduct of Romulus, Numa, and Tullius (the three first Kings of Rome) be considered, it will be found to have been much for the advantage of that City to have its first King martial, and fierce; the second King, quiet and religious; and the third (like the first) active, and war-like again. For, as after the first institution, it was necessary there should be some-body to dispose the people to ways of Religion, and civil conversa∣tion; so it was necessary again after that, that the next King should reassume the vigour and magnanimity of their predecessor; otherwise the minds of the Citizens would have grown effeminate, and the City have become a prey to any of its neighbours. Wherefore it is to be considered, that a Prince not altogether so valiant and enterprizing, may main∣tain the Government upon the score of his Predecessor, and injoy the fruits of his courage and labour; but if it happens he be long lived, and that he is not succeeded by a martial Prince to revive the activity of the Founder, the Government must necessarily be ruined. On the other side, if two Princes immediately succeeding, are martial and heroick, they are observed to do great things, and to advance the Government exceedingly: David, without doubt, was a person no less excellent in military experience than in learning and wisdom; and so great was his courage, that he left his Kingdom to his Son Solomon in quiet and peace, who by arts of peace rather than war injoyed it happily his time upon account of his Father; but he could not leave it to Rehoboam as he had received it of his Father: for Rehoboam being neither like his Grand-father in courage, nor his Father in wisdom, succeeded scarcely to the sixt part of his Empire. Bajazet the Turkish Scholar, though more studious of peace than of war, injoyed the labours of Mahomet his Father, who having (like Da∣vid) subdued all his neighbours, left him a Kingdom entire, that might be peaceably main∣tained; but had (Bazjazet's Son) Selimus now reigning, taken after his Father, and not his Grand-father, that Empire had been ruined; but he out-goes the glory of his Grand∣father.

From hence may be observed, that after an excellent & magnificent Prince, a pusillanimous may succeed, and the Government stand; but if one poor-spirited Prince succeeds another immediately, 'tis impossible it should subsist, unless (like France) it be supported by its old Cu∣stoms and Laws: I call those Princes weak and pusillanimous, who are not conversant, nor addicted to the exercise of Arms, and do conclude, that the tranquillity of Numas's Reign (which continued for many years) was to be attributed to the courage and activity of Ro∣mulus,

which was revived again in Tullus the third King, after whom followed Ancus, a Prince of so excellent a temper, that he knew how to comport as well in the calms of peace as the tempests of war. His first practice was gentle, and by methods of peace, but finding he was look'd upon as effeminate, and grew contemptible to his neighbours, he perceived the way to preserve his dignity, was, to betake himself to martial courses, and manage his affairs rather like Romulus than Numa. From hence an useful example for all Princes may be taken, and it may be observed, that whoever is in the possession of a State, and follows the example of Numa, may either keep it, or lose it, according to the different circum∣stances of fortune, or time. But he who imitates Romulus, and is arm'd with wisdom and prowess, shall be sure to keep it, unless some extraordinary and irresistible power intervenes to supplant him. And 'tis in probability to be thought, that had not the third King of Rome prov'd a martial Prince, and one who knew by his Arms to recover his declining re∣putation, he could never (or with great difficulty) have regained it, or performed those exploits which he did afterwards: so that whilst Rome was a Monarchy, and under the Government of Kings, it was under a double danger of destruction, either by the mildness; or the tyranny of its Prince.

CHAP. XX.

Two good Princes, immediately succeeding, may do great things; and well-grounded Common-wealths having always a virtuous succession, their Con∣quests and Acquisitions must of necessity be according.

WHen Monarchy was banished by the Romans, their dangers were banished with them, and they lay under no fear of either weak Prince or Tyrant; for the com∣mand of the Empire was put into the hands of the Consuls, who came to that authority, not by inheritance, or any indirect or violent ambition, but by the suffrage of the people, and were always excellent persons. The City of Rome enjoying from time to time the benefit of their fortune and virtue, might without much difficulty arrive at the highest top of greatness and dignity, (as it did) in the same number of years as it was under the Govern∣ment of Kings. For we see in the examples of Philip of Macedon, and his Son Alexander the great, that a succession of two martial Princes (without a peaceable interposed) is sufficient to conquer the World. And if it were possible in a Monarchy, 'tis easie in a Commonwealth, in whose power it is to elect, not only two, but an infinite and continu∣ed succession of virtuous persons; so that in a well-ordered Commonwealth, the succession is constantly good.

CHAP. XXI.

How much that Prince or Commonwealth is to be condemned, which neglects to train up Souldiers of its own.

THE Princes and Commonwealths of our times, if to defend themselves, or offend their enemy, (as occasion serves) they be unable to bring Souldiers of their own into the Field, they may thank themselves, and acknowledge (with Tullus) that 'tis not so much want of capacity in their subjects, as want of wisdom in them for neglecting to train them For when Tullus came to the Crown, Rome had been forty years together in peace, (during all Numa's Reign) and there was not a man to be found who had ever seen the face of an enemy, nevertheless his own designs being martial, he resolved to make no use of the Sam∣nites or Tuscans, or any other Mercenary, but as a wise Prince, to discipline his own; and his art and experience was such, that in a short time he made them excellent Souldiers; and there is nothing more certain, than that where men are unapt for war, the fault is not in the situation or nature of the place, but in the carelesness or defect of the Magistrate; of which we have a fresh and memorable example. There is scarce any body ignorant, that of late years the English invaded France, and entertained no Souldiers but their own; and yet, though England had had no wars of thirty years before, and had neither Officer nor Souldier who had ever seen a Battel, they ventured to attack a Kingdom where the Officers were excellent, the Souldiers very good, having been trained up for several years together in the

Italian wars. This proceeded from the prudence of the Prince, and the excellence of that Government, in which (though in times of peace) the exercise of Arms is not intermitted; Pelopidas and Epaminondas having relieved Thebes, and rescued it from the tyranny of the Spartans, finding themselves in the middle of a servile and effeminate people, they so or∣dered it by their virtue and discipline, that they brought them to the use of Arms, took the field with them against the Spartans, and overthrew them. From whence that Historian infers, that there are Souldiers not only in Lacedemon, but where-ever there are men, if there be any body to exercise and train them; which Tullus performed most exquisitely among the Romans, and is most excellently expressed by Virgil, in these words.

—Desidesque movebit Tullus in arma viros.

No soft unactive people Tullus knows, But trains up all promiscuously to blows.

CHAP. XXII.

What is to be observed from the Combat betwixt the three Roman Horatii, and the three Alban Curiatii.

BY Articles betwixt Tullus King of Rome, and Metius King of Alba, it was agreed, that whichsoever of the two sides should overcome, that King should have the do∣minion of the other. The Curiatii were all killed; but one of the Horatii being left, Metius and his Albans fell into subjection to the Romans.

Horatius returning in great triumph into the City, and meeting a Sister of his (who was married to one of the Curiatii) lamenting the loss of her Husband, in a great passion he killed her; for which inhumanity being brought to his trial, he was, after many argu∣ments, discharged, but more upon his Fathers intercession than his own merits. In which accident there were three things considerable; that we are never to venture our whole for∣tune upon the success of a Party; another is, that offences and deserts are not equally re∣warded a well-ordered City; the third, that no compact is well made, where the per∣formance is or ought to be suspected. For to become servile, and in subjection to another City, is a thing of such moment and importance, that it is not to be believed that any Prince or State whatsoever should be content that their liberty should be exposed to the success or courage of three of their Citizens; and this was evident in Metius; for though upon the Victory of the Romans he seemed to acquiesce, and promised obedience, as by Articles was agreed, yet in the first Expedition the Romans undertook against the Veientes, 'tis manifest he would have deceived Tullus, as one who repented of the covenants which he had made: but because of the third we have spoken largely already, in the next two Chapters we shall speak only of the other two.

CHAP. XXIII.

That our whole fortune is not to be ventured upon part of our force, and that for that reason the keeping of passes is many times dangerous.

IT was never thought discretion to put your whole fortune in danger, unless your whole force was ready to defend it. This error is committed several ways; one is when, like Tullus and Metius, they commit the fortune and virtue of so many men as either of them had in their Army, to the fortune and virtue of three particular persons, which was but a pitiful part of either of their strength, not considering how, by that agreement, all the pains which their Predecessors had taken to establish their liberty, and enable their fellow Citizens to defend it, was rendred vain and ineffectual, by putting it into the power of three persons to destroy it; than which (in my judgment) those two Kings could not have done worse. Another great error is, when, upon the approach of an enemy, we trust all to the keeping of an avenue, or the defence of a pass, unless it may be done with our whole force: in that case indeed the resolution is good; but if the passage be narrow, and not

room enough for your whole power, it is uncertain and dangerous; and that which per∣suades me to be of that opinion, is the example of such as having been invaded by a potent Enemy, though their Country was environed with Mountains and Rocks, yet they would not attend, and engage the Enemy upon the passes or Mountains, but marched out of their holds to encounter him; or else (which is as bad) they forsook their advantages, and expected him in some plain or convenient place within: And the reason is (as aforesaid) because many men cannot be brought to defend such places as are Rocky, for want of sub∣sistance; and the passage being streight, it can receive but few people, and by consequence is not able to sustain the insult of a very great Army, and the Enemy may bring as may as he pleases to attack it, because his business is not to fix there, but to pass thorow and be gone: whereas he who is to defend it, cannot be in any considerable Body, being (by reason of the uncertainty of the Enemies approach) to lie there continually, though (as I said be∣fore) the places are both barren and streight. Having lost therefore that pass which you imagined to keep, and upon which your Army and People did wholly rely, the remainder of your Army, and Subjects are possessed with such a fear, that you can have no farther trial of their courage, but all goes to wrack, and your whole fortune lost, but with part of your Army. With what difficulty Hannibal passed the Alps betwixt France and Lombardy, and betwixt Lombardy and Tuscany, there is no body ignorant; nevertheless the Romans chose rather to attend him upon the Tesin, and afterwards in the plain of Arezzo, where the danger was equal both to the Enemy and them; than to carry their Army up into the clouds upon the Rocks and the Snow, to be consumed by the incommodity of the place, before the Enemy came at them. And whosoever shall read History deliberately, shall find few great Captains that would coop themselves up in such passes and streights, not only for the reasons abovesaid, but because all of them cannot be stop'd the Mountains in that respect being like the fields, having not only their Roads and High-ways, but by-paths and passages, which though not observed by Strangers, are well enough known to the In∣habitants, who will be always ready to conduct the Enemy, to remove them farther off who lie constantly upon them. Of this a late Example may be brought, in the year 1515, when Francis King of France design'd to pass into Italy for the recovery of Lombardy, the great objection by those who were against the Expedition, was, That the Swizzers would obstruct his passage over the Mountains, which argument was found idle after∣wards, for the Kings of France waving two or three places which they had guarded, passed by a private and unknown way, and was upon their backs in Italy, before they perceiv'd him; so that being mightily surprized, the Enemy quitted his Posts, and retired into Italy, and all the Lombards submitted to the French; they being deceived in their opinion, who thought the French were with more Ease and Convenience to be obstructed in the Moun∣tains.

CHAP. XXIV.

In well Ordered Governments, offence and desert are never set one against the other, but he who does well, is rewarded, and he who does otherwise, is punished.

THE merits of Horatius were very great, having by his own single valor and conduct, overcome the Curiatii; after which he committed a most abominable act, in killing his own Sister: which Murther was so hainous in the Eyes of the Romans, that he was brought to a Trial for his life, though his deserts were so fresh and considerable; which at first sight seem ingrateful in the people; but he who examins it strictly, and weighs how necessary and sacred a thing Justice ought to be in every Common-wealth, will find them more blameable for discharging, than they would have been for condemning him; and the reason is, because in a well constituted State no man's good actions should indemnisie him for doing ill; for punishment being as due to ill actions, as rewards are to good, having rewarded in a man for doing well, he is satisfied for what he did, and the obligation dischar∣ged; so as if afterwards he commits a Crime, he is to be punished severely according to the Nature of his offence; by the observation of which Orders, a City may continue free a long time, which otherwise will quickly go to ruine. For if a Citizen having perform'd any great Exploit for his Country, should expect not only honor and reward for what he has done, but priviledge, and impunity for any mischief he should do afterwards, his insolence would in a short time grow insupportable, and inconsistent with Civil Government. So

then it is very necessary for discouragement from ill actions, to recompense good, which was the practice in Rome, and though where a Common-wealth is poor, her t••wards can∣not be great; yet even out of that small stock, she is to be punctually grateful, for a thing (how little soever) given in acknowledgment of ones good Service (let it be never so great) is look'd upon as Honorable, and received as a Magnificent reward. The Stories of Hora∣tius Cocles, and Mutius Scaevola are generally famous. Coles with incomp••rable courage maintained fight against a great body of the Enemy upon the Bridge over Tiber, till it was cut behind him, and their passage obstructed: The other designing against the life of Por∣senna King of Tuscany, and killing his Secretary by mistake, being apprehended and brought before the King, to show the courage and constancy of the Romans, he thrust his own hand into the fire, and burnt it off before his face; and how were they gratified? marry each of them had two Staiora's, which is as much ground as can be sown with two Bushels of Corn. The History of Manlius Capitolinus is no less remarkable: Having relieved the Ca∣pitol (which the French had surprized in the night) and beaten them out again, his Come∣rades in requital gave him a certain measure of Flower, which (as times went then) was a mighty reward, and esteemed so adequate to the Service, that Manlius afterwards either out of ambition or ill nature, causing a tumult in Rome, and endeavouring to debauch the peo∣ple, (his former exploits being as they thought amply rewarded) without farther regard to him, they threw him headlong down that Capitol, which he had so gloriously preserved.

CHAP. XXV.

Though it is many times convenient to reform the old Fundamental Customs of a free City, yet it is convenient still to retain some shadow and appearance of their ancient ways.

HE who desires to set up a new form of Government in a Common-wealth, that shall be lasting, and acceptable to the people, is with great caution to preserve at least some shadow and resemblance of the old, That the people may (if possible) be insensible of the innovation; for the generality of Mankind do not penetrate so far into things, but that outward appearance, is as acceptable to them as verity it self. For this cause the Ro∣mans at the beginning of their liberty, when their Kings were expelled, thought it expe∣dient to create two Consuls instead of one King, assigning them only XII Lictors, that their number might not exceed what attended upon the King. Besides this, there was an anniversary Sacrifice in Rome, in which the Ministry of the King was of necessity required: To salve that defect, the Romans created a chief of the said Sacrifice with the Title of Royal Priest (but with subordination to the High Priest) by which Artifice the people were satisfied with their Sacrifice, and took no occasion to complain for the expulsion of their King. He therefore who desires to reform the policy of a State, and to introduce a new, is to disguise it to the people by the retention (at least in appearance) of some part of the ancient Customs, that may keep them from discerning it; and if at any time by accident there be a necessity of changing the power, the number and duration of the Magi∣strates, it will be convenient to continue the Name. This (as I said before) is to be ob∣served by any one who would establish an absolute power either in a Republick; or Monarchical way, but he who would erect such an absolute power, as by Authors is called Tyrannies must unravel the whole bottom, and innovate all.

CHAP. XXVI.

A new Prince in a new Conquest, is to make every thing new.

WHoever makes himself Lord of a City or State (and especially if he finds himself weak, and suspects his ability to keep it) if he intends not to continue the Go∣vernment in the old way, either by Kingship or Common-wealth, the best course he can take is to subvert all, to turn every thing topsie turvy; and make all things as new as him∣self. To alter the Magistracy, create new Titles, elect new persons, confer new Autho∣rities, advance the Poor, and impoverish the Rich, that what is said of David, may be said of him, Esurientes implevit bonis, & divites dimisit inanes. He filled the hungry with

good things, and the rich he sent empty away. Besides it is his interest to build new Cities, to erect new Corporations; to demolish and uncharter the old; to shift the Inhabitants from one place to another; in a word, so to toss and transpose every thing, that there be no honor, nor wealth, nor preferment in the whole Province, but what is ownable to him. And for this he need go no farther than Philip of Macedon (Father to Alexander the Great) for his pattern, who by this practice, of a small Prince, made himself Monarch of all Greece, of whom it is said, That he removed his people, as a Shepheard did his fold. Those ways are cruel, and contrary not only to all civil, but to all Christian, and indeed human con∣versation; for which reason they are to be rejected by every body, for certainly 'tis better to remain a private person, than to make ones self King, by the calamity and destruction of his people. Nevertheless, he who neglects to take the first good way, if he will pre∣serve himself, must make use of this bad; for though many Princes take a middle way betwixt both, yet they find it extream difficult and dangerous; for being neither good nor bad, they are neither fear'd nor belov'd, and so unlikely to prosper.

CHAP. XXVII.

Men are as seldom perfectly bad, as they are perfectly good.

IN the year 1505. Pope Iulius II. marched his Army into Bologna to drive the Family of the Bentivogli out of that State, where they had commanded with Supremacy a hundred years. In the same Expedition he resolved to remove Iohn Pogolo Baglione out of Perugia (where he had Usurped) and in a word, all such Tyrants as had got any Church Lands into their possession. Coming to the Town with the desire and resolution aforesaid, he attended not till he could march in with his Army; but enter'd as it were naked and disarmed (though Iohn Pagolo was in person in the City, and many of his party which were got together to defend him) so that transported with the usual vehemence where∣with he managed all his affairs, he put himself (with his bare guards) into the hands of his Enemy; yet he succeeded so well, that he carried Pagolo off with him, and put in another Governor in behalf of the Church. Wise men who were then about his Holiness, admiring the temerity of the one, as much as the pusillanimity of the other, could not ima∣gine how it should come to pass, that Pagolo having his Enemy as it were naked in his hands, and by consequence an opportunity (with perpetual glory to himself) to have se∣cured him, and pillaged his Equipage (for all the Cardinals were then with him, with the most precious of their Jewels) should so strangely neglect it; especially when they consi∣dered that it was neither Conscience nor good nature which restrained him; for neither of those were to be supposed in a man who had been nought with his own Sister, and mur∣ther'd several of his Relations, to make his way to the Government; wherefore it was concluded to happen, because it is so provided by providence, that no man can be exqui∣sitely wicked, no more than good in perfection; for where there is any thing great and magnificent in a mischief, they know not how to commit it: So Iohn Pagolo who made no bones of either Parricide or Incest, could not (or to speak more properly) durst not make use of his opportunity to perpetrate a thing, which would have filled the world with admi∣ration of his courage, and made his memory venerable to posterity; for he would have been the first who had given his Cardinals to understand how little it is to their reputation to Lord it, and luxuriate as they do; and the greatness of the Fact would have lessened the Scandal, and prevented any danger that might ensue.

CHAP. XXVIII.

For what reasons the Romans were less ingrateful to their Citizens, than the Athenians.

WHoever reads and observes the passages in Commonwealths, will find a touch of ingratitude towards their Citizens in them all, but less in Rome than in Athens; and perhaps in any other Republick whatever. The reason (I suppose) was, because Rome had not that occasion of Jealousie as Athens had: For in Rome, from the expulsion of the Kings, to the time of Silla and Marius, the liberty of the City was never disturbed by any

man within it; so that there being no reason to apprehend, there was no reason to perse∣cute. In Athens it was otherwise; for their liberty being invaded and taken away by Pi∣sistratus when it was most flourishing, and compleat; and that by a pretence of advancing it; They no sooner recover'd it; but remembring the injuries which they had received, and their passed servitude, they flew out into such an exorbitancy of revenge, that they punished not only the faults of their fellow Citizens, but the least umbrage, and appearances of them, from whence followed the Banishment, and Execution of so many excellent persons; Hence came the Ostracism Laws, and all the rest of the outrages committed after∣wards upon the chief of their City, for as ye Writers of Politicks observe very well, the people are more cruel and vindicative who have lost and recovered their liberty, than they who have preserved it, as it was left them by their Fathers. He therefore who considers what is said, will neither condemn Athens, nor magnifie Rome; but impute all to necessity upon the diversity of accidents which hapned in each City. And certainly, if it be seriously considered, it will appear, that if the liberty of the Romans had been oppressed, as the liberty of the Athenians was, Rome would have been no better natur'd, or shown more compassion to its fellow Citizens, than Athens did: And this may be infallibly deduced by what hapned (after the expulsion of the Kings) against Collatinus and P. Val••rius; for Collatinus (though he had been very active in asserting their liberty) was banished for bearing only the Name of Tarquin; and the other had like to have ran the same destiny, for building a house only, upon the top of Mount Celius, which they suspected was to com∣mand the City. So that it may probably be presumed (by its suspicion and severity in the two cases aforesaid) that Rome would have exercised the same ingratitude, had it been injured in its minority, as Athens had been. And that I may have no occasion to discourse of ingratitude hereafter; I shall speak of it more largely in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XXIX.

Whether the Prince, or the People, is most subject to be ingrateful.

ANd because we have undertaken to enlarge upon this subject, I think it not amiss to examine which are most frequently guilty of ingratitude, the Prince, or the People: For better explication, I say, That men are ingrateful, either out of suspicion, or avarice. For if a Prince, or Republick send out any of their great Captains upon some important Expedition, which the said Captain atchieves, and gains honor to himself, and reputation to his Master, in this case the Prince, or State, is obliged to reward him; but if instead of rewarding, they casheer, or disgrace him, or out of a covetous principle, deny him his pay, the ingratitude is inexcusable: and leaves a scandal behind it that can never be worn out, and yet many Princes are too guilty of it; Cornelius Tacitus gives us the reason in this Sentence, Proclivius est injuriae, quam beneficio vicem exolvere, quia gratia oneri, ultio in quaestu habetur. 'Tis more natural to return an injury, than a courtesie, because courtesies are burthensom, but revenge is sweet. But if this ingratitude either in Prince or People, pro∣ceeds not so much from avarice, as suspicion, in that case it is somewhat excusable, and of that kind we read of good store, as when a General has conquered a Province or Empire for his Master, when he has exterminated his Enemies, enriched his Army, and gain'd himself a great Name, 'tis impossible but he must be so acceptable to his own Sol∣diers, and so dreadful to his Enemies, as must beget a jealousie in the Prince; for the Nature of man being jealous and ambitious, and not to be confined within the bounds of his fortune, it cannot be but if the Prince has taken a fancy that the glory of his General, is a diminution to his, the General must by some vain-glorious, or discontented action, establish and confirm it; and then what has the Prince to do? but to secure himself either by causing him to be murthered, by taking away his Command, lessening his reputation with the Soldiers and People, and by all ways of industry possessing them, that the Victory was not obtained by any Conduct of his, but by the kindness of Fortune, vileness of the Enemy, or prudence and good management of the rest of the Officers.

After Vespasian (being in Iudea) was declared Emperor by his Army, Antonius Primus being at the same time in Illyria with another Army, declared for the Emperor, and marched into Italy against Vitellius who was then Paramount in Rome; and having beaten him in two pitch'd Battels, he enter'd the City in the Name of Vespasian: So that Mutianus being sent against Vitellius by Vespasian, he found the Enemy broken, the Town taken,

and all things done by Antonius to his hand. And how was he requited? Why Mutianus took away his Commission, removed him from the Army, and by degrees so lessened his Authority in Rome, that Antonius going into Asia to make his Complaints to Vespasian, was received so coldly, that in a short time he was stript of all kind of authority, and died very miserable: and of this Nature examples are very frequent in History; every body knows how in our times Gonsalvo Ferrante, being the King of Arragon's General in the Kingdom of Naples against the French, behaved himself so well, that by his singular Conduct he conquered it, and put it wholly under the obedience of his Master, who coming afterwards to Naples himself, took from him the Command of his Army, dispossessed him of many strong places which he held in that Country, and carried him with him into Spain, where not long after, he died in obscurity. But there is no remedy; these kind of jealousies are so natural to Princes, that it is almost impossible for them to be grate∣ful to any man, who has performed any great thing for them. And if it be so with Kings, no wonder if it be so with the people, for in a free State, they have always two principal ends, one is to enlarge their Dominions, the other to keep what they have got, and their eagerness to both these, makes them so often guilty of ingratitude. As to the first point, we shall speak elsewhere; the errors in preserving their liberty; to disgust such persons as ought to be rewarded, and to suspect such as ought to be trusted; and though such practices are the occasion of great mischiefs in a corrupt Commonwealth, and Tyranny does many times ensue (as in Rome by Caesar, who took that by force, which the ingrati∣tude of the people denied to his merits,) yet in a Town that is entire, and incorrupt, they do very well, and add much to the duration of their liberty, to enforce great and ambitious men for fear of punishment to comport themselves better. In my judgment of all the Commonwealths that ever had Empire, Rome was the least ingratful for the reasons abovesaid, there being never an Example of its ingratitude but in the case of Scipio: For Coriolanus and Camillus were banished for their injuries to the people, and though one of them remaining obstinate, was never recalled; yet the other was not only recalled, but so restored to the affections of the people, that all his life after, they adored him as a Prince. But their jealousie of Scipio was of such a sort, as had never been known before, proceeding from the Ornaments of his body, and the endowments of his mind; His youth, his wis∣dom, his excellent qualifications had render'd him too admirable; the powerfulness of his Enemy, the danger and tediousness of the War (which he had concluded in a very short time) his deliberation in resolving, and his quickness in Execution, had gained him a greater reputation, than was ever got by any General before him, insomuch as the Senators, Pretors, and all the chief Magistrates in the City began to fear and respect him. This was no pleasing sight to the graver sort, because it had not been formerly the Custom in Rome; whereupon Cato (a man of great esteem for his piety and justice) took up the Cudgels against him, and complained publickly that the City could not be called free, whil'st the Magistrates were in awe of any particular Citizen; if then in a thing so nearly importing their liberty, the people followed the opinion of Cato, in my judgment they were in some measure to be excused. In short, my opinion is, as I said before, that it is avarice and suspicion which makes men ingrateful: To the first of which the people are not naturally addicted; and to the last, with much less propensity than Princes, as having less occasion, which shall be proved hereafter.

CHAP. XXX.

What rules are to be observed by a Prince or Commonwealth to avoid this Vice of ingratitude, and how a General or great Citizen is to demean him∣self to elude it.

TO avoid the necessity of living always in suspicion, and being ingrateful to his Mi∣nisters, a Prince ought to go personally with his Armies, as was done at first by the Emperors of Rome, as the great Turk does now, and as all they do and have done that are valiant and couragious; for in so doing, the honor and profit of their Victories accrews to themselves; but where they are not present at their Conquests themselves, the honor re∣dounds upon their Officers, and they have not any compleat enjoyment of their successes, till they have eclipsed, if not extinguished that glory in other people, which they durst not venture for themselves; so that their ingratitude, and injustice to their Officers, does them more mischief, than their Conquests do them good. But when out of negligence, or

imprudence, they lie at home idle themselves, and send their Generals in their stead, know no better precept to give them, than what they know already themselves. As to the General, if he finds that jealousie inevitable, he has his choice of two things. As soon as the War is ended, he is voluntarily to lay down his Commission; and to pre∣sent it to his Master, before he has occasion to demand it, using great care that none of his actions discover him to be either insolent or ambitious, that his Prince having no cause to suspect him, may have the greater obligation to reward him. If this way does not please, the other is quite contrary; and that is, to declare himself boldly, and try always to set up for himself, cajoling and sweetning his Soldiers and Subjects, making new alliances with his Neighbours, seizing upon the strong Towns, corrupting the Officers, and where they will not be corrupted, securing them some other way, and by doing thus, he shall be even with his Lord, for his ingratitude designed: And besides these two ways, there is none that I know. But (as I said before) because men can neither be good nor bad in extremity, it happens that great men are unwilling to quit their Commands, and retire after the gaining of a Victory; behave themselves modestly they cannot: and to use rigour in an honourable way is impossible. So that whil'st they are in suspence, and uncertain which course to steer, they are many times destroyed. As to a Commonwealth that would preserve and exempt it self from this detestable vice of ingratitude, the same remedy can∣not be prescribed, as was prescribed to a Prince; for not being able to manage its Wars in Person as a Prince may do, the command of their Forces must of necessity be committed to some of their Subjects. The best way they can take, is to follow the Example of Rome, and that will render them less ingrateful than their Neighbors. In the wars of the Ro∣mans, by ancient Custom all people were employed, as well Nobles as others, and from thence it came that they were always well furnished with Generals and Officers of all sorts, which kept them from being jealous of any one, having so many of equal merit to oppose him: Besides which, there were express Laws against ambition, and all people so narrowly observed, that no man durst discover the least design or inclination that way; and in the creation, of Dictators, he was commonly prefer'd, who debas'd himself most, or disco∣vered least desire to obtain it; by which means preventing the occasion of suspicion, they prevented the ingratitude. That State therefore which would avoid the guilt of ingrati∣tude, is to imitate Rome, and that person who would avoid the effects, must observe how the Romans defended themselves.

CHAP. XXXI.

That the Romans used no extraordinary punishments towards their great Cap∣tains, when they committed an Error of ignorance, or malice, provided the Government was not damnified by it.

THe Romans (as I said before) were not only less unthankful, than their Neighbors but they were more human and gentle in the punishment of their Generals, than any other State; if their miscarriage was malicious, they punished it not severely; but if it was by ignorance or mistake, instead of revenging, they did many times reward it; and this they did upon very grave consideration, for the Romans understood the charge of an Army to be so great a care, and of such transcendant importance, that whoever undertook it, ought to have his mind free and indisturbed by any other respects or troubles whatso∣ever, for his thoughts being with his troubles, he would never mind his Army, nor take any advantage. For Example, an Army is sent into Greece against Philip of Macedon, or into Italy against Hanibal, or those people upon the Frontiers, which had been conquered before, and the Captain who has the General Command, is loaden with all the cares which do commonly attend great and extraordinary Enterprizes. Now if to those necessary cares for his Army, there should be superadded a fear, and apprehension of being punished at his return (if things went otherwise than well) and perpetual reflexion upon those who have been abused and put to death upon the same score, it must needs disturb the tranquilli∣ty of his mind, and make him unfit for any great action. The wise Romans thought the infamy and dishonour of losing a Battel, punishment enough, without heaping one affli∣ction upon another. And as to those whose errors proceed rather from malice than igno∣rance, we have another Example. Sargius, and Virginius had each of them an Army, and were encamped before Veii: Sargius was posted against the Tuscans, and Virginius on the other side against any body else. It hapned the Falisci having joyned with several

of their neighbors, came to fall upon Sergius. Sergius had notice, and found himself too weak; yet rather than send to his Companion for supplies, he chose to be routed; and Virginius on the other side, though he knew his distress, would by no means relieve him, unless he desired it; so that that Roman Army was cut off by the ambition and emulation of their Generals; a thing of very ill example, had it been suffered to pass without punish∣ment.

Nevertheless, whereas other States would have punished them with death, Rome inflicted only a pecuniary mulct, but their crime deserved sharper correction, but the Romans were unwilling to do any thing against custom, which (as is said before) is very sacred with them. As to the errors of ignorance, we have another example in Varro, by whose folly and rashness the Romans having lost the Battel of Cannas against Hanibal, and brought their whole Government in danger, had Hanibal known how to use, as well as gain a Vi∣ctory; yet his offence having in it more of ignorance than malice, when he came back, the Senate went out to meet him in their Formalities, and not being able to congratulate his suc∣cess, they gave him thanks for his return, and that De salute reipublicae non desperasset, That he did not despair of their affairs, When Papirius Cursor the Dictator would needs put Fabius to death, because contrary to orders he had fought with the Samnites among other reasons which the Father of Fabius urged against that sentence, this was one, that the people of Rome had till that time never been so severe upon any of their Commanders for the loss of a Battel, as Papirius would now be upon the Victor for gaining one.

CHAP. XXXII.

A Commonwealth or Prince is not to defer his beneficence till the necessity of the object requires it.

THE liberality of the Romans to the people succeeded very well when Prosenna inva∣ded Rome in behalf of the Tarquins; for the Senate apprehending the people might be brought to restore the Kings rather than endure the war, to oblige them, releast their gabels upon salt, and all their other duties, declaring the people were sufficent bene∣factors to the publick; in providing, and bringing up their children: all which was done to cajole them into such an humour as might make them endure the siege, and swallow the ca∣lamities of the War: but let no man rely upon this example, and defer his indulgence to the people, till the enemy be upon his back; for it shall never succeed so well to him as it did to the Romans, because the multitude will think themselves more obliged to the enemy than to him, and believe, that when the necessity is over, they shall be as bad as before. The reason why this way succeeded so happily to the Romans, was, because their State was but new, and scarce setled, and the People were sensible that several Laws were made before for their advantage and reputation; as particularly the Law of appeal to the people: so as they were able to satisfy themselves that the benefits which were confer'd upon them by the Se∣nate, proceeded rather from a disposition in the Senate to do them good, than from any apprehension of the enemy: besides, the injuries and outrages of their Kings lay fresh and heavy upon their memories. But these cases hapning very seldom, 'tis but very seldom that such remedies succeed; wherefore it is better for any Commonwealth or Prince to consider the worst before-hand, and what people he is most like to have need of in time of adversity; and to live so with them in time of prosperity, as that they may be encouraged to relieve him upon any distress. And he who acts otherwise, whether Prince or Commonwealth, (but especially a Prince) and presumes, when the danger is hanging over his head, that it is time enough to favour the people, will find himself mistaken, and the people readier to contribute to his ruine than defence.

CHAP. XXXIII.

If an inconvenience increases either within a State, or against it; it is better to temporize and comply, than to endeavour to remove it by violence.

THe Roman Commonwealth increasing in Empire, Reputation and Force, their neigh∣bours not having considered it, nor what damage that greatness might pull down up∣on them, began now (when too late) to discover their error; and being willing to do that now which had been more easie before, forty little States of them confederated against Rome. The Romans, among their usual provisions in case of imminent danger, created a Dictator, who, without any mans advice, might resolve as he pleased, and execute his resolutions without being called to an account. This Magistrate was not only the occasion of over∣coming their enemies at that time, but was very useful upon all accidents afterwards when their dominion increased. Which may teach us, that when either at home within, or abroad against a Commonwealth, an inconvenience arises, (whether from an inward or an outward cause it is not material) 'tis better counsel to comply and temporize, than to en∣deavour furiously to suppress it; for to resist, is to augment it, and to pull down upon our heads what we were but afraid of before. And these kind of accidents fall out in a Com∣monwealth oftner from intrinsick than extrinsick causes, where the power and authority of some Citizen is permitted to increase too fast, and more than is convenient for the ho∣nour or benefit of the State; or when such Laws are abrogated or neglected as were most for the interest of their State; which error, if suffered to run on, will be more dangerous to oppose than to comply with; for it is so much the harder to find out these inconvenien∣cies in the beginning, by how much 'tis natural for all people to favour every thing that is new, especially if introduced by a young man, with the least shew or pretence of advan∣tage: for if a young Gentleman appears in a Commonwealth endued with more than or∣dinary qualities, the eyes of the whole City are immediately upon him, they run unani∣mously to respect him, and pay him all the honour that can be imagined; so that if he has the least spark of ambition or vain-glory, he is presently puffed up, and inflamed with the contemplation of his own worth, and the affection of the people: and when he is arrived at such an height, as to be as visible as their error, then 'tis too late; there are but few re∣medies in the case; and when most of them are applyed, they do but magnifie his power. Many examples might be brought to this purpose, but I shall only instance in one.

Cosimo di Medicis (from whom the famous Family of the Medici in our City had their first grandeur) was in such reputation for his wisdom; and his fellow Citizens were so ig∣norant, that he began to be formidable to the State, and the Magistrates began to think it difficult to take him down, but destructive to let him stand. There was at that time in Florence a person of great experience in matters of State, called Nicolo da Uzano, who be∣ing well advised of the first fault which he had committed in not considering in time the inconveniencies which might follow upon Cosimo's reputation, resolved to obviate the se∣cond; that is, that no force should be used to oppress him, as knowing that course would be the ruine of the State; and so it proved not long after his death. For the Citizens which remained, not following his counsel, began to combine, and fortifie against Cosimo, and indeed forc'd him out of Rome. Whereupon, his party being increased, in a short time called him home again, and made him their Prince, to which dignity he could never have arrived, but by the opposition of his enemies.

The same hapned to Iulius Caesar, whose great virtue and excellent qualifications re∣commended him so highly to the favour of Pompey and the people, that by degrees he be∣came terrible, and their favour was turned into fear; of which Cicero complains, when he says that Pompey began to fear him too late; for when his fear prompted him to look out for a remedy, that remedy hastned the ruine of the State. I say then (when this case hap∣pens) it is incomparably better to temporize, than to endeavour to repel the mischief which threatens by violence and force. For many times, by that means, it passes as it came, and goes out of it self, or else the damage it brings is the longer a coming. In these cases Princes ought to be very vigilant, lest going about to retrench and lessen the great power of a neighbour, they give him opportunity to increase it, and bring themselves into greater danger: you are therefore to compare your own strength, and your enemies; and if you find your self the stronger, to attaque him couragiously; but if weaker, you had better be quiet, lest it happens to you as it did to those little States who confederated against Rome, to whom (as appeared by the event) it had been much better to have sate still, and endea∣voured

their friendship, than to have irritated the great power of the Romans, and forc'd them to a war; for the Romans had never got to that height, if that confederacy had not given them occasion of trying all experiments for their defence, and put them among the rest, upon the creation of Dictators, by which new invention they not only mastered all dangers that threatned them, but prevented a thousand mischiefs into which (without that remedy) the Commonwealth would most certainly have fallen.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The Dictatorship was useful, not hurtful to the Commonwealth of Rome; and how that Power which is usurp'd, and illegally assumed, is pernitious to a State, not that which is conferred legally by the suffrage of the people.

THere are those to be found who have said that the Dictatorship was the ruine and de∣struction of that Commonwealth, alledging that the first Tyrant that was ever in that City, set himself up, under the title of Dictator, and affirming that Caesar could not un∣der any other name have justified his Tyranny.

Those who maintain that opinion did not examine it thorowly, and are not for that rea∣son to be believed. For it was not the name or dignity of the Dictator which brought Rome into slavery, but the authority assumed by the Citizens upon the perpetuation of that office; and if there had been no such thing as Dictator, Caesar had taken some other Title upon him to compass his designs; for when ones power is absolute, he can assume what name he pleases; but 'tis not a great Title that gives any man power. Whilst the Dicta∣torship was disposed by publick suffrage, it was very beneficial; those who attained it by ways extraordinary, abused it exceedingly; the rest were never known to have done any injury to the Commonwealth thorow all the Dictatorships: the reason is probable, because a man must be endued with many good qualities before he can usurp such an authority. He must be abundantly rich; he must know how to insinuate with every body; he must have a great party, and make every man his friend, which is not practicable where the Laws are in force; and if he had all those qualifications, they would render him so formi∣dable, that the free voices would ever concur in his election: besides, the Dictator was not perpetual, but created only upon particular exigence, and with limited power, extending no farther than the present danger, during which he had power to dispose of all things at his pleasure, and punish as he thought good without any appeal; but he could do nothing in diminution to the Government, he could not intrench upon the authority of the Senate or People, abrogate their old Laws, or institute new: so that the shortness of his Dictatorship, the limitation of his authority, and the incorruption of the people, made it impossible for him to transgress, and do any mischief to the City; and on the contrary, that Office has been always beneficial, and, in my judgment, the principal in Rome, and has contributed more than all the rest to make it Mistress of the World; for without that, that City had never been able to have obviated so many dangers, nor gone thorow so many difficulties, against which their accustomed and ordinary means would have been of little validity, as being too tedious, and slow; (no one Counsel or Magistrate being able to do all things alone but being in a mutual necessity the one of the other) for in cases which require immediate remedy, time passes away, and is often lost whilst they are in their counsels, and when they come to a resolution, 'tis too late, and their remedies dangerous.

Wherefore I think it convenient that a Commonwealth have a certain way to be used only in case urgent necessity, as the Seignory of Venice, (which at this day is the best re∣gulated Commonwealth in the World) that State in time of imminent danger has a re∣served power to confer authority upon some few of their Citizens, by virtue of which they may order all as they please, without the consultation of the rest, for when a Common∣wealth is destitute of some such custom, it must of necessity be ruined by sticking to their old, or break them to preserve it self; and it were to be wish'd that nothing might happen in a Commonwealth that might give occasion for these extraordinary ways; for though those extraordinary ways may sometimes be good, yet the example is ill, and introduces a custom of breaking old orders for good, which afterwards, under that pretence, will be broken for ill: wherefore that Commonwealth can never be perfect, that by its Laws has not provided against every thing, prepared remedies for every accident, and appointed in what manner they shall be managed; which is to be done no better way than by a Dicta∣tor, or some such Magistrate to be created upon extraordinary occasion; for without them

they must certainly be ruined: and one thing very remarkable in this order, is, the wisdom of the Romans in the formality of its election: for the Dictators being introduced with some diminution to the Consuls, (who being from heads of the City brought down to obedience like other people, might possibly resent it, and in time be the occasion of dissen∣tion in the City) they committed their election into the hands of the Consuls, to the end that upon any extraordinary emergence, when Rome should have occasion of so extraor∣dinary a Magistrate, the Consuls should comply the more willingly, because they had the making them themselves; for the wounds which a man gives himself spontaneously, and of his own election, are not so grievous as what he is forced for to bear. But towards the latter end of their Empire, the Romans, instead of a Dictator, invested their Consul with an equivalent authority in these words, Videat Consul, ne Respublica quid detrimenti capiat; Let it be the Consuls care that the Commonwealth receives no prejudice. So that to return to our matter, I conclude, that the neighbouring States conspiring against the Romans, and endeavouring to oppress them, made them contrive better, not only for their defence, but to put themselves into a posture, with more vigour, and counsel, and authority to repel their invasion, and turn their force upon them.

CHAP. XXXV.

How it came to pass that the Creation of the Decem-virat was prejudicial to the liberty of that State, though it was done freely, and by publick suffrage.

IN the last Chapter we have shewn that a power legally conferred, and by the suffrage of the people, is not dangerous to the State; but that which is usurped, and gotten by force, to which the election of the Decem-viri may seem to be contrary, who were chosen by the people of Rome to make their Laws, and reform extravagancies in the Commonwealth, which Decem-viri by degrees encroached upon their liberties, and made themselves Ty∣rants. Wherefore we are to consider what is said, with limitation and restraint; and respect both the manner in which such power is confer'd, as likewise the time it is to continue, whe∣ther for longer or shorter: for an absolute power (though granted but for a year) is very dangerous, and produces such effects as are sutable to the mind of the person to whom it is granted. And the power of the Decem-viri (if examined) will be found much greater than the power of the Dictators. For notwithstanding the creation of the Dictator, the majesty of the Consuls and Senate remained, together with the authority of the Tribunes, which were as bounds to restrain and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the Dictator; and although the Dictator had power to remove any one out of the Consulship, or take from him his Tribunitial authority; yet he could not vacat or abolish the whole Orders of Senators, Consuls, and Tribunes, make new Laws, nor introduce a new form of Government. So that their eyes being always upon him, he was forced (as it were) to intend only such things as were for the benefit of the Commonwealth. But in the creation of the Decem-viri it was otherwise; for the whole power of the people was transfer'd to them, the Con∣suls and Senate being cashiered, and the power of the Tribunes of the people almost quite laid aside; so that standing alone in the Government, without Consuls, or Tribunes, or ap∣peal to the people, or any other Magistrate to correct or controul them; it was no strange thing that the very next year after their creation, they should become intolerable and inso∣lent, especially being instigated by the ambition of Appius, And for this reason it is to be observed, that when it is said, a Power conferred legally, and by the suffrage of the people, is never prejudicial to the State; it is to be supposed to be confer'd with due circumstances, and for a certain time; but when the people is cheated, and gives it imprudently and rashly, as in this case of the Decem-viri, things never go better, which is easily proved by consider∣ing what it was that kept the Dictators so good, and made the Decem-viri so wicked: and weighing withal the manner which other Republicks that were reputed well ordered, observed, in conferring their authority for a long time, as the Spartans to their Kings, and the Venetians to their Dukes: both of them prescribing them rules and limits that they were not to exceed, and appointing such guards upon them as should be able (though they were never so ill disposed of themselves) to keep them from employing their power to the detriment of the State.

Nor is it sufficient if this Power be confer'd upon good men; for men are frail, and easily corrupted, and then in a short time he that is absolute may easily corrupt the people, contract friendships, make parties, heap up riches, and commit a thousand extravagancies; nor can

the poverty of their persons, or the want of relations prevent it, for wealth, and honour, and every thing follows them which are absolute, as we shall show particularly when we speak of the creation of the Decem-viri.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Citizens who have executed the greatest Offices, ought not afterwards. to disdain or scruple the less.

MArcus Fabius and Cais Manlius being Consuls, the Romans obtained a glorious Vi∣ctory over the Veientes, and the Etrusci, in which was slain Quintus Fabius Brother to the Consul, who was chosen the year before. From whence occasion is offered of ad∣miring the excellence of the Roman constitution; and observing how well it was accom∣modated for the enlargement of their Empire, from whose Model the more the Common∣wealths of our days do recede, the more do they wander and deviate from the best. For though the Romans affected glory and command as much as other people, they did not disdain notwithstanding to obey in their Armies, the same persons whom they had for∣merly commanded; and serve as private Soldiers, where they had formerly been Generals. This is a practice contrary to the opinion and genius of our age so much, that in Venice it is provided by a publick Law, that a Citizen who has had a greater command, may refuse to accept of a less (and the City allows it) which Law though it may be convenient for pri∣vate persons, must needs be prejudicial to the publick; because the publick may with more confidence commit an inferior command to a great Officer, than prefer an inferior Officer to a great command: For to a young Soldier, those places of importance are not safely entrusted, unless persons of experience and wisdom be placed about him, by whose Coun∣sel he may be directed: And if the Romans had done then, what the Venetians and other Commonwealths do now, and not suffered any man who had ever been Consul, to serve in any other quality, many things had befallen them that would have endangered their liberty; and again, if any young Officers had been admitted to the supreme commands, and no body placed about them to manage and direct them, they would have grown dissolute and careless, and many things have hapned that might have ruined the State.

CHAP. XXXVII.

What troubles and offence was created in Rome by the Agrarian Law; and how dangerous it is to make a new Law opposite to an old Custom, with too much retrospection.

IT is observed by most ancient Writers, that as men are afflicted in adversity, so they are satiated in prosperity; and that joy and grief have the same effects: For when men are not necessitated to fight, they fight for ambition, which is so powerful in our minds, that let us arrive at what height of good fortune we can, we are never contented, but are still labouring for more; and this happens to us, because we are naturally capable of desiring many things, which we are unable to compass; and therefore our desire being greater than our power to acquire, our minds are never at rest with what we enjoy. And this is the occasion of all our varieties of fortune, for when we are always driving at more, and fearful of losing what is already in our possession, we are apt to fall into suspicions, from thence into quarrels, and from thence into Wars, which do usually bring after them the ruine of our Country. This we have discoursed, to give you a better contemplation of the People of Rome, which by a kind of necessity was forced by their Tribunitial power to fortifie themselves against the oppressions of the Patricii; but when they had obtained what indeed necessity impelled them to desire, being instigated by their ambition, they went on further, and contended with the Patricii both for Honor, and Estate; which was the occasion of the Seditions about the Agrarian Law, and by degrees the destruction of the Common-wealth. And because it is necessary in every well order'd State, that respect be had rather to the enrichment of the Publick, than particular Citizens, the people of Rome could not (in what belong'd to this Law) but erre against the Funda∣mentals

of their Government, if they were so constituted, that process of time could give no occasion of difference, unless we will rather affirm that at first all things were so well, that it was beyond the power of time to disorder them: Be it which way it will, it is certain this Law was never mentioned in Rome, but with great controversie, and tu∣mult. This Law consisted principally in two heads. One was, That no Citizen of Rome should be permitted to possess more than a certain proportion of Land. The other, that what Land should be taken from the Enemy, should be divided equally among the people; both of which Articles were against the interest of the Nobility; for most of them ha∣ving more Land than was allowed by this Law, their fortunes by it were to be confiscated, and half of them taken away; and then by the distribution of what they should take from the Enemy, they should lose all opportunity of enriching themselves for the future; which being certainly true, and this Law so perfectly pernicious to the interest of the Nobility, it was never mentioned by the Tribunes, but the Patricii opposed it, and with all the ea∣gerness imaginable; yet not always by force, but sometimes by evasion, either com∣manding out their Armies upon some pretended design, or by setting up another Tribune in opposition to him who proposed the Law, that thereby they might dissolve it, or else by sending new Colonies. And so it hapned when the Colony was sent to Antium at the time when the difference was so high betwixt the Patricii and the Agrarians, that no other expedient could be found to keep them from blood. Livy tells us, That there were very few that would list themselves upon that accompt, to fill up the number of that Colony, so much more did the people prefer an alotment about Rome, than in any other place. But afterwards the quarrel grew higher, and to appease their Seditions, the Romans were glad to send their Armies sometimes to the extreamest parts of Italy, and sometimes be∣yond them. But afterwards it falling out that the Lands which they took from the Ene∣my were remote, at great distance from Rome, and not to be cultivated with any conve∣nience, the people grew weary, and insisted not so fiercely on their Agrarian Law: They began also to be more moderate in those kind of confiscations, but when any Country was seized, they sent Colonies to plant them: With these Arts they skin'd over their animosities till the time of the Gracchi, who reviving them again, gave occasion to the ruine of their Government: for the Nobility having encreased their strength, the quarrel advanced so far, that they came to blows, and the Magistrate being unable to restrain them, th•• fury of the Faction encreasing, each party began to look out for a head. The people chose Marius, and made him four times Consul, (with some little interval) which authority he managed so well to his own advantage, that by the power and interest which he had got in that time, he made himself thrice Consul afterwards. The Nobility having no other remedy against so growing a Plague, applyed themselves to Sylla, and having made him their chief, they fell to down right Wars, which were carried on with much blood and variety of fortune, till at last the Nobility prevailed. The same faction re∣vived again in the days of Caesar and Pompey, and was attended by the destruction of the State: For Caesar espousing the Marian party, and Pompey the Syllan; Caesar overcame, and was the first that set up a Tyranny in Rome; after whose time that City could never recover its liberty. This was the beginning, and this was the end of the Agrarian Law, which may seem to contradict what we have said elsewhere. That the discords and enmity betwixt the people and Senate of Rome conduced to the enlargement of their Empire, and the conservation of their liberty, by giving opportunity for the making of such Laws, as were great corroboration to their liberties and freedom; but I answer, That the effects of the Agrarian Law, does not hinder, but that what we have said may be true; for so great was the ambition of the Nobility, that had it not been curb'd and check'd several ways, it would have usurped upon the City, and got the whole power into its hands. And if we observe that the Agrarian dispute was three hundred years together in Rome, before it could subvert it, we may easily imagine, the ambition of the Patricii would have done it much sooner, had it not been ballanced and depressed by the people with their Agrarian Laws, and some other inventions. From whence likewise we may observe that wealth is more estimable among men, than honor; for when the Patricii were in contro∣versie with the people about Titles and Honor, they never went so high as to give them any extraordinary disgust: But when their Estates and Fortunes were at stake, they defended them with such zeal, that they chose rather to put the whole Commonwealth into a flame, than to part with them quickly. The great authors of that Conflagration were the Gracchi, whose good will and intentions towards the people, was much more to be commended than their wisdom. For to remove an inveterated inconvenience, and to that purpose to make a Law with too much retrospection, is ill Counsel (as I said before) and hastens that ruine which it was designed to prevent; but with Patience and

Compliance, the mischief is either delayed, or spends it self in time, before it does any great hurt.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Weak Commonwealths are generally irresolute, and ill advised, taking their measures more from Necessity, than Election.

THe Volsci, and the Equi understanding that Rome was sadly visited with a Contagion, concluded it a fair opportunity to conquer it, and having betwixt them raised a powerful Army, they invaded the Latini, and Hernici; over-ran most of their Country, and forced them to send to Rome for assistance. The Romans returned answer, that they should put themselves in Arms, and make as good defence as they could; for the Sickness was so raging, they could give them no relief. which shows the generosity and wisdom of that Senate, That in all conditions, and under the greatest of their Calamities never receded from its Majesty and Grandeur; but at all times would have the disposal of the affairs of its Subjects, and when necessity required, made no scruple to command things contrary to their old ways of proceeding. This I say, because formerly the Senate had forbidden them to arm, upon any occasion whatever; and perhaps another Council would have thought it derogatory to their Grandeur, to permit them to defend them∣selves: But this Senate was endued with admirable prudence, understood how things were to be taken, and rejected; and of two evils, how to make choice of the least. It troubled them much that they were not in condition to protect them; and it troubled them no less, That they would be forced to defend themselves, upon their own score without suc∣cours from Rome; yet finding there was a necessity of it, the enemy being at their Gates, and threatning them with death, they retained their authority, and with great gravity sent them word to defend themselves and raise what forces they could. This may seem but a common resolution, and what any other Commonwealths would have taken as well as that; but weak and ill ordered Commonwealths cannot come off with so much honour. Duke Valentine having taken Faenza, and overrun most part of Bologna, demanded pas∣sage of the Florentines to march his Army to Rome. The Florentine Council met, and consulted, and there was not one man who thought it convenient to grant it. This was not according to the discretion of the Romans; for the Duke being very strong, and the Florentines but weak, it had been more for their honour to have granted him passage, when they could not obstruct it; that what they could not resist, might have been imputed to their courtesie. But there is no remedy, 'tis the property of weak States to do every thing amiss, and never to do well but in spight of their teeths, for there is no such thing as prudence amongst them. And this Florence has verified in two other cases.

In the year 1500. when Lewis XII. had repossessed himself of Milan, he had an incli∣nation to restore Pisa to the Florentines upon the payment of 50000 Florens: To this purpose he sent thither his Army under the Command of Mounsieur de Beaumont in whom (though a French man) the Florentines had great confidence. Beaumont came up with his Army betwixt Cassina and Pisa, and lodged it conveniently for the battering the Town: having been two or three days before, it and all things ready for the assault, Commissio∣ners came out, and offered to surrender to the French, upon condition that he would en∣gage upon the honor of his Master that it should not in four months time be delivered to the Florentine; to which the Florentines not consenting, the Commissioners returned. The cause why the Florentines refused it, was their jealousie of the King, though they had put themselves under his protection. They did not consider that the King could better have put the Town into their hands when he was Master of it himself (and if he had refused it, it would have discover'd him) than promise to do it when he was not in possession, and yet they be forced to purchase that promise at a very great rate. Two years after, Arezzo revolted, and the King sent Seigneur Iubalt with supplies to the Florentines, who had besieged the Town. Iubalt was no sooner arrived, but the Inha∣bitants of Arezzo made him the same proffer, and the Florentines could not be brought to consent: Iubalt resented it, and knowing it to be a great fault, he practised privately with the Aretines, without Communicating with the Florentine Commissaries: An agreement was clap'd up betwixt them, by virtue of which Iubalt entred the Town, and re∣proached the Florentines by their indiscretion, as people wholly inexperienced in the

affairs of the world. He told them, if they desired to have it, they should signifie it to the King, who would be better able to gratifie them in the Town, than without. The Florentines were highly offended, and spake very hardly of Iubalt, till they con∣sidered that of Beaumont had done the same at Pisa, they had both as well as one I say therefore, that weak and irresolute States, do seldom take good Counsels, unless they be forced; for their weakness suffers them not to deliberate, where any thing is doubtful; and if that doubt be not removed by a violent necessity, they never come to a resolution, but are always in suspence.

CHAP. XXXIX.

Divers People have many times the same Accidents.

WHoever compares past things with the present, will find that in all Ages men have had the same humours and appetites as now. So that 'tis an easie matter by consulting what is pass'd, not only (in all common-wealths) to see what will follow, but to provide such remedies as their Predecessors did apply; or if there be no Presidents, to invent new remedies according to the similitude of the acci∣dents. But because these considerations are neglected, History not read, or not under∣stood at least by him who governs, it comes to pass that all Ages have their miscarriages and troubles. The City of Florence after the Government had stood 94 years, having lost a good part of its Territory, as Pisa, and other Towns, was forced to make War upon those who possessed them; and the Inhabitants being strong, and unwilling to restore them, much was spent in the War; to very little purpose. Their great expence, occa∣sioned great Taxes, and their impositions upon the people, made them mutinous, and unquiet. These affairs were administred by a Magistracy of ten Citizens, who were called the Dieci della Guerra: The people began to repine and to complain that the said Counsel was the cause of the War, and that they embezled their Money. That the best way would be to remove them from that Office or when their time was expired to choose no more, but let the Government fall back into its old channel again. These grave Persons who had the superintendancy of the War, were no sooner discharged, but things grew worse and worse, and instead of recovering Pisa, and the rest of the Towns in dispute, they lost Arezzo, and several other places. The people finding their mistake, and that their ma∣lady was rather from the Feaver, than the Physitian, they restored the ten Commissaries, which before they had cashier'd. The people of Rome had the same fancy against the Consuls, and would not believe but they were the causes of all their distractions, and that to settle all things, and preserve themselves in peace, the best way would be to remove them entirely, and provide that there should never be any more, or else to restrain and limit their authority in such manner, that they should have no power over them, either within the City or without. They believed that all proceeded from the ambition of the Nobility, who not being able to chastise the people in the City, because they were protected by their Tribunes, contrived to carry them out of Town under the command of their Consuls, to correct them where they should not be capable of any redress. The first man who had the confidence to propose it, was Terentillus a Tribune, who moved that it might be committed to five persons to consider the power of the Consuls, and to appoint limi∣tations. The Nobility opposed it, and (it is probable) employed all their interest against it, for it was no less than to debase the Majesty of the Government, and leave themselves no dignity in the commonwealth. Nevertheless the obstinacy of the Tribunes was such, that the Name of Consul was laid aside, and after several experiments, the people chose rather to create their Tribunes with Consular power, than to create new Consuls again, showing thereby that their quarrel was not so much against the authority, as Name: But they found their error at length, and restored their Consuls, as the Florentines did their Council of ten.

CHAP. XL.

The creation of the Decem-virat in Rome; what things are most remarkable in it; and how far such a Constitution may be useful or pernicious to a Common∣wealth.

BEfore we discourse of the troubles and commotions which hapned in Rome by means of the Decem-virat, it will not be amiss to give a short history of its Creation, in which there are many things well worthy our remark, as well for the preservation as de∣struction of a State; and this discourse will remonstrate the errors both of the Senate and People in prejudice to the liberty, and of Appius (chief of the Decem-viri) against that tyranny which he design'd to erect. The Romans therefore after a long debate betwixt the Nobility and People about the Constitution of such Laws as might settle and establish the liberty of their State, by common consent, sent to Athens Spurius Posthumus, with two other persons, for exemplifications of such Laws as Solon had made there, that thereby they might model their own. As soon as they were returned they chose certain learned and grave men to peruse the said Laws, and select such as they thought convenient for the Ro∣mans. The persons created for this office were ten of the principal Citizens (with Com∣mission for a year) among whom, Appius Claudius was one, a witty, but a turbulent man. And that they might act freely, without any awe or impediment in their affairs, they laid aside all the other Magistrates, (in particular the Tribunes and Consuls) and forbad all appeal to the people; so that this Magistracy were compleat Soveraigns in Rome. Not long after Appius assumed the whole authority of the ten, his Companions paying a reverence, as their Superior, by reason of his interest with the people; for he had made himself so popular on a sudden, it was almost a miracle to consider how soon his nature was changed, and he of their only cruel and fierce adversary become their greatest Courtier and Favourite.

The first year all went very well, and he who presided marched only with twelve Li∣ctors before him; when any Citizen was to be tried for murder, they framed the Process, but appointing a day, left it to be judged by the people, though their jurisdiction was So∣veraign, and without any appeal. They writ their Laws in ten Tables, but before they were ratified they exposed them to the people that every man might see them at his plea∣sure, and approve or object as he saw occasion. When Appius perceived the end of his Commission approaching, he caused it to be rumoured among the people, that to compleat all, and give perfection to their designs, it would be convenient to add two Tables more to their Ten, in order to which the common people consented that the Decem-virat should be continued for a year; and they did it with the more readiness, that neither the Consuls nor Tribunes might be restored, but Causes be left to their own judgment, as is said before. A day being appointed for a new creation, 'tis not to be imagined how all the Nobility stickled, and endeavoured to gain that honour which they had so stifly impugned by their applica∣tions to the people, whom they had so highly provoked. But among them all, none was so solicitous for the continuation of the Decem-virat, as Appius Claudius who pressed it of the people with so much instance and humanity, that he began to be suspected by his asso∣ciates, Credebant enim haud gratuitam in tanta superbia Comitatem fore; They could not imagine a person of his pride would stoop to such flatterry without some great design: that they might defeat neatly, and with cunning, what they could not do by force; though he was the youngest of them all, they committed the nomination of the next ten to him, suppo∣sing he would have observed ancient rules, and not named himself, which was a practice of no use nor reputation in Rome, Ille verb impedimentum, pro occasione arripuit he spoil'd their Plot made advantage of their impediment, and named himself among the foremost, to the amazement and displeasure of all the Nobility.

This Creation was no sooner over, but both Nobility and People began to be sensible of their error; for, as was said of him, Finem fecit ferendae alienae personae, Appius began to shew himself, and lay aside the disguise he had put on: he began to act according to his own natural pride, and in a little time had made his Collegues as bad as himself. To terrifie the Senate and people both, the first day of their Magistracy they multiplied their Lictors to 120, whereas formerly they had but 12, which were carried before every one of them by turns, but now every one of them had as many. This terror for some time was equally diffused, but afterwards they began to favour the Nobility, and insult upon the people only; and if any of the people that had been injured by any of the Decem-viri, and had no right done him by the first, to whom he addressed, if he appeal'd to another, he was sure to be worse;

insomuch as the people finding their error, began in their affliction to look upon the No∣bility; Et inde libertatis captari auram, unde servitutem timendo, in eum statum rempub∣licam adduxerant; and from thence hope for their liberty, from where their apprehension of servitude had brought their Commonwealth into the condition in which it was.

And this affliction in the people was no little satisfaction to the Nobility, Ut ipsi taedio praesentium, Consules desiderarent; that the tediousness of their sufferings might make them restore their Consuls. By this time their years was expired, and the two Tables to be added to the ten, both ready, and wanted nothing but publication; the Decem-viri had no mind to lay down, but began to think of continuing their authority by force, to which end they raised themselves Guards out of the young Nobility, and paid them out of the Estates of those who were condemned. Quibus donis juventus corrumpebatur, & malebat licentiam su∣am, quam omnium libertatem; by which preferment the youth were debauched, and chose rather to be licentious themselves than that their Country should be free.

Whilst things were in this posture, the Sabini and the Volsci made War upon the Romans and invaded them with a great Army. The Romans were in great consternation and the Decem-viri began to find the weakness of their Government, for without a Senate they were at a loss to manage their War; and with it their authority would be supplanted. But being necessitated at last, they came to a resolution, and resembled the Senate. Many speeches were made against the Decem-viri, in particular by Valerius and Horatius; and doubtless their authority had been utterly exploded, but that the Senate; in spight to the people, chose rather to continue them, lest, if they were deposed, the people should set up their Tribunes, and the Consuls be quite laid aside; whereas, if afterwards the Decem-viri could be brought fairly to lay down, by degrees the Consuls might be restored, and the Tri∣bunes be cashiered. Hereupon the Senate silently, without further prosecution of them, prepared for the War, and sent forth two Armies under the Command of several of the Ten, but Appius Claudius was left behind for the Government of the City. Whilst his Collegues were abroad, it was his fortune to fall in love with a Plebeian's daughter called Virginia, and not being able to persuade, he would take her away by force; Virginius the Father of the Virgin was willing to defend the chastity of his Daughter, and knowing no other way to secure it, he got Appius to be imprisoned: whereupon great tumults suc∣ceeding in Rome, and in the Army, the Souldiers returned, and joyning with the people they encamped upon the holy Mountain, where they resolved to continue till the Ten had resigned, Tribunes and Consuls were restored, and the Commonwealth had recovered its old liberty and freedom. This is the story of the Decem-virat, as shortly related as could be, in which it may be observed, that the people of Rome fell into subjection and servitude upon the same causes as other Commonwealths very frequently do; that is, by the too great desire of the people to be free, and the too great ambition in the Nobility of Com∣mand: when these two Factions cannot agree, they are forced to refer all to some third person in whom they confide; and then begins the Tyranny. The Decem-virat was ere∣cted in Rome by consent both of the Nobility and People, and invested with so much pow∣er, out of a hatred which the Nobility bare to the Tribunitial, and the people to the Con∣sular authority: as soon as the Decem-viri were chosen, Appius pretended highly for the people, and promised to be their Champion, whereupon they favoured him exceedingly. And (be it in what City it will) whenever the people are brought to extol and applaud a person, for no other reason, but because it is in his power to punish their enemies; if that person be cunning and industrious, their liberty is lost, and he can usurp when he pleases; for by the assistance of the people he may master the Nobility; and when they are down, it will be no hard matter to subdue the people, who will have no body to fly to, nor no body to support them: but before the Nobility be suppressed, he is by no means to meddle with the people. And this has been the method of all those who have laid the foundation of Tyranny in any Commonwealth; which if Appius had followed, he had not lost his ill∣got authority so soon: but he went quite contrary, and with as much imprudence as was possible, ran himself into the displeasure of the same persons which advanced him; and ingratiated with those who were against his preferment, and were no way able to sustain him, whereby he lost his old friends who were powerful, and endeavoured to get new that could do him no good. For though the Nobility have naturally no aversion to Tyranny; yet that part of the Nobility which shares not in the profits is always an enemy to the Ty∣rant, and their ambition and avarice is so great, all the riches and honours in the Tyrants disposal are too little to take them off. Hence it is that the aggressor in any enterprize is of necessity to be stronger than his adversary; and he who in the establishment of a Ty∣ranny makes the people rather than the Nobility his friends, will be stronger and more se∣cure than he who goes the other way, cajoles with the Nobility, and disobliges the People:

for the people being always stronger in the City, by their friendship, a Tyrant may subsist without any foreign supplies. This was visible in the case of Nabis the Tyrant of Sparta, who having the affections of the people, and secured himself of some of the Nobility, defended himself against all Greece, and the whole power of the Romans, which without the hearts of the people he could never have done. But he who makes his interest with the Nobility, cannot maintain himself without foreign assistance; for he will want Guards for th•• security of his person, Souldiers to do the Office of the Militia in the Country, and Confederates and Allies to succour him in his distress; whereas if he could be supplyed in these three defects, it might be possible for him to subsist without the friendship of the people. But Appius failing in these, miscarried in the very beginning of his Ty∣ranny.

In the creation of the Decem-virat the Senate and the People were guilty of very great error; for though in our discourse of Dictators we have said before, that those Magistrates only are pernitious to the publick liberty, who set up themselves by force, not they who are legally chosen and by the suffrage of the people; yet the people are to take special care in the election of their Magistrates, that they may not easily usurp. But the Romans instead of placing Guards about their Decem-viri that might have kept them in order, they not only took their Guards away, but displaced all the rest of their Magistrates, and made them absolute for that year, and all out of a design to countermine one another; the Nobility to suppress the Tribunes, and the people the Consuls. So that it hapned to them, as Fer∣dinand King of Arragon was wont to say it hapned to men that hated one another; that is, that they acted like birds of prey, all of them pursuing the quarry with equal rapacity; but the little birds not regarding the greater over their heads, are easily interrupted, and made prey themselves. But we have said enough to demonstrate the ill Counsel of the Romans in thinking to preserve their liberty by the creation of the Decem-virat, and the errors of Appius in driving at the Soveraignty, and miscarrying so soon.

CHAP. XLI.

For a mean man to grow immediately insolent, or a meek man immediately cruel, without just steps of gradation, is both imprudent and unprofitable.

AMong the rest of Appius his faults in the management of his Tyranny, it was of no little ill consequence that he changed his humour so suddenly: his cunning in cajoling the people, and pretending to be of their party, was good: his invention to renew the creation of the Ten was no worse; his boldness in presenting himself contrary to the ex∣pectation of the Nobility was well enough, and his creating Collegues for his turn was not amiss. But having gone thus far, (as is said before) to change his nature in a moment; of a friend, to become an enemy to the people; of an humble and affable man, to shew himself proud; of a mild man, to become difficult and perverse; and all this with so little circumstance, that the whole World might see it was either the falsness or levity of his tem∣per, was high indiscretion: for he that has ever pretended to be good, and is willing for his advantage to become otherwise, must not do it at a leap, but by degrees, and upon oc∣casion, that before the diversity of his deportment deprives him of his old friends, he may have gained himself new, without diminution to his authority; otherwise being discovered and deserted, he is certainly ruined.

CHAP. XLII.

How easily mens manners are corrupted.

IT is remarkable likewise in the passages of the Decem-viri, that men are easily corrupted, and become wicked, be their education never so good. The youth which Appius de∣bauched, and took for his Guards, is sufficient to prove it; who, though of honourable ex∣traction, and brought up with all possible advantage, suffered themselves to be corrupted by their preferments, became favourers of tyranny, and perfer'd their own licentiousness be∣fore the liberty of their Country. Quintus Fabius did the same, who, though an excellent person at first, and one of the Decem-viri of the second creation, blinded with ambition

and enveigled by the cunning of Appius, changed his good humour into bad, and grew as intolerable as he; which things, if seriously considered, should make all Legislators (either in Commonwealths or Kingdom) the more careful and diligent to restrain the ambition of mankind, and take from them all hopes of impunity when they offend in that kind.

CHAP. XLIII.

Those Souldiers which fight for their own honour are the best, and most to be trusted

FRom the same History it may be observed how much it imports the prosperity or adver∣sity of affairs to have the minds of the Souldiers quiet, and ready to engage upon a prin∣ciple of honour, rather than to have them turbulent, and disposed to fight upon every mans ambition: for whereas the Roman Armies were always Victorious under the conduct of the Consuls; under the Decem-viri they were always unfortunate: from hence likewise it may be collected how unsafe it is to commit the defence of our affairs to a mercenary Army who have nothing to encourage or oblige them but their pitiful pay, which is not con∣siderable enough to make them so faithful as to lay down their lives in your quarrel, For in an Army where the Souldier is not bound to the person for whom he fights by some par∣ticular obligation, or the expectation, of more than ordinary advantage by the Victory if the enemy be strong, they will make but little resistance; and this kindness and affection of the Souldiers to the General cannot be but where they are subjects fighting under a good Prince or a lawful Magistrate in defence of their Posterity and Religion: so that it is necessary for every King or Commonwealth who desires to defend himself well, to train up his own Subjects in Military Discipline, that he may safely depend upon them in time of distress; and it has been the practice of all those who have done any great things. The Roman Armies under the Decem-viri had doubtless the same courage as under the Con∣suls: but not being so well affected towards the one as the other, they would not put it forth, nor give such testimonies as formerly: but when the tyranny of the Decem-virat ex∣tinguished, and their liberty was recovered, having then the same tenderness and affection to their Country, they fought as well as before, and their enterprizes had the same happy success.

CHAP. XLIV.

A multitude without an head is altogether unserviceable; nor is any man to threaten that has any thing to desire.

UPon the accident of Virginius, the people having taken Arms, and retir'd to the holy-Mount, the Senate sent to them to know upon what account they had abandoned their Officers, and betaken themselves to that Mount: and the authority of the Senate was so venerable among the people, that having no head among them, there was no body durst return an answer: Titus Livius tells us, Non defuit quid responderetur, deerat qui responsum daret; They wanted not what to say, but who to deliver it. For having no certain Comman∣der, every private person was unwilling to expose himself to their displeasure. From whence we may understand how useless a thing the multitude is without a head, which be∣ing observed by Virginius, he caused twenty Military Tribunes to be made, with power to treat and expostulate with the Senate instead of a Head.

The people insisting to have Valerius and Horatius sent to them, to whom they would communicate their grievances, Valerius and Horatius refused to go till the Decemviri had laid down their authority; which being at length obtained with much concertation; Va∣lerius and Horatius repaired to the people, and understood that they would have new Tri∣bunes to be chosen; they would have appeals from every Magistrate to the people; and they would have the Decem-viri to be delivered up into their hands, that they might burn them alive: the Embassadors liked the first of their demands, but refused to consent to the last as impious, telling them, Crudelitatem damnatis, in crudelitatem ruitis: You condemn cruelty, and practise it your selves: and before you will be free, you will tyrannize over your

adversaries; advising them to lay that Article by, and mention the Decemviri no farther, but to address themselves to the reassumption of their power and authority, after which they would not want ways of receiving satisfaction; for then every man's life and fortune would be at their disposing. Hence we may learn how weak and imprudent it is to desire a thing, and before we receive it, declare to what ill use we intend it, especially if we mean to do mischief, 'tis just as you should say, pray give me your Sword, that I may run you thorow, 'Tis sufficient to borrow the Sword, and when you have it, you may do as you please.

CHAP. XLV.

'Tis a thing of ill Example to break a new Law, especially for the Maker: and 'tis no less dangerous to the Governor of a State, to multiply injuries, and repeat them every day.

THe Commotions about the Tyranny of the Decem-viri being composed, and Rome restored to its old form of Government again; Virginius cited Appius before the the people to answer what he had attempted upon his Daughter. Appius appeared with his Nobility about him; Virginius commanded him to Prison: Appius cryed out, he appealed to the people: Virginius replyed, That he who had taken away those appeals from the people, ought not to have any benefit by them, nor be permitted to implore their protection, whose Laws and Liberties could receive no protection from him. Appius insisted, that they ought not to violate a thing which they had urged with that eagerness, and ordained with that zeal. And though indeed the life of Appius was wicked enough, and there was no punishment that he did not deserve; yet it was inhospitable and contrary to all civil Society, to violate their own Laws, which were but newly made, and passed with so much importunity: for in my judgment there is nothing so indecorous, nor of so ill example in a Commonwealth, as the infraction of a new Law, by the Le∣gislator himself.

When in the year 1494. the State of Florence was restored by the assistance of a Frier called Hieronimo Savonarolo (whose writings give sufficient testimony of his Learning and integrity) having among other things for the security of the Citizens, obtained a Law for appeals to the people in matters of State, both from the Senate and the Council of Eight (which Law he had a long time solicited, and got with much difficulty at last) It hapned that not long after, there were five persons condemned to death by the Senate, which persons endeavouring very earnestly to appeal to the people, they were denyed that liber∣ty, and could not have the benefit of that Law; which was greater diminution to the reputation of the Frier, than any thing that had ever hapned before: For if that Law was of such importance as he had pretended, it ought to have been observed; if nor, why was it solicited so earnestly? And it was the more remarkable in the Frier, because in his many Sermons and Discourses afterwards to the people, he neither blamed the breaking of that Law, nor went about to excuse it, for being to his purpose, he would not condemn it, and excuse it he could not, having nothing to say; which action having discovered the ambition and partiality of his mind, took much off from his repute, and loaded him with scandal. It is of great inconvenience likewise in a State, to revive, and ferment the hu∣mours in the minds of the Citizens, by a daily renovation of their injuries upon one per∣son or other, as it hapned in Rome after the Decem-virat, was dissolved, and the Tribuni∣tial authority re-established by the people: For all the Decem-viri, and several other considerable Citizens were Accused, and Condemned, in so much as there was a General consternation among the Nobility, who thought there would be no end of their condemnation, till they were utterly extinct: Which proceeding and apprehension, would doubtless have produced great troubles in the State, had not they been prevented by Marcus Duellius the Tribune, who published an Edict, That for a twelve-month it should not be lawful either to cite or accuse any man that was Citizen of Rome; by which act of Mode∣ration, he secured the Nobility. From whence we may discern how unsafe it is for any Prince or Commonwealth to keep the minds of their Subjects in perpetual fear and sus∣pence; and without doubt nothing can be more pernicious; for men being insecure, and jealous of being questioned for some Capital offence, will look out for protection, and not only so, but are provoked to more boldness, and become less scrupulous of doing great mischiefs. If therefore such Commotions happen, it is better if possible to compose them

without blood, but if Example must be made, it is to be done at once, that afterwards the people may be reassured, and recover their old security, and tranquility of mind.

CHAP. XLVI.

How men leap from one passion to another, and how they who at first aim at nothing but self-preservation, when secured of that, grow oppressors of other People.

AFter the people of Rome had recovered their liberty, and had by so much impro∣ved their former condition, by how much they had made many new Laws to for∣tifie their power, one would have expected they should have been quiet, and after so much trouble and embroilment, enjoyed some time of repose; but it fell out quite contrary, they were more perplexed than before, every day producing some new Sedition or Di∣sturbance: Of which, Livy giving the reasons so clearly, I do not think it amiss to in∣sert them in this place. These two Orders (says he) were in perpetual opposition; when the people were humble, the Nobility was proud, when the populace was quiet, and content with their bounds, the young Nobility took their time to be insolent; and when the Tribunes interposed in their behalf, they made little progress at first, and at length were as much injur'd themselves. The graver sort of the Nobility on the other side, though they thought their own youth to be too furious and insolent, yet they had rather if one side must transgress, that it should be their own, than the peoples: So that their immoderate desire of preserving their priviledge, was the cause that when either party was prevalent, it employed its whole power in oppressing the other. It is common among men, when they would secure themselves, to injure other people; they begin first to do mischief, to revile, or to beat, or what other outrage they are able, as if the injury they would avoid themselves, was to be thrown upon their Neighbour, and there was no Me∣dium betwixt doing, and suffering of wrong. From hence we may see after what man∣ner (among other things) Commonwealths are dissolved, and how suddenly men pass from one ambition to another, according to that true saying which Salust put into the mouth of Caesar. Omnia mala exempla, bonis initiis Orta sunt. All disorders and abuses, are good in their beginnings. The first thing an ambitious Citizen endeavours, is so to fortifie, that he may defend himself not only against his private adversary, but against the publick Magistrate, if at any time he would offend him; to which end he makes what friends he can, by furnishing them with Mony or supporting them against their Oppres∣sors; and this seeming very honest in appearance, people are easily deluded, and no body goes about to prevent it; so that no obstacle being given, he grows insensibly so great, that not only the private Citizens, but the Magistrate begins to apprehend him; and then there is no resisting him without manifest danger, for the reasons (which I have mention'd before) of the dangerous contending with inconvenience that has got that growth and maturity in a City. What is then to be done? Let him alone in his prosperity, and he enslaves you for ever, unless death or some other kind accident delivers you: If you think to remove him on a sudden, you do but add to his power and hasten your own ruine; for finding himself in such a posture that his Friends, his Enemies, the Magistrates, and all people are afraid of him, he will then begin to domineer, and dispose of all things ac∣cording to his own judgment and pleasure; If there be any way to prevent it, it is by watching in time, by having a diligent eye over your Citizens, that under colour of doing good, they may not be able to do mischief; and that they may have as much reputation as may serve, not ruine their liberty: but of this more hereafter.

CHAP. XLVII.

Though the people, in things that are discours'd in general, are many times mistaken, yet when they are reduced to particulars, they are more sensible and judicious.

THe Name of consul (as we said before) being grown odious to the people of Rome they resolved to have them created for the future out of the Populace; or else to limit and circumscribe their authority with such rulers as they should think fit. The Nobility, to prevent both inconveniences, took a way betwixt both, and was contented that they should create four Tribunes with consular authority, to be chosen indifferently out of the people, and Senate. The people were well enough satisfied, as thinking by that means the Consulship would extinguish, and that they should have a share of the supream dignity themselves. But observe what followed when they came to the creation of their Tribunes, and it was not only in their power, but expected, that they should have been all made out of the people, they chose them all out of the Nobility, which gave occasion to Livy to say, Quorum Comitiorum eventus docuit, alios animos in Contentione libertatis & honoris, alios secundum deposita Certamina in incorrupto judicio esse. The success of that Election did show, That when their honour and liberty were in controversie, the people were of one mind; when they were secure and free, they were of another. Con∣sidering with my self what might be the reason, I suppose it is because men are more apt to be mistaken in generals, than in particulars. The people thought themselves more worthy of the Cousulship than the Nobility, because they had the greatest interest in the City; They underwent the greatest difficulty in the Wars, and it was their Arms which defended its liberty, and propagated the Empire of Rome: according to which argument, their desires seeming but reasonable, they resolved they would have them in spight of all opposition: But when they came to particulars, and to examine their own private Ca∣pacities for Government, they found themselves so weak and defective, that though alto∣gether they thought themselves able enough, yet they could not find one man they judged proper for the employment; ashamed therefore of their incapacity, they gave their voices for such as they found were more really worthy; which Titus Livius admiring, has these words, Hanc modestiam, aequitatem{que} & altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quae tunc populi universi fuit? Where will you find now-a-days, that Modesty, that Equity, that Magnanimity in one man, that was then obvious in the whole body of the people? To the same purpose there hapned another notable Example in Capua, after Hanibal had defeated the Romans at the Battel of Cannas. After that defeat, the Inhabitants of Capua began to mutiny against the Government (as indeed all Italy did at that time) the grounds of their discontent, was an old pique betwixt the people and Senate, which the first thought then to improve to the destruction of the other. Pacuvius Calanus being a very wise man, and at the Helm at that time, considering with himself of what dangerous conse∣quence a tumult might prove in so populous a City, resolved to find out some way to accommodate their difference. To this end, he assembled the Senate, and in few words remonstrated to them the implacable hatred which the people had to them; That they were in great danger of being murthered by them, and the City delivered up to Hanibal, by reason that the condition of Rome was become so deplorable; and at length he con∣cluded, that if they would commit the whole matter to him, he would find out an expe∣dient to unite them, and his expedient was to lock up the Senate in the Palace, and by putting them into the peoples power, to preserve them. The Senate submitted, were lock'd up in the Castle, and having assembled the people, he told them, That the hour was now come for redeeming their liberty, and chastising the insolence of their Nobility, who had so often abused them. He told them he had them all lock'd up in his Custody, to be disposed of as they pleased; but because he could not think it was their desire to leave the City without a Government, before they proceeded to the execution of the ancient Sena∣tors, it would be necessary, as he conceived, to think of creating a new one; to that purpose he had brought the Names of the old Senators in a Purse, would draw them out one by one, and as they resolved upon another to succeed in each place, he would see the old one delivered out to execution. The people were content, and Pacuvius drew one, and nam'd him aloud, upon which a great noise was raised, some said he was cruel, others he was proud, and others that he was arrogant: Then says Pacuvius, he is unfit to be continued, pray will you make choice of another in his stead. Silence was commanded, and one of the people was named; He was named no sooner, but some began to hum,

others to laugh, and all to revile, and so proceeding from one to another, they were all concluded unfit for so honourable a degree. Paccucius taking the occasion, told them, since you are sensible it is unfit that the City should be without a Senate; and since you cannot agree about the Election of a new; it would be expedient in my judgment, that you pro∣pose some way of reconciliation; for doubtless the fear in which the Senators have been, must of necessity have so humbled them, that that gentleness and humanity which you have sought for elsewhere, may now be found in them. The people began then to discover in particular, the fault which they had committed in judging in general, and declared they were ready for any reasonable reconciliation. And in this manner it is that most people deceive themselves in judging generally of things and their accidents, which upon parti∣cular examination they do easily discover.

After the year 1414. the chief of the Florentines being driven out of the City, it was left wholly without order or government, over-whelm'd with licentiousness and ambition, and the interest of the publick running headlong to ruine. Many of the popular party foreseeing the inevitable destruction of the City, and not knowing to what else to impute it, they charged it upon the ambition of some persons among the Nobility, which (as they pretended) formented their disorders, to take away their liberty, and model the State according to their own fancies, and designs. And these Mutineers were in all places; in the Streets, in the Houses, in the palaces, declaring publickly, and threatning that if ever they came to the government, they would look farther into the business, and punish all those which they should find conscious of it. It hapned afterwards that some of these Citizens were advanced as they desired; but when they were at that height, and saw things nearer than before, they became sensible of their error, and found that it was not the am∣bition of the Nobility, but the malignity of the times, which was the occasion of all their trouble and commotion; so as they became new men, and exercised a new way of administration; Insomuch that those who had heard them complain and threaten when they were in private capacity, seeing them now at the helm, and performing nothing that they had promised, did not look upon it as conviction of their judgment, so much as corruption of their minds. Which thing being frequent among them, gave occasion to the Proverb, Costoro hanno un animo in Piazza, et uno in Palazzo. They are of one mind in the Town, and another in the Throne. Thus, by serious consideration of what has been said we may see how to open the eyes of the people, and reduce them to a sence of their errors, if we take them from their general and abstracted notions, and fix them upon par∣ticulars, as in the case of Paccucius in Capua, and the Senate in Rome. Again, I am of opinion that no wise man is to decline the judgment of the people in the distribution of Offices and Honours, and such particular affairs; for in those things they are almost infallible, and when they do mistake, it is rather to be attributed to the obstinacy of some few, to whom that business is referred, than to the ignorance of the whole body; which being certainly so, I think it not superfluous to shew in my next Chapter the Order which the Senate observed to over-reach the people in those kinds of distributions.

CHAP. XLVIII.

To prevent the advancement of mean people to the Magistracy, it is particularly to be contrived that the competition be, betwixt the best and most Noble, and the wickedest and most abject.

WHen the Senate began to apprehend, that the Tribunes wnuld be chosen out of the people, and invested with Consular power; they had two ways, one of which they constantly made use of. They put the best and most honorable persons to stand, or else by their Mony they foisted in some sordid and ignoble Plebeian, among those of the better sort which pretended to the Magistracy, and demanded it for him: The last way made the people ashamed to confer it: the first made them ashamed to remove it; which reinforces what I have said so often before, that though in generals the people may be mi∣staken, in particulars they are provident enough.

CHAP. XLIX.

If those Cities which have been free from their foundation (as Rome) have found it difficult to contrive such Laws as might maintain them so. Those which have been always servile, will find it almost impossible.

THe Government of Rome, and its affairs abroad and at home, do sufficiently show how hard it is to establish such Laws in a Commonwealth as my preserve it always in a good and quiet Estate. It had first Romulus, then Numa, Tullus Hostilius, Servius, and others, who employed their industry and capacity to regulate it well, and prescribe good Laws; after which, ten Citizens were created on purpose, and yet new difficulties arose every day, which required new remedies: One of their great expedients (which indeed contributed much to the incorruption of that City) was the creation of the Censors, to correct the exorbitances, splendor, and ill husbandry of the Citizens; and although in the beginning it was with some inconsideration decreed that those Officers should be created for five years, yet by the prudence of Mamercus the Dictator, that error was afterwards re∣ctifyed, and the time of their continuance reduced to 18 months, which disgusted the then Censors so highly, that they found means to turn Mamercus out of the Senate, to the great regret, both of the Senators and people. And because the History does not show how Mamercus defended himself, it must needs be the neglect of the Historian, or the defect of the Laws; for it is not to be thought that in a perfect Commonwealth, a Citi∣zen should be so ill treated for promu••ging a Law so much for the security of their liberty, and his innocence left without sanctuary or protection. But to return to my design, I say, it is not to be admired if Cities conceived, and born, and brought up all along in servitude, find so much difficulty to regulate, and preserve themselves in tranquility and peace (as was to be seen in Florence) when Rome and other States (which have been free from the beginning) have scarce been able to do it. Florence was in Subjection to the Roman Em∣pire, and governed by other people, so long that it had searce any hopes of ever being free. Afterwards having time to breath, it began to look up, and make Laws for it self, but mingling them with their old Laws, which were bad, they did them no good. For two hundred years together their Government was in this manner, so that it was scarce wor∣thy the name of a Commonwealth. And the same inconveniencies have been incident to all Cities whose beginnings have been servile like that. And though the Florentines did many times by publick and free suffrage transfer an Authority upon a few of their princi∣pal Citizens, to examine and reform all things; yet those few regarded not so much the common enterest and liberty, as their own private design and advantage in the whole man∣ner of their proceedings; which was so far from producing any order or settlement as was intended, that it augmented the disorder, and made things worse than before. To pass by other things which are likewise to be observed, I say that in every Commonwealth it is particularly to be considered in whose hands the Cognizance of Capital offences is placed, and who has the execution of the Sanguinary Laws: This was well ordered in Rome, an appeal lying to the people from all the courts and Magistrates of the City; and if at any time by that appeal, the delay of execution became dangerous to the State, they had recourse to the Dictator, who commanded execution immediately; but they never made use of their refuge, but in extream necessity.

But Florence, and other Cities born in servitude and Subjection, had not the benefit of such an Officer, but were governed by strangers upon whom the Prince had transferred his Authority; which Custom they kept up, after they had made themselves free, and con∣tinued the same Authority in a Foreigner, whom they called their Captain, which was a dangerous thing, considering how easily he might be corrupted by the better sort of the Citizens: Afterwards the Custom changed with the revolutions of State; and eight Citizens were created to do the Office of the Captain, which alteration proved much for the worse, for (as I said before) a few men prefer'd to the government, are always liable to be caressed and cajoled by the Nobility, to the prejudice of the people. Against which inconvenience, Venice provided very well, where there is a Council of Ten, which can punish any Citizen whatever without any appeal; yet for fear they should not be sufficient (though they have authority enough) for the punishment of persons of more than ordi∣nary quality, they have constituted the Quarantie to assist them, and the Council of Pregui besides, which is the highest Council of that City; so that if any man will accuse, there are judges enough ready to hear him. If therefore in Rome which was originally free, and

model'd and govern'd by the Counsels of so many wise men, new faults were daily disco∣vered, and fresh occasions for new Laws, to be made for the preservation of their liberty; it is not to be admir'd, if in other Cities it was worse, where their Original was not so free, nor so many wise men to model, and instruct them.

CHAP. L.

No Magistrate or Council ought to have power to check or controul the publick acts of the City.

TItus Quintius Cincimatus, and Cneus Iulius Mentus being Consuls together in Rome, but at perpetual odds, the affairs of that State was at a stand, their Laws were not executed, their Wars were not prosecuted, nor any thing managed as it should be. The Senate observing it, persuaded them to make a Dictator, by whom the State might be reformed, and their differences composed, which had hitherto hindered the reformation: But the Consuls, how contrary so ever in other things, consented not to do it, the Senate having no other remedy, addressed to the Tribunes, who by the Authority of the Senate required, and compelled the Consuls to the Creation of a Dictator: In which place it is remarkable how beneficial the assistance of the Tribunitial power was, not only to defend the people against the insolence of the Nobility, but to controul and restrain the emulation and difference among themselves. And here it is carefully to be provided in the settlement of a Commonwealth, that it be not in the power of a few persons to whom the Govern∣ment is entrusted, to quash or obstruct any Customs or Acts that are necessary to its subsi∣stance: For Example, If you authorize a Council, or any other persons to distribute Honours, dispose of Offices, or execute any other of your commands, you must either lay a strict injunction or necessity upon them to do as you appoint, or provide, so that if it be neglected by them, it may be done by some body else; otherwise things are ill managed, and the order is defective, as is manifest by that example in Rome, it the perversness of the Consuls had not been opposed by the Authority of the Tribunes. In the Republick of Venice, the grand Council (or Senate) has the distribution of Honours, and the Election of Magistrates, both abroad and at home; and it hapning one time, that the Senate either upon some disgust, or false suggestion omitted to creat Successors to the Magistrates at home, or to their Officers abroad, there followed great disorders immediately; the Ter∣ritory and City wanting their lawful judges, could have no justice in any thing, till the Senate was appeased. And this inconvenience would in time have brought the City into an ill condition, had it not been prevented by the wisdom of some Citizens, who taking the opportunity obtained a Law, That there should be no vacancy of Offices, either within the City or without, but the old Offices should be continued till their Successors were chosen, by which Law they deprived that great Council of a power to interrupt the course of Ju∣stice, which could not have been suffered without hazard to the State

CHAP. LI.

A Prince or Commonwealth that is constrained to do a thing, is to seem to do it frankly, and without any compulsion.

A Wise man orders his affairs so, that whatever he does, seems rather voluntary and gracious, than done by force and compulsion, be his necessity of doing it never so great, which point of wisdom being well observed by the Romans, got them great reputa∣tion among the people, especially when they decreed stipends to the Soldiers out of the publick Treasury, who before were obliged to serve at their own proper charges; for seeing their Wars were like to be tedious, and their Armies to be carried into far Countries, before they could be finished, they found neither the first could be continued, nor the latter per∣form'd but at the publick expence, wherefore the Senate was forced and necessitated to pay the Soldiers out of the publick stock; yet they did it so slyly, and with that artifice, that though compelled by necessity, it was received as a grace, and gain'd them exceed∣ingly the affections of the people, who had never so much as mention'd it by their Tri∣bunes, or thought of it themselves: So that never any thing was received with more

demonstration of joy. But the Tribunes were not so well satisfied, but endeavoured to possess the people that it was not an act of that grace as they imagined; and that if they looked closely into it, it would appear rather a grievance, than a benevolence; for how was this Mony to be rais'd, but by Taxes and Impositions upon the people? so that if the Senators were bountiful, it was out of other mens purses. But all would not do, let the Tribunes say as they pleased, the people believed themselves highly obliged; and then the manner of raising the Mony made it much the more grateful, for it was done with more than ordinary equity, the greatest part of it being levyed upon the greatest men, and the poor favoured as much as was possible.

CHAP. LII.

The best and most secure way to repress the insolence of an ambitious and power∣ful State, is to preclude and stop up those ways by which he would come to his greatness.

BY what has been said before, it appears what affection the Senate conciliated among the people, not only by the frankness of their bounty, but by their kindness in collecting it; which order, if continued to the people, would have prevented all the tumults which hapned afterward in that City, and deprived the Tribunes of their great credit and autho∣rity. And indeed there is not a better or more secure way to suppress the insolence, or cross-bite the designs of an ambitious Citizen, than to take the same ways to prevent, which he takes to advance them; which course, if it had been followed by the adversaries of Co∣simo de Medici would have been much more for their advantage than to have forced him out of the Town. For had they applyed themselves to caressing and insinuating with the people, (which was the way he took to fortifie himself) they had disarm'd him without any tumult or violence, and taken from him the only arms upon which he depended for his defence. About the same time Piero Soderini by his extraordinary beneficence got him self a great interest and reputation among the people, and was publickly esteemed the great Champion and Protector of their liberties: and doubtless his adversaries, who began to grow jealous of his greatness, had done much more wisely, and honourably, and safely, to have gone the same way to work, and countermined him by their indulgence to the people, than to oppose themselves downright, and ruine him and their whole Country together; for could they by any art or insinuation have gained the affections of the City, they had taken from him the only thing upon which he relyed, without noise or confusion, and they might have opposed in all his counsels, without fear of the people: if he be urged here, that if the Citizens which were enemies to Piero committed an error, in not taking the same course to retain as he had done to debauch the people, Peter committed the same fault by not making use of the same instruments which his adversaries employed against him; it is answered, that Soderini indeed might have tryed, but he could have done it neither with honour or case; for the way that his adversaries took was to set up the Medici, by whose assistance they bearded him exceedingly, and ruined him at last; and it had been dishonourable for Soderini to have deserted the liberties of the people, which he had un∣dertaken to defend, and gone over to the party of the Medici; nor could he have done it so secretly or suddenly, but the people would have smelt it, and have turned the violence of their affection into as furious and hatred, which would have made his destruction much more easy to his enemies, for who-ever was but suspected to be a favourer of the Medici, was thought, ipso facto, an adversary to the people. It is necessary therefore in all deliberations to weigh all things, to consider what danger and what advantage every thing will yield, and make choice of what is least dangerous: otherwise it will happen to you as it did to Mar∣cus Tullius, who raised and augmented the greatness of Mark Anthony by the same way which he intended for his destruction; for when Mark Anthony was declared an enemy by the Senate, having a great Army attending him, and most of them of Caesar's old Soldiers, Cicero to draw them off from him, persuaded the Senate to put Octavius at the head of their Army, and sent him (with the Consuls) against Antonius, pretending that the very name of Octavius (being Nephew to Caesar) would bring over all his Unckles party to him, whereby Antonius would be so weakned it would be no hard matter to reduce him. But it hapned quite contrary; for Antonius having gained Octavius to his side, they joyned their Forces against Tully and his Senate, and ruined their whole Party. Which might have been easily foreseen; nor ought Cicero so imprudently to have reviv'd the name of Caesar, by

whom the whole world was brought into servitude, and especially Rome; nor have per∣suaded himself that a Tyrant or any of his race would ever restore that liberty which his Predecessor had suppressed.

CHAP. LIII.

The people (deceived with a false appearance of good) do many times desire that which turns to their destruction: and how great hopes and large promises do easily debauch them.

AFter the taking of Veii by the Romans, a report being spread of the convenience and pleasantness of the Town, and richness of the Country about it, the people of Rome began to fancy that it would be much for their advantage to transplant one half of their City, aud send them thither to inhabit, for there were many fair houses to receive them; and it could be no weakning or diminution to Rome, seeing the distance betwixt the two Cities was so small; Veii would be taken rather for a member of Rome, than a distinct and particular City. The Senate and graver sort of Citizens had so little inclination to this design, that they resolved to die before ever they would consent to it. The people were so mad upon it on the other side, that when it came to a debat, and it was to be resolved what was to be done, the dispute was so hot, they had proceeded to blows, and the whole Town been engaged in blood, had not the Senate interposed certain ancient and eminent men, who by their interest and veneration among the people defended the blow, and appeased them for that time. In which passage there are two things considerable: the first, that the people being deceived with a false imagination of good, do many times solicit their own ruine, and run the Commonwealth upon infinite dangers and difficulties, unless some per∣son in whom they have great confidence strikes in to instruct them which is the good, and which is the evil; and when by accident it falls out that the people (having been formerly deceived either by persons or things) cannot repose that confidence in any one, then of ne∣cessity all goes to wrack, and nothing can prevent it: to this purpose Dante in his discourse about Monarchy, tells us,

Il popolo molte volte grida Vivala sua morte, & muoia la sua vita.

The enraged multitude do often crie Give us our death, our life we do defie

This incredulity is many times the occasion that good counsels are neglected, as it hapned to the Venetians when invaded by several enemies at one time, they could not take off any one of them, by restoring what they had taken wrongfully from other people; which was the occasion of the war, and almost of their ruine. From whence we may consider the easiness and difficulty of persuading the people, and make this distinction, if the affair proposed be in appearance either magnanimous, or profitable, though at the bottom it be never so distructive, the people are always easie to be persuaded: on the other side, if any thing be offered (how honourable, how useful soever) with the least shew or glance of cowardize or inconvenience, they are never, or with great difficulty to be wrought to it. To confirm this, we have many examples both modern and ancient in Rome and other places. From hence sprang their jealousies against Fabius Maximus, who could never beat it into the heads of that City, that it was better for their Common wealth to protract, and spin out the war, than to push things on, and bring all to the hazard of a Battel; for the people looking upon it as cowardly and base coun∣sel, and not discerning the utility at the bottom, would by no means admit it; and Fa∣bius wanted rhetorick to enforce it upon them: and so strangely are they blinded sometimes with their bravery and courage, that though the Romans had committed the same error once before, and given authority to Fabius his Master of the Horse to fight when he saw occasion whether Fabius would or not; (which authority had like to have ruined the whole Army, had not Fabius with his prudence prevented it) yet that experiment doing no good, they were guilty again▪ and invested Varro with the same power, upon no other ac∣count, but because he had swagger'd up and down the Town, that when-ever they qualified

him with such a Commission, he would fight Hanibal, cut him to pieces; they believe what he said, give him authority; and what followed? Why they were beaten at Cannas; the Roman Army cut off; and the Roman Empire almost extinguished. And not unlike this was the example of Marcus Centenius Penula, (a mean person, and considerable for nothing but some small command in the Army) who presented himself one day to the Se∣nate, and offered if they would give him power to raise an Army of Voluntiers where he pleased all over Italy, he would undertake in a short time to beat Hanibal out of it. The Senate was sensible the proposition was rash, yet (considering withal that if they should deny him, and report should come of it afterwards to the people, it might dissatisfie them; beget some tumult in the City; and be the occasion of envy and animosity to themselves) they granted his request, choosing rather to expose all those who were so ill advised as to follow him, than run the hazard of new dissentions at home. Having got his Commis∣sion, and afterwards his Men, with a confused and disorderly Army he marches against Hanibal, and fought him, but he failed of his promise, for he was killed himself, and most of his Forces. In Greece in the City of Athens, Nicias, a grave and wise Citizen, could never persuade the people against an Expedition into Sicily; but persuing it against all sober advise, they miscarried, and their own Country was ruined. Scipio, when he was made Consul, desired that he might have Africk for his province, and he would undertake to demolish Carthage but the Senate being averse upon the judgment of Fabius Maximus, Scipio threatned to propose it to the people, as knowing very well how gratf••ul it would be to them, We might produce examples of the same nature out of our own City of Florence, as when Hercules Bentivogli General of the Florentine Army, with Antonio Gia∣comini, having defeated the Forces of Bertolomeo at San Vincenti, they went to besiege Pisa, which enterprize was debated and concluded by the people, upon the great promises which Hercules had made, though indeed the wiser sort of Citizens were against it; but the mul∣titude were possessed with great matters that would be done, and nothing could dissuade them. I say then, there is not an easier way to ruine a State where the authority is in the people, than to put them upon some gallant, but desperate enterprize; for where there is any thing of magnanimity in their nature, it is sure to be embraced, and it is not in the wit of men to dissuade them: but as this is many times the ruine of the State, so it is more often and more certainly the destruction of those Citizens which promoted and comman∣ded it, for the people full of expectations of victory, when they find they have miscarried, never impute it to an ill accident or fortune, but throw all upon the ignorance or treachery of their Commanders, which seldom escape without being banished, imprisoned, or killed; as has hapned to several of the Carthaginian and Athenian Captains. Nor does it avail that they have been victorious before; for their present misfortune drowns all, as it fell out to Antonio Giacomini our General, who not taking Pisa as he promised, and the people ex∣pected, fell into so great disgrace with them, that notwithstanding the many great things which he had done, he was permitted to live, more by the favour and humanity of the Go∣vernors, than by gratitude or good nature of the people.

CHAP. LIV.

How great the authority of a grave man is, to asswage the tumultuousness of the people.

THe second thing remarkable, that was mentioned in my last Chapter, is, that their is nothing more certain to appease a popular tumult, and reduce the people to reason, than the interposition of some wise person of authority among them; as Virgil has told us with very good reason.

Tum pietate gravem, ac meritis si forte virum quem Conspexere, silent, arrectis{que} auribus adstant.

If in their tumults, a grave man appears, All's whist, and nothing stirring but their ears.

He therefore who commands in a mutinous Army, or in a seditious City, and desires to appease either the one or the other, is in my judgment to present himself with the most grace and advantage that he can; adorned with all the ornaments of his dignity, and what-ever

else may make him venerable to the people. Not many years since Florence was divided into Factions, the Frateschi and the Arabiati; and their animosity was so great, they came to blows, and the Frateschi were overthrown, and Pagolantonio Soderini slain among the rest, who was as eminent a Citizen as most of his time; upon the strength of this Victory the people ran in a tumult to his house, with intention to plunder it; but his Brother Fran∣cesco (then Bishop of Volterra, and Cardinal now) being accidently there, as soon as he understood how things were, and perceived the rabble to encrease, he called for the richest of his Robes, and having put them on, and his Episcopal Rochet over them, he marched out into the croud, and by the Majesty of his person, and the efficacy of his language, pre∣vailed with them to forbear, and to return peaceably to their houses; which action was so grateful to the City, that it was celebrated publickly many daies after. I conclude there∣fore that there is not a surer, nor more necessary way to compose the distractions of the people, than the appearance of some grave person in such a posture as may make him vene∣rable to them. To return therefore to what we said before, it may be seen from hence, with what obstinacy the Romans accepted of that proposition for transplanting to Veii, be∣cause they thought it profitable, and did not perceive the inconvenience that was in it; for as there hapned many tumults thereupon, so much more mischief had followed, had not the Senate and some other grave persons interposed, and by good fortune restrain'd them.

CHAP. LV.

How easily things are managed in a City where the Commons are incorrupt; how hard it is to erect a principality where there is an equality; and where it is not, a Commonwealth is impossible.

THough we have declared before what we thought was to be expected from a City whose inhabitants were totally corrupt; yet that will not hinder us from considering the subtilty of the Senate in relation to a vow which Camillus had made to consecrate the tenth part of the spoils of the Veientes to Apollo; which spoils being fallen into the clutches of the Common people, the Senate had no way but to publish an Edict, requiring all of them at a certain time and place to bring in the tenth part of their gains. 'Tis true, that Proclamation had no great effect, because another expedient was found out to satisfie the vow; yet it is remarkable, the confidence the Senate had in the good nature and comply∣ance of the people; and the great opinion that they would punctually bring in what-ever they were commanded. On the other side it is observable, that the people went not about to shuffle or defraud the Edict by bringing in less than their due; but declared frankly against it, as a thing illegally required. Which example, with many other which I have mentioned before, are brought to shew the probity and religion wherewith that people was endued, and what good might be expected from them: and certainly where there is not that submission and conformity, no confidence is to be had; as in those Provinces which are corrupted at this day, in Italy above all the rest, and I may say in France and in Spain, which are likewise in some measure under the same corruption; for tho they are not perhaps subject to so many, and so dangerous disorders as we are in Italy; yet it proceeds not from the meliority of the people, but from the excellence of their constitution, being governed by a Monarchy, which keeps them united, not only by the virtue and example of their Prince, but by the Laws and Customs of each Kingdom, which are preserved to this day. Germany is the place of the whole World where the footsteps of the old Romans virtue and fidelity is conspicuous; and that fidelity is the cause why so many Cities live happily in li∣berty; for they are so careful and studious of their Laws, that that very one thing keeps them from servitude, and being over-run by their enemies; and if any instance be desired of this more than ordinary probity in the Germans, I shall produce one, not unlike that be∣fore, betwixt the Senate and the people of Rome. It is the custom in those States when they have occasion for mony upon the publick account, for the councils and Magistrates in authority to lay a tax of one or two per cent. upon all the inhabitants under their jurisdi∣ction, according to their respective Estates; at the day and place appointed for payment, every man appears with his mony, and having taken his oath first that the sum he pays is according to the full of his Estate, he throws it into a chest provided for that purpose, and no notice taken what it is he throws in; from whence we may conclude that there is still some sparks left in that people of their old ingenuity and religion: nor is it to be doubted but every man pays his due, for otherwise the sum would not amount to the imposition, nor

to what they formerly paid; whereby the fraud would be discovered, and they become lia∣ble to a new tax: which integrity and justice is the more admirable in our days, because it is to be found no where but in Germany, and the reason (as I conceive) is twofold; one, be∣cause they have had little or no commerce with their neighbours, neither trading into foreign parts, nor admitting foreigners into theirs; contenting themselves with their own diet, and clothes, and commodities, and thereby preventing all occasion of evil conversation, which is the corruption of good manners, especially among the French, the Spaniards and Italians, which are wicked enough to debauch the whole World. The other reason is, be∣cause those Commonwealths who have preserved their liberties, and kept themselves in∣corrupt, do not suffer any of their Citizens to live high, and at the rate of a Gentleman; but they live all in an equality and parity, as those few Noblemen or Gentlemen who are there are very odious to the people; and when-ever any of them fall by accident into their hands, they die without mercy, as those who are the fountain of all their luxury, and the oc∣casion of their scandal. I call those Gentlemen who live idly and plentifully upon their Estates without any care or employment, and they are very pernicious where-ever they are; but above all, they are most dangerous, who, besides their great revenues, have their Castellanies, their Jurisdictions, and their Vassels, which pay them fealty and homage: of these two sorts the Kingdom of Naples, the Territories of Rome, Romagna and Lombardy are full; for which reason there is no such thing as a free State in all those Countries, be∣cause the Gentry are mortal enemies to those constitutions, and it would be impossible to erect a Republick where they had the dominion; if any alteration be to be wrought, it is by reducing them into a Monarchy; for the matter being so corrupt, that the Laws are be∣come ineffectual to restrain them, there is a necessity that force be applyed, and that by a regal power the licentiousness and ambition of the Grandees be reduced into order: this may be illustrated by the example of Tuscany, which is a small Territory, and yet has three considerable Commonwealths in it, as Florence; Siena and Lucca; and the rest of the Ci∣ties of that Province, though they depend upon them, yet their minds and their laws shew a strange propensity to freedom; all which proceeds from the scarcity of Gentry in those parts, especially with such power and jurisdiction as aforesaid. On the contrary, there is so great an equality among them, that if a prudent and publick man should happen among them, who had any knowledg of that kind of Government, he might easily form them in∣to a solid Commonwealth: but hitherto it has been their misfortune to have no such man: I conclude therefore, that he who would establish a Commonwealth, where the Country con∣sists most of Gentlemen, will find it impossible, unless he ruines them first; and on the other side, he who would set up a Monarchy or Principality where the equality is great, must se∣lect the most considerable and unquiet amongst them; give them Castles, and Lands, and Preferments, and any thing that may oblige them to his side: by which means they shall not only maintain the power of their Prince, but their own insolence and ambition, and the people be forced to submit to a yoke, to which nothing else could compel them: for whilst there is a due proportion betwixt the Prince and the Subject, all things go well, and every man enjoys his Estate: but to settle a Republick in a Country disposed to Monar∣chy, or to erect a Monarchy where the condition of the people have a tendency to a Com∣monwealth, requires a person of more than ordinary authority and brain: Many have tried it, but very few have succeeded; the greatness and difficulty of the enterprize confoun∣ding them so at first, that they know not where they are, and give over as soon as they have begun. But it may be objected, that the constitution of the Venetian Government con∣futes my position, That no Commonwealth can be established where the Gentry are considerable; for under that State no man is admitted to any office but those who are Gentlemen. I an∣swer, that the Venetian Gentry are nothing but name; for their Lands and Possessions are very few, the principal part of their Estates lying in their merchandize and goods: besides, none of them have any Seigneuries or Jurisdiction over the people, so that a Gentleman among them, is but a title of honour and preheminence, founded upon none of those things which in other places make them so considerable. For as in other Commonwealths the Citizens are distinguished into several Orders, so Venice is entirely divided into two, the Populace and the Gentry, the Gentry having, or being capable of all honours and employ∣ments, from which the Populace are utterly excluded; which for the reasons abovesaid, it has produced no disturbance in that State. These things being considered, let him who desires to erect a Government, settle a Commonwealth where there is a parity among the inhabitants; and a Monarchy where there are many great men, and the Gentry numerous. Otherwise his Government will be incongruous, and of little duration.

CHAP. LVI.

Great accidents, before they happen to any City or Province, are commonly pro∣gnosticated by some sign, or predicted by some men.

HOw it comes to pass, I know not; but by ancient and modern example it is evident, that no great accident befalls a City or Province, but it is presaged by Divination, or Prodigy, or Astrology, or some way or other; and that I may not go far for my proof, every one knows what was foretold by Frier Girolamo Savonarola before the Expedition of Charles viii into Italy; besides which it was reported all over Tuscany, that there were arm'd men seen fighting in the air over the Town of Arezzo, and that the clashing of their arms in the conflict was heard by the people.

It is generally known in Florence, that before the death of the old Laurence de Medici the Duomo or chief Church in that City was struck with lightning, and the people destroyed: and before Piero Sodermi (who was made Gonfaloniere for his life by the people) was ba∣nished and degraded, the Palace was burn'd by lightning likewise: many other instances might be produced, which I omit for brevity sake: I shall only add one which is mentioned by Livy before the coming of the French to Rome. Marcus Ceditius a Plebeian acquainted the Senate, that passing one night about twelve a clock thorow the Via-nova, he heard a voice (bigger than a mans) which advised him to let the Senate know, the French were up∣on their march to Rome. How these things could be, it is to be discoursed by persons well versed in the causes of natural and supernatural events; for my part I will not pretend to understand them, unless (according to the opinion of some Philosophers) we may believe, that the air being full of intelligences and spirits, who foreseeing future events, and com∣miserating the condition of mankind, gives them warning by these kind of intimations, that they may the more timely provide and defend themselves against their calamities. But what-ever is the cause, experience assures us, that after such denuntiations, some extra∣ordinary thing or other does constantly happen.

CHAP. LVII.

The multitude united, is formidable and strong, but separated, is weak and inconsiderable.

THe Romans being overthrown, and their Country much wasted, upon the coming of the French; many of them (contrary to an express Order and Edict of the Senate) transplanted to Veii, and left Rome. Whereupon, by a new Proclamation, the Se∣nate commanded, that by a precise day, and upon a certain penalty, they should return to their old habitations: when the news of this Proclamation was first brought to Veii, it was despised and laugh'd at by every body; but when the day appointed for their return arri∣ved, there was not a man but pack'd up his goods, and came back as was required, and as Li∣vy says in the case, Ex ferocibus universis, singuli metu suo obedientes; Not one of them who were so contumacious together, but apart began to fear, and that fear made him obedient. And certainly nothing can give us a more lively description of the nature of a multitude than this case. They are bold, and will speak liberally against the decrees of their Prince; and afterwards when they see their punishment before their faces, every one grows fearful of his neighbour, slips his neck out of the coller, and returns to his obedience. So that it is not much to be considered what the people say, either of their Princes good management or bad, so they be strong enough to keep them in their good humour when they are well disposed, and provide (which they are ill) that they do them no hurt. But this ill disposi∣tion of the people, I mean all ill dispositions but what arise either from the loss of their liberty, or the loss of some excellent Prince still living, upon whom they had setled their affections.

For the evil dispositions proceeding from these causes are transcendently dreadful, and strong remedies are to be applyed to restrain them.

In other cases their anger is nothing, especially having no body to head them; for as there is nothing so terrible as their fury in one case, so there is nothing so vain and incon∣siderable in the other, because, though they have betaken themselves to their Arms, they

are easily reduced, if you can but avoid the first heat of their fury; for by degrees they will cool, and every man considering it is his duty to return, will begin to suspect himself, and think of his security, either by making his peace, or escape. Whenever therefore the multitude is in a mutiny, their best way is immediately to choose themselves a Head, who may correct, keep them united, and contrive for their defence, as the Romans did when leaving Rome upon the death of Virginia; for their protection and security, They created twenty Tribunes from among themselves: and if this course be neglected, it happens to them as Livy presaged in the foregoing Sentence, That as nothing is more couragious than the multitude united, so nothing is more abject when they are separate and divided.

CHAP. LVIII.

That the multitude is wiser, and more constant than a Prince.

THat nothing is more vain and inconstant than the multitude, Titus Livius and all other Historians do agree. You shall many times find them condemning a man to death, and lamenting him when he is dead, and wishing for him again. This hapned in the case of Manlius Capitolinus, who being suspected to design against their liberty, was by the people thrown headlong down the rock, and in a short time exceedingly regretted. The words of our Author are these. Populum brevi, posteaquam ab eo periculum nullum erat, desiderium ejus tenuit. When their fear of him was over, their affection revived. And in another place where he shows the accidents which hapned in Syracuse after the death of Girolamo Nephew to Hierone, he says, Haec natura multitudinis est, aut humiliter servit, aut superbe dominatur. The nature of the Multitude is, to be servilly obedient, or insolently Tyrannical.

Things being thus, I know not whether I shall not seem too bold; to undertake the de∣fence of a thing, which all the world opposes; and run my self upon a necessity of either quitting it with disgrace, or pursuing it with scandal; yet methinks, being to maintain it with arguments not force, it should not be so criminal. I say then in behalf of the multitude; that what they are charged withal by most Authors, may be charged upon all private persons in the world, and especially upon Princes; for whoever lives irregularly, and is not restrained by the Law, is subject to the same exorbitancies, and will commit as bad faults as the most dissolute multitude in the world: And this may be easily known, if it be considered how many Princes there have been, and how few of them good, I mean of such Princes as have despised, and broke thorow those Laws which were intended to restrain them. The Kings in Egypt were not anciently of this sort, for they were govern'd by Laws in those Provinces from the very beginning; and the Kings of Sparta were the same: Nor need we look back so far for examples; we have the Kings of France in our own days, whose Kingdom in my judgment, is at this time the most regular, and best govern'd in the world. Those Princes therefore who are born under such Laws and Con∣stitutions, and obliged to live by them, are not to be reckoned or compared with the disso∣lute and mutinous multitude; but they are to be considered with a multitude under the same Laws and restrictions; As the people of Rome were whilst their Commonwealth was incorrupt, and they were found neither to be insolent in authority, nor slavish in their subjection; but by their Laws, and their Magistrates, they kept up their dignity with honour: And if at any time necessity required that they should appear against the power of any particular person; they did it effectually, as in the cases of Manlius, the Decem-viri, and others who designed to enslave them. On the other side, when it was for the interest of the Publick, they were as obsequious and dutiful to the Dictators and Consuls, as they had been obstinate before. Nor was their regret for Manlius when he was dead, at all to be admired; it was the memory of his virtues that caused it, which are commendable even among Enemies. The same thing might have hapned to the best of Princes; for all wri∣ters agree, that virtue is laudable wheresoever it is to be found. And I am of opinion, that could Manlius have been raised again, and presented to them in the height of their sadness, they would have served him as before, discharged him of his imprisonment, but condemned him to death. Nor are Princes (and those held very wise) exempt from this kind of inconstancy. They have put many to death, and lamented them afterwards; as Alexander for Clito, and other of his friends, and Herod for Mariamnes. But what Titus Livius says of this subject, is not intended of a multitude regulated by Laws, as the Romans were; but a loose and disorderly multitude, like the people of Syracuse, who behaved them∣selves

like mad-men, and committed the same faults that Herod and Alexander had com∣mitted before them. The multitude therefore is no more to be accused of fury and incon∣stancy, than a Prince; for they are both subject to extravagance, when they have no Laws, nor no rules to restrain them. And of this (besides what I have said) there are many examples, not only among the Roman Emperors, but among other Princes and Tyrants, which have been guilty of more giddiness and inconstancy, than any multitude whatever. I conclude therefore against the common opinion, that the people are no more light, in∣grateful, nor changeable than Princes; but that both of them are equally faulty, and he that should go about to excuse the Princes, would be in a very great error; for a people which governs by Law, and is well ordered, shall be as stable, as wise, and as grateful as a Prince, and perhaps more, though he be never so wise: And on the other side, a dissolute and irregular Prince shall be more mutable, imprudent, and ingrateful, than any multitude whatever, and that not so much from any diversity in his Nature (for they are much at one, and if there be any excellence, 'tis on the side of the people) as from their greater or lesser respect to the Laws under which they are to live: And he who shall consider the people of Rome, will find that for 400 years together, they hated the very name of a King, were ambitious of honour, and studious exceedingly for the good of their Country, as may be justified by many examples. If it be objected that the Romans were ingrateful to Sci∣pio, I refer them to what I proved so largely before, that the people are less ingrateful than Princes. And as to prudence, and constancy, I affirm, They have much the advantage, and are more wise, more steddy, and more judicious than Princes; for which reason the voice of the people, is resembled to the voice of God, because by some occult and singular quality it does often presage things that are wonderful, and relating to their own welfare or calamity. In giving their judgment about dubious things, you shall seldom find them mistake, if at any time two eminent Orators equally excellent in their profession, do con∣trovert and discourse a thing pro and con before them, they will assuredly take the most rational side; which shows they are no less capable of truth, than other people. And if in matters of honour, or enterprize which carry an appearance of publick utility, they be sometimes mistaken, (as is said before) the Princes are more, by reason of their passions, and perturbations of mind, to which they are much more obnoxious than the people. In the election of Magistrats they are more dexterous, and judicious than Princes, nor, shall the people be ever persuaded to advance a corrupt, and infamous man, which among Princes is easie and common. If it takes a disgust or abhorrency to any thing, 'tis not readily removed, but sticks by them for several ages, which among Princes is not so; both which points may be evicted by the people of Rome, who in so many hundred years, and so many elections of Consuls, and Tribunes, never made four elections that they repented of afterwards, and for the name of a King they abhorred it so perfectly, that no virtue, no former Service to his Country could excuse any man whom they suspected to aspire to it. It is evident likewise that those Cities which are governed by the people, have enlarged their Territories in a short time, and extended their Empire farther, than those who have been subject to Princes; as Rome after the expulsion of Kings, and Athens after they had rescued themselves from the tyranny of Pisistrates; which can proceed from nothing, but that the Government by a free State is intrinsically better, than the Government by a Prince: Nor can Livy's expression about the levity of the Syracusans oppose my opinion; for let all the good and ill qualities of the Prince and people be compared, and it will be found, That the people are less extravagant, and more honourable of the two. And if in the instituting of good Laws, the ordaining of new Statutes, and the making new Or∣ders for civil conversation and Society, Princes have the better, yet the people preserving, and executing them better than they, are doubtless as worthy of praise, as the Founders themselves. To be short, Principalities and Republicks have both of them subsisted several years, and both of them had occasion to be regulated and reformed; for a Prince that is licentious, and does what he has a mind to; has a mind to that which does him hurt, and is a weak man for his pains; and the people which takes the same liberty, is as mad on the other side. And if the comparison be made betwixt mix'd Principalities, that are cir∣cumscribed, and bounded by Laws, and popular Governments under the same tyes and restrictions; the people will be found more virtuous than the Princes; but if it be betwixt loose and dissolute Governments both of the one kind, and the other, the errors on the side of the Princes will appear more great, more numerous, and more incapable of redress; for in popular tumults, a sober man may interpose, and by fair words reduce them to rea∣son; but to an enraged Prince, who dares intercede; or what remedy is there to repair to, but violence, and the Sword? From whence we may judge and distinguish betwixt the inconvenience of the one and the other: The people are appeased with gentleness, and

good words; and the Prince not to be prevailed upon, but by violence and force; and if it be so, who is it that will deny, That the Disease is more dangerous, where the Cure is most difficult? Moreover when the people tumultuate, there is not so much fear of any present mischief that they are likely to commit, as of the consequences of it, and that it may end in a tyranny. But with ill Princes it is quite contrary, the present misery is the most dread∣ful, because they hope when he dyes, their liberty may be recovered. You see then the difference betwixt them; one is more dangerous at present, and the other for the future; the cruelty of the people extends only to such as (in their opinion) conspire against the common good. The severity of the Prince, is more against them who design against his particular interest. But this opinion of the people goes daily down the wind; for every man has liberty to speak what he pleases against them (though even the Government be popular:) But against a Prince no man can talk without a thousand apprehensions, and dangers. Nor will it seem to me incongruous (the matter having drawn me thus far) in my next Chapter to discourse what Confederacies are most safe, those which are made with Princes, or those which are made with Commonwealths.

CHAP. LIX.

What Leagues or Confederacies are most to be trusted; Those which are made with Princes, or those which are made with free States.

BEcause Princes with Princes, and free States among themselves, and many times with Princes do enter into leagues of friendship and confederacy, I thought it not amiss to enquire in this place, whose faith is the most firm, and in whose amity the greatest confi∣dence is to be reposed. Having considered it diligently with my self, it seems to me that in many cases they are alike, and in some they differ. And first, when necessity of State requires, and there is any visible danger of losing the Government, neither the one nor the other are so precise, but they will make bold with their engagements, and behave them∣selves ingratefully: Demetrius Poliorcetes had obliged the Athenians by many good Offices; but his Army being aftewards defeated, and himself flying to them for refuge, as to his Confederates, and Friends, he was repulsed, and not admitted into the City, which trou∣bled him more than the loss of his Army. Pompey being beaten in Thessalia by Caesar fled likewise into Egypt to Ptolomy, whom he had formerly restored to his Kingdom, and was murthered by him for his confidence. In both these Examples the ingratitude seems to be the same; yet the inhumanity was greater on the Princes side, than on the Common∣wealths; but be it as it will, when the State is in danger, they are neither of them scru∣pulous. And if there be any Prince or Commonwealth so punctual as to preserve their league, though with destruction to themselves; it may proceed from the same causes. It may very well happen that a Prince may confederate with some other great Potentate, (who though unable to defend him at that time; may give him hopes notwithstanding of restoring him some other) and persevere in his Confederacy, as thinking that by having made himself of that Princes party, he has rendered his accommodation with the adver∣sary imposible. This was the case of all the Neopolitan Princes who sided with the French in their Expedition unto those parts: And as to the free States, they suffered of old some∣thing in this Nature, as Saguntum in Spain, which City chose rather to expose its self to direption, and all the Calamities of War, than forsake its confederacy with the Romans, and in the year 1512. Florence did almost the same to continue its amity with the French. So that computing every thing, and considering what both parties have done upon such imminent and irresistable danger, I believe there is more constancy and firm friendship to be found among Commonwealths than among Princes; for though perhaps they may have the same sentiments and inclinations as Princes; yet their motions, and resolutions being slower, they are longer before they violate their faith. But when their leagues and confederacies are to be broken, upon the bare prospect of advantage; in that case your Commonwealths are much more religious and severe; and examples may be brought where a small gain has tempted a Prince, when a great one could not move a Common∣wealth. Themistocles in an Oration to the Athenians, told them, That he had something to advise that would be infinitely to their advantage, but durst not communicate it in pub∣lick, because to publish it, would hinder the Execution; whereupon the people deputed Aristides to receive it; and act in it afterwards as he should think convenient. Themi∣stocles acquainted him, That the whole Grecian Fleet (though under their passport and

parole) were in a place where they might be all taken or destroyed, which would make the Athenians absolute Masters in those Seas; and Aristides reported to the people, That the Council of Themistocles was profitable, but would be a great dishonour to their State; upon which it was unanimously rejected. But had the same occasion been offered to Philip of Macedon, or some other Princes, they would not have been so tender; for it was a practice among them (and especially with Philip) who got more by breaking his faith, than by all his other designs. As to the breaches upon the non-observance of Arti∣cles, they are ordinary things, and I have nothing to say of them: I speak only of extra∣ordinary occasions, and am of opinion from what I have said, That the people do trans∣gress less in that Nature, than Princes, and may therefore with more confidence be trusted.

CHAP. LX.

How the Consulship, and other Dignities in Rome were conferred without respect of age.

IT is manifest in the History of the Roman Commonwealth, that after the people were made capable of the Consulship, the Citizens were promiscuously prefer'd with∣out respect either of age or extraction; but any man was advanced for his Virtue, whe∣ther he was a young man, or an old: and this was evident in Valerius Corvinus, who was created Consul in the 23 year of his age; upon which consideration in one of his Speeches to the Army, he told them that the Consulship was, Praemium Virtutis, non Sanguinis. The reward, not of Nobility, but Virtue. Whether this was prudently done, or not, may admit of dispute: But as to the receiving all sorts of persons to that dignity without consideration of their blood; there was a necessity of that, and the same necessi∣ty that was in Rome, may happen in any other City that desires to do the same great things which were done in Rome, of which we have spoken elsewhere. For men are not to be persuaded to suffer, but in hopes of reward; and that hope cannot be taken away, with∣out manifest danger. It was but equitable therefore that the people should be capable of the Consulship, that being nourished a while with only the hopes, they might at length be so happy as to have it in effect. A City that employs not its people in any great affair, may order them as it pleases; but if it designs to extend its Empire, and do as the Romans did, there must be no distinction. And that no regard ought to be had of any man's age, appears by this, That in the election of a young man to a degree, in which the wisdom of an old man is requisite, the multitude being to elect, it is necessary that the young man be recommended by some extraordinary Exploit; and when a young man is so happy, as to have made himself conspicuous in the City by some honourable Atchievement, it were not only hard, but inconvenient if the said City might not receive the benefit of his vir∣tue immediately, but be forced to attend till his mind as well as body was super-annuated, and all that vigour and promptitude lost, which at that time might have been so serviceable to his Country: at which age Valerius Corvinus, Scipio, Pompey, and many others did great things, and were permitted to triumph for their pains.