The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

CHAP. VI.

Whether in Rome such a form of Government could be established, as should take away the animosities betwixt the Senate and the People.

WHat the continued jealousies betwixt the Senate and the People did produce, we have already discoursed; but because the effects of them remained till the time of the Gracchi, and were the occasion of the destruction of their liberty, it may be demanded whether Rome might not have attained that height of Authority and Grandeur under ano∣ther form of Government that might have prevented those animosities. To resolve this Question, it is necessary to look back upon those Republicks whose Fortune it has been to retain their liberty a long time without those inconveniencies, to examine what was their form, and whether it was practicable in Rome. As Examples, we may produce Sparta and Venice, the first Ancient, the latter more modern, both mentioned before Sparta was governed by a King, and a small Senate; Venice did not divide the Government into distinct Names; but all who were admitted to the administration were called Gentlemen under one common appellation; and that, more by accident, than any prudence in the Le∣gislator; for when to those Rocks upon which that City is now seated, many people did repair for the reasons abovesaid, in process of time their number encreasing so fast, that they could not live peaceably without Laws, they resolved to put themselves under some form, and meeting often together to deliberate upon that, when they found they were numerous enough to subsist by themselves, they made a Law to praeclude all new comers from the Government: and hinding afterwards their numbers encrease, and that there were multitudes of Inhabitants incapable of publick administration; in honours to the Governors they called them Gentlemen of Venice, and the others but Citizens; and this distinction might not only be instituted, but continued without tumult, because when first introduced, all the Inhabitants participating of the Government, no body could complain, and they who came after, finding it firm and established, had no reason, nor opportunity to disturb it; They had no reason, because no injury was done them; they had no opportunity, because the Government restrained them, and they were not employed in any thing that might furnish them with authority; besides those who came after were not in number disproportionable to the Governors, the latter being equally, if not more numerous than they; for which rea∣sons the Venetians were able not only to erect, but maintain their Government a long time without any revolution.

Sparta being (as I said before) governed by a King and a small Senate, might likewise preserve its Model a long time, by reason the Inhabitants were but few, strangers excluded and the Laws of Lycurgus established with great veneration, so that living by those Laws, all occasion of tumult was taken away, and they might continue united a long time; for though the Offices and Commands were conferred upon a few, yet the revenue of the Country being equally distributed, the people were not Seditious, though they were kept at a distance; nor did the Nobility provoke them by any insolence or oppression; and this proceeded from the condition of their Kings, who being environed by the Nobility, had no safer way to secure their dignity, than by protecting the people from injustice and vio∣lence, by which means the fear, and the desire of Command being taken from the people, the Emulations betwixt them and the Nobility and the occasion of tumultuating ceased, so that it was not hard for them to enjoy their tranquillity several Ages; Of the length of

their tranquillity, there were two principal causes; First, The number of the Spartans being small, there was no necessity that their Governors should be many; and next no strangers being admitted, they were not liable to be corrupted, nor to encrease to such a number, as might grow insupportable to those few who were under their Government. These things being considered, it is plain that the Roman Legislators could not have insti∣tuted a Commonwealth that should be free from Sedition and Mutiny, any other way, than by imitating the Venetians and Spartans, that is by not employing the people in their Wars, like the Venetians, nor entertaining Foreiners into their City, as the Spartans. But the Roman Legislators transgressing in both, the people grew strong, and by consequence tumultuous; and if any way the Government were to be rendered more quiet, this in con∣venience would follow, it would be rendered also more weak, and all means be taken away that might conduct it to that height of grandeur and authority, at which afterwards it arrived; so that those applications which prevented the tumults in Rome, prevented also its enlargement, and the extent of its Empire, as it happens in most humane affairs, the removal of one inconvenience is the contracting of another. For if you arm, and adapt a numerous people for the War, by their means to enlarge your Territory; you put them into a conditon of being unmanageable afterwards, and not to be kept down to your Disci∣pline and Government; whereas if you keep them disarmed, and their number but few, though you may make your self Arbitrary, you can never continue it, for your Subjects will grow so poor spirited and vile, you will become a pre to the first man that invades you. In all deliberations therefore, the inconveniences are to be considered, and that reso∣lution prefer'd, in which their are fewest; for none can be taken that are absolutely free The Romans then in imitation of the Spartans, might have set up a King for his life, and appointed a little Senate; but by so doing, they could never have laid the foundation of so vast an Empire, for an Elective King, and a small Senate would have contributed but little to their unity and peace. He then who would set up a new Commonwealth, should con∣sider whether he would have it (like Rome) extend its Dominion and Soveraignty; or keep it self within its own bounds without any dilatation. In the first case it is necessary to imitate the Romans, and give way to the tumults and publick dissentions as well as he can; for without his Citizens be numerous, and well disciplin'd and arm'd, he can never extend his Dominion; and if he could, it would be impossible to keep it. In the second, he is to frame to the Model of the Spartans, and Venetians; but because augmentation of Empire, is commonly the destruction of such Commonwealths, he is by all possible means to prohibit new acquisitions, because depending upon weak Commonwealths, they are always destructive and pernicious, as experience has shown in the Examples of Sparta and Venice. The first having subdued most part of Greece, discovered, upon a slight accident, the weakness of its foundation, for the Thebans revolting at the instigation of Pelopidas, gave opportunity to other Cities, and quite ruined the Government. In like manner Ve∣nice having conquer'd the greatest part of Italy, more by their Mony and Artifice, than Arms, presuming too much upon their force, and coming to a Battel, they were worsted, and in one day lost all which they had got. I should think therefore a Commonwealth that would stand a long time, should model it self within according to the Example of Sparta and like Venice, seat it self in so strong and inexpugnable a place, that it might not appre∣hend any sudden insult; nor make it self so great on the other side as to become formidable to its Neighbors; For the common Motives that excite people to make War upon a Com∣monwealth, are two; either to conquer it themselves, or to secure themselves against it, and by the aforesaid expedient, those two ways are totally frustrated; for if it be hard of access, and well-disposed to defend it self, it will seldom or never happen that any Body will attempt it. If it keeps within its own bounds, and by experience be found free from ambition, no body will fear it, nor will any body offend it; and questionless it would be the more safe, if by the Laws and Constitutions it was forbidden to extend, for I am clearly of opinion, that keeping things in this balance and Equilibrium, the Government would be more civil, and the peace of the City more certain. But the affairs of man being muta∣ble, and nothing in them that is durable and firm; there is a necessity that they either encrease or diminish, and that necessity does many times constrain us, to what in reason we should rather decline. Whence it happens, That if a Government be erected apt to defend it self in peace and security without extending its bounds, and necessity enforces it to en∣large, That enlargement takes away its foundation, and ruines it the sooner. So on the other side, when the Stars are so benign to a Commonwealth, as to place it in peace, without any occasion of War, that peace begets idlness, and idlness effeminacy or faction, which two things (and indeed either of them alone) will be sufficient to subvert it. Where∣fore, it being impossible, as I conceive, to keep things in this balance and mediocrity; in

the constitution of all republicks, particular care is to be had to what is most honorable; and things are to be so ordered, that if necessity should compel them to inlarge, they might do it in such manner as to be sure to keep it. But to return, a Commonwealth, in my judgment, is better fram'd to the example of Rome, than either to the Venetian or Spartan, it being so hard to hit the exact way between the one and the other; and for the emula∣tions betwixt the Nobility and the People they are to be born as inconveniences, but such as are necessary for a people that would rise to the Grandeur of the Romans; against which nevertheless (as I have shewn before) the authority of the Tribunes will be some remedy, if invested with the power of impeaching, which was given to the Tribunes in other States, as I shall shew in my next Chapter.