The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

CHAP V.

Where the Guardianship of liberty may be most securely deposited, whether among the people or Nobility: and which has greater occasion to tumultuate, he that would acquire more, or he that would defend and keep what he has.

THey who have given us the wisest and most judicious scheme of a Commonwealth, have laid down the conservation of liberty as a necessary fundamental, and according as that is more or less secured, the Government is like to be more or less durable. But for∣asmuch as all Commonwealths consist of Nobility and Populacy, the question arises, In whose hands that liberty is deposited most safely. In old times among the Lacedemonians, and in our times among the Venetians, it was intrusted with the Nobility; but among the Romans with the common people; for which reason it is to be examined which of them made the better elections.

If we look back to their Originals, there are arguments on both sides; but if we regard only their fate and conclusion, the Nobility must carry it, in respect that the liberty of the Spartans and Venetians have been much longer lived. But on the other side, (to justifie the Romans) freedom is (I conceive) most properly committed to their custody who have least appetite to usurp. And doubtless, if the ends and designs both of the Nobility and Com∣mons be considered, it will be found the Nobility are ambitious of Dominion, while the Commons have no other thoughts but to defend themselves against it; and, by consequence, having less hopes to usurp, they have more inclination to live free: so that the conservation of their liberty being committed to the people, it is but reasonable to believe they will be more careful to preserve it; and by how much they are less likely to usurp upon it them∣selves, with the more vigilance will they secure it against the incroachments of others. On the other side, he that defends the Spartan and Venetian constitution, alledges, that by put∣ting that power into the hands of the Nobility, two excellent things are performed. One is, that thereby they satisfie their ambition who have the greatest interest in the Common∣wealth. The other, that they take from the people all opportunity of exerting their na∣tural turbulency and unquietness, which has not only been the occasion of infinite dissen∣tions, but is apt likewise to enforce the Nobility upon such desperate courses as may in time produce unremediable effects. Of this, Rome it self is proposed as an example, where the Tribunes being invested with that authority, it was not sufficient to have one Plebeian Consul, but the people must have both, and not content with that neither, they would have the Censor, Praetor, and the other great Magistrates of the City chosen out of the people. Nor was this enough, but carried on with the same exorbitant fury, they began by degrees to adore such men as they saw likely to confront and beard the Nobility, which humour was the rise of Marius his greatness, and his greatness the destruction of Rome. All this considered, it is no easie matter, upon impartial deliberation on both sides, to pronounce which of the two is most safely to be trusted with the liberty, because it is no less difficult to determine which is most pernicious to a Commonwealth, he that (not satisfied with what he has) is ambitious of more, or he that is content, and would secure what he has got. He that shall examine it critically, will conclude thus; Either you argue for a Repub∣lick, whose aim is to extend and propagate its Empire, as Rome; Or one whose designs reach no further than to preserve what they have got. In the first case 'tis necessary in all things to follow the example of Rome; in the second, Venice and Sparta are rather to be imitated for the reasons aforesaid, which shall be reinforc'd in the following Chapter. But to return from whence we have stragled, and discourse of what men are most nocent in a Commonwealth, they that are impatient to get, or they that are only fearful to lose; I say, that when Marcus Menenius was made Dictator, and Marcus Fulvius Master of the Horse, (both of them Plebeians) to inquire into certain Conspiracies that were entred into at Capua, against the City of Rome, authority was given them at the same time to examine and take cognisance of such persons as, by bribery, or any other unlawful means, design'd upon the Consulship, or any other of the great offices in Rome: by which the Nobility be∣ing highly provoked, (as suspecting it to be done in opposition to them) caused it to be spread abroad, that the Nobility did not by any ambitious or irregular ways affect or de∣sign upon those great places; but the Commons, who not daring to trust their preferment to their extraction or virtue, took all extraordinary courses to advance themselves to them. In particular they accused the Dictator, and that with so much vehemence and success, he was glad to call a Council, and (having complained very much of the calumniations of

the Nobility) to lay down his Dictatorship, and submit himself to the judgment of the people, by whom the Cause being heard, he was fairly acquitted. There it was disputed very hard which was most ambitious; He that would get, or He that would preserve; for a violent appetite either in the one, or the other may be the occasion of great disturbances, which in my judgment are oftner caused by them that are in possession, because the appre∣hension of losing what they have got, produces the same eagerness and passion, as desire of acquisition does in the other, forasmuch as they seldom think themselves safe in what they have, but by new accumulation; besides, the more wealth or Territory they have, the more power or capacity they have to Usurp as they see occasion: to which may be added that their incorrigible and ambitious deportments, do provoke and kindle a desire in such as have not those dignities, to compass them if they can, and that for two reasons, to revenge themselves upon them, by stripping them of all, and to enrich themselves into the bargain by the wealth and honour which they see others manage so ill.