CHAP. LII.
The best and most secure way to repress the insolence of an ambitious and power∣ful State, is to preclude and stop up those ways by which he would come to his greatness.
BY what has been said before, it appears what affection the Senate conciliated among the people, not only by the frankness of their bounty, but by their kindness in collecting it; which order, if continued to the people, would have prevented all the tumults which hapned afterward in that City, and deprived the Tribunes of their great credit and autho∣rity. And indeed there is not a better or more secure way to suppress the insolence, or cross-bite the designs of an ambitious Citizen, than to take the same ways to prevent, which he takes to advance them; which course, if it had been followed by the adversaries of Co∣simo de Medici would have been much more for their advantage than to have forced him out of the Town. For had they applyed themselves to caressing and insinuating with the people, (which was the way he took to fortifie himself) they had disarm'd him without any tumult or violence, and taken from him the only arms upon which he depended for his defence. About the same time Piero Soderini by his extraordinary beneficence got him self a great interest and reputation among the people, and was publickly esteemed the great Champion and Protector of their liberties: and doubtless his adversaries, who began to grow jealous of his greatness, had done much more wisely, and honourably, and safely, to have gone the same way to work, and countermined him by their indulgence to the people, than to oppose themselves downright, and ruine him and their whole Country together; for could they by any art or insinuation have gained the affections of the City, they had taken from him the only thing upon which he relyed, without noise or confusion, and they might have opposed in all his counsels, without fear of the people: if he be urged here, that if the Citizens which were enemies to Piero committed an error, in not taking the same course to retain as he had done to debauch the people, Peter committed the same fault by not making use of the same instruments which his adversaries employed against him; it is answered, that Soderini indeed might have tryed, but he could have done it neither with honour or case; for the way that his adversaries took was to set up the Medici, by whose assistance they bearded him exceedingly, and ruined him at last; and it had been dishonourable for Soderini to have deserted the liberties of the people, which he had un∣dertaken to defend, and gone over to the party of the Medici; nor could he have done it so secretly or suddenly, but the people would have smelt it, and have turned the violence of their affection into as furious and hatred, which would have made his destruction much more easy to his enemies, for who-ever was but suspected to be a favourer of the Medici, was thought, ipso facto, an adversary to the people. It is necessary therefore in all deliberations to weigh all things, to consider what danger and what advantage every thing will yield, and make choice of what is least dangerous: otherwise it will happen to you as it did to Mar∣cus Tullius, who raised and augmented the greatness of Mark Anthony by the same way which he intended for his destruction; for when Mark Anthony was declared an enemy by the Senate, having a great Army attending him, and most of them of Caesar's old Soldiers, Cicero to draw them off from him, persuaded the Senate to put Octavius at the head of their Army, and sent him (with the Consuls) against Antonius, pretending that the very name of Octavius (being Nephew to Caesar) would bring over all his Unckles party to him, whereby Antonius would be so weakned it would be no hard matter to reduce him. But it hapned quite contrary; for Antonius having gained Octavius to his side, they joyned their Forces against Tully and his Senate, and ruined their whole Party. Which might have been easily foreseen; nor ought Cicero so imprudently to have reviv'd the name of Caesar, by