CHAP. XXXV.
How it came to pass that the Creation of the Decem-virat was prejudicial to the liberty of that State, though it was done freely, and by publick suffrage.
IN the last Chapter we have shewn that a power legally conferred, and by the suffrage of the people, is not dangerous to the State; but that which is usurped, and gotten by force, to which the election of the Decem-viri may seem to be contrary, who were chosen by the people of Rome to make their Laws, and reform extravagancies in the Commonwealth, which Decem-viri by degrees encroached upon their liberties, and made themselves Ty∣rants. Wherefore we are to consider what is said, with limitation and restraint; and respect both the manner in which such power is confer'd, as likewise the time it is to continue, whe∣ther for longer or shorter: for an absolute power (though granted but for a year) is very dangerous, and produces such effects as are sutable to the mind of the person to whom it is granted. And the power of the Decem-viri (if examined) will be found much greater than the power of the Dictators. For notwithstanding the creation of the Dictator, the majesty of the Consuls and Senate remained, together with the authority of the Tribunes, which were as bounds to restrain and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the Dictator; and although the Dictator had power to remove any one out of the Consulship, or take from him his Tribunitial authority; yet he could not vacat or abolish the whole Orders of Senators, Consuls, and Tribunes, make new Laws, nor introduce a new form of Government. So that their eyes being always upon him, he was forced (as it were) to intend only such things as were for the benefit of the Commonwealth. But in the creation of the Decem-viri it was otherwise; for the whole power of the people was transfer'd to them, the Con∣suls and Senate being cashiered, and the power of the Tribunes of the people almost quite laid aside; so that standing alone in the Government, without Consuls, or Tribunes, or ap∣peal to the people, or any other Magistrate to correct or controul them; it was no strange thing that the very next year after their creation, they should become intolerable and inso∣lent, especially being instigated by the ambition of Appius, And for this reason it is to be observed, that when it is said, a Power conferred legally, and by the suffrage of the people, is never prejudicial to the State; it is to be supposed to be confer'd with due circumstances, and for a certain time; but when the people is cheated, and gives it imprudently and rashly, as in this case of the Decem-viri, things never go better, which is easily proved by consider∣ing what it was that kept the Dictators so good, and made the Decem-viri so wicked: and weighing withal the manner which other Republicks that were reputed well ordered, observed, in conferring their authority for a long time, as the Spartans to their Kings, and the Venetians to their Dukes: both of them prescribing them rules and limits that they were not to exceed, and appointing such guards upon them as should be able (though they were never so ill disposed of themselves) to keep them from employing their power to the detriment of the State.
Nor is it sufficient if this Power be confer'd upon good men; for men are frail, and easily corrupted, and then in a short time he that is absolute may easily corrupt the people, contract friendships, make parties, heap up riches, and commit a thousand extravagancies; nor can