The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The Dictatorship was useful, not hurtful to the Commonwealth of Rome; and how that Power which is usurp'd, and illegally assumed, is pernitious to a State, not that which is conferred legally by the suffrage of the people.

THere are those to be found who have said that the Dictatorship was the ruine and de∣struction of that Commonwealth, alledging that the first Tyrant that was ever in that City, set himself up, under the title of Dictator, and affirming that Caesar could not un∣der any other name have justified his Tyranny.

Those who maintain that opinion did not examine it thorowly, and are not for that rea∣son to be believed. For it was not the name or dignity of the Dictator which brought Rome into slavery, but the authority assumed by the Citizens upon the perpetuation of that office; and if there had been no such thing as Dictator, Caesar had taken some other Title upon him to compass his designs; for when ones power is absolute, he can assume what name he pleases; but 'tis not a great Title that gives any man power. Whilst the Dicta∣torship was disposed by publick suffrage, it was very beneficial; those who attained it by ways extraordinary, abused it exceedingly; the rest were never known to have done any injury to the Commonwealth thorow all the Dictatorships: the reason is probable, because a man must be endued with many good qualities before he can usurp such an authority. He must be abundantly rich; he must know how to insinuate with every body; he must have a great party, and make every man his friend, which is not practicable where the Laws are in force; and if he had all those qualifications, they would render him so formi∣dable, that the free voices would ever concur in his election: besides, the Dictator was not perpetual, but created only upon particular exigence, and with limited power, extending no farther than the present danger, during which he had power to dispose of all things at his pleasure, and punish as he thought good without any appeal; but he could do nothing in diminution to the Government, he could not intrench upon the authority of the Senate or People, abrogate their old Laws, or institute new: so that the shortness of his Dictatorship, the limitation of his authority, and the incorruption of the people, made it impossible for him to transgress, and do any mischief to the City; and on the contrary, that Office has been always beneficial, and, in my judgment, the principal in Rome, and has contributed more than all the rest to make it Mistress of the World; for without that, that City had never been able to have obviated so many dangers, nor gone thorow so many difficulties, against which their accustomed and ordinary means would have been of little validity, as being too tedious, and slow; (no one Counsel or Magistrate being able to do all things alone but being in a mutual necessity the one of the other) for in cases which require immediate remedy, time passes away, and is often lost whilst they are in their counsels, and when they come to a resolution, 'tis too late, and their remedies dangerous.

Wherefore I think it convenient that a Commonwealth have a certain way to be used only in case urgent necessity, as the Seignory of Venice, (which at this day is the best re∣gulated Commonwealth in the World) that State in time of imminent danger has a re∣served power to confer authority upon some few of their Citizens, by virtue of which they may order all as they please, without the consultation of the rest, for when a Common∣wealth is destitute of some such custom, it must of necessity be ruined by sticking to their old, or break them to preserve it self; and it were to be wish'd that nothing might happen in a Commonwealth that might give occasion for these extraordinary ways; for though those extraordinary ways may sometimes be good, yet the example is ill, and introduces a custom of breaking old orders for good, which afterwards, under that pretence, will be broken for ill: wherefore that Commonwealth can never be perfect, that by its Laws has not provided against every thing, prepared remedies for every accident, and appointed in what manner they shall be managed; which is to be done no better way than by a Dicta∣tor, or some such Magistrate to be created upon extraordinary occasion; for without them

they must certainly be ruined: and one thing very remarkable in this order, is, the wisdom of the Romans in the formality of its election: for the Dictators being introduced with some diminution to the Consuls, (who being from heads of the City brought down to obedience like other people, might possibly resent it, and in time be the occasion of dissen∣tion in the City) they committed their election into the hands of the Consuls, to the end that upon any extraordinary emergence, when Rome should have occasion of so extraor∣dinary a Magistrate, the Consuls should comply the more willingly, because they had the making them themselves; for the wounds which a man gives himself spontaneously, and of his own election, are not so grievous as what he is forced for to bear. But towards the latter end of their Empire, the Romans, instead of a Dictator, invested their Consul with an equivalent authority in these words, Videat Consul, ne Respublica quid detrimenti capiat; Let it be the Consuls care that the Commonwealth receives no prejudice. So that to return to our matter, I conclude, that the neighbouring States conspiring against the Romans, and endeavouring to oppress them, made them contrive better, not only for their defence, but to put themselves into a posture, with more vigour, and counsel, and authority to repel their invasion, and turn their force upon them.