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CHAP. XXXIII.
If an inconvenience increases either within a State, or against it; it is better to temporize and comply, than to endeavour to remove it by violence.
THe Roman Commonwealth increasing in Empire, Reputation and Force, their neigh∣bours not having considered it, nor what damage that greatness might pull down up∣on them, began now (when too late) to discover their error; and being willing to do that now which had been more easie before, forty little States of them confederated against Rome. The Romans, among their usual provisions in case of imminent danger, created a Dictator, who, without any mans advice, might resolve as he pleased, and execute his resolutions without being called to an account. This Magistrate was not only the occasion of over∣coming their enemies at that time, but was very useful upon all accidents afterwards when their dominion increased. Which may teach us, that when either at home within, or abroad against a Commonwealth, an inconvenience arises, (whether from an inward or an outward cause it is not material) 'tis better counsel to comply and temporize, than to en∣deavour furiously to suppress it; for to resist, is to augment it, and to pull down upon our heads what we were but afraid of before. And these kind of accidents fall out in a Com∣monwealth oftner from intrinsick than extrinsick causes, where the power and authority of some Citizen is permitted to increase too fast, and more than is convenient for the ho∣nour or benefit of the State; or when such Laws are abrogated or neglected as were most for the interest of their State; which error, if suffered to run on, will be more dangerous to oppose than to comply with; for it is so much the harder to find out these inconvenien∣cies in the beginning, by how much 'tis natural for all people to favour every thing that is new, especially if introduced by a young man, with the least shew or pretence of advan∣tage: for if a young Gentleman appears in a Commonwealth endued with more than or∣dinary qualities, the eyes of the whole City are immediately upon him, they run unani∣mously to respect him, and pay him all the honour that can be imagined; so that if he has the least spark of ambition or vain-glory, he is presently puffed up, and inflamed with the contemplation of his own worth, and the affection of the people: and when he is arrived at such an height, as to be as visible as their error, then 'tis too late; there are but few re∣medies in the case; and when most of them are applyed, they do but magnifie his power. Many examples might be brought to this purpose, but I shall only instance in one.
Cosimo di Medicis (from whom the famous Family of the Medici in our City had their first grandeur) was in such reputation for his wisdom; and his fellow Citizens were so ig∣norant, that he began to be formidable to the State, and the Magistrates began to think it difficult to take him down, but destructive to let him stand. There was at that time in Florence a person of great experience in matters of State, called Nicolo da Uzano, who be∣ing well advised of the first fault which he had committed in not considering in time the inconveniencies which might follow upon Cosimo's reputation, resolved to obviate the se∣cond; that is, that no force should be used to oppress him, as knowing that course would be the ruine of the State; and so it proved not long after his death. For the Citizens which remained, not following his counsel, began to combine, and fortifie against Cosimo, and indeed forc'd him out of Rome. Whereupon, his party being increased, in a short time called him home again, and made him their Prince, to which dignity he could never have arrived, but by the opposition of his enemies.
The same hapned to Iulius Caesar, whose great virtue and excellent qualifications re∣commended him so highly to the favour of Pompey and the people, that by degrees he be∣came terrible, and their favour was turned into fear; of which Cicero complains, when he says that Pompey began to fear him too late; for when his fear prompted him to look out for a remedy, that remedy hastned the ruine of the State. I say then (when this case hap∣pens) it is incomparably better to temporize, than to endeavour to repel the mischief which threatens by violence and force. For many times, by that means, it passes as it came, and goes out of it self, or else the damage it brings is the longer a coming. In these cases Princes ought to be very vigilant, lest going about to retrench and lessen the great power of a neighbour, they give him opportunity to increase it, and bring themselves into greater danger: you are therefore to compare your own strength, and your enemies; and if you find your self the stronger, to attaque him couragiously; but if weaker, you had better be quiet, lest it happens to you as it did to those little States who confederated against Rome, to whom (as appeared by the event) it had been much better to have sate still, and endea∣voured