The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

CHAP. II.

The several kinds of Commonwealths and under which kind the Roman is comprehended.

WAving the discourse of those Cities which in their beginning have been dependant, I shall speak of such as were originally free, and governed themselves according to their own fancies, Commonwealths or Principalities, as their own inclinations lead them. Of these (according to the diversity of their principles) their Laws and Orders were divers. Some of them at their first foundation received their Laws at one time from a single person, as the Spartans from Lycurgus. Others received them by chance, at several times, upon variety of accidents, as Rome; and that Commonwealth is doubtlesly happy, whose good fortune it is to have a person so wise as to constitute and dispose its Laws in such manner at first, that it may subsist safely and securely by them, without necessity of new modelling or cor∣rection. Of this sort was Sparta, which for more than 800 years was observed to remain entire and incorrupt, without any dangerous commotion. On the other side, that City must needs be in some measure unhappy, which, not having submitted to, or complyed with the prudence of a single founder, is necessitated of it selt to remodel and reform••, Of these kinds, that is most unhappy whose principles were at first remote and devious from the right way which might have conducted to perfection; and indeed those Common∣wealths which are in this degree, are almost impossible to be established by any accident whatsoever. But others (whose Commencements are good, and capable of improvement, though perhaps not exquisitely perfect) may become perfect afterwards by the concurrence of accidents, yet not without danger forasmuch as most men are averse, and will not easily admit of any new Law which introduces new Orders and Customs into a City, without great appearance of necessity, and that necessity arising necessarily from some danger im∣pending, it many times falls out the Commonwealth perishes before remedy can be ap∣plyed. Of this the Commonwealth of Florence is instance sufficient, which in the com∣motion of Aretz was the IIth. time reformed, and the 12.th time confounded by the se∣dition of Prato.

But being now to discourse of the State of the Roman Commonwealth, and what were the accidents and orders which advanced it to that perfection, it is convenient to premise (what has been asserted by several Authors) that there are but three sorts of Governments Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, to either of which who-ever intends to erect a Go∣vernment, may apply as he pleases. Other (of no less reputation) are of opinion the forms of Government are six, of which three are bad, and three good of themselves, but so easily corrupted, even they become fatal and pernicious. Those which are good are the three before mentioned, those which are evil are three others depending upon the three former; and carrying so near a resemblance, they many times interfere, and fall one into the other, as Monarchy into tyranny, Aristocracy into Oligarchy, and Democracy into Anarchy and Con∣fusion: insomuch, that who-ever forms his Government of one of the three former, forms it for no long time, because no care nor remedy can prevent, but it will degenerate into its contrary, by reason of the similitude betwixt virtue and vice: and these changes and va∣riations of Government happened by accident amongst men; for at the beginning of the World the Inhabitants being few, they lived dispersed after the manner of beasts: after∣wards, as they multiplyed, they began to unite and, for their better defence, to look out for such as were more strong, robust, and valiant, that they might choose one out of them to make him their head, and pay him obedience; from hence the first distinction betwixt honest and dishonest did arise: for observing that if any injur'd his Benefactor, it imme∣diately created an hatred and compassion among the rest, all people abhorring him that was ungrateful, and commiserating him that was injur'd; lest the same injustice might hap∣pen to themselves, they began to make Laws, and ordain punishments for offenders; and this was the first appearance of justice in the World; after which, being to make Election of their Prince, they did not so much respect the ability of his body as the qualifications of his mind, choosing him that was most prudent and just; but by degrees their Government coming to be Hereditary, and not by Election, according to their former way, those which inherited degenerated from their Ancestors, and neglecting all virtuous actions, began to be∣lieve that Princes were exalted for no other end but to discriminate themselvcs from their subjects by their pomp, luxury, and all other effeminate qualities, by which means they fell into the hatred of the people, and by consequence became afraid of them, and that fear en∣creasing,

they began to meditate revenge, oppressing some, and disobliging others, till in∣sensibly the Government altered, and fell into Tyranny. And these were the first grounds of ruine, the first occasion of Conjuration and Conspiracy against Princes, not so much in the pusillanimous and poor, as in those whose generosity, spirit and riches would not suffer them to submit to so dishonourable administrations. The multitude following the autho∣rity of the Nobles, took up Arms against their Prince, and having conquered and extirpa∣ted that Government, they subjected themselves to the Nobility which had freed them; and detesting the name of a single person, they took the Government upon themselves, and at first (reflecting upon the late Tyranny) governed according to new Laws devised by themselves, postponing particular profit to publick advantage, so that both the one and the other were preserved and managed with great diligence and exactness. But their autho∣rity afterwards descending upon their Sons, (who being ignorant of the variations of for∣tune, as not having experimented her inconstancy) and not contenting themselves with a civil equality, but falling into rapine, oppression, ambition, and adulteries, they changed the Government again, and brought it from an Optimacy to be governed by few, without any respect or consideration of Justice or Civility; so that in a short time it hapned to them as to the Tyrant; for the multitude being weary of their Government, were ready to assist any body that would attempt to remove it, by which means in a short time it was extinguished.

And forasmuch as the tyranny of their Prince, and the insolence of their Nobles were fresh in their memory, they resolved to restore neither the one nor the other, but conclude upon a popular State, which was regulated so as neither Prince nor Noble should have any authority: and there being no States but are reverenced at first, this Populacy continued for some time, but not long, (especially after its Founders) for it fell immediately into an irresistible licentiousness, contemning all authority both publick and private; and every man living after his own mind, a thousand injuries were daily committed, so that forc'd by necessity, by the suggestions of some good ma•• or for avoiding the like enormities, they returned to their primitive Kingship, and from thence by degrees relapsed again in the manner, and upon the occasions aforesaid. And this is the Sphear and Circle in which all Republicks have, and do move; but it seldom or never happens that they return to the same circumstances of Government again, because it is scarce possible for any of them to be so long liv'd, as to pass many times thorow the same mutations and remain upon its legs. It sometimes comes to pass likewise, that in the conflicts and troubles of a State, being de∣stitute both of counsel and force, it becomes a prey to some neighbouring Commonwealth that is better governed than it: but admitting that could not be, Governments would fall from one to another, and make an infinite circulation. For these reasons all the foresaid forms of Government are in my judgment infirm and unstable; the three good ones from the shortness of man's life and the three bad ones from their proper imperfections. Where∣upon, the wisest Legislators finding this defect, and avoiding every one of those kinds, they fram'd a Government which should consist of them all, believing it to be more permanent and stable, because, Prince, Nobles and People living in the same City, and Communicating in the same Government, they would be all of them in sight of one another, and more ca∣pable of correction. The person which in this kind has merited most praise was Lycurgus, who ordered his Laws in Sparta in such manner that giving King Nobility and People each of them their portion, he erected a Government that continued for more than eight hundred years, to his great honour, and that Cities repose.

To Solon it hapned clear otherwise, (who was the Athenian Legislator) whose aiming only at a popular Government, was the cause it was so short lived, that before he died he saw the tyranny of Pisistrates spring out of it; and though forty years after the Tyrant's Heirs were expelled, and Athens restored to its liberty, yet resuming the old model which Solon had recommended, it could not continue above an hundred years, notwithstanding many new laws were super-added to restrain the insolence of the Nobility, and the loose∣ness of the Commons. But there being no mixture and temperament of Principality and Optimacy with the other, in respect of Sparta, Athens was but of little duration. But to return to Rome, though it had not a Lycurgus to obstetricate at its birth, and supply it with such Laws as might preserve its freedom so long.

Nevertheless, the accidents which hapned upon the dissention betwixt the people and the Senate produced that in some measure which was defective at its foundation; for though in its beginning its Laws and Orders were imperfect, yet it did not altogether deflect from the right way which was to conduct it to perfection, Romulus, Numa, and all the rest of its Kings making many good laws conformable to its freedom. But their ultimate design being to perpetuate their Monarchy, though that City remained free, there were many things omit∣ted

by those Princes which were necessary for its conservation. And though it fell out their Kings lost their Dominion upon the abovesaid occasions, yet those who expulsed them, creating two Consuls in their stead, they rather drove the name than the authority of King∣ship out of the City. After which, the Government residing in the Consuls and Senate, it consisted only of two of the three sorts, Monarchy and Aristocracy: it remained now to give place only to a popular Government, and the Roman Nobility being grown insolent upon occasions which shall be mentioned hereafter, the people tumultuated, took up Arms against them, and prevailed so far, that (lest otherwise they might lose all) it was consented the people should have their share, and yet the Senate and Consuls on the other hand retain so much of their former authority as to keep up their degrees as before: and this was the beginning of the Tribunes of the people, after the creation of which, that State became better established, every one of the three sorts having a share in the Government, and for∣tune was very favourable, that though it suffered many mutations and passed from a Mo∣narchy to an Aristocracy, and from that to the people by the same gradations, and the same occasions I have mentioned; nevertheless the power was not taken from their Kings to transfer it upon the Nobles, nor from the Nobility to give it wholly to the people; but remaining mixt and compounded of all three, that Republick grew in time to be perfect, to which perfection the difference and jealousies betwixt the Senate and people contributed exceedingly, as shall be largely demonstrated in the two following Chapters.