The works of the famous Nicholas Machiavel, citizen and secretary of Florence written originally in Italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into English.

CHAP. XVI.

A people accustomed to the dominion of a Prince, though by accident they may acquire their liberty, yet it is with great difficulty, if they maintain it.

IF the Records of ancient History will serve our turn, it is manifest by many examples, that a people born and bred up in subjection to a Prince, cannot without great difficulty pre∣serve its liberty, if by any accident it attains it, as the Romans did upon the expulsion of the Tarquins & not without reason; for the people is like a wild beast, (which, though naturally fierce, disposed to live in the woods, and to find out dens and converts to conceal it self) yet hav∣ing been always brought up as it were in prison & servitude, if by accident it breaks its bonds and escapes out into the field, it is in a maze, knows not whither to run, where to sustain, or where to conceal it self, as having been accustomed to bondage and confinement; by which means, if worth the looking after, it is easily recovered. It is the same with a people which has lived always in subjection, who, understanding nothing of publick offence or defence, and knowing as little of Princes as Princes do of them, are with the greatest ease imagina∣ble reduced to a yoke which is commonly more grievous than what they escaped from be∣fore; and this happens to them where they are not totally debauched (for where the Mass is corrupted, they cannot subsist a moment): I speak now of those where the malignity is not so diffused, but that there are still left more good men than bad; in which case another difficulty does likewise occur, and that is, when-ever the yoke of tyrranny is shaken off, and liberty set up, it follows continually that many enemies are created, whose interest it is to subvert it, and no friends made that shall have any advantage by supporting it. By ene∣mies I mean all those privado's and favourites of Princes who have enjoyed the perferments and wealth of their Master, and cannot but be disgusted to find themselves dispossessed; wherefore they are constantly ready to take any occasion of restoring their old Prince, that they themselves might be restored to their authority and employment. And for friends whose interest it is that (upon the shaking off their Tyrant) their liberty should be preser∣ved, they are not to be expected, because in free States, honours and offices are confer'd upon such as by their virtue, some great atcheivment for the benefit of the Common∣wealth, or some other honourable action have seemed to deserve them; and when a man receives no more than what he thinks he has deserved, he ascribes it to his own merits ra∣ther than to the liberality of the State, and holds himself not obliged. Besides, the com∣mon utility resulting from a free State, though it be in their power, it is not at all in their knowledg; for who is it that considers, or takes care that every man enjoys quietly what God has given him; that their wives be not dishonoured, their children abused, nor their fellows oppressed? For who is it that will think himself bound to any man for doing him no wrong? and things being so, a free State newly acquired, never creates such friends as will be half so solicitous for its conservation, as those enemies who have been dispossessed of their fortunes and preferment▪ will be to undermine it, and restore their old Master again: and if it be enquired what course is to be taken against the inconveniences and disorders which follow thereupon; there is not a more efficacious, safer, and more necessary remedy, than to kill the Sons of Brutus, who (as History tells us) entred into a conspiracy against the State, with other young Gentlemen of Rome, for no other reason but because they could not be so loose and licentious under the Consuls as under the Kings; as if their freedoms were incompatible, and the liberty of the people was servitude to them: where∣fore he who proposes to govern a people, whether by the way of Monarchy or Republick and does not secure himself of those who are adverse to the change, must never think to effect, or at least to enjoy it long: and on the other side, it is convenient he should know the infelicity of those Princes who cannot secure their Dominion without murder and blood; by which means the multitude is incensed, and become mortally their enemies: he

who has but few enemies may secure it the better; but where the multitude is provoked, no security is to be had; and the more cruelty is used, the weaker the Government; so that when all's done the surest remedy is to indulge the people, and make them your friends. And now (though I may seem something confused and immethodical in speaking sometimes of a Prince, and then of a Republick) I shall take the liberty to do it here briefly, that I may have no occasion hereafter. A Prince therefore who, by usurping upon the liberties of the people, has made them his enemies, (if he desires to reconcile himself) is above all things to consider what the people affect, and he shall find it to consist principally in two things; one is, revenge upon those who have been instrumental in their slavery; and the other is restitution of their liberty. In the first the Prince may gratifie them fully, in the second but in part. Of the first we have an exact instance. Clearchus Governour of He∣raclia being banished for his tyranny, a controversie betwixt the Nobility and the Commons hapning afterwards in that Town, it fell out, that the Nobility finding themselves the weaker, addressed to Clearchus, and having entred into confederacy with him, they gave him admission and overcoming the people, he took away their liberties. But Clearchus perceiving himself in the clutches of the Nobility, and not only subject to their insolence, (which was neither to be satiated nor corrected) but to the rage and fury of the multitude, which could by no means digest his encroachments upon their liberty, he resolved at one blow to rid himself of his Grandees, and reconcile himself to the people, and taking his opportunity, he cut off all his Nobility with great satisfaction to the rest. The other thing which they desire with so much favour is restitution of their liberty in which the Prince cannot totally comply without degrading himself: he is therefore to examine upon what grounds the people are so fond of it, and he will find that some few indeed are zea∣lous for their liberty, in hopes of office and preferment; but the greatest part desire it only to be secure against oppression, and to live comfortably, and at ease. For in all Governments, whether Republick or Monarchical, forty or fifty men go away with all the commands and offices of importance, which number being small, it is no hard matter for a Prince to secure himself against them, by cutting them off, or by such addition to their former advantages as may in some measure oblige them.

The rest, whose aim is only to live quietly, are easily satisfied by constituting such Laws and Ordinances as may make the power of the Prince consistant with the security of the people. If a Prince does this, and be observed upon no accident what-ever to violate their Laws, the people will quickly be contented, and believe themselves safe. And of this the Kingdom of France is an example; being quiet, and at peace, because the Kings are bound by innumerable Laws, which comprehend the security of the Subject; for by the first in∣stitution of that Monarchy, the Kings have the disposition of their Revenue, and the ma∣nagement of their Armies, but in every thing else they are circumscribed by the Laws. That Prince therefore, or Commonwealth, which at its first erection secures not it self, is obliged to do it at the first opportunity, as the Romans did when they murdered the Sons of Brutus, and he that slips it will repent when 'tis too late: for the people of Rome (not yet entirely corrupted) having recovered their liberty, it was sufficient to maintain it, that they made away the Bruti, and extinguished the Tarquins, which otherwise was not to have been done, had the whole mass and body of the people been debauched, as I shall shew in the following Chapter.