Man without passion, or, The wife stoick, according to the sentiments of Seneca written originally in French, by ... Anthony Le Grand ; Englished by G.R.

Discourse VII.

That a Wise man may live without Passions.

I Wonder not that man should be so miserable, since he himself is a Conspirator against his own Felicity, since he makes vanity of aug∣menting natures defects, since he takes pride in his own miseries, and emploies all her benefits to make himself un∣happy or guilty. Those that have exercised their Eloquence in decifering corrupted nature, thought it sufficient to be the Sons of Adam to render us disobedient, that the sin of that first revolter against his God, was the spring of all our evils, whereof Passions became the Children after they had been the Mother, and that man never committed an unjust act but by the instigation of concupisence, which becomes the chastisement thereof.

Although the Authors of this Doctrin be to me very venerable, and though the opinion which they maintain be approved by all Christians; never∣theless, I perswade my self that they will not ab∣solutely deny to allow me, that we derive not all our defects from his crime, that we may as well

bewaile the perfections which we still retain as those we have lost, and that we find orderly mo∣tions in our Bodies which are rather arguments of the Excellency of the Soul then the defection of nature. Some men would be innocent if Hea∣ven had not honoured them with favors, their rare qualities occasion their misery, they are poor be∣cause they are too rich, they run themselves into dangers by being too much enlightened, and they engage not in Error but by being more perfect then others. What ever renders a wise man ac∣complisht makes them miserable, they anticipate misfortune by their foresight, their memories call to mind the injuries done them, their wits are busied about useless or hazardous things, and all their qualifications become pernicious or disad∣vantagious.

To augment their own miseries and add to natures defects voluntary errors, they take counsel from the noise of the People, they regulate their lives by their reports, they act but by their exam∣ple, and they approve all for reasonable that hath many Approbators, and not that wherein truth most consisteth. Likewise they who have made so many invectives against the sin of our first Fa∣ther, have almost depraved the whole stock of man-kind, by endeavouring to explain the most difficult Principle of our Religion; and have taught them undesignedly, to justify their defects and to form excuses for their lewdness. For if that inhumane Father, say they, have bequeathed us death with our being, if he have made us Slaves by the loss of his innocence, if the Passions which arise in our Soul be the effects of his Rebellion,

if they be as inseparable as our members, and if we cannot shun their Surprizals but by the aids of grace; who shall resolve to labour their Conquest, seeing they are born with us, and proceed from the conjunction of the Soul with the Body, since the seeds thereof are in us, and that that grace to which they have recourse, is a bounty which God only bestows upon his Favorites? To avoid then all these complaints it must be owned that human nature is not so depraved as they describe her, that she yet retains some remains of her purity, and that man hath still a power to combat vice, follow vertue, and conquer his Passions.

When those famous men that laid the founda∣tion of Romes Empire, would instruct their Sub∣jects by their precepts or re∣form them by their Laws, they rather disordered then settled them, they taught them crimes of which before they were ignorant, and they made many guilty persons in design∣ing to keep men innocent. Parricides, saith Seneca, first began in Rome by the prohibition thereof, the punishment threatned to those that should be found so monstrous inspired them with cruelty; men became barbarians when they were forbidden to be inhumane, and they feared not to murther them from whom they had received life, after the Law had informed them that such a sin might be committed. So that those men must be Enemies to nature who throw all their faults upon her infirmities, and we must deny that we often employ our perfections to procure

our own unhappiness. This truth appears evi∣dently in the Subject of this discourse. We ren∣der Passions which are but the pure effects of opi∣nion and the will, to be the productions of nature, we fancy that they are born with us, and we con∣clude from our weakness, that a wise man cannot defend himself from them but by a Miracle. In fine, we deem all things difficult which we fear to undertake, and judging of other mens strength by our own, we take all for impossibilities which we our selves cannot perform.

Also I am of Senecas judgment, and do main∣tain with him, that there is as much difference be∣tween the Stoicks and other Philosophers as between men and women: and as these two sex are necessary for the build∣ing of Families and States, the one is born to command and the other to obey. For let Epicurus be commended, let his Disciples protect him, and let them ransack the Body of Morality to shape excuses for his opinions, yet it must be owned that he has made no Scholars but Slaves, and that when he designed to create Philosophers, he innocently formed vicious and impious persons. Aristotle Father of the Academia, is not more vertuous then Epicurus, though he seem more reasonable, for he makes but Bastard wise men, he moderates the violence of their inclinations to render their con∣duct easy, and allowing them ordinary distempers he hath taught them that they cannot be healthy

unless they have infirmities, that they cannot be∣come liberal without covetousness, that to be va∣liant they must have the help of ambition, and that vertue would be of no use to them, if they had not Passions to execute what she projects. This opinion seems so little generous to Zeno's Disciples, that they cannot forbear vigorously to oppose it, and Seneca has condemned it for so unreasonable a tenet, that he thinks he pleads vertues cause so often as he is ingaged in the Com∣bat.

Where, replies he, is the freedom of the wise man, if he may not act but by the intermediation of his Passions? If he be obliged to fly to their Counsels, and if he must borrow of them all the forms of his Government? Reason is unthroned so soon as she admits an alliance with them, and their Communication is so pernicious to her, that she cannot lend them an Eare without insensibly mixing with their Party. For when she hath once admitted them, they do what they will, and not what she permits them, they follow their own in∣clinations, though she contend for the Conquest, and they become in the end so insolent or so wild, that they violently constrain their Soveraign to yeild to their discretion. For this cause he judg∣eth that the only means to be delivered from them, is to prevent their assaults, and attack them before they threaten, and according to the Rules of Policy, provide that those who are yet but for∣reign Enemies, become not our domestick Ty∣rants.

It availes not his Adversaries to fly to natures imperfections for a reply, and to say that Reason

is become blind and weak, since she suffered her self to be seduced by the Serpent. This reply, though true, proves nothing in morality, and what∣soever foundations they draw from Divines to support it, yet must they confess that it makes not so much for Reason as for Faith. For again saith this wise Roman, if Reason be not strong enough to hinder Passions from making excursions into her Dominions, how will they have her to keep them in order when they have entred her Territories? If she sink under their violence when she is dis∣posed to expect them, how shall she be able to give them Laws when she is become their Captive? And if she cannot repulse Enemies at the Gate, how shall she repel their fury when they have gotten possession? We must then infer either that a wise man may prevent their assaults or that he cannot moderate their inclinations, that he can hinder their sudden swellings, or that he can∣not stay their disorders when they have made Head.

Tranquillity is one of the qualifications of a wise man; men cannot rob him of it till he change his condition, and he may boast of happi∣ness so long as he preserves it: but Passions vio∣lently bereave him of it in every of their assaults, and he ceaseth to be his own when he has any thing of dispute with them. He is their Slave without being conquered he mourns in opposing them, and he is constrained to part with the most precious of his Benefits, so often as he takes re∣solution to fight them.

For be they never so well moderated they cease not to disturb his quiet, they throw dissention among the Parties that com∣pose it, and they so much oc∣cupy his mind, that nothing is left him but a weak and languishing liberty. The Peri∣pateticks are not so just as to abate him any of his evils for the elevation of his Grandeur: they render him subject to all the maladies of the Soul, they allot him all Passions, to vanquish or tame: and without considering that many times one violent evil is preferrable to a multitude of wasting diseases, they will that he have fear, but it must be moderated, that he be spurred by ambi∣tion but it must be restrained, that he form desires and hopes, but they must be limited, that he be moved by Anger, but it must be easy to recal, and that he have Love and Audacity, but they must not run into folly and fury. But who doth not easily see that this Tyranny strikes directly at his Liberty, that these motions howsoever moderated annoy his Peace? And that it would be more easy to conquer one powerful Enemy then give Battel to a multitude of smaller adversaries at one and the same time.

Vertue is so delicate in this point, that she could never yet suffer Passions to be assigned her for Companions, as she knows that they hold intelligence with vice, she rejects all their proffered services, she believes that he unjustly-Tryumphs

that owes Victory to any thing but his Valor; that he is unworthy the name of Conqueror, if he may be reproached that in the combat he mixt Cowardize with his Courage, and did not over∣throw his Enemy, but because he was somewhat fearful and imprudent. She is jealous of all their Labors, she will have no Souldiers that esteem their own Counsels more then her Commands, and she would think it injurious to her own Grandeur to make use of their Services.

Truely what art soever hath been used by hu∣mane prudence to allay their fury the method of reducing them to Reasons obedience is yet to seek, and which way soever they be considered it wants Dexterity to subject them to her Empire. As we find no Animals that yeild obedience to this Sove∣raign, and as the tamed hearken as little to her Counsels as the wild; so, man hath no Passions that will obey his Commands, they make head to op∣pose his decrees, they conspire to lessen his Au∣thority, and by a faction as unjust as insolent, they dispute the Government he pretendeth to have over them. Their nature resembles that of the Tygre and Lyon, which never forsake their savage humor, which are as ravenous in the House as in the For∣rest, and can never be so well tamed, but they re∣turn to their first fury when least suspected. In fine, Passions are faithless subjects, and domestick Enemies, with whom a Peace is no less to be feared when War and persecution.

But to return to my matter, if Passions be in∣evitable, and if all our prudence be too weak to prevent the assaults of fear, the attacks of grief, the snares of Love, and the surprizals of Anger

upon our will, who can assure himself of staying their Carreer, and of obliging them that prepare for Battel without our leave to proceed no farther then we shall direct? One of these two extreams must be chosen, either to stiffle them in the Cradle, or resolve to become their Slaves: to give them Battel before they make head, or resolve to sur∣render our liberty: to deprive them of means to gather their forces, or take up a resolution to sub∣mit to their violence. For as those things which stir them up are without us, and the good and evil which they respect are not in our power, they imitate the nature of the objects that employ them, they encrease according to the causes where∣of they partake, and they become more violent or moderate, according as things seem pleasant or dissatisfactory; desire redoubles his strength when hope appears of his Party, and flatters him with the possession of the benefit he hunts after. Fear is augmented when the apprehended evil shews it self with more then ordinary horrors, or when working her own misery, she describes it more terrible then it is.

What I have said of desire and fear may be applyed to all our Passions, and as they arm with∣out our command, and the objects that support them depend not of us, it must be confessed that it's not in our power to bring them to Reason, to moderate their fury, or hinder their running into excess. It's a sort of folly to think that we have an Enemy at our command whose insolence we may suppress, and to imagine that that Governor is able to keep Rebels in awe, who was not pru∣dent enough to prevent their taking up of Armes,

putting into the Field, and forming an Army to offer him open Battel.

Although this arguing be bold yet it is unan∣swerable even in Aristotles opinion, and they that would enervate it must have recourse to their own weaknesses to lessen its force. They say it is very difficult for a man to gain so absolute a power over himself, as to command all his inclinations, to see beautiful Faces, and to be insensible of love, to look upon a threatening evil, and not to fear its arrival, to have Treasures laid before him, and to have no desire to them, to be injuriously and de∣spitefully used, and not to let Anger arise, to have his pleasant Edifices destroyed, his Lands vio∣lently forraged, and his goods plundered, and he not afflicted. Such favors are only bestowed upon beatified persons, we must be separated from hu∣mane commerce to obtain them, and we must mount the Heavenly mansions to consider the glories of this World with indifference, and to behold all the revolutions that are wrought in it without disturbance.

If this Objection be the chief foundation of the contrary opinion, yet is it not very strong but in shew, it reproves our practice, but diminisheth no∣thing of our abillity, it declares the faults of fools, and hides the perfections of wisemen, and without survaying mans nature, it excuseth his sordidness and considereth not his advantages. Man is na∣turally generous, he hath not yet attempted any thing but what his industry hath overcome, and all those difficulties which the Academia opposed to his undertakings, have only served to augment his glory and admire his courage.

The most wild and savage Passions have yeilded to his power, and all that fury wherewith they were animated, could not hinder his constraining them to the obedience of his Laws; his power is equal to his will in this point, from his own cou∣rage he obtains what ever he desires to execute, and all his faculties are so subservient, that he hath often drawn services from them, that seemed im∣possible to nature. Some humorists have refrained smiling, and pursuing their resolution have ban∣isht from their countenance that pleasant pro∣perty which distinguisheth us from other Crea∣tures. Temperance hath taught others to suppress their appetites, and hath so much forced their own inclinations as never to tast Wine. Some have de∣fended themselves against the violent assaults of love, have had in derision all those pleasant Faces that have made so many Idolaters in the World; and have so much conquered themselves as to be∣come Masters of a Passion that hath all men for Slaves. There have been others that have so far commanded themselves as to live without sleep, and have made watching so familiar to them as that they have not been seen to close their eye-lids. In fine, man is absolute in his Goverment, he hath not undertaken any thing which he brought not to perfection, difficulties have discovered his strength; and we have seen nothing so irksom which he hath not surmounted when he joyned perseverance to his courage.

The labors then which he ought to imploy to gain this perfection, ought not to divert him from so glorious a design, and without hunting for many reasons to prompt him to it, it will suffice that he

reflect upon his own life to be taught, that it is as easy to Conquer as to moderate his Passions. The greater part of his actions are real punish∣ments, all that he does is mixt with disquiet; and I know not but it might be more easy for him to live without Passions, then to act what he daily performs. For what is more delightful then a vertuous vacation, and what is more toilsom then Anger? What is more tranquil then clemency, and what more turmoiling then cruelty? Conti∣nence begets content, but Love is unsatiable, mo∣desty loves to be at quiet, but desire delights in trouble, humanity is quiet, but confidence is ever busied.

In fine, Vertue is treatable with sattisfaction, but Passions are not conversable without hazard of Conscience rest or liberty. From all these discourses it's not difficult to conclude, that a wise man may be without Passions, since they are not natural to him; since sense and opinion are their springs, since their services are dangerous, and that he can∣not employ them in his necessities, without injury to his liberty or courage.

Notes

• Aestimatio rerum non sumitur ab affectione singulorum, Sed secun∣dum quod communiter venditur. L. 33. F. ad L. Acquil.
• Parricidae cum lege ce∣perunt, & illis facinus paena monstrauit: pes∣simo loco fuit pietas post quam culeas saepius vi∣dimus quàm cruces. Sen. de clem. lib. 10. cap. 23.
• Tantum inter Stoicos & caeteros Sapientiam professos interesse, quan∣tum inter faeminas & mares merito dixerim; cùm utraque turba ad vitae societatem tan∣tundem conferat, sed altera pars ad obsequen∣dum, altera imperio nata sit Sen. lib. Const. cap. 10.
• Quid si sanum voces leviter febricitantem? Non est bona valetudo mediocritas morbi: quo∣modo oculos major & perfecta suffusio excae∣cat, sic modica turbat. Sen. Ep. 85.
• Non quia difficilia sunt, non audemus, sed quia non audemus difficilia sunt. Sen. Ep. 104.