An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

The Ninth Part OF THE INSTITUTION OF PHILOSOPHY. OF MAN, Considered in the other PART, The MIND. (Book 9)

CHAP. I. Of the Nature of Human Mind, and that it is more Evidently perceived than Bedy.

I. That too much Cre∣dit is not to be given to our fal∣lacious Senses. SINCE we have often been deceived by our Senses, and the Images of things have been impos'd upon us, which diffe∣red from the Objects whence they pro∣ceeded, or whence we imagined they proceeded; and since in our Dreams we have seem'd to behold some things, which never∣theless were far enough off from us; and to hear things which in no wise smote the Organs of our Hearing: We have hereupon sufficient Cause to suspect that Corporeal things are not always such as we apprehend them to be, and consequently that we have sufficient reason to doubt of their Existence, forasmuch as Natural Reason dictates to us, that we are not to trust those things which have at some time or other deceiv'd us. Where∣fore we may doubt whether there be a Heaven, Sun, or Stars; whether those Bodies which are about us are real; whether we have Body, Feet, or Arms, in regard we have oftentimes in our Dreams seem'd to make use of them, whenas at the same time, deep Sleep hath bound us fast, and rendred us immoveable.

II. The Exi∣stence of Human Mind is in∣ferr'd from hence, That we are. But though we may doubt of the verity of Cor∣poreal Things, yet we cannot doubt but that we have an Existence, so long as it is certain we doubt; for it is impossible that any one should doubt or think, and at the same time not be. Whence this Proposition, I think therefore I am, is the first certain Conclusion we can possibly make, when we muster up our thoughts in Order; whence it is inferred, that our Mind is more known to us than our Body, in regard whatever doubt we make of other things, we cannot but Be so long as we Doubt.

III. The Soul is not any thing be∣longing to the Body. For if I attentively weigh and examin who I am, who write these things, who see, who hold the Pen, who draw the Lines; I know for certain, that were the use of my Hands taken away, my Eyes digg'd out, and my Fingers cut off, I could neither write, see not touch; but nevertheless should find it apparent that I yet Exist; and sup∣pose I were depriv'd of all Exterior Senses, yet still I am, so long as I think: For my Body may be dissevered into divers parts, and none of those parts be remaining with which I am encompass'd, since I am not all Heart, nor Brain, nor Liver, nor any other of those parts which constitute the Body; yet nevertheless something of me may be remaining, which makes use of those parts, and with which it is surrounded as with a Garment.

IV. What it is to think. The Existence of Human Mind being thus ex∣plain'd, we are now to inspect what it is, or rather, who that I is, who have a clear conception, that I am, and do doubt of the Existence of others. For am I any thing? surely I am. What then, I am a Thinking, Knowing, Imagining, Perceiving, Willing, Affirm∣ing, Denying Thing; for I know that I Perceive, I imagine that I Behold many things, I am sensible

[illustration]

[illustration]

Book. 1. Part. 9. Chap. 1.

G. Freman In.

I. Kip Sculp.

To the Worship∣full John Hervey of Jckworthin the County of Suffolke Esq.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Rich: Blome

that many things are conveyed from their Objects to my Senses, I affirm that I am a Thinking thing, I deny that Corporeal things do certainly Exist, and am conscious to my self of them all; but I am more certain that I am, since it may come to pass, that all those things of which I Think, may be no where Existent; but it cannot be otherwise, but that I must needs be, who appear to Behold, to Affirm, to Deny, to Will, &c.

V. A Defini∣tion of Hu∣man Mind. Human Mind therefore may rightly be defi∣ned a Thing thinking by a certain peculiar way, finite, and as it were, by mutual Covenant joyned to a Body well disposed. And herein it differs from an Angel, or Spiritual intelligence, which is indeed apt to assume a Body; but not so firmly inclining to it, as to desire, as the Human Mind doth, to have it intimately united.

VI. Why a Thinking thing is said to be finite. But it is called Finite, because tho' a Human Mind always Thinks, yet it Thinks not of all things, nor penetrates immediately into those things of which it Thinks. Moreover it Wills many things which it attains not to, all which are Arguments of imperfection, from which the infinite Mind, that is to say, God Almighty is absolutely free.

VII. What is to be under∣stood by the name of Cogitation. By the name of Thought is understood that interiour Sense and Conscience by which we are certain of all those things, which we Act or Suf∣fer; so that to say that Human Mind is a Think∣ing substance, is no other thing than to say, that there is in it a Conscience, or Co▪discerning of all Cogitations, Wills, Appetites and Sensations which are found therein; whether it be their Principle, or suffers from others: For certain it is, that what∣soever is in us which depends not upon the Cogi∣tations of the said Mind, belongs not to it. Whence the simple Cogitation of Human Mind may aptly be defined to be, an implanted Action of Human Mind: Whereof the said Mind by its own testimony is conscious. In the first place, Cogitation is said to be something implanted in the Mind, because it is indeed the very Essence of the Mind. Secondly, It is said to be by its own testi∣mony conscious, in regard every Mind hath its own Cogitation so known, that tho' there should be a doubt concerning other things, yet the Cogitation, it self can never be called into doubt; since the doubting, nay the very Erring person must of ne∣cessity Think.

VIII. The Soul Thinks e∣ven in Sleep. Some difficulty may haply arise from the fore∣said definition of the Mind, as if Human Mind be a Thinking substance, that is, Willing, Nilling, Doubting, Perceiving, &c. it should always Think, which seems a thing impossible to any one that is asleep, since then we cannot be conscious that we do Think. To this I answer, that nothing occurs to us in Sleep, which directly or indirectly pro∣ceeds from the Soul, whereof we are not consci∣ous; and tho' our Soul in the midst of Sleep may Think, but negligently, yet it is not to be thought totally destitute of all Cogitation: By the same reason almost as when it is said, that there is no part of the World which is at any time totally void of all Motion, tho' some parts may be said to Rest, by reason of the more slow and insensi∣ble Motion, and may seem as it were deprived of all Motion.

IX. Why we remember not our Co∣gitations. It may haply be urged, if this were true, we could not but remember at least some of those Co∣gitations, but we dayly experience the contrary. I answer: It is one thing to be conscious of our Thoughts, and another thing to remember them; for there is more required to the remembring of any thing, than to the being conscious thereof; for to remember a thing so long as the Mind is joyned to the Body, it is requisite that the Species or Image thereof should have its Vestigia or Foot∣steps in our Brain, upon which we afterwards reflecting should remember; but to Think, it is sufficient that we are conscious of our Perception or Cogitation, which happens not only to persons Sleeping, but even to Infants in the Mothers Womb. Since doubtless those very Infants have many Co∣gitations, and their Minds taken up with Idea's of Heat, Cold, Titillation, Pain, &c. which pro∣ceed from the Union of the said Mind with the Body; however they remember not afterwards what they Thought, or suffered at that time.

X. Whether the Power of Think∣ing sufficeth for the Mind to be called Cogitant. If it be alledged that it is sufficient for Human Mind to be called Cogitant, for that it hath the power to Think, and not for that it always actu∣ally Thinks: As a Potter hath a faculty always of forming Pots, Pitchers, &c. yet nevertheless for want of Clay, or the Potters Wheel, cannot always reduce his Power into Act; so it suffices, that there be implanted in the Mind a Power to Think, tho' it do not always actually exercise that Power for want of Matter which should occur, or through the defect of Organs which are hinder'd in Sleep.

XI. The An∣swer. The Answer is easie; for there is no necessity that the Potter should always actually Operate, by reason he Acts ad extra, or Externally, and requires External Matter for those things he is to form; but Human Soul in its Operations wants no Object to tend unto: For if all things which are to smite the Senses of the Body were removed, it would yet have the Idea of it self, and of all those Verities which we term Nota per se, or known of themselves, and consequently Human Mind cannot but always Think; and certainly it seems to imply a contradiction, that that Spiritual Part of ours, so long as it hath an Existence, should not Think, since it is no other than a Thinking thing, and we can conceive nothing in it besides Cogitation or Thought.

XII. Soul is opposed to Body as Act to Power. For the difference between Matter and Soul is, that that is the Potentia or Power, this the Act; so that Cogitation must needs be always present in every Intellectual thing, but actual motion is not always requisite in Body or Matter, in regard its Nature is Sluggish and Idle, that it comprehends Potentiality or Power, and not Act; but for a Soul to be without Act or Cogitation implies a Contra∣diction, since if you take away Cogitation from it, there will remain nothing in it of positive and ab∣solute, by which it may be said to Exist.

XIII. Human Mind can∣not be with∣out Cogita∣tion. I know that some will object, that Human Mind may be without all Cogitation; but this we absolutely deny: For if it should so happen, it would either so happen, because it hath not a Power or Faculty of thinking, or because it will not have such a Faculty or Power. If it hath not such a power, its Essence is destroy'd, in regard it consists in Cogitation; but if it will not, that very thing is an inference that it doth think, since to Will and Nill are Modes of perceiving, for we undergo no greater difficulty in conceiving that the Soul must needs always think, than in conceiving the Light must needs always Shine; and that Heat

cannot but be always Hot, for as much as it belongs to the Essence of the Soul to Think, as it belongs to Light to Shine, and Heat to Warm or make Hot; for a Faculty supposes something real, and Existing in Nature; or if we well attend to our Conception, it is no other than a thing really mu∣table and capable of divers Modes; So that as the faculty of receiving Figures in the Body, is meer Extension, so the faculty of Thinking in the Mind is meer Cogitation, so far as it may be applied to divers things, and by divers ways.

XIV. To think is no less Essential to Human Mind, than to be Ex∣pended is to the Body. Moreover the Actual Cogitation of the Soul may be proved by comparing it to the Body; for as it cannot be granted to be a Body which is not ex∣tended; that is, which hath not an actual and de∣terminate Figure; In like manner Human Mind must of necessity have some Cogitation, which in a manner is its Life; but that Children and In∣fants in the Mothers Womb, should not afterwards remember their Cogitations in that State, need not be any matter of wonder, since in Persons of more adult Age, there may possibily sometimes remain no memory, not only of things which were re∣presented in Sleep, but also even of those things which have been acted or thought on Waking.

XV. Cogitation is either taken for the thing Thinking, or for the Modes of Thinking. It will yet more clearly appear, that Cogitation belongs to the nature of Human Mind, if Cogi∣tation be in a twofold acceptation considered, first as it is that which constitutes the Nature of an im∣material thing, and then it is no other than that thing which Thinks; in another sense Cogitation may be taken for divers Modes of Thinking, in as much as Substance is capable of Exciting divers Cogitations, for the Thinking Nature hath power from it self to draw forth such or such Acts; ne∣vertheless it is not thence to be inferr'd, that a Thinking Substance is something universal, contain∣ing all the Modes of Perceiving: No more than it can be said, that a Body is something common con∣taining all Figure; because Cogitation is not a Universal, but a particular Nature which admits all those Modes, as Extension is a Nature recei∣ving all Figures; for we may very well conceive a Cogitant Nature, tho' all its Modes are not known, yet they cannot be understood without the said Cogitant Nature. For if I Imagin, if I Will, if I Remember, Cogitation appears in all these things; yet on the contrary, if I think, there is no necessity that there should be any one of these in particular, and consequently Imagination, Remembrance, Volition are only divers Modes of Thinking, even as Figure, Motion, Site, &c. are divers Modes of Extension, or of a thing Ex∣tended.

XVI. Mind is Cogitant as Matter is Extense. Wherefore we must conclude, that the Essence of Mind is placed in Cogitation in the same man∣ner, as the Essence of Matter consists in Extensi∣on, and according to the various Modifications of Cogitation, Mind is always Willing, Imaginant or Sentient; in like manner, as according to divers Modifications of Extension, Matter assumes the Form sometimes of Water, sometimes of Fire, sometimes of Fewel, or infinite other particular Forms; and consequently as a piece of Wax may be changed into divers Figures, and be Round or Square, not without varying its Nature; so Human Mind remains one and unvaried, although it may be altered divers ways, and may be mutable by a different Application of it self to Heaven, for example sake, Earth, God, Angels, &c. be∣cause tho' it be limited and finite, yet it is not de∣termined to any thing certain, and consequently Thinks or perceives all things which are deeply inherent in it.

XVII. The Soul or Mind is the cause of indivi∣duation to the whole Man. I have heretofore in several places said enough to shew, that the Soul or Mind is a certain substan∣tial Form, when as all other Forms are nothing else but certain rangings and dispositions of Parts. Nor must I now omit to declare openly, and in most express Terms, that it is that which indi∣viduates a Human Body, or rather Man himself, and does principally and essentially make one to differ from another. For as the whole Essence of a Human Body in general, consists in a certain disposition to receive a Human Soul; and the par∣ticular Essence of each Body, as for instance the Body of Peter, is founded in a particular disposi∣tion it hath to receive its own proper Soul; suppo∣sing that in some part or portion of Matter, should be found the same essential disposition, which that Body had wherewith Peter was Born, it cannot be otherwise, but that it must be a Human Body, even the Body of Peter himself, and the very same in number wherewith he was Born; forasmuch as it hath the same essential Form, or principle of Individuation: And also if the same Scul, to wit Peters, were actually united thereto, it is necessary for the same reason that there must be a Man, yea, Peter, and the same numerical Peter that was be∣fore.

CHAP. II. That Human Mind is distinguisht from the Body, and is Spiritual and Immaterial.

I. The Mind is to be di∣stinguisht from Body. THAT the Immateriality of Human Mind may the more clearly be discerned, it will not be from the purpose to explain more at large the Essence of Mind and Body, and shew wherein they may be exactly distinguisht.

II. In every thing a principal Attribute is given from whence o∣ther things proceed. They who have most deeply searcht into the Nature of things, have observ'd among the Attri∣butes, which constitute the Essence of any thing, that there is one primary Attribute, which in a manner gives a being to it, and from whence all the rest flow as from a Fountain: As Cogitation in respect of Human Mind, for as much as all things which are found in it presuppose Cogitation; for Imagination, Volition or Will, Sensation, &c. are only different Modes of Cogitation, which spring from it, as from its Root: For to Imagin is another Mode of Thinking, than to Will; and to Will, another Mode of Thinking than sensation. In like manner Extension is the first Attribute, which constitutes a Corporeal thing, and from which all the rest are derived, for as much as all things which attend it, presuppose Extension; for what∣soever hath Figure is Extense, whatsoever can be divided is Extense, and whatsoever is contain∣ed in place is Extense; so that Cogitation and Ex∣tension constitute the Natures of Intelligent and Corporeal Substance.

III. An Obje∣ction from the confu∣sed Idea of a thing Extense and a thing Cogitant. If any one urge, that there are Idea's granted which involve Cogitation and Extension together; for Example, the Idea of Pain, Colour, &c. for whosoever is sensible of Colour, Pain and other Idea's of the Senses, or does but imagin them,

Extension must needs occur to him with such a Perception. Who is able to perceive Whiteness, or any other Colour, without Extension? Wherefore if Idea's be granted, which are compounded of Cogitation and Extension; what hinders, but that we may judge that there is in the thing it self some∣what like to that Idea; that is to say, that Cogitant and Extense may be in the said Thing at the same time?

IV. Composition takes not away Di∣stinction of Parts. I Answer, that by this Argument Cogitation is not concluded to be one in Reality and Essence, with Extension, but only in Composition. So that Cogitation and Extension, or a thinking and extended Substance, constitute one Compound, so far as there are found therein divers Modifications of Cogitation and Extension; which together, and in one act are attain'd by the Senses, and also by Imagination. And in Truth, if the Matter be narrowly weighed, it will appear that those Idea's of Senses and Imagination, in which Extension is joyn'd with Perception, afford us no other Notion, than that Cogitation and Extension have an Existence together, or that we are compos'd of Mind and Body. So that these two things are no ways oppos'd to each other; to wit, that the Judgment concerning these things, follow the Idea's which we perceive by sense, and is conformable to them; and yet the Nature of a thing Thinking, is altogether distinct from the Na∣ture of a thing Extended.

V. Mind di••∣••rs more ••rom Body, than from Nothing. For the Idea of the Mind, hath nothing com∣mon with the Idea of the Body, and one of them may be clearly and distinctly conceiv'd without the other. Nay, so great is the difference between Cogitation and Extension, that Cogitation may more properly be said to be Nothing, than Extended; because tho' in respect of Substance generally so taken, Mind differs not more from Body, than from Nothing, since both of them is something subsistent, and wants not the help of another Substance to Exist; yet if they be consider'd in themselves, so far as one of them is Extense, and the other Cogitant, they are more distinguish'd from each other, than from Nothing; in regard every Crea∣ture, being not a most perfect Entity, but including many Imperfections, participates of Nothing. But it can be no way apprehended, that the Idea of Cogitation should include any thing of the Idea of Extension, and consequently Cogitation disagrees or differs more from Extension, than from Nothing. In the same manner as Vertue is more properly distinguish'd from Vice, than from Stupidity: And Science is more remote from Errour, than from Ignorance.

VI. It is prov'd that the Soul is Im∣material. This distinction being well understood, it will be no difficult thing to make out, that the Mind is a Spirit, or some Immaterial Entity; because since Mind and Body are Subjects of different Proprieties, the Conceptions which we have of them, are also absolutely different. For the diversi∣ty of Essences is known to us by their Proprieties. Nor have we any other Indication whereby to judge; that the Natures of things are different, than by inspecting into the distinction of Proprieties in them. For we have no other way to make obser∣vation, that Ice and Fire differ from each other; but because Fire heats, and Ice cools; or that the Eye is a thing different from the Foot; but because we see with our Eyes, and distinguish divers Objects, and with our Feet we walk and sustain our Body. Since therefore Human Mind and Body have altogether different Proprieties, no Man can doubt, but that there is an absolute di∣stinction between them; and I dare say, there are no Attributes which are more opposite one to another, than to Think and to be Extended. For to be Corporeal, and to Know, what relation have they one to the other? What Similitude can be apprehended between Perception and Motion? or between Will and Figure? Whence it is plainly to be asserted, that Mind and Body are altogether different; and consequently since Body hath Extension, the Thing thinking must needs be void of all Extension; which is the same thing as to be Immaterial: For by the Name of an Immaterial Entity nothing else is to be understood, but that which hath no parts, and is void of Ex∣tension.

VII. An Obje∣ction drawn from the distinction of Justice and Mercy in God If it be Objected, that diversity of Conceptions does not always infer a difference in things; so as that they must be incompatible in the same Subject. For the Conception we have of Justice is undoubt∣edly distinct from that we have of Mercy in GOD; and yet no Divine can deny, but that they are both equally fit to be ascrib'd to GOD himself; therefore it follows not, because the Conception of the Thing thinking, is distinguish'd from the Con∣ception of the Thing Extended; but that they may be attributed to one and the same Subject.

VIII. An Answer to the Ob∣jection. I Answer, When two things may be conceiv'd incompleatly, or by abstraction of the Intellect inadequately conceiving the Matter, there is no necessity that they be repos'd in divers Subjects; but those may well be which are consider'd ade∣quately, or as Compleat Entities: For Justice and Mercy in GOD are consider'd not as two Com∣pleat Things, since Justice may be understood without a Just Person; but not Mercy without a Merciful Person: And consequently since they cannot be but modally distinguish'd, they may be both in One GOD. But we compleatly under∣stand, that a Body or material Substance is Ex∣tense, Partible, Figurate, with an Exclusion of all those things which are peculiar to the Mind: And on the contrary we understand, that the Mind is a compleat Substance, which Perceives, Wills, Doubts, &c. tho' those things be remote from i•• which belong to the Nature of Body; and so Cogi∣tation and Extension are incompatible in the same Subject.

IX. A thing Cogitant. and a thing Ex∣tense, are conceiv'd in another manner, than Fi∣gure and Motion in the same Sub∣ject. Other Objections which may be made against the Incompatibility of Cogitation and Extension, are resolv'd in the same manner, as if any should say, that motion and figure, and the like modes of a thing Extended, have divers Conceptions, and yet are found in the same Subject. For figure and motion cannot be conceived, but in Extended matter; For as motion is a Body▪ having figure, so we cannot understand figure, but in Matter apt for motion. There is a great difference between Motion and Figure, and between a thing extended and cogi∣tant; for should all Moveable be taken away, we should have no longer any Idea of Figure or Mo∣tion remaining, since such is the Reason of Mode, that altho' Substances may be conceived without Modes, yet Modes cannot without Substances; therefore in regard we might conceive a thing Co∣gitant, tho' there were no such thing as Body in

rerum Natura; it follows, that a thing Cogitant is really distinguish'd from a Subject Extense, and consequently is Material and Spiritual.

X. The Spiri∣tuality of the Soul is demon∣strated by its Opera∣tions. The same Conclusion may also be demonstrated à posteriori, to wit, by its Operations, which are Spiritual, and absolutely Independent of all Mat∣ter: For Volition and Intellect include no Exten∣sion, since we conceive both very well, without any mention made of Matter. Besides, we find by daily Experience, that the Cogitations of Man are render'd the more obscure, by how much the more he hath of commerce with the Body; and on the contrary, more subtil and distinct, by how much the more he subtracts himself from the Body, as is manifest in Extasie and Rapture, where the Mind in a manner abstracted Meditates altogether on what is sublime, and distinctly sees all things; all which would never happen, if the Soul were Material. For if the Power, for Examples sake, of Understanding, depended upon the Body, it would of necessity follow its Dispositions, that is, be depress'd when that is weakned, and become more vivacious, when that is vigorous and strong. Whereas we find by Experience the con∣trary thereof in Old men, who apprehend things more clearly and distinctly than Young men, who at the same time excell Old men in Strength of Body, and have their Animal Spirits more viva∣cious, upon which Corporeal motions depend.

XI. The Appre∣hension of Spiritual things, shews the Mind to be Incorporeal. Then how can it be, if Human Mind be Ma∣terial and Corporeal, that it should contain in it self such vast Images of things? How should it comprehend the Latitude of the Earth, the Im∣mensity of the Heavens, and the Bodies that are diffus'd through all parts of the Universe, if it be not Spiritual? How can it discern a Line to be altogether void of Latitude? A Point not discernable to the Eye, and wholly Individual? Wherefore we must in this Matter conclude with the Words of St. AUGUSTINE, If Corporeal things are beheld with Corporeal Eyes, by a certain wonderful Affinity, it certainly follows that the Mind, by which we see Incorporeal things, is not Corporeal or Body.

XII. The Cogni∣tion of Verity, &c. argues the Immateri∣ality of the Soul. Moreover, who knows not how many and how great things totally separate from all Matter our Soul can conceive? For without any help of the Senses, it apprehends Verity, Sapience, Unity, Beauty; it understands the Principles of Sciences, and unfolds the Demonstrations drawn from them, and attends to the Series of Reasons; but with what Sense, or with what Corporeal Species doth it represent these things to it self? Wherefore since by Reason alone it performs all these things, it must of necessity be Immaterial and Incorporeal. Lastly, Many things which are divided in them∣selves, meet together in our Mind, as opposite and contradictory Propositions, &c. yet nevertheless the Soul is not increas'd by the reception, nor by the withdrawing of them. A thing which cannot happen to Body, which always become greater by the addition of Parts, and lesser by the abstraction of them.

CHAP. III. How Human Mind is Ʋnited to the Body.

I. Th••••e Notions which usually present themselves to us. THere are Three principal Notions which commonly offer themselves to us: The No∣tion of Body, which we have maintain'd, consists in Extension, from whence the Idea's of Figure and Motion proceed: The Notion of Mind, whose Essence we place in Cogitation, and to which the perceptions of Intellect, and propensions of Will do tend: The third Notion is of Soul and Body, as they are united; from which Union we understand, that Mind hath the force of moving Body, and on the contrary, the Body hath the power of Acting upon the Mind, as shall here∣after be more clearly made out: For it is not to be imagin'd, that the Soul is only present with the Body, as a Mariner is present in his Ship, or as a Rider is seated upon his Horse; but that it is intimately united to it, so as to make one Com∣pound with it: I say, the Notion of Soul and Body; because the Soul is properly so called, inas∣much as it is destin'd to Inform the Body, or inasmuch as it can be United to a well-disposed Body, as hath been formerly mention'd.

II. Human Mind is to be consi∣der'd, as United to the Body. For the Soul of Man is not to be consider'd as a Spirit in it self, and as it is Absolute and a Sub∣stance which Thinks; but according to the Rela∣tion which a Spirit hath to a Body well dispos'd, and to which it is United. For Experience plainly teacheth us, That all the Functions of the Soul, consider'd in Quality of a Soul, depend absolutely on the Body, to which it is United, and which ren∣ders this Union altogether necessary.

III. It is diffi∣cult to conceive, how the Soul is United to the Body. The only difficulty is to apprehend this sort of Union: For our Intellect can hardly conceive, how Body, which is a thing Extense, moves the Mind; and Mind, which is a thing Immaterial and In∣extense, can impel the Body; and tho' by Expe∣rience we find it is so, yet no Comparison or Dis∣course drawn from other things is sufficient to de∣monstrate and evidence it to us. Those Philoso∣phers who admit Real Accidents, and judge that they are Entities distinct from Substance, produce a Similitude of a Stone tending downward, by the force of Gravity. Now since, according to these Philosophers, this Quality of Grave things tending downwards, is not Substance, but Accident, this may serve for a sufficient Explication, how a thing not Extended, may act upon a Body Ex∣tended.

IV. To this difficulty the Preju∣dices of Infancy, and the Opinions of a School conduce. Yet because we maintain, that there is no such Quality in Nature granted, another way is to be found out; but before we fix upon a Mode, by which the Body is annex'd to the Soul, it will be worth our while to note, that all the difficulty in conceiving that Union, arises chiefly from our selves; who following the Prejudices of our In∣fancy first, and afterwards the trite Opinions of Philosophy in Schools, have thought it impossible for Human Intellect to conceive, how a thing Material and Incorporeal can be United, and how a thing Unextended can be associated to a thing Extense, unless that be taken also for Ex∣tense. This Prejudice hath exercis'd the Wits of many; and because they could find no Mode of Union, by which things so distant in Nature could be United, were compelled to have recourse to certain Virtual parts; and to assert, that the Soul is not indeed really, but only virtually Ex∣tense, and that it hath Virtual parts, by means whereof it may the better be adjoyn'd to the Body, and so compose one Total with it.

V. It cannot be said, that the Soul is virtually Extense. But what they mean by these Virtual parts, I confess I do not in the least understand, nor doth any Notion of them present it self to me. Nor can it be conceived, that there are things Virtually Extense, unless thereby are understood parts without parts, that is, whereof one is placed be∣yond the other. But parts situate one beyond the other, are distinguish'd not virtually, but really, and may separately Exist, and consequently may be said to be really distinguish'd; since in the Con∣ception of them Division is included, and a Sepa∣ration of them one from another, which presuppose Extension.

VI. Three sorts of Union. But that the Conjunction of Mind and Body, which is commonly call'd Union may be the better understood, we are to premise what Union is, and how many kinds of it there are. Union is a Con∣sociation of things agreeable into One. And since we can have a Conception but of two things, namely Mind and Body, we can thence infer only a Threefold Union: The first, which inter∣cedes between two Bodies; the second, by which two Minds are associated; the third and last, by which Mind and Body are United. But all Union includes some Similitude and Dependency, in which respect 2 different things pass after a cer∣tain manner into one. For in this very respect they are judged to be United, when they can act and suffer dependently upon each other: For 2 Bodies are said to be United, when they are so near, that one may act upon the other; and that again suffer from the former. Not that it is necessary, that both together act and suffer at once; but it is sufficient, if one act and the other suffer. In the same manner 2 Minds are united one with another, when the same Affections are common to them both, and are so dispos'd, that neither of them wills or loves any thing, but for the others sake. In the same manner we say, that a Rational Soul is joyn'd to the Body, when any Operations of the Body depend upon the Cogitati∣ons of the Mind; and on the contrary, that the Body is joyned to the Soul, when any Cogitations arise dependently from these Operations, or rather motions of the said Body.

VII. How Mind and Body are United. Nor do I think, that any one will deny this manner of Conjunction or Union, by which the Mind and Body are conjoyned, since a clearer cannot be made out; in regard the Mind and Body operating dependently upon each other, we may very easily understand the Similitude and Relation, which ought to be among things which are united; and this Similitude and Relation we have formerly affirm'd to consist in Action and Passion: So that as the Union of 2 Minds will continue so long as Love remains between them; so the Union of 2 Bodies will never cease, so long as they are locally present one with another. In like manner the Union of Mind and Body will not be dissolv'd, so long as he who hath joyn'd them together shall suffer the Body to produce its mo∣tions, with a dependency upon the Cogitations of the Mind, and the Mind to Exercise its Co∣gitations dependently upon the motions of the Body.

VIII. The Con∣junction of the Mind with the Body, is twofold. By Two ways most especially may Spirit be joyned with Body; first into one Person; as the Word was made Flesh, S. John 1. Secondly, Into One Nature; as Human Mind is joyned with Body. Of the first, Divines treat in their Theses, con∣cerning the Incarnation of the Word; the second is handled by Philosophers.

IX. Wherein consists the Union of Soul and Body. The Union of Soul and Body consists in an Actual dependency of all the Cogitations of the Soul, upon certain motions of the Body; and of some certain motions of the Body, upon some Cogi∣tations of the Soul; I said in the first place, That this Union consists in an Actual dependence; be∣cause for the Uniting of Body and Soul, it suffices not that their Motions and Cogitations, can mu∣tually depend upon each other; but it is also necessary, that they Actually depend. In the second place, I said; and of some certain motions of the Body, upon some Cogitations of the Mind; because not all the motions of the Body depend upon the Cogitations of the Mind, since many depend upon the Machin of the Body only, and the Universal Laws of Nature.

X. There is not requir'd any Union, as a thing distinct from Mind and Body. Others explicate this Commerce another way; for they will have it, that a certain Mode inter∣cedes between Body and Mind, to which they give the Name of Union, and account it instead of a Ligament or Bond, by which those things that make up the Compound are joyned one with ano∣ther. For they cannot conceive how 2 Things can be joyn'd together, and nothing of New hap∣pen upon this Conjunction. But they have enough to be satisfied: For if by the Name of Union, they understand nothing, but that mutual Commerce of Actions and Passions, which is found in Mind and Body, they agree with us; for we acknowledge that Union is the Mode of the Being of Body and Soul: For all things are after another mode or state when United, than when Separated. But if they mean, that this Union is some real thing di∣stinct from both, and as it were that very thing, by the mediation whereof the parts of a Com∣pound are United, we apprehend not, nor acknow∣ledge any such thing in Philosophy; and should we receive it, we can no way make it out, how such a thing can joyn together two such, as Mind and Body. For this Union should be either Extense, or void of all Extension: If they affirm it Extense, how can it be Co-extended with Mind, which is a Spirit and Immaterial? If it be void of Exten∣sion, how can it be joyn'd to a Body? So that this Mode of Uniting is altogether superfluous, since the difficulty of Conceiving how 2 Substances can be immediately United one with another, by a mutual dependence of their Motions and Cogita∣tions is less, than to comprehend, how they should be united by another thing, which if it be In∣extense, cannot be conjoyn'd to the Body; nor to Mind, if it have Extension, and be divided accord∣ing to parts.

XI. But a Re∣ciprocation of Action and Passion. And the Truth is, since neither Body can Think, nor Mind be capable of Dimension; there can be no Mode common to Mind and Body, except a mutual Acting of each upon each, from which alone the Proprieties of both can follow.

XII. Whether the Soul and Body be United to each other, before they mutually Act and Suffer. Perhaps it may be said That the Conjunction of Mind and Body cannot consist in the relation which the Actions and Passions of both have to each other; because such a Concourse presupposes, that the Mind is already United to the Body. For the Mind must first be in the Body, before it can draw forth any Operations which depend upon the Body, and consequently Union precedes that mutual dependency.

XIII. The An∣swer. I Answer, That there is no Necessity that the Mind should be first United to the Body, before it operate there, in regard its Existence precedes not Action in Time: So that it does not absolutely require to be joyned to the Body, before such time as it draws forth its Operations. Nay, if the Matter were well Examin'd, when as Spirit is confin'd to no Space, and may only be in a place by its Operations: It cannot therefore be said, to be in the Body, but because it exercises there its Operations or Cogitations dependently on the Body. Which mutual Correspondence constitutes the Reason of the Union, which is between the Mind and Body.

XIV. When the Union be∣tween Mind and Body be∣gins. But if it be ask'd, How comes about this Conjunction of Soul and Body, and when doth it begin?

I Answer again, It is most Consentaneous to Reason, to believe that this Union begins at that very moment in which the Body gives occasion to the Mind, to draw forth some Cogitation, and Contrarily the Soul to the Body, to stir up some motion. For as this Conjunction is plac'd in a mutual Dependency, which is between both, in respect of certain Actions and Passions, it cannot begin sooner: So that it is most probable, that such a Union begins, as soon as the Heart, Brain, Nerves, Muscles, &c. are sufficiently fram'd to bring it about, that the Action of the Objects may be transmitted as far as the Glandula and the Animal Spirits be convey'd into the Muscles. On the contrary, this Union ceaseth, whenever it hap∣pens that the said Commerce cannot be continued, or when any part of the Body is so defective, that the Heart is no longer able to transfuse the Spirits to the Brain; nor the Brain into its Muscles, to agitate some, and conserve others in their proper state: So that the said Confederacy is never broken on the part of the Mind, but of the Body.

XV. This Union is Essen∣tial to Man. From these things we deduce, that the Con∣junction of Soul and Body, though it be call'd an Accident of either part, so far as it may be pre∣sent or absent, without the destruction of either part, is nevertheless so proper to both Parts of Man together, that it may and ought to be allow'd to be Essential to him: For Essence, as it is deriv'd from Esse, to be, is so called, because so long as it is something, it must of necessity be. So that so long as Man is, it follows, that the foresaid Efficacy of Mind upon Body, and of Body upon Mind, must needs be.

XVI. Why GOD may not be said to be joyn'd to his Crea∣tures, or an Angel to an assu∣med Body. But it is also easie to Understand, why GOD, tho' he is present to all Created things, as who Conserves the same by a Continued Creation; yet nevertheless is not said to be conjoyned to them, in regard they cannot act upon GOD, by exciting in him those Cogitations which he had not before. So also an Angel, who according to the Vul∣gar Opinion, is present personally an assumed Body, cannot be said to be joyned to the said Body. For tho' an Angel may act upon such a Body, yet that Body cannot Re-act upon the Angel; So as that when the said Body, for Examples sake, is hurt, the Angel should feel pain, as we find by Experience in our selves.

XVII. Conditions of the Union of Body and Soul. But as there is no Society, which is not founded upon some Conditions, which are Reciprocal be∣tween one and the other party, united or associated together: GOD, in the formation of Man, united Body and Spirit upon these Conditions.

XVIII. The First Condition▪ The First is, That as long as the Soul shall remain United to the Body, there will be an Idea of Extension, that is to say, of Body, consider'd in it self; and that it shall have this Idea from the motion of the Brain, excited by the general Course of the Animal Spirits; according to which con∣dition, the Soul hath always present the Idea of Extension, as Experience teacheth us.

XIX. The Second, The Second is, That the whole motion of the Brain, which is excited by the Nerves, will pro∣duce within the Soul a certain Sensation, which will always accompany this motion, and the Soul not be able to separate it. By means of this Con∣dition, we fee, for Example, the Light, when the Sun moves the Optick Nerves: We hear Noise, when resounding Bodies shake the Auditive Nerves.

XX. The Third. The Third, That the Spirit, so long as it re∣mains United to the Body, will have the Idea of some particular Body, from the motion which this Body shall excite in the Brain, by the means of the Organs of Sense. By this Condition, the Soul hath the Idea of all Bodies, which smite the Senses.

XXI. The Fourth. The Fourth, That the whole motion of the Brain, which shall be excited by the determinate Course of the Animal Spirits, resembling another motion, caused by the Nerves, will produce in the Soul the Idea of some particular Body, which the Soul hath already perceiv'd. By this Condition it is, that there are represented to us things absent, which we have formerly seen.

XXII. The Fifth. The Fifth is, That by the Sense of Touching we feel pleasure or pain, according as the movents, which cause these Sensations, shall be conformable or in opposition to the Natural Constitution of the Body. By this Condition, the motion of a Feather drawn over the Hand, as it were for Titillation, will cause a Sentiment of pain in Sick People, in regard the said motion is not agreeable to the present state of the Body. On the contrary, it excites a Sentiment of pleasure to those that are in health, because in that Estate it is conformable to the pre∣sent Constitution of the Body.

XXIII. The Sixth. The Sixth is, That when we have received the Idea of an Object, it will be attended by an In∣clination of the Soul, which will carry it either to fly or to pursue the said Object, according as it shall appear good or bad. By this Condition it is that we are sensible of Love, Hatred, and gene∣rally all Passions that attend the Soul.

XXIV. The Se∣venth. The Seventh is, That all the Thoughts of the Soul, which regard the preservation of the Body, as they create Sentiments and Passions, must be accompanied with that motion of the Animal Spirits, which shall be most proper for the Exe∣cution of the Desires of the Soul. And it is upon this Condition that Fear, for Example, is accompanied with a Course of Animal Spirits, which induceth us to shun what we fear; and that on the contrary, Desire is accompanied with a Course of Spirits, which carries us to the pursuit of that which we desire.

XXV. The Eighth. The Eighth is, That the Spirit, inasmuch as it is united with the Body, never Thinks, but by the motions of the Body, to which it is united. And it is by this Condition, that all the Idea's which we

have of particular Bodies, depend mediately or immediately, upon some motion of the Brain. I say, All the Idea's we have of particular Bodies: And hereby we are to Note, that the Idea's which the Spirit hath of GOD, and of it self, depend not at all upon its being United with the Body; but simply upon its being a Spirit, whose whole Nature is to Think, and by consequence to think of GOD and of it self.

XXVI. The Ninth. The Ninth is, that when the Animal Spirits are more abounding than usual, they excite in the Soul, Goodness and Liberality; when their Parts are more strong and gross, they excite Confidence and Hardiness; when they are equal in force, in grossness and in figure, they procure Constancy; when they are more agitated, they produce promp∣titude, diligence, and desire. In fine, when they have a temperate agitation, they cause tranquility of Spirit. On the contrary, when these Qualities fail in the Animal Spirits, or when there is an opposite Temper in them, the effects that are produc'd in the Soul, are Malignity, Timidity, or Fearfulness; Inconstancy, Tardiness, Inquietude, &c.

XXVII. The Tenth. The Tenth and last Condition is, That the Union of Spirit and Body will continue so long as the Heart shall be in a condition to send Blood towards the Brain, and from thence to send the Animal Spirits through the Nerves into the Muscles, which are subservient to those motions that are necessary for Life. By this Condition it is, that the Soul never gives occasion to the Body to break the Union, it being sufficiently evident that the default always proceeds from the Body, as Expe∣rience teaches us.

CHAP. IV. Whether there are Innate or Inbred Idea's in Human Mind.

I. There are three sorts of Idea's. IT is a frequent and common Disquisition in the Schools, whether Human Mind be pure Po∣tentia, or Power, and so abstracted from the Species or Idea of things, as to have no inbred Cogitations in it. The Aristotelians maintain the Affirmative, and are of Opinion, that that Faculty of Perception which we experiment in our selves, is, when first the Mind begins to exist, as it were a Rasa Tabula, or plain Table: So that whatsoever Idea, in process of time, is deprehended in it, is drawn from the Senses, or acquir'd by Tradition. So that for the better Solution of this famous Question, we are first to know what an Idea is, and how many Acceptations it admits of. By the Name of Idea, nothing else is understood, but the thing it self thought, so far as it hath any thing Objective in the Intellect. Or more in short, Whatsoever can be conversant in our Cogitation: And there are Three kinds of it, namely, Adven∣titious; or those which are receiv'd from things transmitted by the Senses; as is that Idea which we have of the Sun, Stars, and the like External Objects. Secondly, Fictitious, or which are formed from our Intellect; as the Idea's we have of a Chimaera, Syrens, &c. Lastly, Innate, which are Created with the Faculty of Thinking and form∣ing them: And they are called Innate, in the same manner as we speak of the Stone, or the Gout, to be Natural to some Families, of which Families they who are born, bring with them into the World a disposition prone to those Diseases.

II. The Idea's of Quali∣ties are Congenite or Equally born with the Soul it self. These things thus briefly noted, we are next to enquire, Whether Human Mind be so Created, as to have these sort of inbred Idea's born with it, and not drawn from any of the Senses; and in Truth, it seems not to be deny'd, but that many such Idea's are found therein. For to begin from things most obvious, it is most certain, that the Idea's which we perceive by any sense, are inbred, and can no way proceed from the Things themselves by any Similitude. For he that well understands, by what way the perception of Pain, for Example, is excited in the Soul, will easily be convinc'd, that the Idea of Pain hath no more affinity with that perverse disposition of Parts, by whose means the Soul frames an Idea of Pain, than that deprav'd Affection hath an affinity with a Sword, by which a Wound hath been in∣flicted into a Body; or than the unwonted agitation of Blood or Spirits, by whose impulse Human Mind conceives Idea's of Passions, carries a Simi∣litude with those Images or Cogitations; and con∣sequently when the Sense of Pain, and other Per∣ceptions which are produc'd by the motions of the Spirits, are excited in the Minds by no other Species, which have affinity with them, it must needs be affirm'd, that these sort of Idea's which have no affinity, are innate or inbred to it. For it is evident, that all the Perceptions of the Senses are obscure and confus'd, insomuch that Light, Colours, Sounds, Odours, Sapours, Heat and Cold, and other tactile Qualities, are not apprehended by us, but by a confus'd way, and not under the Conception of Motion: And hereupon we must conclude, that their Idea's are innate in us, and that it is from our Nature that we understand them.

III. The Idea's of Mathe∣matical Figures, are im∣planted into the Mind, from their first Original This takes place not only in Qualities, whereof we acknowledge our Cogitation to be confus'd; but also in things most clear and manifest. For what can be more clear, than that when a Line, a Triangle, a Rhombus, or other Mathematical Figures are given, it is not to be attributed to our Senses, that we have the Idea's of them? Since most certain it is that there is no absolute true Right Line in Nature, nor any Triangle whose 3 Angles are perfectly Equal to two Right Angles. Since therefore the Idea's of Figures proceed not from the Senses, and contain nothing Corporeal or of Corporeal Affection, we must necessarily conclude, that they are implanted in Human Mind; that is, that a Faculty is given by GOD to the said Mind, to produce such like Forms of Conceptions, and that they are not form'd according to any Exem∣plar of things without.

IV. It is a false Max∣im, that there is nothing in the Intel∣lect, which was not first in the Sense. If any one Object, That trite Saying of the ARISTOTELIANS in the Schools, viz. that there is nothing in the Intellect, which was not first in the Senses. I answer, that that Vulgar Axiom is altogether false, and only to be admitted by those who do not sufficiently consider by what Motives the Soul is excited to perceive External things. For whoever will seriously examin, how far our Senses extend themselves, and what it is precisely that can arrive from them to our Faculty of Thinking, must needs grant, that no Idea's of things are presented from them to us, such as we form

them in our thought; so that there is nothing in our Idea's which was not first inbred in our Mind or Cogitant Faculty, excepting those circumstances which regard experience, so as to judge, that such or such Idea's as are now present to our Cogitation, are to be referred to things without us: not that the said Idea's have immitted those very things to our Mind through the Organs of our Senses, but because they have immitted something which gave it occasion to form those very things by a faculty innate to it, at one time rather than another; forasmuch as nothing hath access to our Mind from external Objects, through the Organs of our Senses, except certain Corporeal Motions; but nei∣ther those Motions, nor the Figures arising from them, are conceived by us, such as they are form'd in the Organs of the Senses; whence it follows that those very Idea's of Motions and Figures are inbred in us. And so much the more ought the Idea's of Pain, Colours, Sounds, and the like, to be innate, as our Mind, by means of certain Cor∣poreal Motions, can exhibit them to us; since they have no similitude with Corporeal Moti∣ons.

V. It is by Na∣ture that we under∣stand what is Thing, Substance and other general Axioms. Besides, who can have the confidence to assert, that the Idea's we have of Thing, Substance, Truth, Goodness, Equity, and the like general Na∣tures, have any commerce with Material Things, and that the Idea's, which we form of them, flow'd out of Bodies, through the Senses, into the Mind? Who will be so positive as to affirm that these Common Notions, for Examples sake, The same thing cannot be and not be; that which is done cannot be undone; those things which agree in a third, agree among themselves; take equals from equals, and there remain equals; and the like, proceed from the Senses and from things without us? What can be more absurd, than that all common Notions, which are in our Mind, arise from the said Motions, and cannot be without them? I would fain have any one tell me, what that Corporeal Motion should be, which can form any common Notion in our Mind; since all those motions are particular; but these Notions are uni∣versal, and have no affinity or relation to the said motions. Since therefore nothing can come into our Mind from Bodies but by motion; it is not to be doubted, but that those Idea's, at least, which have no affinity with motion; are Congenite and Inbred with the said Mind, from their Original. Hence St. Augustin in his 9th Book de Trinitate, The Mind, saith he, knows it self by it self; and in another place, It is known for a certain, that the Mind can never be so affected, as not to remember, not to understand and love it self, though it should not be always thinking.

VI. The Idea of God is in∣bred in Hu∣man Mind. The same thing also evidently appears in that Idea which Human Mind hath of the Existence of GOD; forasmuch as it forms the said Idea, not by the Benefit of the Senses; not by Human Institution; not by its own Arbitrement: And consequently it must needs be innate or inbred in it, since there is nothing else in Nature to be found, which can set set forth an Ens Infinite, Omnipo∣tent, Immense, Supreamly Good and Perfect; for though there is in us, in regard we are Substances, an Idea of Substance; yet there occurs not to us from thence an Idea of a Substance, Infinite, Inde∣pendent and Supreamly Intelligent, &c. since we are finite; and so, whatever Idea we have of GOD, must needs have it from a Substance which is Infinite, that is, GOD, and consequent∣ly which immediately proceeds from him.

VII. Whether an Idea of God can be had from the Observati∣ons of things. If it be urg'd, ••••at this Idea of GOD which we experiment in us, proceeds not from our faculty of thinking, to which it is innate, but from Divine Revelation, Tradition or Observati∣on of things; for in an Entity supreamly perfect, which is call'd GOD, Human Mind considers nothing but those perfections which are found in Man; for Examples sake, Existence, Power, Ju∣stice, Mercy, and the like▪ from which, if im∣perfection be removed, they may be so ascribed to GOD, the most Excellent of Beings.

VIII. The Diffi∣culty re∣mov'd. This Objection is resolved by our most illustri∣ous Philosopher, in his Answer to the fam'd RE∣GIUS, Physician of Utrecht; by giving to understand, that one thing may be from another two ways; either because this other thing is the proximate and primary Cause thereof, or because it is remote, and only accidental, and so gives occasi∣on to the Primary Cause to produce its effect at one time rather than another: As all Artific••rs and Workmen are the primary and proximate Causes of their own Operations; but they who set them on work, and pay them for their labour, are the accidentary and remote Causes of the said performances, which perhaps, the Workmen unbidden, and without hopes of reward, would scarce have gone about. Now there is no doubt but Tradition, or the Observation of things is often times the remote Cause which inviteth us to give attention to that Idea which we are able to conceive of GOD; and to represent it to our Cogitation. But that it is the proximate and efficient Cause of the said Idea, cannot be asserted by any one, except by him who judges that nothing is ever understood by us concerning GOD, but what the name DEUS or GOD means, or what sort of Cor∣poreal Figure it is, which is made use of by Painters to represent GOD. Forasmuch as Observation, if it be made by the Sight, represents nothing to the Mind by its own proper vertue, but Pictures, and those only consisting of certain Corporeal Mo∣tions; if by hearing, nothing but Words and Voices; if by other Senses, nothing is contain'd in the said Observation which can possibly relate to GOD: So that all those things we think of, except Voices and Pictures, as their significates, are represented to us by Idea's, not coming from else∣where than from our faculty of thinking, and con∣sequently inbred in us.

CHAP. V. Of the Faculties of Human Mind, Intel∣lect, Imagination, Will, Memory, Remi∣niscence and Wit.

I. Diversity of Actions argues di∣versity of Powers. SINCE there are found various Operations in the Mind, we must of necessity assign vari∣ous Principles from whence they proceed; for di∣versity of Actions argues diversity of Powers. Wherefore since there are divers Species of Cogi∣tations in the Mind, there are consequently to be establisht divers faculties which are the proprieties of a thinking Being. Forasmuch as by the word Faculty, nothing else is understood, in Human

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Book. 1. Part. 9. Chap. 5.

G. Freman In.

I. Kip Sculp.

To the Right Honourable Iohn Sheffeild, Baron of Botterwick, Earle of Mulgrave, L^d. Chamberlaine to King Iames the 2^d, Lord Lievtenant of the East-Rideing of Yorkshire, vice Admirall of Yorkshire Northumberland, and Bishoprick of Durham, K^t. of the most noble order of the Garter, & one of his Ma^tys. most Honourable Privy Councell &c.^a.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

Mind, but an Aptitude or Capacity to a certain Variation; for since Mind is Indefinitely Variable, Actual Variety must needs proceed from some Fa∣culty, as from a present Cause. All Operations which carry Cogitation with them, are of two sorts. Of the first kind are those Operations which have Intellect for their Principle. Of the second are those which depend upon Will. And tho' many other modes of thinking may be reckon∣ed, yet they all proceed from two faculties of Perceiving and Willing: For Sense, Imagination, Itellect, Memory, &c. are various modes of per∣ceiving, whereas Judgment, Affirmation, Nega∣tion, and all our Appetites and Propensions are dif∣ferent modes of Willing. Of the Senses we have already discourst; it remains that we say some∣thing of Intellect, Imagination, Will and Me∣mory.

II. What In∣tellect is. By the word Intellect, nothing else is to be un∣derstood, but that faculty by which the Mind, without any Material Species, apprehends all Ob∣jects whatsoever, whether Immaterial or Corporeal; and this faculty is more inseparable from the Mind than any of the rest; whereof there is not any one that hath not some dependence upon the Body; whereas the Mind hath no need of the help of any other thing to understand by, but it self and its own proper Idea's. So that the Mind hath no need of any Organs, nor makes any use of the Brain, whereby to Conceive or Understand Exter¦nal things.

III. How it is distinguisht from Ima∣gination. Only in this one thing, Intellect is distinguisht from Imagination, that is, that the Mind can Ima∣gin nothing but Corporeal, when in Imagining it applies it self to the Body, and contemplates the Image of the Object as present to the Eye, which happens not in Intellection or understanding; when as the Mind, in Understanding, is in a sort re∣cluded or shut up within its self; and if it apply it self to any External Body, it is only to contem∣plate the Idea of the Object which it hath in its self. Wherefore that common Saying, Nothing is in the Intellect, which was not first in the Sense, is not to be conceived of the pure saculty of Un∣derstanding. Since the pure Intellection, as we have said, as well of a Material as Immaterial Object, is independent of any Corporeal Species, and cannot any way be received in the Intellect; but may very well be understood of the Imagi∣nation, because we cannot possibly imagin any thing but what is Corporeal, particular and deter∣minate. Whence the Power of Imagining in the Soul may be defin'd, The Power which the Soul hath to know particular Bodies, and the represen∣tations of Equality or Inequality which are in them. So that Intellect and Imagination differ in respect of the Object; since the Object of the Intellect is of larger extent than the Object of Imagination, as having a perception, not only of things which belong to Intelligences, and Substances meerly Spi∣ritual; but also many other proprieties, or parti∣cular Bodies, which are not deprehended from the Senses, and which decline even Imagination it self, as hath been said in the foregoing Chapter.

IV. The defini∣tion of In∣tellect. Whence we may conclude, that Intellect in ge∣neral is nothing but a Faculty or Power which the Soul hath to know whatsoever it knows, by what way or manner soever it knows it.

V. What Will is, and how it differs from Intel∣lect. The second sort of our Cogitations proceeds from the Will, that is, from a Power within us, to determin our Resolves, by giving or denying our Assent in things which are propounded by the Intellect. For such is the form in the ordering of our Cogitations, that the Light of our Understand∣ing, always precedes the Actions of our Will; in regard the Intellect is, as it were, the Torch, with∣out which our Will cannot determin any thing. When, I say, that Will cannot determin any thing, but what the Intellect shews it; it is not to be so taken, as if those two Powers were things distinct from each other, but that it is one and the same Mind which is diversly considered according as it Perceives or Wills, and according as it Suffers or Acts; so as that Knowledge, Pleasure and all o∣ther Faculties of the Soul, are but one and the same Soul, considered as having power to Know, to Will, to Imagin, to Perceive: For the Intel∣lect is a passive Power, which consists in this, that it wholly receives Idea's; whereas the Will is a faculty by which the Mind chooses, or is deter∣min'd to embrace or decline all that which the Intellect clearly perceives; so that the Will is no∣thing but the free determination of the Mind to do any thing, or not to do the said thing, to affirm or deny a thing to be such or such.

VI. The defini∣tion of Will. And consequently Will in general may be de∣fin'd, a power which the Soul hath to determin and resolve about those things which it apprehends, which way soever it apprehends them.

VII. The Essence of Will con∣sists not in Indiffe∣rence. For this is the Nature of Will, that at the same time wherein True or False, Good or Bad is, by the Intellect, propos'd to it clearly and without confusion, it resolves, without any hesitation, to choose the one and reject the other; so that the Essence of it consists not, as some will have it, in Indifference to choose any thing, or not to choose it, since Will can never be said to be indifferent, except when the Object is not clearly and distinct∣ly propos'd to it, or when it knows not what it ought to resolve upon. For a Man is said to be indifferent, when few Reasons are propos'd to him, or such as are not sufficient to move him, to em∣brace one thing rather than another: whence it is said of a Sinner, that always some things are found indifferent in him; namely, a Sinner knows not clearly the Bad he is about to commit; or if he formerly knew it, he attends not, at the time he commits it, to the reasons which prove it to be bad; for if he perceiv'd it, it could not be that he should sin, according to that vulgar Axiom, The Will pursues no Evil as it is Evil.

VIII. But in De∣terminati∣on. On the contrary, when a man sees a thing clear∣ly, and without all obscurity to be convenient for him, it is almost impossible but that he should be carried with an inclination to it, so long as the judgment of the self same thing remains in the same person. So that Will, infallibly tends toward that which appears most convenient for it, so it be made clear and manifest to him. Nor is there less reason why it should be called Free, since as DESCARTES saith, in his fourth Medita∣tion, Neither is it necessary that I should be carried into both parts, to be free; but by how much the more I incline to one part•• either because I perceive True and Good more evi∣dently in that, or because GOD so inwardly disposes my thought, so much the more freely I

choose that. Neither indeed doth Divine Grace, or Natural Cognition ever diminish Liberty, but rather increase and confirm it. But that indiffe∣rence which I experiment, since no reason impells me to one part more than another, is the Lowest degree of Liberty, and witnesses no perfection therein, but only a defect, or a certain negation in Cognition. For if I could always see what is True and Good, I should never make any doubt, what is to be judged of it, or chosen out of it; so though I might be absolutely free, yet never indifferent.

IX. Memory, and in what it consists. By the name of Memory, so far as can be col∣lected from the descriptions of other faculties, is understood the Power which the Soul hath to con∣ceive, feel or imagin, that which it hath already conceiv'd, felt or imagin'd: And on the part of the Body, a certain facility which the Pores of the Ventricles of the Brain, which had before been relaxt by the Animal Spirits, have to open them∣selves again. For if we consider the Nature of those Species which are preserv'd in the Memory, we shall find that they are nothing but certain Ve∣stigia or Footsteps which the Agitation and Course of the Spirits leave among the Fibres of the Brain, almost in the same manner, as folds in a compli∣cated leaf of Paper retain a faculty of entertain¦ing again those forms which had been before imprest upon them; in regard that when the Spirits have a power of dilating the Pores of the Brain, of pleating, and variously disposing of the Filaments, through which they pass, according to the various motions in which they are carried, it comes to pass that the Pores have a certain power of drawing and directing the Spirits, so that at length they pass out through the same intervals, and in the same manner as formerly they went out; and so the said Spirits finding out those Pores, enter more easily into them than others; whence it happens that a man remembers any thing, when the said thing, having been formerly observ'd by him, hath left certain Vestigia in the Brain, by occasion whereof the said thing comes in mind.

X. How we come to be able some∣times to re∣peat a whole Ora∣tion. Whence no wonder, if, upon hearing a Nar∣ration, or reading an Oration, which we have committed to memory, we are able afterwards to repeat the same, and that in the same manner as we heard or read it; because, as upon making of folds in Paper, the first fold being made, the rest constituted in the same series easily follow, as ha∣ving regard to the said series. So that whatever Vestigium is first made in the Brain, the rest which have respect to that series, easily follow.

XI. How we come to re∣member those things which we had forgot. In like manner we remember things which we have forgotten, when we recollect a certain di∣stinct Vestigium in the Brain, according as it oc∣curs in the same series; from whence beginning to deduce and unwind the series, we proceed so far, till at length we discover that which, while hid, we enquir'd into. As in Paper, not meeting ea∣sily with some certain fold, we choose out some other distinct fold, occurring in the same series, from whence a deduction being begun, the fold which they hid is at length discovered.

XII. What things help Memory in the Brain. All Species which help the Memory, are especi∣ally in the Glandule (which we have formerly declar'd to reside in the midst of the Brain) in regard that it is the principal Seat of the Soul; though other parts of the Brain are also sometimes inservient to Memory; nay, even the Nerves like∣wise and Muscles, as is observable in a Minstrel or Musitian, who hath something of Memory at his Fingers ends, since his dexterity in the moving of them, and shifting them up and down, which he hath acquir'd by long use, helps his Memory to the finding out of those places, to the smiting whereof he is disposed; and for the same reason the Idea's of two things occur in the Mind, if they were both imprest together: For upon the beholding of any ones Countenance, immediately there occur, at one and the same time, Eyes, Nose, Forehead, Lips, &c. in regard when we beheld his Face, all those things appeared. Hence they who have once tasted of any Meat, wherein they have observed any thing that might hurt the Eyes, can never remember the said Meat, but that also will occur, that it offended the Sight. Neither can they endure to hear any other person speak∣ing of such sort of Meat, but they will be affect∣ed with the same aversion; the cause whereof is, that the Animal Spirits excite the same motion in the Glandule, which they excited, when they first beheld the Meat.

XIII. What Re∣miniscence is, and what it adds above the Memo∣ry. Reminiscence is an addition of something above Memory; for it is not enough to remember that the species of a thing is simply objected, but it is also necessary, that when it occurs to us the se∣cond time, we take notice, that it therefore so happens, because it had been presented to our view before; for indeed Reminiscence is nothing but the Resumption, by present Memory, of Cognition first had, and then afterwards Obliterated; and much of the like Nature is the inquiry and recovery of the Knowlegde of a Man whom we had forgot by reason of the present memory of Places, Plays, and the like; and consequently there is required to re∣miniscence, that the Images of things be partly obliterated, partly not: For we are then said to reminisce, when, from the Footsteps of the Ima∣ges which remain, we recollect something of those which were slipt from our Mind. Wherefore the whole difference which is between Memory and Reminiscence, consists only in this, that to Memo∣ry it suffices, if any species return upon the Glan∣dule, and that species be received without any re∣flection: But to Reminiscence, besides that recepti∣on of the thing, it is required, that the return thereof be known to us, and that we may have knowledge, that we had it, or perceived it before.

XIV. Conscience is included in all Knowledge. From what hath been said, may be easily col∣lected, that Conscience, or Self-knowledge is in∣volved in all Human Knowledge, and is insepara∣ble from it; for Conscience is so manifest and in∣trinsecal to the Mind, that it cannot be abstracted from it; but upon that very account, it may be affirmed to be destitute of Sense and Knowledge, properly so called; for that which acts and suffers, and yet knows not that it acts or suffers, may be justly said to want sense in the said action or pas∣sion; as is clearly demonstrated in those who be∣ing wholly intent upon any thing, or being mo∣ved with anger, perceive not; for examples sake, the sound of a Bell, or any thing presented to the sight, and consequently neither are sensible of, nor acknowledge any of those things. From whence it appears, that Conscience is a certain Species of Cogitation, namely that immanent or inhering action of a thinking substance, by which it knows

that it hath a real Cognition or perception of any thing. Forasmuch as Conscience seems to be no other thing but the mind indued with knowledge, as well of it self, as of its own Cogitation: whence CICERO in the 3d. Book of his Of∣fices; When, saith he, a Matter is to be propos'd to a person sworn, he is to remember that he hath GOD for a witness of what is said to him; that is to say, according to my Judgment, his own Mind. Whence it follows that we are convinced by Conscience, as by a clear and distinct Know∣ledge.

XV. Even in false Judg∣ments. Nor is it against our assertion, to say that the Mind is able to form various Judgments, even tho' false, concerning its own perception, and intelle∣ction; because the Mind is never deceived in this, namely, that it should know or understand, at that time when it thinks that it knows and com∣prehends. In regard this Perception or Cogitation is always perfected by the Mind in the Mind, and therefore it cannot be, that when I think that I receive any thing with my Ears, I should not have such a perception; nay though it were possi∣ble, and should often happen that I should not hear at all, and the Organ of hearing should not be affected with any thing, so long that I think that it is affected; as we find it falls out in our Dreams: So that in all Cognition, two things chiefly are to be observed; the first is Conscience, which is that Animadversion whereby we mark, or take notice of any thing; the other is that which is said to be Animadverted or observed, and is all that which is immediately apprehended by the Mind, and which in the first and second part of this Insti∣tution we have often call'd Idea.

XVI. What Wit is. Now since the Indowments of Wit have also re∣gard to the Soul, it may be here inquired, what Wit is, and whence so great a diversity of Wits arises, and why some men are more propense to certain Studies, and certain peculiar managements of Life than others. As to the first, some so describe Wit, as to call it a power implanted in man to understand, act and govern himself and others, to be approved in Vertues, or commit Vices; in all which generally one man very much excels ano∣ther. In fine, Wit seems scarce to differ from Ingenui∣ty or Aptness, and thereupon it may probably be said that it chiefly depends upon the Organs of the Body, and the disposition and contexture of the Fibres.

XVII. Whence a∣rises the Diversity of Wits As to the second, concerning the Variety of Wits, It can by no means or possibility be imputed to the diversity of Souls; for in regard all Souls are Intellectual and Incorporeal, and own no Au∣thor but GOD alone, they seem, according to Nature, to be altogether equal, (unless GOD for some certain ends should design to produce some more perfect than others) and then all the inequality which is deprehended in them, must proceed from the variety of the Organs, and espe∣cially of the Brain: We understand not human reason pure and abstracted from the Body, but the same so far as it is perfected or hindred, in any manner, by the disposition of the Body.

XVIII. What are the Indow∣ments of Wit. So DES CARTES in the begining of his Dissertation, concerning the method of rightly using Reason, reckons up three qualities of Wit; Cele∣rity of Thinking, Facility of distinctly Imagin∣ing, and Capacity and use of Memory: Nor does he acknowledge, that he knows any other qualities different from these, by which Wit can be rendred more excellent. But right Reason or a good Mind, that is, a Power of judging incorruptly and discerning true from false, he concludes to be equal in all, and distinguishes it from Wit.

XIX. Celerity of Thinking depends upon the Spirits. Now whence should the Celerity of Thinking proceed, but from the agility and promptitude of the Spirits? for we see Men frequently after a chirp∣ing cup of Wine, to become more chearful; and indued as it were, with a new faculty of Think∣ing; whence that trite Adage, with litle variation from Horace, Rich Wines make even Fools Philo∣sophers. On the contrary, we see others of an acute Understanding and Sagacity of Wit, upon taking a Cup too much▪ or upon the Brain being ill affected, by never so small an indisposition, to become Heavy, Dull and Stupid, and very much unlike themselves, as to what they appear at other times, which certainly argues that the Celerity of Thinking, depends much upon the disposition of the Body, and that the inequality of the Opera∣tions proceeds from the inequality of the Or∣gans.

XX. The faci∣lity of di∣stinctly Imagin∣ing, and capacity of Memory ariseth from the disposition of the Bo∣dy. In like manner the Facility of distinctly Imagin∣ing, and the capacity of Memory having regard to the internal Sense, are acquired chiefly by use, and rendred familiar by long habit and custom; whence we find by experience, that not all Men are carried with the like proclivity to certain kinds of Studies, but that as in some Men there is one sort of ingenuity, in others another: So there is a various promptitude to attain to Sciences; for they that are prevalent in Imagination, are very comprehensive of Mathematical Demonstrations, but have not happy success in Metaphysicial Spe∣culations; which happens not for want of Ratio∣cination; but because in Mathematicks Imagina∣tion only, not Ratiocination is made use of. So DES CARTES Part 2. Epist. 33. That part of Wit, namely Imagination, which is chiefly con∣ducible in Mathematicks, burts more than profits in Metaphysical Speculations. The diversity there∣fore of Wits ariseth from the constitution of the Organs, and from the temperament of the Brain and Spirits; which disposition, nevertheless, in regard it varies infinite ways; no wonder some Genous's are most inclined to Philosophy, others follow Mathematicks, others Musick. &c.

CHAP. VI. Of the Affections or Passions of the Mind.

I. That the Passions of the Soul are distin∣guisht from the Senses. HAving treated apart of the Nature of the Body and Soul, and distinguisht the Functi∣ons of both, it remains that we say something of the Passions which are peculiar to Man, to whom nevertheless they are no otherwise Attributed, but as he consists of Body and Soul; for those Affe∣ctions and Operations being neither belonging to the Mind alone, nor to the Body alone, proceed meerly from the Union and confederacy of Mind and Body; such as are the Passions, which are cal∣led Affections and Commotions of the Mind; be∣cause it is the Mind, which they principally shake and divers ways impel and disturb: For tho' the Senses depend also upon the said Union of Body and Soul, yet they gently insinuate them∣selves

into the Mind, and relate not so much to the Soul as to External Objects, by which also they may be deceived and drawn into an Error; but the Affections of the Soul are inward, and so adhere to it, that it cannot have experience of them any other way but as they are; whence it comes that they who are in a deep Sleep, seem to behold certain things with open Eyes, and to suffer those things in the Body which no way touch us: Yet nevertheless, it can be no way brought to pass, that we should feel our selves sad or deeply in Love, but that there must be really such a commotion in us, and that we are affected not with a Feigned, but Genuin Love or Sadness.

II. The defini∣tion of Pas∣sion. Wherefore the Passions of the Soul are thus best desined: The Perceptions, or Senses, or com∣motions of the Soul, which are referr'd especially to it, and which are produc'd, conserved and corro∣borated by a certain motion of the Spirits. They are first called Perceptions, because that name is common to all Cogitations; and we use it to signi∣fie all Cogitations, which are produc'd without the Concourse of the Will, and which are excited by impressions lest in the Brain; for whatsoever is not Action, ought to be called Passion.

III. Each part of the de∣finition ex∣plicated. Next, they are called Senses, because they come to the Soul after the manner of Senses, and are of the number of those Cognitions, which by that streight bond that is between Soul and Body are rendred confused: But by a special term they are called Commotions of the Soul, in regard we are taught by our own experience; that no Cogita∣tions enter into our Soul, which so much disturb and move it as those do. It is moreover added, that they are especially referr'd to the Soul, to distinguish them which come from exteriour Ob∣jects, or arise from interiour dispositions of the Body, as the preceptions of Colours, Odours, Sounds, &c. which are referred to External Objects; Hunger, Thirst, Pain which are referred to our Body.

IV. Passions de∣pend upon the con∣course of the Spirits. Lastly, it is concluded that those Passions are produc'd, Nourisht and Corroborated, by a certain peculiar motion of the Spirits; to distinguish them from the proper Acts of our Will, which indeed may be called the commotions of the Soul, and also such as may be referr'd to the Soul, but which are not produc'd from the Spirits, but from the Soul it self. Whereas, in the Passions the Animal Spirits proceeding from the Heart, are carried into the Brain; and from their commotions ariseth the perturbation of the Soul, and being risen is conserv'd, so long as the Animal Spirits passing the same way, agitate the Mind by the same rea∣son; and upon their increase, the commotion of the Mind may so increase as to be excited by them, not only to judge, but vehemently to desire, and sometime to grow Mad.

V. How Hu∣man Pas∣sions are distinguisht from the Affections of a sepa∣rate Soul or Angel. Whence the Passions which are incident to Man, as he is composed of Soul and Body, are distinguisht from those which are belonging to a Separate Soul, or Angel; for there is no doubt, but that a Soul dislodg'd from the Body is toucht with various Affections, and is lya∣ble to divers kinds of Motions: For see∣ing it hath a clear and distinct knowledge of things, it may also have motions attending the said Cognition; and so long as in those things it de∣prehends good or evil, it may refer them to it self, and consequently prosecute them with Love or Hatred: For if it obtain that good which it hath judged convenient for it self, there cannot but arise much Joy thereupon; but if it find it self deprived thereof, Sadness will follow: Yet those Passions differ from ours, because they are not joind with the motions of the Animal Spirits, which excite and conserve them in us. Nay, they arise in them by a clear and distinct Cognition which they have, of the thing which they look upon and behold as their good.

VI. Affections are call'd Passions in respect of the Soul, Actions in respect of the Body. But lest for the future any difficulty should a∣rise about the word Passions, we assert that Acti∣ons and Passions in Intellectual and Cogitative things, are no other than what they are in Cor∣poreal things; for as in a Material thing, Action and Passion consist in Local motion, being called Action when the motion is conceived to be in the Movent, and Passion, when it is considered to be in the thing moved; so in Incorporeals, Action is said to be, that which holds on the Movers side, as Volition in the Soul: Passion is that which keeps on the part of the thing moved, as Intellection and Vision in the same Soul. So the Affections which we take upon us here to describe, are called Pas∣sions in respect of the Soul to which they belong; but Actions in respect of the Body, which Acts immediately upon the Soul, and in its Actings ef∣fects mutation and variety.

VII. Passions ought to move the Soul. But because in Man there are found various Passions, and those Passions obtain several Names, according to the diversity of Agents: We say, those Passions are only considered by us, which proceed from some particular Agitation of the Spirits, and whose effects are as it were felt in the Soul; for tho' other impressions, which are formed in the Brain by External Objects; or which depend upon the Footsteps of former im∣pressions left in the Brain; or which by the or∣dinary course of the Animal Spirits, are pre∣sented to us Sleeping or Waking, may be called Passions; that is, so far as they are excited in the Soul without the concurrence of the Will: Yet to speak properly, they are not so much to be called Passions, as Habits, or Propensions which dis∣pose to some Passion, since they move not the Soul, nor depend, or are cherisht by any special course of the Animal Spirits.

VIII. Thevario••s causes of Affections. First Tem∣perament. Although the Agitation of the Spirits, may be called the proximate cause of our Affections, yet there are other remoter causes, which may be as∣signed, as the Temperament of our Body, which conduces not a little to the exciting of Passions in the Brain; since it is in the stead of Disposition, and after a sort impells the Soul to follow its pro∣pensions: Hence, those who have their Body any way disposed to Love, easily suffer their Minds to be drawn away to those Cogitations, by which they are excited to the said effect.

IX. The second cause of Passions is the Objects. The second Principle is those Objects, which incur into our Senses; as any terrible Figure ex∣cites the Passion of terrour in the Soul; whereas a grateful Figure which courteth the Eyes, caus∣eth Joy and Benevolence, in regard the motions convey'd from External things to the Brain, va∣riously dispose the Spirits thereof, and thereupon there arise different Affections in us: So that who ever desires any thing of us with a smooth Tongue, down-cast Eyes, and a Body disposed to Humility, will more easily obtain his desire of us, than ano∣ther,

who on the contrary, with a severe Counten∣ance, an imperious Tone of Voice, and more like a Commander than a Suppliant demands the same.

X. The third is the Acti∣on of the Soul. The third Cause, is the Action of the Soul it self, as often as according to its innate Liberty, it proposes such or such Objects to be considered, in the long meditation where the Passions a∣rise.

XI. The fourth cause is the first dispo∣sition of the Body. The fourth Cause is, the first Disposition of the Body in regard not only Affections; may be ex∣cited in us by Rational motions of the Mind, whilest it knows what to prosecute with Love or Hatred; but also by those first Dispositions of the Body, that procreate those obscure Sensations of Good and Evil, which happens to the Body, as DESCARTES intimates in his Epistles. Be∣hold, saith he, four Passions, Joy, Love, Sadness and Hatred, which I suppose being first in us, we had before our Birth, and judge them to be no other than very confused Sensations or Cogitations; in regard the Soul was so tied to Matter, that it could not yet attend but to those divers impressions, that were to be received from it: And tho' after some years, it began to be affected with other Joys, and other Loves than those which depend only upon a right Disposition, and convenient Aliment of the Body; nevertheless that which was Intel∣lectual in its Joys and Loves, had always conco∣mitant those Senses which the said Passions first excited in it; yea, and those Natural motions and functions which were then in the Body.

XII. Which ap∣pears in Love. So by reason, that before the Nativity Love did not arise but from a convenient Aliment, which flowing in great plenty into the common Ocean, the Heart and Lungs, excited in them a greater heat than usual; hence it is, that the said heat always accompanies Love, tho' proceeding from far different Causes.

XIII. Three de∣grees to be observ'd in the Passions Now we may observe, that there is a three∣fold degree in the Affections of the Mind, an∣swerable to a threefold degree of the Senses. The first is the commotion or alteration of the Heart, the Blood and the Animal Spirits: The second being a consequent from the first, is the percep∣tion of the Mind. And lastly, an access of per∣turbation of Mind, so far as it precipitates incli∣nation or aversion of Judgment or Will, is the third degree in the Affections.

CHAP. VII. In what part of the Body the Soul receives its Passions.

I. The Soul is joind to the whole Body. FRom what hath been said, is sufficiently mani∣fest, that Human Soul is joind to the whole Body, and that the motions thereof so depend up∣on its Cogitations, that they may be said to make one compound. Hence that common saying among Philosophers, That the Soul is whole in the whole Body, and whole in each part thereof: Not that the Soul can positively, and by true extension be found in each part of the Body, for that is repug∣nant to immaterial Substance, such as we have al∣ready demonstrated Human Mind to be; but because the Body is one certain thing, and in a certain peculiar Sense Individual, namely in respect of the disposition of the Organs; all which are so mutually related one to another, that any one being taken away, the Body is thereby ren∣dred maimed and imperfect; and since such is the Nature of the Soul, that it is void of all Extension and Dimensions, it can be referr'd to no Member of the Body so as to equal its quantity, but only to the whole Compages of the Organs which is con∣sidered as one; whence it comes to pass, that any part of the Body being cut off, the Soul could not be conceived a jot less, nor if any could be added, a jot greater.

II. Human Mind is in a peculiar manner in the brain. But tho' the Soul were joind to the whole Body, yet it could be said more intimately and immedi∣ately to be united to one part than another. Thus GOD, tho' he be diffused through the whole World, and by his Power in a manner fills all places, yet in a peculiar way he may be said to be in Heaven, where he Governs and Rules all things as he pleaseth. So we say, that Human Mind resides in the Brain, as in the upper part or Cittadel of the Body; and that not promiscuously neither in all its Parts, but more especially it hath its Seat in the Conarion, whose office it is to receive the Ani∣mal Spirits, and to unite in it self the Images pro∣ceeding from Corporeal Organs: For this is that part, wherein the Soul most proximately and espe∣cially exerciseth its Functions, by perceiving and willing all things which proceed from the Body, or have their tendency into it.

III▪ Of what use the Glandule in the Brain is. The reason why such a Glandule is asserted to be in the Brain, and to be the Seat of the Common Sense, I have already declared, to which others may be added, whereof this is not the most incon∣siderable, that our Soul is one and undivided, and consequently it seems most consentaneous to reason, that that part of the Body to which it is immedi∣ately joined be also one; and since there is no part in the Brain besides this Glandule which is not double, it seems most probable to be the Seat of the Soul; and that which conduces not a little to the confirming of this Opinion is, that this pineal Glandule is as it were ••eated in its Throne, from whence it may, as I may so say, have a fair pro∣spect into all the 4 Ventricles of the Brain, and so may easily receive impressions from the Nerves that come from all parts: Moreover this Glandule is sufficiently agile and moveable, as being hung upon two Nervous strings, so that it may be moved this way or that way, according to the arbitrement of the Mind; which is the thing chiefly required in the common Sensorium, for otherwise the Spirits could not tend one way more than another.

IV. That the Passions chiefly re∣side in the Brain. These things thus briefly stated, it must be concluded, that the Passions have their chief resi∣dence in the Brain, not in the Heart, as some would have it; since when ever there are Cogita∣tions or Senses, as above noted, they are produc'd by the Mind in the Brain; nor is what we affirm rendred invalid by saying, that the Passions, which are always accompanied by some commotion of the Blood and Spirits, may be as it were felt in the Heart, for that so happens because all the Nerves of our Body, are extended as certain Filaments into all parts of the Body: So that when it suffers Pain in any of the Members, for Exam∣ples sake, in the Foot or Leg, it is not to be imagined that the Soul makes use of its faculties in those parts; but rather that it feels Pain, by

the ministry of those Nerves which are extended from the said Members to the Brain. No other∣wise than when one end of an extended Rope is drawn, the other is immediately moved, as hath been above declar'd.

V. In what Order the Passions are form'd. So the Blood being well tempered, and expand∣ing it self more than usually in the Heart, the little Nerves being diffused about its Orifices are so loosened and agitated, that there follows thence another motion, which affects the Mind with a certain Natural Sense of hilarity or chearfulness. So upon the imagination of the fruition of any good, the Spirits are sent from the Brain to the Muscles, and by their help the Orifices of the Heart are dilated, and its Nervules mov'd in that motion, from whence the sense of Joy cannot but follow. In like manner, upon the receipt of a grateful message, as soon as the Mind perceives it, the Spirits, from the Brain, flow to the Muscles of the Bowels, and there moving the Nervules, by their means excite another motion in the Brain, which affects the Mind with a lively sense of Joy. And by the same reason, the senses of Sadness, Love, Hatred, Anger, Fear, &c. are communica∣ted to the Brain through the Nervules of the Bowels, and there immediately, and most especially affect the Mind, and consequently reside therein, as in their primary Seat; but in the Heart and other parts affected by them, as in their secundary Seat.

VI. It is not ne∣cessary that the Soul be in the Heart, thereby to perceive Passions. Therefore whilst in the perturbations of the Mind, we observe a certain alteration, as it were, inhering in the heart; we must certainly conclude, that our Mind perceives not but by the help of some Nervule which reaches from the Brain to the Heart; and there is no more necessity that the Soul should immediately exercise its functions in the Heart, because it feels its Passions therein, than that it should be in Heaven as often as it perceives the Rays, and the Globular Pression made by the Sun.

VII. The more vehement Motions of the Spirits may di∣sturb the Soul. Hence it often happens, that divers affections arise in the Soul, namely, when the Spirits are otherwise disposed by the Mind, than by the Ob∣jects, or their own temperament. In regard that Human Mind, tho' it be wholly rational, yet does it not always make good use of its own reason, but is greatly disturbed by external things; so that the Body by its Spirits, and the Soul it self by its Will may excite different Motions; and herein con∣sists those conflicts which are vulgarly said to in∣terceed between the lower and upper part of the Soul. For since all our perceptions, as well those which proceed from the Will, as those which de∣pend upon the Impulses of the Spirits, contain something evident in them, that may invite to prosecute this or that Object; this by Love, that by Hatred: the Glandule may be drawn one way by the Soul, another way by the Animal Spirits; from which different motions, the Soul feels it self alternately inclin'd, one while to take one part, another while the other; and in this one thing con∣sists their repugnance: yet not so, as that the Soul can at one and the same time be carried two con∣trary ways, or the Glandule be at the same mo∣ment inclin'd to opposite parts, but only upon this account, that the force wherewith the Spirits in∣cline the Glandule on one side, and wherewith the Mind struggles with its Will on the other side, hath this effect, that the Soul, almost at one moment, feels it self stirr'd up to have an affecti∣on, and aversion for one and the same Ob∣ject.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Order and Number of the Passions.

I. Passions are made diffe∣rent from their Ob∣jects. ALthough the Soul depends not upon Corpo∣real Objects, so as to think, and without any material Species, to be able to comprehend all sorts of things: And tho' in the forming of the Passions, it sometimes makes use of its own intelligent faculty alone, and can at pleasure apply it self to conceive sometimes one Object, sometimes another; yet it is manifest from what hath been said before, that the passions may also be excited by Objects which move the Sense: Nay, and that these Ob∣jects are the most especial and common principles: so that to find passions, there needs nothing but to weigh the nature of the Objects, and to take no∣tice of the Effects which proceed from them. But because in man they are many and various, and many times so confus'd among themselves, that they can scarce be distinguisht from each other; we must mind the diversities of Objects which pre∣sent themselves to our Senses, that by the percepti∣on of them, we may the more easily arrive at the knowledge of those affections which are begotten in us. Yet there is no necessity that all the diver∣sities of Objects should be examined; but those alone which can either profit or hurt us, or any other way be relating to us.

II. The Soul is void of partition, and conse∣quently ill divided in∣to Irascible and concu∣piscible. Wherefore the better to enumerate the Passions, we are only to take notice how many several ways Objects may concern us, or may act upon our Senses, so as to profit or hurt us. Nothing is more frequent in Schools, than to take the Soul in pieces and to divide it, I know not by what Art, into Sensitive and Rational, by which they constitute two Appetites in the sensitive part of the Soul; whereof one they call concupiscible, which resides in the Body, and tends wholly to its Conservati∣on; the other Irascible, which comes nearer to Reason, and supplies it with strength and vigor. But hence arose this Error of assigning 2 persons as it were in a Scene, that they did not carefully distingui••h the Functions of the Soul and Body, but attributed to the Soul those Offices which belong to the Body only. For whatsoever opposes Reason, cannot proceed but meerly from the Body, which comes to pass when the Animal Spirits, which are also Bodies, hit by an opposite way upon the Glan∣dule, and by their power endeavour to hinder the effect of the Soul. For in one Body there is to be considered but one Soul, void of all parts, and be∣ing but one and the same, called both Sensitive and Rational.

III. There are divers fa∣culties in the Soul. But if those Authors, who admit 2 Appetites in the Soul, only mean this, that the Soul is indued with 2 Functions, the one of Lusting, the other of being Angry, we shall not gainsay them; but whereas it hath the faculties not only of being Angry, and being Concupiscent, but also the fa∣culty of Admiring, Hoping, Fearing, there seems to be no reason that all affections should be re∣ferred to Concupiscence or Anger; when as Ad∣miration,

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Book. 1. Part. 9. Chap. 9.

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which is the primary Affection, hath no relation either to Concupiscence or Anger.

IV. Admirati∣on the first Passion that occurs to us. Therefore another way must be found out to enumerate the Passions; and in my mind there can be none more convenient, and more certain, than for all the motions of the Mind, which occur to us, to be considered in their Order. For as soon as any thing presents it self to us, or appears un∣der any species which hath no similitude with any thing we knew before, it causes the Soul to be surpris'd at the sight thereof, and to remain some time in contemplation upon it; and in regard this may possibly happen before we have well consider∣ed whether the said thing represented to us be good or bad for us, it hence follows that Admiration is to be accounted the first of all those Affections which are inbred in us; but since it happens that we either admire the excellency of any admirable Object, or contemn the despicableness of any other, either Esteem or Contempt must needs accompany this Admiration, and by this means Magnanimi∣ty or Abjection of Spirit are created in us; name∣ly, while we either extol our selves for some just cause, or contemn our selves for that pusillanimity which we find to be in us: But when we esteem greatness of Action in other persons, whom we esteem capable of doing Good or Ill to Mankind; from such an esteem as this proceeds Veneration.

V. The next are Love, Hatred, Cu∣••idity, ••ope, and ••he like. In the next place, when the Soul considers un∣der some qualification an Object of Good or Evil, that is, of what is either agreeable or ungrateful to us, having no regard to difference of time therein, it excites either to Love or Hatred; for asmuch as Love is an Affection of Union, as Ha∣tred is of Separation. But when respect is had to time, that is, when a man is more carried on to the Contemplation of the future, than of the pre∣sent or past time; a future Object is expected, ei∣ther as only possible, or moreover as easie or hard to be obtained. From the former consideration is kindled Cupidity, by which not only the presence of an absent Good, and the conservation of what is possest is desired, but also the Absence of an Evil, as well present as in apprehension. But if a thing be represented, not only upon the account of pos∣sibility, but also as easie of acquisition, it begets Hope, the utmost degree whereof is Trust or Se∣curity. But if it be lookt upon as difficult to be obtain'd, it creates Timidity or Fear, the utmost degree whereof is Despair: Hitherto may be re∣ferred Doubtfulness or Fluctuation of Mind, when we dispose our selves to deliberate or enter upon Counsel.

VI. Here fol∣low those Passions which con∣sider Good and Evil as present. Lastly, when Good and Evil, as being consi∣dered to have relation to us, are present, they produce 2 other Effects; the first Joy, the other Sorrow or Sadness. But when we look upon them as relating to others, we judge those persons either worthy or unworthy of so great a Good. If wor∣thy, it producess gladness in the Soul, either Seri∣ous or mixt with Derision: If unworthy, the good which attends upon them stirs up Envy or Heart∣burning in us; and if bad attend them, it stirs up Commiseration, which is a kind of sadness.

VII. Acquies∣cence, Peni∣tence, Glory, &c. In an Object past, or even also present, atten∣tion may be had to the Cause of Good or Evil. A Good which has been done by us, if it relate to opinion we have of it as Good, it begets an in∣ward acquiescence or contentment, which is the sweetest of all passions, and wonderfully delights the Soul; whereas an Evil done, if it relate to the Opinion we have of it as Evil, brings forth repen∣tance, which is the most troublesom of all the passions, and incessantly disturbs and afflicts the Soul. A Good done by us, as it relates to the Opinion which others conceive of it, produces Glory; on the contrary, Evil so relating, Shame and sense of Disgrace. If a Good be conferred upon us by another, we testifie our Gratitude to∣wards him: If the same Good be bestowed upon another, he is the Object of our Favour: On the other side, if an Evil be inflicted on others, it causes our Indignation; if on our selves, our An∣ger; which two last Affections may be said to be species of Hatred or Aversion. A long Duration or Continuance of Good induces Satiety or Loath∣ing; as on the contrary, Duration of Evil dimi∣nisheth Pain or Misery, and renders it more light and tolerable.

VIII. Desire, Hi∣larity, &c. Lastly, from a past Good, upon remembrance of the Joy thence received, there springs up Desire, as from an Evil happily surmounted, Hilarity ari∣seth, which may be referred to Joyfulness. Now altho' we have here enumerated several sorts of Passions, yet if they be each of them well consi∣dered and examined, it will soon appear, that ma∣ny of them are referrible to others as primitive ones, which are reckoned ony 6 in number, name∣ly Admiration, Love, Hatred, Cupidity or sensu∣al desire, Joy and Sadness: The rest are secunda∣ray, being either compounded of many of them, or referrible to them as to their Genus's.

CHAP. IX. Of Admiration.

I. Admirati∣on precedes all other Passions. ADmiration leads up a Troop of Passions, be∣ing the first and chief of all that affect Human Mind, and upon which all the rest, in some sort or other, depend. For as in other Functions of the Soul, Apprehension preceeds Judgment and Dis∣course, and it is necessary that some Object be re∣presented before such time as the Soul gives or de∣nies assent thereunto: So any thing whatsoever is perceived by Admiration, before any one can pro∣secute it with Love or Hatred, or can Covet it, or conceive Joy by the obtaining of it, or Sorrow by the want of it.

II. The defini∣tion of Ad∣miration. Now Admiration is a suddain impulse of the Mind, by which it is led to an attentive conside∣ration of those Objects which seem unwonted to it, and with the novelty whereof it is surpris'd. This Passion belongs to the Brain alone, and hath no commerce with any other parts of the Body, as other Passions have, which are referred to the heart, and which the motions of the Blood and Spirits ever accompany. That this is peculiar to Admi∣ration, may be collected from hence, namely, that when ever this Passion is imploy'd in the attention of the thing perceived, and only regards the no∣velty thereof, it hath no consideration therein ei∣ther of Good or Evil, and consequently hath no correspondence with the Heart and Blood, upon which the whole concern of the Body depends, but only with the Brain, in which are laid up all those Instruments which conduce to the forming of this Cognition.

III. What pro∣duces Ad∣miration. The Cause of this Affection is the very Impres∣sion made in the Brain, according as it represents some Extraordinary Object, worthy the Souls Em∣ployment and Attention. For the Novelty of the thing hath somewhat of Gratefulness, which takes the Beholders, and draws their Contemplation to it. Hence it comes to pass, that we admire all things that are Novel, and those always please most that came latest into our Sense. To confirm what hath been said, the motions of the Spirits are not a little conducing, which are dispos'd by that Impression, and with great Violence direct their Course to∣wards that part of the Brain in which it was form'd; and so far as they receive from it a dispo∣sition to pass into the Muscles, which serve to retain the Organs of the Senses in the same Po∣sition.

IV. The force and efficacy of Admi∣ration. Altho' Admiration takes beginning in the Brain, and is wholly employ'd in the Contemplation of a New and unwonted Object; yet nothing hinders, but that by the said Impression which it makes in the Brain, it may act upon our Body, and imitate the Efficacy of other Passions. Nay, sometimes it grows so prevalent, that it seizeth on our Body more strongly than they, and exercises its Power upon it much more forcibly; which chiefly pro∣ceeds from hence, namely that the Novelty from whence it springs, brings forth Motions the most prompt of all, and such as have their whole strength at the beginning. Nor can it be doubted, but that these sort of Motions are stronger, than those which are increas'd by degrees, and have no strength, but what they acquire by little and little. Since it is most certain, that such like Motions may either be averted, or stopt by little labour; whereas the sudden Surprizal of a New thing, admits of no such aversion, since it can scarce be discern'd, and insinuates it self in a moment. For as we can stir Hand or Foot almost in the same Moment in which we think of Moving them; in regard the Idea of this sort of Motion, which is form'd in our Brain, sends Spirits into the Mus∣cles, fit to effect that said Motion: So the Idea of a grateful Object, which comes unawares into the Mind, immediately by the help of the Nerves, sends Spirits, which opens the Orifices of the Heart. Nor does Admiration any thing else in this business, but by its Novelty add Strength to the Motion, and causes the Blood, which upon the sudden dilating of the Orifices of the Heart, flows through the Vena Cava into it, and goes out through the Vena Arteriosa, suddenly to inflate and expand the Lungs.

V. A Novelty affects the Brain in an un∣wonted manner. To which Reasons another also may be added, namely, That those Things which outwardly excite Admiration, when they are New, and have not yet arriv'd through our Senses to the Brain, strike it in some certain Parts, where it hath not been struck before; and since those Parts of the Brain are more soft and tender than the rest, it falls out that they receive the Stroak deeper, and the Affections of the Motions which are there begotten, are, by reason of their unwontedness, render'd more Vehement.

VI. Esteem and Contempt, Species of Admira∣tion. There are 2 Species of Admiration, Esteem and Contempt, which are not to be taken for simple Opinions, that without Passion may be entertain'd concerning the Value of any thing whatsoever, but for the Affections which arise from those Opinions: Esteem therefore is a pro∣pension of the Soul, produc'd by the Motion of the Spirits, to represent to its self the Value of any thing whatsoever. And Contempt is the opposite propension which the Soul hath to consider the Littleness or Vileness of the thing Contemn'd: which Passions may be referr'd not only to Exter∣nal Objects, but even to our selves; as namely, when we strictly enquiring into our selves, find Reason to suspect or despise our own Merit. But in regard we often flatter our selves, and judge that more laudable, which is done by our selves, than by others; it will be worth our while to understand what it is, for which we may entertain a Self-esteem. And truly, I can see nothing that I judge can be Entituled to this Merit, but the right use of our Free-will, and that Greatness of Soul by which we govern our Wills, and subdue them to the Yoak of Reason. Forasmuch as other Goods, which are out of our power, can conduce nothing to our Good, and consequently deserve not our Esteem or Praise. Only those Actions, which depend upon our Will, can confer upon us the Merit either of Praise or Dispraise; since by the use thereof we are render'd in a sort like to GOD, and come so much the nearer to his Image. In this alone true Generosity consists, when a Man well knowing that nothing properly is his own, except the free disposition of his Will, duly Va∣lues himself as he sees Cause, upon the right use of his Reason, and retains a firm purpose always to act those things which he shall judge to be most Excellent.

VII. What Ve∣neration is. Veneration, which considers Objects without us, is an Inclination of the Soul, by which it is carried, not only to Esteem the Person which it honours; but also to Subject it self to him with a certain Fear, for the sake of gaining his Favour. Whence it comes to pass, that Veneration proceeds only from the Consideration of Power, which we con∣ceive to be in a Free Agent, wherewith he is able either to benefit or hurt us; although all this while we know nothing of his Will, that is, we are not certain which of the two will befall us, Good or Harm. So in Old times, some venerated Mountains, Temples and Groves, not that they believ'd, that these Works of Art and Nature were GODS; but because they imagin'd, that certain Divinities lay hid in them, which might at their pleasure either do them Good or Hurt.

VIII. Effects of Dedigna∣tion. To this Passion, Dedignation or Disesteem is op∣pos'd, by which we despise Free Causes, though at the same time we judge them to have power of doing Good or Harm; because we think them so much beneath us, as not to be capable of Exe∣cuting their said Power upon us.

IX. An Excess of Admi∣ration be∣gets Stu∣pour. Stupour, or Amazement, is an Excess of Admi∣ration, which happens to us when a sudden Sur∣prizal causes the Spirits, which are included in the Cavities of the Brain, so to advance to that place in which the Image of the Object, which we admire, is form'd, as sometimes to carry all to the said place, and to make them so employ'd in Con∣serving that Image, that from thence to the Muscles, from those Vestigia which they first fol∣low'd in the Brain, no way lies open to any others. Whence it happens, that the Body remains wholly immoveable in that State wherein it first was;

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Book. 1. Part. 9. Chap. 10

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To the Right Noble Catherine Dutchess and Countess of Northumberland Viscountess Falmouth & Baroness of Pontefract &c.^a.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome

and nothing but the first Image, which first oc∣curr'd to the Mind, can be deprehended, nor can a more exact Knowledge thereof be thereby gain'd.

CHAP. X. Of Love and Hatred.

I. Why Love and Ha∣tred are to be treated of together. ALtho' Hatred be oppos'd to Love, and they both of them never agree in the same Per∣son, about the same Object, nevertheless it is Expe∣dient to joyn both together in this one Chapter, that by comparing the Nature of them both, one with another, it may the more appear wherein they most chiefly differ.

II. The Defini∣tion of Love. LOVE is defined, a Perception or Commotion of the Soul, generated by a special Motion of the Spirits, whereby it is excited to joyn it self by its Will to those things which seem grateful to it. On the contrary, HATRED is a Commotion of the Soul, produc'd by the Spirits, by which it is incited to separate it self, by its Will, from Objects which are represented as ungrateful and noxious to it. But in regard the Soul applies it self to those things which it judges Good, and is averted from the very same things, so far as they are re∣presented to it under the Notion of Evil; not only by Love and Hatred, but also by Judg∣ment; we add, that Love and Hatred are caus'd by the Motion of the Spirits, which is peculiar to all Passions, and which separates them from other Perceptions of the Soul. To joyn our selves by Will to any Object, is not to tend to that which is future, and to covet it as a thing absent; but to consent by Affection, which happens when we consider our selves, as it were already joyn'd to the thing belov'd, that is, when we conceive our selves to make up, as it were, one Total with it, and whereof we think our selves to be but one part, and the Beloved thing another. But in Hatred, we consider our selves as a Total, wholly separated from the Object.

III. What things pro∣duce Love or Hatred. The Causes of these Affections, are Objects which may be represented to the Soul by the Inter∣nal Senses, to wit, its own proper Reason. For that is generally accounted Good or Evil, which is judg'd by our Internal Senses, either agreeable or contrary to our Nature. Or else by the External Senses, by which the Beauty or Deformity of things is apprehended. For we commonly judge those things Beautiful or Deformed, that court or offend our Sight; which, in that particular, ex∣cells all the rest of our Senses. Hence we are inclin'd to things beautiful and fair by that part of Love, which may rightly be call'd Complacence. Evil and Deformed things, we prosecute with Hatred and Horrour. The said Love may also be called Benevolence, in regard we affect not all things with the same Affection: For according to the Esteem we have of them, we love some things more, and some things less; whence Philosophers have been forc'd to invent several Names, for the making a distinction between some sorts of Love and others.

IV. There are three sorts of Love. For when we set a less Value on any Object, than upon our selves, and think it inferiour to us, we may be said to have a Propension, or sort of Benevolence towards it. When we have the same Value for it as for our selves, and Opinion of Merit makes no difference between us and that, we are tied to it by that which we call Friendship. But if we place more Worth and Merit upon the Object, and admire it above our selves, it becomes the Object of our Devotion, Reverence, or Worship. So that Love may be di∣stinguish'd into Benevolence, Friendship, and De∣votion, as into three species or diversities, wherein it wholly consists: For things Inanimate, or Ani∣mals void of Reason, may be belov'd; but no such thing as Friendship can be, but between Man and Man; that is, not as to the Sex, but as be∣tween one Human Creature and another; in whom it is so innate to be United each to other, that neither of them can be so vile or contemptible in the others Eyes, as not to be thought worthy to be joyn'd to the other by some Tye or Relation, provided he know that he is belov'd and be in∣dued with a generous Spirit.

V. Devotion is chiefly directed to the Deity. But by Devotion we are affected most chiefly to the Supream Deity, whom if we knew to that degree as were fit, we could not but love, tho' it may be said that Subjects to their Prince, Natives to their Country, Citizens or Towns-men to the City or Town where they were born or bred, are carried with a sort of Devotion, as Valuing the said Objects thereof above themselves, and thinking it their Duty to expose, if need be, their own Lives upon their account.

VI. The Causes of Love are in di∣vers Parts of the Body. The Cause of Love and Hatred, as also of the three other Passions, is not, as that of Admiration, in the Brain alone; but also in the Heart, Liver, Spleen, and other Parts of the Body, which con∣duce to the generation of the Blood, and the con∣veyance of the Spirits thence. For altho' the Blood is carried to the Heart through the Veins, by a Circular motion; yet sometimes it happens to be impell'd into it with a more violent Force through some Veins, than through others. It happens also, that the Passages by which the Blood enters into the Heart, or by which it issues out of it, are by some Accident or other, made more wide or more narrow. Hence in Love there arises a Notable agitation of the Blood and Spirits, when the Im∣pression of the Lovely Object, form'd in the Brain, conveys the Animal Spirits through the Nerves of the 9th Conjugation, to the Muscles of the Stomach and Intestines, that so the Chyle or Alimental Juice, which by an iterated Circuit passing through the Heart, is turn'd into Blood, may pass on very swiftly to the Heart, and makes no stay either in the Vicine parts, or elsewhere; but with a rapid Course entring into it, stir up a more than ordinary fierce heat or fire therein: Because then the Blood becomes rarefied, and sends the more enlivened Spirits into the Brain; which Spirits corroborating the Impression which the first Perception of the amiable Object forms, Cause the Soul to rest in that Perception, and to take notice of the said Object, as acceptable and good.

VII. Hatred proceeds from diffe∣rent Causes. On the contrary in Hatred, the first perception of the thing we have an aversation to, so draws down the Spirits which are about the Intestins and Stomach, that they hinder the Chyle from mixing with the Blood, that is, by Compressing all the Orifices, by which it uses to flow down thither, and at the same time transmits some of this Chyle

through the Nerves of the Milt, and lower part of the Liver, which is the receptacle of Choler, with other Blood to the Heart, which causes no small inequality in its Heat, because the Blood that proceeds from the Milt, hardly suffers al∣teration, and can scarce be Heated or Dilated: Whereas the Blood that proceeds from the lower part of the Liver, which is the receptacle of the Gall, is rarefied and expanded in a Moment. Wherefore the Spirits transmitted from the Heart toward the Brain, consist of parts of different Vertue, and are agitated with unequal motions. Whence it comes to pass, that they there corrobo∣rate and fortifie the Thoughts of Hatred, which they find newly formed, and weary the Soul with thoughts of Melancholy and Sourness.

VIII. Various ef∣fects of Love. There are reckoned up many effects of Love, as the Pulse of the Arteries being equal and more intent and vehement than usual; a calm Heat glowing in the Heart; a suddain Concoction of the Meat in the Stomach, and the like; but the most principal of all, and which most chiefly re∣quires our consideration, is a kind of Languishment, which is no other than a certain proclivity to a cessation of motion, which proceeds from hence, namely, that the Pineal Glandule disposes not the Spirits, which are in the Cavities of the Brain, to flow into one Muscle rather than another. This Languour is produc'd by Love, when the thing de∣sired cannot for the present be obtained, for then Love so detains the Soul in the Cogitation of the beloved Object, that it makes use of all the Spi∣rits in the Brain, to represent to it the Idea there∣of, and stops all other motions of the Glandule which conduce not to this effect.

CHAP. XI. Of Affections.

I. Cupidity no less di∣sturbs us than those Passions that re∣spect the future. SInce all the Affections of the Soul, except Ad∣miration, tend towards Good and Evil, and are given us by nature, for the aiming at what is profitable, and rejecting of what is hurtful to us; it is to be considered how many ways it may be done: For since in Love and Hatred, there is no respect had of time, and only the convenience or inconvenience of the Object is lookt upon, these Passions seem to agitate, no less than those which tend towards the future, and seek after the Object with a kind of Anxiety: Hence the Cogi∣tations of young Men which regard things to come, are more precipitous, and more sharply molest and disquiet their Minds, such as are Hope, Fear, Jealousy, &c. which are species of Cupidity.

II. What Cu∣pidity is, and how it compre∣hends as well an aversation of Evil as desire of Good. Cupidity therefore or desire is a commotion of the Soul produc'd by the Spirits, whereby it is carried towards Good as a thing to come, by which Pas∣sion we not only wish for an absent thing, whose presence we judge convenient for us, but likewise the conservation of the thing possessed; nay, if we strictly inquire into the Nature of Cupidity, we by it no less desire the absence of an Evil not pre∣sent, than the presence of that which is Good, and which we apprehend may possibly happen, so that Cupidity comprehends not only the desire of Good, but also the declining or aversation of E∣vil: For as much as to speak properly, there is one and the same agitation of Mind, by which at the same time we are moved to aim at some Good, for Example sake, Honours, and to decline a contrary Evil, that is to say, Ignominy or Dis∣grace: For since there is no assignable Good, whose privation is not an Evil, nor any Evil, if it be considered under a positive respect, whose priva∣tion is not a real Good, there seems no reason to distinguish between that Appetite by which we affect the Good, and that by which we decline and reject its contrary.

III. The Differ∣ence be∣tween a∣voiding E∣vil, and desiring Good. All the difference that can be conceived in them, proceeds only from the Passions which ac∣company this various desire, namely, because to the Cupidity by which we tend to any Good, there are annext Love, Hope, Joy, &c. and to the same Cupidity, by which we are carried to the Aver∣sation of any Evil, there are joyn'd Hatred, Fear and Sadness; wherefore if Cupidity be considered according as it tends to the Prosecution of Good, or Aversation of its contrary Evil, it cannot be a double Passion, but only one, which executes both parts.

IV. This Pas∣sion is pro∣duc'd by the Animal Spirits. The causes of this Passion are the Animal Spi∣rits, which pass from the Heart to the Brain, and seem to cherish and preserve the Image there first impress't. For as soon as the Soul hath a Will to acquire some Good, which is grateful to it, or to remove some Evil; immediately it Transmits the Spirits, by the help of the Glandule to all parts of the Body, especially to the Heart, that, so much the greater plenty of Blood as is received within its Cavities, so much the greater quantity of Spirits may be conveyed to the Brain, as well to conserve, and corroborate therein the Image of the Will, as to move those Muscles that are ne∣cessary for the gaining of that which is desired; whence it comes to pass, that when the Mind de∣sires any thing, the whole Body is rendred more Agile, and becomes more chearful to execute all the offices of the Body, than at other times it uses to be; namely, because the Heart being more ve∣hemently agitated, supplies the Brain with the more Spirits, which taking their course thence to the Muscles, cause the Senses to become more vivacious, or the Members of the Body more dis∣posed to motion.

V. The sever∣al species of Cupidi∣ty. To Cupidity or Desire, as hath been said, are reduced Hope, Fear, Jealousy, Security, Despera∣tion, Fluctuation of Mind, Animosity, Boldness, Emulation, Pusillanimity and Consternation.

VI. The Defi∣nition of Hope. Hope is a disposition of the Soul, produc'd by a special motion of the Spirits, to believe that that will come to pass, which it desires. So that no Object can stir up Hope, unless it be represented to the Mind, as easie to be obtained.

VII. Of Fear. Fear, is another disposition of the Mind, by it perswades it self that that which it desires, will not come to pass: These two Passions however they are opposed, may nevertheless be found in the same, and at the same time, namely, when any one is perswaded by different Reasons, by some, that the Object he desires may be easily, by others, difficultly acquir'd.

VIII. Of Jealou∣sie. Jealousie, which is referr'd to Fear, is the Fear of losing a good which we greatly esteem, pro∣ceeding from the least causes of suspecting; or when led by suspicion only, we fear to lose a cer∣tain good.

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Book. 1. Part. 9. Chap. 11.

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To the Worshipfull Henry Gorges of Eye in Here∣fordshire Esq^r

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

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Book. 1. Part. 9. Chap. 12.

G. Freman Inv.

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To the Worshipfull James Mundy of the Inner Temple Esq^r. one of the Judges of the Sheriffs Court London.

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Richard Blome.

IX. Of Fluctu∣ation of Mind. Fluctuation of Mind, is the Fear of Erring in the choice of things, which tend to constitute the end, which while it retains the Soul in doubt, and suffers it not to perform one action more than an••∣ther, causes it to perform none, and consequent••y hath a sufficient time left it to determine before it makes choice of any thing: Which Passion is so prevalent in some Persons, that oftentimes when there is no need of deliberation, in the thing de∣signed, nay when it is the only thing to be omit∣ted or performed; yet nevertheless, they remain in such suspense, that they are altogether incap∣able of inquiry into other things.

X. Of Animo∣sity, Bold∣ness and Emula∣tion. Animosity is some certain Heat or Agitation, which disposes the Mind to act stoutly in the per∣formance of those things which it designs. If any great danger attend the said things, it is called Boldness, which disposes the Soul to act those things, on which some great and imminent danger is attendant. Emulation, which is a certain Species of Animosity, ariseth from the consideration of o∣ther Men's success: Because when we see other Mens undertakings happily succeed, we are com∣monly moved by their Example to set upon the same thing, and in our Acting to Trace the same Footsteps as they have done. And this happens while the Body is so disposed, that Cupidity and Hope, have more strength to impel the Blood co∣piously into the Heart, than Fear and Desperation have to hinder it.

XI. Of Pusilla∣nimity and Consterna∣tion. To Animosity, Pusillanimity is directly con∣trary, and it is a Languor or Coolness which hin∣ders the Soul from going on to execute those things, which it would certainly execute, if it were desti∣tute of the said Coolness. And Consternation, which is opposite to Boldness, is joyn'd not only to the Cold, but also to the Stupidity and Pertur∣bation of Mind, which disarms it of its Power and Ability, to oppose its self against those Evils which it expects, and thinks to be at hand.

CHAP. XII. Of Joy.

I. Gladness is the Term or Bound o•• all Af∣fections. GLadness or Joy may be called the Term or Bound of all the motions of our Soul; which as they begin in Admiration, so they cease or terminate in Joy as in their own proper Scope or Aim: For desire of Good ceaseth in the obtain∣ing of Good, and all inquietude is removed from us, as soon as we possess those things which we so greatly desired. In present Joy Fear ceaseth, Sad∣ness is banisht, Desperation is destroyed, Love is at rest, and the rest of the Affections vanish, whilst we are wholly taken with Joy or Pleasure.

II. The Defini∣tion of Joy. Gladness or Joy is a pleasant commotion of the Soul, in which the possession of that Good consists, which the impressions of the Brain represent to it as its own. We say, that the possession of Good consists in a pleasant commotion of the Soul, in regard it is as it were the only Fruit of all the Goods it has, which being taken away, it can no more be said to injoy them, than if it were totally deprived of them. To which it is properly ad∣ded, that that Good, by the impressions of the Brain, is represented to the Soul as its own: That Joy, which is a Passion, may the more easily be distin∣guisht from that which the Soul experiments by Action, which that they may not be confounded, it will not be from the purpose to observe the Na∣ture of each.

III. Joy is two∣fold sen∣sual and Intellectual. For Joy is twofold, one Sensual or which so depends upon the Body as to make it its principal Object, the other Intellectual, which is a plea∣sant commotion of the Soul, springing from a clear and distinct knowledge of the Good wich is apprehended: Which distinction is hence under∣stood, namely, because the Intellectual Joy may sometimes be without the Sensual, as when from any good Action, we feel a satisfaction from that pure consideration that we have performed our Duty; altho' it be difficult to experiment it, so long as the Soul is in the Body, since the Intellectu∣al Joy makes always some impression upon the Body, such as is required to the framing of a Pas∣sion, for there is so streight a Union between our Soul and Body, that tho' the Good which the Soul is sensible of belongs not to the Body; yet Ima∣gination always fains some Idea in the Brain, from whence there follows a motion of the Spirits, which produces the Passion of Joy.

IV. The Exter∣nal cause of this affection is the pos∣session of a Good. The cause of this Passion, as may be gathered from its Definition, is the possession of som•• Good; for then the Soul seems to be satisfied, when it injoys that thing which it esteems to be its own Good, and to conduce to its Felicity; tho' it often happens, that we find our selves overjoy'd, and wrapt up in I know not what kind of Pleasure, when the cause of this change is utterly unknown: As when our Body is chearfully dispos'd, and with great alacrity performs its offices, but this pro∣ceeds from hence, namely, that the Good impres∣ses some Idea's in the Brain, without the help of our Soul: That is, when the constitution of the Brain is such, that the Animal Spirits may the more easily be brought down into the Nerves, as well those which serve for dilating the Orifi∣ces of the Heart, as others. So when the Heaven is somewhat more than ordinary Serene, we feel a kind of Hilarity or Chearfulness in our selves, which proceeds from no Function of the Intellect, but only from the impressions, which the motion of the Spirits excites in the Brain.

V. The Inter∣nal causes are the Blood and motion of the Spirits. The Internal Causes of this Passion are the Blood, and motion of the Spirits, not so much in the Nerves of the Stomach and Intestines, as in Love, or of the Milt and Liver, as in Hatred, as in those which are spread through the rest of Body, those especially which are about the little Mouths of the Heart. In regard they by open∣ing and inlarging afford a way to the Blood, which other Nerves propel from the Veins to the Heart, that it may go in and out in greater plenty than usually; but because the Blood having many times before entred the Heart, and so flowing out of the Arteries into the Veins, is thereby more sub∣tilized, it thereupon becomes the more easily rare∣fied and creates Spirits, which by reason of their equality are adapted for the forming and corro∣borating impressions of the Brain, which supply the Heart with joyful and serene Cogitations; whence it happens that so long as the Soul is affected with Joy, the Pulse of the Arteries is equal, and more quick than usual; moreover a certain grateful Heat is felt, not only in the Breast, but also in the Ex∣ternal part of the Body, into which together with the Blood it is copiously transmitted.

VI. The vari∣ous effects of Joy. The most noted instance of Joy, and which is commonly observed in those that are therewith affected, is a Lively Colour, and generally ruddy, which it paints in the Countenance, and which hence proceeds, namely, that Joy dilating the Fi∣bres of the Heart, causeth the Blood more copiously to enter into the Heart; and being there more in∣tensely warmed to be distributed the sooner into the Veins; and by this means excites a grateful and lively Colour in the whole Body, especially in the Face: Moreover, in the same affection of Joy, the Spirits happen to be so disposed; as that those which flow into the Muscles of the Face and Breast, make such a concussion of them, as to cause Cachinnation or bursting into a strain of Laugh∣ter, which sometimes is so great, that by the force thereof, the passages of the Eyes being opened, Tears thereupon gush out: For Tears are nothing else but Vapours, which in their passage out of the Eyes, are turn'd to Water in the superficies of them, after the same manner, as was before declared, con∣cerning the Original of Fountains.

VII. Of Joy the••e are divers Spe∣cies. There are divers species of Joy, according as we consider the Good hapning to our selves, or the Evil to others. The first which offers it self is Derision, which hence hath its Original, viz. that we find some Light Evil in one, who is thought to deserve it. In which Passion there is mingled something of Hatred. As when we have an aver∣sion to the said Evil; and yet nevertheless rejoyce to see it inflicted on him whom we think it but just it should fall upon. Those that are remarka∣ble for any kind of deformity or defect of Body, are chiefly obnoxious to this Passion, as the Gib∣bous or Bunch-backt, Goggle-Ey'd, Lame, who, in regard they are not ignorant of their being an Ob∣ject of contempt and derision from others, rejoyce to find others in as bad circumstances as them∣semselves; it being to them a solace of that Grief, which they suffer from the Contumely objected against them; so that they take the least occasion given to insult over them, and sport themselves with their defects.

VIII. What Sa∣tisfaction is. Satisfaction or Acquiescence in ones self, is a Joy of all the most grateful, which proceeds from the Opinion of something done by us which we judge to be Good. Whence they who give them∣selves to Vertue and Honest Actions, feel, I know not what Tranquillity, of Soul, and Quiet of Con∣science, which is the most pure and sincere of all satisfactions, because they depend upon those things which are in our power.

IX. What Fa∣vour. Favour is a Joy wherewith we are affected to∣ward those that do well, and use their Free-will according to Reason. Since by a Natural Impulse, we are apt to Love those whom we judge to be Well-doers, tho' nothing of profit accrue to us thereby.

X. What Gra∣titude. Gratitude is a certain joyful desire of doing well to those who have deserved well of us. This Af∣fection is peculiar to Generous Souls, who are ne∣ver insensible of Kindnesses, but strive always to be requiters of Benefits receiv'd.

XI. What Glo∣ry. Glory is a Joy arising from Opinion or Hope, conceiv'd of obtaining praise among others. This Passion is founded upon Self-love, as when we va∣lue our selves according to the esteem we see set upon us by others.

CHAP. XIII. Of Sadness.

I. Sadness on Enemy to Man. GRIEF brings up the Rear of the Passions, the most common affection among Mortals, the Companion and Enemy of Joy. It seems to have been allotted by Nature for the Persecutor of Man∣kind, and lier in wait as well for Soul as Body. There is scarce any Sadness which does not transfer its force from the Soul upon the Body, and with one stroak hit two different things at once.

II. The Defini∣tion of Sad∣ness. For Sadness is no other than a certain un∣grateful Languor, or the Inconvenience which happens to the Soul, from the Evil or Defect which the Impressions of the Brain represent to it as its own. Which Definition extends only to Sensual Pains, as they differ from Intellectual. For no doubt, but sometimes, there may be Sadness in the Soul, tho' all Cause be removed which excites Corporal Pain, as appears in those who have a Limb cut off, who are not only affected with Sadness upon the loss of the said Member, but also long after when they look upon themselves as maim'd persons, and depriv'd of a part which con∣duceth to the gaining of a Livelihood. But in re∣gard these sorts of Pain are seldom found, which are produc'd by an Action of pure Intellect; and whatsoever happens to the Soul, so long at it is united to the Body, is depainted forth by Imagi∣nation in the Brain, We only here treat of Sadness, as it is a Passion.

III. Whence Grief ari∣seth. And it arises from from an Opinion of an ad∣herence of some Evil or Default; for the Body cannot be hurt, but the Soul must immediately be disturbed, and be sensible of a certain bitterness thereby. Tho' it sometimes happens, that we find our selves sad or dejected, when ignorant of any causes of the said dejection. As when the Body languishes, and is not able to perform its functi∣ons, when the Heaven is all over covered with Clouds, as it often happens in the Winter-time; because then the Nerves of the Body are not, as they us'd to be, agitated, and so remain, in a sort, immoveable.

IV. The Inter∣nal Causes of Sadness. Sadness arises when the Animal Spirits are so dispos'd by the Glandule to the presence of an Object of Sadness, that they streighten and con∣tract the Orifices of the Heart by the Nervule wherewith they are encompassed, and hinder the Blood from its copious entrance into it, and egress out of it. Whence it happens that the Heart hath very little of Ardour and Inflammation, the passages in the mean time remaining open, through which the Chyle is conveyed from the Stomach and Entrails into the common Ocean, which is the cause of Appetites being diminisht, unless Hatred supervening Sadness, which is oftentimes joyned to this Passion, closes and shuts them up.

V. Various Ef∣fects of Sadness. Thereupon in persons affected with Sadness, the Pulse becomes weak and slow, and they seem to feel, as it were, Fetters about the Heart, which bind and restrain it like Icicles. Which frigidity being disperst through the rest of the Body, causes it to remain sluggish and unactive, and does also make those that labour under Sadness to grow pale, because by compressing the vessels of the Heart, it causes the Blood to flow the more slowly into the Veins; and so having less agitation than usual, it requires a less place to possess; so that betaking

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Book. 1. Part. 9. Chap. 13.

G. Freman. Inv.

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it self into larger Veins which are nearer to the Heart, it leaves the more remote; whereof those that are diffus'd through the Face are more conspicuous; and upon that occasion they are ren∣dred more pallid. Nor is the cause very different of those Tremours which are incident to persons affected with sadness, in regard when the Blood, as hath been said, is languidly deduc'd through the whole Body, it must needs be but slowly convey'd to the Muscles of the Arms and Legs, so that the Valvulae are not straightly enough closed, which is the reason that the Spirits, swiftly taking their course through the Connivent Ostioles of the Muscles, produce tremours in the said members of the Body.

VI. How Tears are atten∣dant upon Sadness. Tears, as they accompany Joy, so also some∣times Sadness, and are produc'd, when upon the Blood being refrigerated by Sadness, the Pores of the Eyes are contracted, by reason of which com∣pression the Vapours proceeding from them are con∣verted into Water; that is to say, because their moti∣on being retarded, their parts meet, and are so united one with another, that they end in Tears.

VII. Evil, ac∣cording as it is appre∣hended, ex∣cites vari∣ous effects in us. As Evil is an Object of Sadness, so it produces various effects in us, according as we refer it to our selves or others. For an Evil offered by us under the notion of an Evil, when we consider that we have committed it, excites repentance, which is so much the more bitter, in re∣gard it depends upon our Free Will, and was in our power of committing or not com∣mitting that which so much aggrieves us. The Remorse of Conscience is a Sadness arising from a scruple or doubt, whether what we have done be good or not. In this Passion, Dubitation ought to be necessarily included; forasmuch as if what we commit should be manifestly known to be Evil, we should refrain from committing it, since our Will is never carried on, but to those things which are represented to us under some ap∣pearance of Good. And if that Evil which we commit, should plainly appear to be an Evil, we should then be toucht, not with a simple remorse, but with downright Repentance, which is the severest of all Passions. We are therefore toucht with re∣morse, because we attempted a work before we made any doubt of it, or shook off the scruple of Mind which attended it.

VIII. What En∣vy produces. Envy is a species of Sadness, not simple, but mixt with Hatred; which proceeds from hence, namely, that we see a Good to befall others which we judge them unworthy of. This Passion ex∣tends not it self to all sorts of Good, but only those which we call the Goods of Fortune. For those things which are granted to us by Nature, seem to be above Envy. The Envious are for the most part of a Livid Colour, in regard Sadness ope∣rates upon the Body the same way as Hatred, causing Choler, which proceeds from the lower∣most part of the Liver; as likewise Melancholy from the Spleen, to flow to the Heart, from whence diffus'd through the Arteries and Veins, they cause the parts of the Blood which is in the Veins to be less agitated; and this is sufficient to induce a Livid Colour upon the Countenance, pro∣vided it be copious and intense enough.

IX. What Fa∣stidie is. Fastidie or Loathing, is another sort of Sadness arising from the same cause from which Joy for∣merly arose; for we are of that Humour, that al∣most all things we possess, are valued by us as good, only for the time being, and are afterwards lookt upon as incommodious, which especially ap∣pears in Eating and Drinking, which never please but so long as the Appetite prevails, and are distast∣ful when the Appetite ceaseth, and because they then cease to be grateful to the Taste.

X. The Eeffect of Commi∣seration. Commiseration is a Sadness mixt with Benevo∣lence or Love, proceeding from the consideration of some Evil which befalls those persons whom we think unworthy of it: And is in some so vehe∣ment, that it draws Tears from their Eyes, by reason that at that time, through the Affection of Love, a great quantity of Blood is propelled to the Heart, from whence many Vapours being emitted to the Eyes, and having their motion re∣tarded with cold, are, as hath been several times already intimated, changed into Tears.

XI. The Ef∣fects of In∣dignation. Indignation hath a great affinity with Hatred or Aversion, wherewith we are naturally stirr'd up against those that do ill. It is very often join'd with Envy and Commiseration, and the difference lies chiefly in the Object. Forasmuch as we envy those to whom any thing of good happens, and are fellow▪sufferers with those that suffer ill unde∣servingly. But our Indignation is against those only who do good turns to those that are unwor∣thy of them.

XII. Of Anger. Anger, which may be referred to Indignation, is the Aversion against those who have offered any Ill, or at least have design'd any Injury to us. This Anger is always attended by a desire of Re∣venge, which is the most impetuous of all Affecti∣ons; in regard the Hatred which is found in it, causes the Bilious Blood, which flows from the Milt, and from the little Veins of the Liver to undergo a very great Agitation; which Blood en∣tring the Heart, stirs up an extraordinary Heat, which is far more rigid and vehement than that which proceeds from Love or Sadness.

XIII. A Twofold Anger. There are two sorts of Anger, one very quick, and soon breaking forth, and disclosing it self in the Countenance; but this is of little effect, and with small labour allay'd: The other is not so soon discharged, but inwardly afflicts and stings; and the effects of this are much more dangerous than those of the Former. To the first, those are Ob∣noxious, who either Love, or are indued with a good Nature; by reason that this sort of Anger proceeds not from Hatred, but from a suddain Aversion which hastily seises them; because those things which they think of, fall not out in the same manner as they imagin; whence it happens, that as soon as they come to consider that those things which so moved them, ought not to have stirred them up to Anger, they are toucht with shame and Repentance, and condemn themselves for their rash and unseasonable passion; whereas those that are affected with the other sort of An∣ger are more to be fear'd, discovering no other co∣lour in their Face, but a pallid Hue, in regard the heat being drawn back to the Heart, they reserve themselves for revenge, and think of nothing but the time of Vengeance, and those circumstances which lead thereunto•• 'This is a Vice peculiar to Persons of a Base and Abject Spirit.

XIV. What Shame is, and Desire. Shame is founded upon Self-love, which pro∣ceeds from Opinion or Fear of Dispraise▪ Desire,

if it be more strictly inquired into, than commonly it is in Schools, is a certain sadness for a Good lost, and whereof there is no hope of recovery: For we are never afflicted with Desire, except for the loss of Goods sometime possest, and which we imagin so snatcht from us, as to be left without any hope of ever obtaining them again.

CHAP. XIV. Whence the Natural Inclinations and Aver∣sions of some Men arise.

I. Various In∣clinations are found in Men. HAving treated of those Passions of the Soul which are common to all Men, and which presuppose a Connexion of the Body and Soul; it remains that we say something of the Inclinations of some Men, which are peculiar to themselves, and which have the Body only for their Principle. For there are found in some Men certain Affecti∣ons, which are by Nature implanted in them, by which they incline to some things with a wonder∣ful Ardour of Desire; and are so abhorrent of others, as not to be able to indure the sight of them. So some Men have certain Meats in very great esteem and delight. Others on the contrary, have as much aversion to one thing or other: Many cannot endure the sight of a Cat, or the very presence of it in the same Room, tho' they see it not; some cannot abide the smell of Roses; and so for other things some have a Love, others an Aversion, of which neither can give any ac∣count.

II. Antipathy and Sym∣pathy are only words in the Schools. It is a common thing in Schools to have recourse to the words Sympathy and Antipathy, and there∣by to pretend to give an account of Passions, which indeed they are wholly ignorant of, by say∣ing that these things so happen, because there is a certain Agreement or Enmity in Natural things, by which they either Love or Hate. But this way of Philosophizing may be compared with a certain design or project for a piece of Painting; as if any one should go about to give directions with a Pen and Ink, how the Sign of a City were to be painted, in what part of the Country the City was situated, what Posts were chiefly possest by the Besiegers, where the Enemies planted their Scaling-ladders to get over the Walls, how the Engines broke the Gates asunder, where the Pio∣neers sprung their Mines, with what Arms the Besieged defended themselves, and where they made their Sallies; but after all should leave the whole Draught and Colouring to the Art of the Painter, yet nevertheless should take upon him to be the Author of this Picture of the Siege, to which he had contributed nothing but Names. So to assert that any thing is effected by a certain Virtue, and not to declare, after what manner it is done, is to my apprehension the same thing as to confess ingenuously, that he is totally ignorant of the matter discours'd of.

III. If a Corpo∣real Action be joyned to any Cogi∣tation, we cannot re∣member the one with∣out the other. Therefore some other way must be tried for the finding out of these Ocoult Inclinations or Quali∣ties which are observed in some Men; which may easily be effected, if we consider but two things; First that there is such a connection of Soul and Body, that when once we have join'd any one Corporeal Action to any thought, never after any one of them manifests it self, but the other attends it; as we may observe in those persons, who being sick, have drunk up any Potion with much distast and reluctance, that they cannot afterwards feed upon any Meat or Drink that hath any thing of the relish of the said Potion; but that the Stomach must needs have an aversation to it; nay, cannot so much as remember that Aversion, but that the same Savour, which sometime offended the Tongue, must return into the Mind.

IV. Sometimes it may be, that the same thing may be ef∣fected, yet the Actions of the Body not be the same. Secondly, observe that it is not always of neces∣sity that the same Actions of the Body be joyn'd to the same thoughts. For those that speak Eng∣lish utter their conceptions by some certain words different from those by which the French express their cogitations, yet they both mean the same thing; for no otherwise is DEUS conceived by an English Man, under the word GOD, than by a French Man under the word DIEU, both of them understanding the same thing, tho' by two different appellations: For as often as an English Man hears the Name of GOD, he presently ap∣prehends thereby an Infinite, Eternal, Almighty Being, &c. the same doth a French Man when the sound of the word DIEU comes to his Ear.

V. Whence Na∣tural A∣versions arise. These things thus briefly noted, any one may easily give an account of all those matters which he finds particular either to himself or others. The Aversions which are observed in some men, against some things, hence proceed, namely that, in the beginning of their Life, they have been hurt or offended by them: So the smell of Roses, might possibly have given to an Infant, while yet in the Cradle, some great Offence, or a Cat might have affrighted him, without any ones taking no∣tice thereof, or the Party's retaining it afterwards in memory. Some Aversions also are produced in us before we are born, since certain it is, that the Motions of the Mother have a very great in∣fluence upon the Motions of the Child in the Womb, so as that whatever is hurtful to the one, is also hurtful to the other. Thus James I. King of Great Britain, had so great an Aversion to drawn Swords, that he could not behold them with∣out a world of horror, which is thought to have thus affected him, by reason that his Mother Ma∣ry, Queen of Scots, when she was great with Child of him, was frighted at the sight of a Sword, wherewith in her Bed-Chamber, and be∣fore her Face, in a barbarous manner, one of her Courtiers was stabb'd to death.

VI. How it came to pass that K. James I. so much ab∣horred the sight of a drawn Sword. 'Tis true, that it is no easie matter to deter∣min the cause of this King's Horror upon the said occasion, since it is hard to conceive how the Image of the thing which was only transmitted through the Eyes to the Mothers Glandule, could light upon the Glandule of the Infant, whereas, as for other things, as the Odour of Roses, or the Savour of Meat, it may be aptly enough made our, since the Odour of the Roses, and the Sa∣vour'd Aliment might easily through the Pores of the Mother, reach to the Infant, since it is nou∣risht by the Mother, and both have a communion together by the Novel String. Yet it may be said that that Aversion in the King, might happen to him by the Mothers Eyes, because at the pre∣sence of so-horrid an Object, a Notable Mutation might be made in the Mothers Animal Spirits, by which the Infant she carried in her Womb was

offended, by reason of the mutual Relation between the motions of them both.

VII. Imagina∣tion alone can beget such aver∣sions. Besides, there is not an absolute Necessity that the Object should be always present to our Senses, for the exciting of any Passion in us, since that can be effected by Imagination alone. For an Impression through the Arteries of a Woman with Child, may arrive to a certain part of the Birth, and there produce some Marks thereof. Whereupon it happens, that those Women who transgress their Nuptial Faith, and prostitute themselves to other Men, many times bring forth Children like to their Husbands; namely, because the fear of being surpriz'd by the sudden arrival of their Husbands, causes them to have the Presence of their said Hus∣bands perpetually represented to their Imagination, as hath been observ'd in the 9th Book of our Na∣tural History, in the Chapter of Imagination.

VIII. Why of two Men beheld, we love one more than another. There seems yet to be a greater Difficulty, how to give an account, why of two Persons, whose Merits are equally unknown, we incline to Love one more than another. But this will not be any great Miracle, when we seriously consider that the Objects which affect our Senses, move certain Parts of the Brain, by the help of the Nerves, and make Pleits, which, without any farther con∣cern of the Object, vanish; yet so, as that the part in which they had been receiv'd, remains dispos'd for the receiving of Pleits from any other Object, which have any Similitude with the former. So when yet a Child, languishing with a long Di∣stemper, and given over by the Physicians, I fell into the hands of a certain Woman, by whose Care and Industry recovering my Health, I con∣tracted so intimate a Friendship with a Son of hers, that I could scarcely be divided from his Com∣pany, without much Regret and Impatience: Yea, after some Months, being carried home to my Parents, I perpetually languish'd with a desire of this my Little Companion; nor put I any end to my Tears, till such time as he was restored to my Society. And when a few Months after, it pleased GOD to take him out of this Life, I con∣tinued to bear a singular Affection towards all Boys whatsoever, that resembled him in Countenance; and to this very day preserve the same Affection to Children of the like Resemblance.

IX. This Dispo∣sition is induc'd from Ob∣jects by the Senses, or from some other Cause. In like manner, when we Love any Body for any hidden Cause, it is more credible that it hence proceeds, namely that there is something in him, like to those things which were formerly in some beloved Object, tho' we know not what it is. And though doubtless that which thus allures our Affe∣ction, is oftner a Vertue than a Vice; yet never∣theless, in regard it may sometimes so happen, that it may be a Vice, no wise Man ought to indulge to this sort of Affection, till such time as he hath well weigh'd the Merit of that Person, with whose Presence or Concernment, he finds himself so affected. DES CARTES, when a Child, as he himself writes to CHANUTE, loved a little Girl of the same Age with himself, that was Squint-Ey'd; and by this means the Impression, which through the Sight was received in his Brain, was so joyned to the Impression which was also made in him, to move the Passion of Love, that even a long time after, as often as he lighted upon any who had the like sort of Eyes, he found himself properise to Love them above others, and for this very thing, because they had that Imper∣fection; yet did he not know that this was the Cause of his Love. On the contrary, from the time that revolving with himself, he apprehended this Blemish to be an occasion thereof, he was no longer affected by it.

CHAP. XV. Of the Immortality of Human Mind, and of its State after Death.

I. Human Mind being Spiritual, cannot be destroyed. THat Human Mind is uncapable of Death and Destruction, its Nature and Functions clearly demonstrate: For whereas it is evident from what hath been often said, that the Soul is a Spiritual Essence and separate from all Matter, it must consequently of necessity be free from all Destruction and Corruption; since nothing but what is Concrete and Compound can be separated, divided, or taken asunder. For Destruction is, as it were, a Separation, Dividing, or Parting asunder of those Parts, which before the said Destruction were held together, as it were, by a certain Link or Tye.

II. Which is also made evident from its Functions. Nor do the Functions of the Soul less argue its Incorruption, as being Effected by no Organ of the Body, as is sufficiently made out almost throughout this whole Work; forasmuch as it forms and pro∣portions the Universal Natures of things abstra∣cted from Matter, which cannot be the Work of a Corporeal Faculty. For a Power or Faculty sub∣jected to a Material Organ, receives the Qualities and Forms of things after a certain Corporeal man∣ner What therefore comprehends Forms in a Spiritual manner, u••es no Instrument of the Body. Neither indeed are the Principles imprest upon the Mind, or the Rudiments of Cogitation assign'd to out Intellect, Mathematical Demonstrations, or Certain and Fix'd Judgments, any Corporeal Acts or Productions of Imagination. But nothing In∣commutable or perfectly Single; nothing Eternal, nothing Universal and Abstract is perceived by the Power of Imagination; whereas all Bodies are subject to mutation, place, and time.

III. How Com∣pounds and Simples are said, to lose their Existen••••▪ Now the better to support this Verity with Reasons, we must suppose, that of those things which perish or cease to be, some are Simple, and some Compound. The Compound are said to lose their Existence, when the Parts which concur to their Composition are separated from each other. As a Man is said to Cease, when Soul and Body, of which he is compos'd, are separated. Whereas the Simple can no other way cease to be, but by Annihilation, as they could no other way be pro∣duc'd but by Creation. And since Creation, as also Annihilation, are both beyond the power and ability of Nature, they can no way be destroy'd by any Creature. But it is evident, that the Soul is a thing purely Simple, since it is the only Subject that entertains Cogitation or Thought, together with the various Modes of Cogitation, and conse∣quently the Capacity of being destroy'd, is Natu∣rally repugnant to it.

IV. Since the Body pe∣rishes not, much more must the Soul have an Existence And this will appear more evidently, by com∣paring the Soul with the Body. Certain it is, that the Body which gives place in dignity and perfe∣ction to the Soul, is not reduc'd to Nothing, when the Soul is separated from it: How therefore can the Soul, which is more noble and more perfect

be thought to be annihilated when the Body is separated from it? Since indeed, no Reason can be brought for the duration of a Material Sub∣stance, which may not, by a more forcible Right, be apply'd to Human Mind. If we have recourse to the Evidence of Sense for the Consistence of Body, it cannot be maintain'd of all its Parts, since very many of them, into which it is resolv'd, are undiscernible to our Senses. Neither is the per∣ception of our Senses so efficacious a means to demonstrate the Existence of Bodies, as the Rea∣sons henceforth to be produc'd, are for asserting the Immortality of the Soul.

V. Human Mind can be destroy'd by no Cre∣ated Being. If it be Objected, That GOD by his Power can annihilate all Souls whatsoever, and that it is through his Preservation alone that Souls are said to be Immortal. This we are ready to confess, as acknowledging that GOD alone is a Being wholly Independent, Eternal, Necessary, &c. and that there is nothing Existent in Nature, but only so long as he pleases. So that we have nothing now to do, but to make it out plainly, that Human Mind is of such a Nature and Quality, that it cannot be corrupted or destroy'd by any Crea∣ted Being, which is a sufficient Ground for it to be call'd Immortal. For it being Undeniable, that GOD is all Wise, all Good, and all Constant; and Human Soul, the Noblest Workmanship of so great a Maker, and the Image of him: Who can imagin or believe, but that it must needs be far from the Mind of so Wise and Constant a Maker to Create so Glorious a Work, and afterwards to de∣stroy it? True it is indeed, and not to be gain∣said, that GOD by his extraordinary Power, can destroy the Human Soul consider'd, according to its absolute Esse or Being: But it is repugnant to Reason, that he should destroy it by his ordi∣nary Power, which is sufficient to make the Soul Immortal. For when we treat of the Immortality of the Soul, the Question is not, Whether GOD, by his Extraordinary Power can destroy it; but whether it can be destroy'd by Natural Causes, and by the ordinary Power of GOD.

VI. The Cor∣ruption of the Soul, follows not from the Cor∣ruption of the Body. Moreover, when a Man dies, Death happens to the Body upon this occasion only, namely, because some of its Parts are divided, and its figure changed. But the division of Members, or change of Figure, no way concern the Mind, in regard it is indivisi∣ble, and affected with no Figure. Who therefore can believe that the Soul, which is Inextense, can, for so slight a Cause, as is the Change of the Body, perish or be annihilated? In the next place, this sort of Annihilation hath not yet been found in Nature: Nor can it be made out by any Argu∣ment or Example, that Substance can perish Wherefore, seeing that Human Mind is a Sub∣stance Independent of the Body, and not any way subject to the Mutations which are made in it, we conclude, that it may Exist separated from it, and by consequence, that it is Immortal.

VII. There is no Cause ca∣pable to destroy a separate Soul. As to what some say, That hence may indeed be inferr'd, that the Soul may possibly subsist sepa∣rate from the Body; but that it will not last so Eternally. To this I Answer, that admitting one, the other must of necessity follow, in regard no Cause can be assign'd, which can destroy it in its state of Separation, since at time it is free from Matter, which alone is obnoxious to Change.

VIII. Arguments of Lucre∣tius against the Souls Immorta∣lity. I know that there are many Arguments heap'd up by LUCRETIUS against the Immortality of the Soul. But they are of no weight against those who distinguish Soul from Body, and assign them contrary Functions. For if the Soul seem to be affected with the Diseases of the Body, to be di∣sturb'd in immoderate Drink, Epilepsy and Phren∣sie, to be as it were lost in swouning Fits. This happens, because it is joyn'd to the Body, and makes use of it as its Instrument in performing most of its Actions. For as a Scribe furnish'd with a well-made Pen makes neat Letters or Characters; but that Pen being worn out with long use, he can no longer Cut his Letters, as before: So the Soul lighting upon a weak and infirm Body, ceaseth to perform its wonted Office, and remains as it were benum'd, sluggish and altogether un∣active.

IX. Diseases are not to be attri∣buted to the Soul, but to the Body. This change therefore is not to be imputed to the default of the Soul, but of the Body, by whose help, so long as it is tyed thereunto, it operates. So that in a Phrensie or Lethargy, it is not the Soul which is distemper'd, but the Brain: The Instru∣ment fails, so the Functions are at a loss. In like manner Drunkenness is not to be attributed to the Soul, but to the Body; forasmuch as the Brain being unloaded of its Vapours, the Soul is recover'd and comes to it self again, and performs its Offices, as before.

X. The State of the Soul, after its Depar∣ture from the Body is unknown. But the state of the Soul, after its Departure from the Body, is altogether unknown to us, since it wholly depends upon GODS good Pleasure; nor can we know, but by Conjecture, how it will then use its Faculties. It is but a rash Conceit in those, who ascribe such Perfections to it, as they are uncertain of, and measure its Felicity by their groundless Apprehension, since without Revelation we can have no assurance thereof, except that it follows necessarily from its Nature: Only thus much we may know, viz. that it will be Immortal, by reason that since it is a Substance distinct from the Body, its destruction follows not from the dissolution of its Mate, so that it will always persevere in its Nature, that is, will always Think.

XI. The Soul after Death, will not be sen∣sible, nor remember. We may likewise know, that it will have no commerce with External Objects, and that nothing of Body whatsoever can act upon it, because only its Union with the Body renders it capable of receiving the Species and Actions of Objects; so that it must needs be depriv'd of all Sensibility, and be destitute as well of Memory, as Imagination, in regard those things depend of the Body, and are chiefly conducible for the safeguard and knowing of the State thereof. Altho' it is not to be denied, but that it will perceive many Objects, by the force of Intellect, which will render their Notions more distinct and clear, than those which it had, when it was conversant in the Body. And there will be no Obstacle, but that the Soul may re∣produce those Notions of things, which it had in this Life; by which it will come to pass, that it may the more easily remember them, foras∣much as it will occur to it, that once it had them.

XII. The Soul will more clearly know Ob∣jects. So that in regard no Bodies can any longer act upon it, there will be an evident consequence, that in that State and Condition, it will be absolute Mistress of its own Thoughts, and will not think,

but of such things as its own Will and Pleasure shall be to think of; except by chance the Al∣mighty Maker of All things, or other Minds or Intelligences with which it converseth, create a new Thought in it. But so long as the Soul is separated from the Motions of the Body, and nothing hinders, but it may remain employed in its own Cogitations, it will the more diligently, and with greater attention perceive things Objected to it, and will the more acutely advance in Sci∣ences.

XIII. Will every where accompa∣nies the Mind. The like may be said of the Souls Will and Faculty of disposing it self. By reason that when it shall be free from all Commotions, to which before, because of its Commerce with the Body, it was obnoxious, it will with the greater liberty execute its own own Affairs, and will the more easily expel the Doubts, which are an Obstacle to its Determination. Yet of it self it will not be altogether free from Errour; because in regard its Intellect is Finite, and penetrates not into all things, it may be deceiv'd in its Perceptions, tho' it be not so prone to Errour as before. Forasmuch as being no longer possest by any Prejudices, and being free from Affections, it will the more easily gain this Point, not to be obliged to give assent to those Things which it knows not clearly and distinctly, and by this means it will be less liable to Deception.

XIV. It is Doubt∣ful whe∣ther the Mind can, after Sepa∣ration, move ano∣ther Body. But it is not so apparently determin'd, Whe∣ther the Mind will, after the said State of Sepa∣ration, retain the Power which before it had of moving a Body; since indeed such a Faculty doth not necessarily follow the Nature of a Finite Being, neither indeed is the said Faculty granted to its Will, except so far as it hath pleas'd its Maker, that is, so far as he hath Decreed, that its Moving Power must depend upon his Will. But since it highly conduceth to the extolling the Clemency of Almighty GOD, that his Works should be manifested to his Creatures; it is most probable, that he will conserve this Moving Power in Souls, and give them Capacity to joyn their Cogitations at pleasure to certain Bodies, and in such a manner, as it shall desire to move and know them.

XV. The Soul, after Sepa∣ration, will be capable of no Pain, as from the Body. As the Mind or Soul is all Spirit, it will no more after Separation be capable of Joy or Pain, according as they sprung from the Affections of the Body; but only of Joy and Pain, which pro∣ceed from the Intellect. But if ever the Mind chances to suffer any thing from a Corporeal thing, it must be acknowledged, that it must conse∣quently of Necessity be United thereunto by the Divine Power, as it was upon Earth; so as that its Cogitations must be connex'd to the Mo∣tions of the said Body, and according to the Mea∣sure of that Impulse, it must suffer from it more or less. And upon this account it is not impro∣bable, but that the Fire of Hell may act upon the Body of the Damned.

XVI. Other things are hid from us, except what is revealed by Faith. Other things which are attributed to the Soul, after its Departure from the Body, are uncertain and altogether depend upon the Goodness and Mercy of Almighty GOD, whose Arcana or Secret Counsels, to go about to search into, is both Rash and Profane. Hence it is that our Illustrious Philosopher, in his Epistle to the Princess Elizabeth, thus utters his Mind about the State of the Soul separated from the Body. But as to the State, saith he, of the Soul, after this Life, I know far less, than Sir KENELM DIGBY: For omitting those things which Faith instructs us in, I confess indeed, that we may Conjecture many things by the meer Dint of Reason, upon which we may sufficiently flatter our selves, and build mighty Hopes; but can gather nothing of Certainty.