Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

CHAP. XI.

Sensitive creatures not intelligent; Their specifick diffe∣rences; Their Sagacity.

Sect. 1

WEll, that we may part with a Gingle, the rest of his Fancies of dreams, and his dreams of Fancies, I let pass for the present, guessing that what is material in that Discourse, will conveniently be met with hereaf∣ter, and now skip to the latter end of the Chap. 2. pag. 8. where he defines understanding to be that imagination which is raised in every creature by word or voluntary signes. I should have let this passe with the rest; but that I am unwilling to betray that noble faculty of mans soul, his Understanding (by which he is sever'd from, and exalted above all other sublunary creatures) to that sordid con∣dition of being onely a sensual quality. That we may the better apprehend this, we will first observe, that these words, and other such signs which are apprehended by things meerly sensual, although the signs are volun∣tary, such as are imposed by any sign-maker, yet they are perceived to have such signification by those Beasts or Dogs, and the like, not in a rational or intellectual manner, but a natural; for custome meerly, which is ano∣ther nature, and doth the same way facilitate any thing to us as Nature doth, is the onely cause of their appre∣hension of these; and this custome works onely by these two Principles, of a love to that which is profitable for them, and a detestation of that is hurtful, which is nothing but that natural appetite before spoken of; for when any of these find that by coming at such a word he is rewar∣ded; by disobeying such a menace, he provokes his

own punishment; he by custom being sensible of this, doth accordingly: Nor do any of those words signifie any more to thar Beast but his pleasure or pain; he un∣derstands not any simple term what it signifies, but on∣ly these two things; and from these Principles they do not only listen to the words, but speak them, as Parrots, without any understanding more then their belly, and by that you may have Corvos Poetas. Now here is no understanding in these Acts, but almost like a Tree, which if you use to keep bent, it will grow such; so these, being used to the reward or punishment, upon such words, do apprehend them such, and naturally follow or avoid them. But because there are some acts in these beasts which have a nearer affinity with Reason then these he specifies, although I have already written somewhat to this purpose, I will, for the further satisfaction of the Reader, enlarge my self a little, and so pass on to other things.

Sect. 2.

As it is with man, who is one kind or species of Ani∣mals, that he hath, besides that general nature of a sen∣sitive soul, another soul which distinguisheth him from other Animals; so likewise it is with the other species or kinds of Animals, they must have some particular soul, or degree of a sensitive soul, which may di∣stinguish them from man, and one from each other; as the Canine or doggish soul distinguisheth a dog from a lion, a beare, a cat, a man. And each of these (besides that general nature of a sensitve soul, in which they all agree) must have some particu∣lar soul, or substantial difference in that soul, by which each of these is distinguished from the rest: Now this, whatsoever it is, (which I find not named by Philoso∣phers)

but whatsoever this is, it must be the Author of those actions which belong to each; and these peculiar fancies, which do appear in some with a great resem∣blance of wit, of ingenuity; of docibility, of stupidity and blockishnesse in others; and this quality, as natural, is propagated throughout the whole kind or species, failing in very few particulars, in some degrees onely. And when the peculiar property of any Animal advan∣ceth the condition of it to act like those of men, this in them is called by Philosophers (as I remember) Saga∣city, and will appear in divers actions of Elephants, Dogs, Birds, which fill the stories of those who write their lives; but all these are wrought not by reason, but by that principle of Nature, which dictates, Eschew evil, and get good, and is directed by the several kinds of Sa∣gacity, which in every kind of Animals hath some addi∣tion to the general condition of a sensitive creature, but attains not the height of understanding; but because it may be objected here, how can we discern understanding in man, concerning these simple terms, from that of a beast? I will answer this by experience; for man under∣stands these simple terms in their proper notion, but a beast onely in general; I have seen a dog running fierce∣ly at a horse, a woman rebuke him by this Word (Out) which, in its genuine signification, imports Go abroad; and if that Word (Out) had been used to a man, he would have answered, I am out; but the Dog, knowing it onely in generall to be a phrase of Rebuke, ceased from his barking, and went his way, although other more mena∣cing words, by other men which were present, prevailed not with him, they being, as it is likely, such words which had not been used in his ordinary correction, did not, yet this which, likely, was the Word which had

brought him smart, did prevail, to the appeasing him. Perhaps some man, not satisfied in this, may instance in some of those famous Stories of Beasts, which seem to express an apprehension more particular; but I beleeve, if they were examined, there can be no other further knowledge of simple terms, then this of pleasure and pain to his particular, which may be easily conceived to arise out of that Sagacity which is in every kind of Ani∣mals, in several and distinct wayes. What he adds, that, understanding which is peculiar to man, is the understand∣ing not only his will, (this should be a Parenthesis, and a most unnecessary one) but his conceptions and thoughts, by the Sequele and Contexture of the names of things into Af∣firmations and Negations. I can agree with him, that this is peculiar to man, and yet as much may be cavil'd against this, as that went before; and the sagacious acti∣ons of many Beasts would perswade us as soon, that they make Propositions and syllogise, as that they appre∣hend, understanding the simple terms.

Notes

• Sensitive crea∣tures become acquainted with words, and signs, by custom or the suggestions of appetite, not by understan∣ding.
• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 specifick souls, & signal differences di∣stinguishing them each from other.
• Their Saga∣city.