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What he saith presently after, [That much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience,] is not true in those general terms which he proposeth; for Memory of many things maketh not Experience, but Memory of many things alike; so that he that shall remember that fire burnt his hand, water washt it; that this lump of lead felt heavy;
teat Bladder of Air Light, makes not an Experimentall conclusion, from such remembrances, of either heat, or weight, or lightnesse; but when he shall find that this Air, and all he meets with, this Lead, and many others are such, then he hath Experience, and by Experience he knows, that it is so with all other; if he shall reply and produce common language, that we usually say, that we had once Experience of such or such a passage; and therefore one tryal and sense, with remembrance of it, makes an experience. I answer: That experience in a late way of acceptation is so used, for a particular appre∣hension with remembrance; but because experience is the mother of knowledge, and one Swallow assures us not of a Summer, nor doth one Conception give us the cer∣tainty of any Science; therefore the proper way of ta∣king experience is from the particular knowledge of many individuums of the same nature; and in that sense he must take it, because else in vain he defined it the Memory of many things, and should have rather said, It is the remembrance of any thing: And yet give me leave to interpose my conceit, which is, that Experience is not rightly termed Memory of one thing, or many, for Memo∣ry contains many things at quiet in it, which yet are not experiments, until applyed to something else, either in speculation or practice; so that when we call precedent examples for rules of future practice, we rub up our me∣mories to see what provision is in that Storehouse, to fur∣nish us with directions in our businesse at hand; and when we find things of like nature, these are called Ex∣periments. But this being, but a nominal discourse (as much of that which follow▪) I might have saved (as I shall do such things) and have suffered him to beguile any man with it; for it is not material, whether true or
false; only I have hinted out the commonest way of speaking concerning experiments, and the usefullest; I skip now to the 6 pag. of the 2. Chap.
What memory it is that makes Experi∣ence.