Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

Sect. 7.

They who have divers acts which cannot be performed by each other, are not the same thing, (for powers are distin∣guished by their Acts and Objects) but imagination and memory are such; therefore they are not the same.

The major hath its proof and illustration already; the minor shall be thus confirmed; first imagination is busied about, and acts things which come not into the reach of memory, as ••oyning two things together, a horse and a man, it makes a centaure; this presently after he applyes to imagination, which he calls compounded imagination; now these two, although in their parts they were discerned by sense before, and wrapt up in the memory, yet conjoyned together, having been never

in the sense, cannot be in the memory; unlesse after they were framed by the fancy the sensitive memory, but are the fruits of imagination only; so likewise we may say, that there are many things in the memory, which are not imagined when they are in the memory, as thus: The memory is like a Book, in which those things, which are attentively perceived by sense, are by that attention in∣graved or lockt up, as was before exprest, or written in it; imagination is that internall eye which reads this book, and sometimes reads one word, somtimes ano∣ther: Now as it happens out, that there are many things in the book which the eye sees not, yea, it can∣not see all things at once; so it is in the memory, it is impossible that the Fancy should read half those things which are writ in the Memory; many things are there which cannot be looked upon all at once, and, perhaps, sometimes will never be fancied again or imagined, yet are in the Memory; and therefore certainly, where there are so distinct acts and Objects, the things themselves are distinguished; for we never say a man imagineth any thing, of which he hath not an actuall conception; nor that he remembreth any thing by a sensative Memory, of which he hath formerly had no sense; so that those are as much distinguished, in and by their Acts and Ob∣jects, as any two Faculties can be.