Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

CHAP. VIII.

Of Appetite and Knowledge: how wisely methoded by God in all creatures, to the effecting his ends.

ENough, I think, is said to that; but in the latter end of this Introduction, I conceive it such, he seems to scorn that received Opinion, That heavy things move downward out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature, &c. ascribing (saith he) appetite and knowledge of what is good for their preservaion (which is more then man has) to things inanimate, absurdly: Thus he.

Sect. 1.

This Proposition I censure, and shall shew first, that there is such a thing; then answer his objection. Ap∣petite may be distinguished into Natural and Rationall; Natural is the bent, the disposition every thing hath to the preservation of its self, as it is a particular body; or the generality of the Universe, as it is a part of the whole. Rational appetite is that which a thing hath out of the knowledge it hath of the goodnesse and fitnesse which a thing hath for him who doth desire it. Now that there is such an appetite, which we call natural, in every thing which hath not reason, is apparent in every such thing; so that no man can give any account of such actions but by the appetite; As, Why should the Foxes have holes, and the Fowls of the Air have nests, where∣in they may lay up and preserve their young, but this, that they have an appetite to preserve them; so like∣wise, to come lower to his instance, Why do heavy things fall downeward, after they have been forced up∣wards, but that they would preserve themselves; nay, to see these two appetites in the same man, will make it more evident. Every man findes in himself, besides those politique designs which he hath upon study, and arise out of reason, natural desires, and appetites of Meat and Drink, and this against his reasonable appetite; for when his Reason, upon grounds of Physick, directs him not to eat, and, upon the controul of Reason, he denies himself Meat, yet he cannot choose but, by his natural appetite, desire Meat; so likewise he hath a natural ap∣petite to live, even when Reason shews him it is fit for him to dye, and to fall downwards, even when he would mount upward. Thus we see there are appetites in

irrational things, and the irrational part in man, which is not rational; and these cross appetites make great con∣testation in man about his actions; and sometimes the subj••ct, natural Appetite, doth so powerf••lly take up Arms against its supreme, the reasonable Appetite, that it con∣quers the reasonable Appetite, according to that famous Speech of Medéa, so much honoured, both amongst Schools, Divines, and Philosophers:

—Video meliora probo{que} Deteriora sequor.—

I see what is good, and in my reason approve it, but act what in reason I detest. This invincibly shews this Ap∣petite, and that there is even in Natural things, which have not the use of reason, an appetite to satisfie them∣selves in what, some way or other, is good for them. Now then I will come to the Answer of that Objection, of his, which he makes with scorne, that (saith he) they ascribe appetite and knowledge to things inanimate, which is more then man hath.

Sect. 2.

The negative piece which saith, which is more then man hath, is very false; for although, by reason of his cor∣rupt will, Man sometimes mistakes ill for Good, Good for ill, and prosecutes these things accordingly; yet he doth not this as a Man, but as a depraved man, and ei∣ther in things which belong to his Election, having an indifferent nature; or else out of some predominant passion within him, which as it draws his Will, so it blinds oftentimes his Understanding; or else when there is a disguise put upon the Obj••ct, which makes it appear other then it is; but Man, as Man, hath abilities both to know, and prosecute what is Good, and he alwayes

doth desire what is Good, at the least apparent, nor can he do otherwise.

Sect. 3.

For the affirmative part, that they ascribe to inanimate things appetite, and Knowledge, &c. I could answer out of my former distinction, that they do not ascribe a rational, but a natural appetite, which many times is aga••nst reason, as I have shewed; but because we see, in unreasonable Animals, Swallows not only building, but fortifying, their nests with such choise and selected Materials, and those so artificially plastered together, as although Man may imitate, yet he cannot equal the ingenuity of the work; because we observe Bees with such Wonderfull industry gathering, and, in such a constant method, con∣triving the disposure of that harvest they lay up against the hard time of Winter, with multitudes of such things which may amaze, and draw the wit of man to admi∣ration, rather then to contention to compare; because in the inferiour things we find such a consent and co∣operation to the general good of the Universe, as can be parallel'd by no heroick vertue of any Roman or Ro∣mance; that constantly the very Plebeians of the world, the meanest creatures do expose themselves to a certain ru••n for the publike good, as water ascends, air descends to its own destruction, to avoid vacuity; when we shall consider, how, as in Noahs a••k, for the preservation of their species, the wolf and lamb, the lion and the bull, the horse and the beare, the hawke and the Partridge, live in peace; so, for the same intention, fire and water, heat and cold, the greatest enemies in the World meet, and in∣habit, and live quietly and harmoniously together, in the same body; I cannot chuse but adde that there is

the same hand and providence disposing one, as did the other, and so will inlarge my answer to an expo∣sition of this businesse.

Sect. 4.

First then consider, that when God, the Great Natura naturans (as the Philosopher calls him) at the first made all the creatures in the world, he gave each of them their several beings and natures, which were the principles of all their operations, which according to those beings they produced; not as he, in his Introduction to his Leviathan, began with somewhat too high a line, (Na∣ture, the Art whereby God hath made and governs the world) certainly if it were lawfull to call that infinite wise coun∣sel of Gods Will, whereby he worketh all things, and made and governs the World, an Art; yet we could not call that Art, Nature, for Nature is a thing made by God, and therefore not that thing, or Art, by which God did make the World, and in, or with it Nature her self. Again, Nature works necessarily that which it works, in∣somuch, as even in man, what he doth naturally, is necessa∣rily done; and what by reason, liberally, or freely: so that here was a great boldnesse in him with God, whilest he commended himself by a high and great phrase, to make that phrase speak diminishingly of God, in these trans∣cendent works of his: But to return whence this obser∣vation distracted me; when God gave these natures to every thing, he disposed them to advance his Great Designe of the beautious World, and by that Nature, which he gave them, ingrafted in them dispositions to move thus, or thus, as his infinite wisdome knew fittest, either for the particular effect of each nature, or their combined effects to the whole, according to which dis∣positions

they cannot choose but work; and this is cal∣led appetite, the natural inclination, and bent of each thing to produce those effects, which either are agreeing to its self, or the publique good.

Sect. 5.

Now these things are acted by them without their knowledge, onely his who directeth them to this end. As Scotus speaks, a great States-M••n gives divers Offi∣cers dispatches of Letters about his publique ends; they carry the Letters, and, b••ing diligent in their seve∣ral charges, bring about the Design, and it may be said, their diligence effected the Project: So here these things do, as it were, carry Gods Letters, go on his Errands, and although they know not what they do, yet they, by their acting according to that method he disposeth them in, bringing those mighty works of wisdom to pass, which we observe are done by them; or as you discern in a Clock, which being made artificially, and kept in motion, distinguisheth the hours of the day to us; the hand moves to one or two a Clock, and, when it comes thither, it makes such a noise, which speaks the hour of the day; the Clock moves, and moves to this end, to strike and tell the time of the day, but yet the Clock thinks not of the hour, but moves to that purpose; so is it in these inferiour things, they move like a Clock in their order, and the Maker of them aimed them at such or such an effect, they move to it themselves, not know∣ing what they do, and move to that end is designed them, and certainly as when we see a Clock move in such a Method, and produce such effects, as are beyond the reach of such dull things as Iron and Brasse, which are the Materials, we are sure that there was some wi∣ser

head in the contrivance and ordering of it: so cer∣tainly, when we discern in these creatures acts of a high∣er and more excellent condition then their nature can produce, constantly acted by them, we cannot chuse but perceive that great and powerfull wisdome and providence of God in their operations, which we should not forget to consider punctually; therefore to his Argument we say, that these things have an appetite to actions, or such objects, not a knowledge of them; an appetite they have, for nothing moves but by its appetite, unlesse forced, this appetite is the bent of its Nature to this or that; this is not out of knowledge in its self, but in God who so disposed it; in its fall it is barely that natural incli∣nation which God hath given to each thing, and, in some cases, may be called instinct, and is d••scerned both in aversenesse and inclinations, so that heavy bodies, out of this regard, move downwards, and light upwards, having such inclinations naturally in them; but being disposed by a greater wisdom, and if they have any contrary motion, that is forced, which appeares because these, upon the remove of obstacles, when they come to themselves, retreat, like rivers into their own channels, by natural motions into their own places, as hath been shewed; so then both, that all natural bodies have ap∣petite, appears; and likewise how this in the wisest and the most excellent method, which may be, is in them, although their own Reason guide them not to it, but that infinitely wise Reason of their Maker.

This, as I conceive, he writeth as an introduction to this Chap. of Imagination; but how it conduceth to his de∣sign I see not; what follows, comes a little closer.

Notes

• The distincti∣on of Appetite into Natural and rational, their conflicts, &c.
• Appetite and knowledge is no•• more then man hath.
• What appeti••e and knowledg ••in in••eriour ••••eat••res, and ho•• excellent∣••y disposed by providence.
• Gods wisdom, not Art, in the natures of all he made, and disposing the principles of their several operations.
• All things act according to Gods method, with an innate appetite to ac∣complish his end, though without know∣ledge how they tend to it.