Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

Sect. 1.

This Proposition I censure, and shall shew first, that there is such a thing; then answer his objection.* 1.1 Ap∣petite may be distinguished into Natural and Rationall; Natural is the bent, the disposition every thing hath to the preservation of its self, as it is a particular body; or the generality of the Universe, as it is a part of the whole. Rational appetite is that which a thing hath out of the knowledge it hath of the goodnesse and fitnesse which a thing hath for him who doth desire it. Now that there is such an appetite, which we call natural, in every thing which hath not reason, is apparent in every such thing; so that no man can give any account of such actions but by the appetite; As, Why should the Foxes have holes, and the Fowls of the Air have nests, where∣in they may lay up and preserve their young, but this, that they have an appetite to preserve them; so like∣wise, to come lower to his instance, Why do heavy things fall downeward, after they have been forced up∣wards, but that they would preserve themselves; nay, to see these two appetites in the same man, will make it more evident. Every man findes in himself, besides those politique designs which he hath upon study, and arise out of reason, natural desires, and appetites of Meat and Drink, and this against his reasonable appetite; for when his Reason, upon grounds of Physick, directs him not to eat, and, upon the controul of Reason, he denies himself Meat, yet he cannot choose but, by his natural appetite, desire Meat; so likewise he hath a natural ap∣petite to live, even when Reason shews him it is fit for him to dye, and to fall downwards, even when he would mount upward. Thus we see there are appetites in

irrational things, and the irrational part in man, which is not rational; and these cross appetites make great con∣testation in man about his actions; and sometimes the subj••ct, natural Appetite, doth so powerf••lly take up Arms against its supreme, the reasonable Appetite, that it con∣quers the reasonable Appetite, according to that famous Speech of Medéa, so much honoured, both amongst Schools, Divines, and Philosophers:

—Video meliora probo{que} Deteriora sequor.—

I see what is good, and in my reason approve it, but act what in reason I detest. This invincibly shews this Ap∣petite, and that there is even in Natural things, which have not the use of reason, an appetite to satisfie them∣selves in what, some way or other, is good for them. Now then I will come to the Answer of that Objection, of his, which he makes with scorne, that (saith he) they ascribe appetite and knowledge to things inanimate, which is more then man hath.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The distincti∣on of Appetite into Natural and rational, their conflicts, &c.