Sect. 8.
But suppose it be spoken figuratively (which, in these cases of Philosophical punctuall discourses, is not pro∣per) the cause for the effect, doth it follow, that there∣fore because it is so in a man, and produceth not that effect in the fire, therefore it is not the same heat? cer∣tainly causes alwayes work the same effect, where the Subject is the same, but not else: heat hardens clay, which is a common Instance, but softens wax; if fire had sense, as a man hath, it would find paine or pleasure, as a man doth; or if a man had no sense like fire, he would have no pain, or pleasure, as the fire hath not; the same thing works diversly, according to the Subject or Ob∣ject it is busied about. This conceit of his, I make no question, but meeting with his understanding, which was the Mother of it, mightily pleased him, or else he would never have printed it in two Books, and in one have cited the other; but certainly, meeting with my dull braine, infected with contemptible Universitie lear∣ning, it displeaseth me exceedingly, and therefore there is no arguing for the diversity of an Agent, from the di∣versity of operation, when the Object is diverse, it works upon. And here he concludes this businesse, saying, by this the fourth Proposition is proved, &c. But how, let any man consider. Now I thought to have concluded with him, but number 10. he crowds together such a