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Sect. 4.
But I have not yet finished this businesse; in the lat∣ter end of his first chapter of his Leviathan, he saith, (That the Philosophy Schools throughout christendome, grounded upon some Texts of Aristotle, teach another do∣ctrine from him, and say, for the cause of vision, the thing seen sendeth forth a visible species, (in English) a visible shew, apparition, or aspect, the receiving whereof is sight, &c.)
This I must censure, and say, that I think that scarce any Philosophie-School teacheth this conclusion, that the receiving the species is sight, but the judgment of the soul upon the receipt, for receipt is a meer passive thing, but all the language in the world makes to see an active verb; if receipt of the species should make sight, then a Looking-glass would see, for that receives the species, and truly the eye is a kind of animate Looking-glass, as a Looking-glass an inanimate eye; but the difference lies in the activity of the soul, which animates the eye, but not the Looking-glasse.
But he is angry with the conceit of species, and would have men believe, that that opinion, so universally held, is founded only upon some Texts of Aristotle; but I will tell him, it is not so founded upon Texts, as if his onely authority had gained the general esteem, which that truth hath obtained upon mens judgments, but the reasons of him and his followers, which this Gentleman should have endeavoured to have answered, and not have thought that his bare credit, with scorning it, should prevaile against Christendom. But that a Reader may take notice of some of these reasons, and not trou∣ble himself to peruse other books, I will set down one or two, which may suffice.