Sect. 17.
But because he make's some Queries, which he think's, or seem's to think, are able to stumble a Reader,
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But because he make's some Queries, which he think's, or seem's to think, are able to stumble a Reader,
being unanswerable, I shall, putting them down, endea∣vour to answer them; although I may justly say, in ca∣ses of this nature, it is as true as in any, that a weak and silly man may ask more, then a learned man can answer. His first is (Potest ne fieri, can it be, that he, who is God, can do any thing, not as God, or in the nature of God?) this last phrase (or in the nature of God) seem's to me a strange exposition of that (as God) for quatenus ipsum, is not in the nature of the thing which act's, but according to the nature, or to act out of the Principles of that na∣ture; now that may be done even by God in these out∣ward acts of creating and governing the Creature, which acts are not in, but out of his nature, although according to his nature; I do not understand quatenus here in the strictest sense of Logicians, for that which is reciprocall, but in a larger, as I expounded, it; To the Q••estion its self: I answer to it, as it seem's to be proposed, as if it were in generall, that nothing can act any thing which is not out of the principles of its nature; for this, consi∣der, Socrates is a man, yet he can affect sensuall things, which he doth, not as a man, but as a beast, or a sensitive Creature; he groweth and the like, not as a man, that is, out of the principles of humanity, but as a vegetable; again, Socrates is a Son, or a Father, or both; he doth ma∣ny things as neither; he doth many, being a Son, and a man; as a Son out of the principles of Sonship, not as man out of the principles of humanity; so that when any thing hath a substantial essence and a relative, it may act out of the principles of that relative condition it hath, and not out of the essentiall nature it hath; if he speak, as he doth, of the persons of the Trinity, no doubt, but those personall actions and relations betwixt Father, Son and holy Spirit, although done and acted in
that essence, yet are not essentiall, but personall; and for other acts, if any person assume any thing into a personal union with it, it may act by and in that united nature, that which it act's, not according to his Divine, that is, out of that principle; thus may it eat, walk, and the like; this (because he still require's instances from the Crea∣ture) is evident out of them; a man, when his hand is warmed by fire, or cooled by Frost, can, by putting his hand to another, warm or cool another's hand, still being a m••n, he act's according to the Condition of that quality, which is added to him, and not according to the principles of humanity.
His second Quere is [Can it be, that a Divine person can be a divers thing from the Divine nature] I think, amongst a thousand which he may read, that have writ∣ten about this businesse, who are Orthodox, he can shew none that ever affirmed it it; they say that the Father, Son and Spirit are diverse persons, but not diverse things, diversus est filius, not diversum, a diverse person, not a diverse substance.
His third and last Quere is [Whether it may be, that there should be the same nature of all three persons, and yet, one of these persons acting something, the nature should not act that same thing?] he instances in the incar∣nation, birth, death, &c. of the Son, which had the Divine nature, and yet the Father and the holy Spirit, which had the same nature and essence numero, that is, in number, with the Son, should not be incarnate, born, &c.] To this, I conceive, I have spoken sufficiently already, where I have shewed, that one person can be incarnate, and not the other, which when it is granted, all the rest will fol∣low, he may be conceived, born, dye, &c. in that nature which was united to him, although not in that of which
he was a person; which hath been a most Catholick universally received truth, these thousand yeares and upward, in the Christian world, and therefore ought, if refused, to be confuted with reasons, not with oppo∣sition onely of the Authority of two or three men, by a plain denyall and no more. This is all, of any mo∣ment, that I find objected against the exposition of this place, which I hope I have satisfyed, and in it evinced, that our Saviour is a person in the Trinity, equall with the Father, and distinct from the Father.
Sm••lcius's fi••st Q••erie, &c.
Rectifyed.
Answered. All actions not alwayes necessari••y according to the nature of him, or that which act's.
Smalius's se∣cond Querie Answe••ed and frustrated.
His third Querie
Answered, with reference to the dis∣course before concerning the incarnati∣on of the Fa∣ther and holy Ghost.