Sect. 2.
The next thing I blame is his description of Liberty, thus, [By liberty is understood, according to the proper sig∣nification of the word, the absence of externall impediments.] This is a most improper exposition of that liberty he im∣mediately before put in the definition of right,* 1.1 for ex∣ternall impediments have nothing to doe with the liberty of right; nor doth the taking away the ability to recover his estate by strength of opposition, take away the right to have it, especially this natural right; for other rights, by civill institution, and donation, do in some manner, depend upon outward things, because those Nationall lawes, which give them these rights, are outward, although right and title be an inward thing, the issue of that out∣ward law; but in natural right the very law which give's a man this right is an internall law, a law writ in man's heart; and therefore the liberty which attend's this right, and which, he saith, this right is, can in no sense be un∣derstood to be the absence of externall impediments; he adds [Which impediments may oft take away part of a mans power to do what he would.] This is weakly said,* 1.2 or most impertinently, or both; for external impediments can take away no part of natural power (which alone is ne∣cessary to natural right) this may hinder nature in its ope∣rations, but this cannot take away the power of opera∣ting; and in oecconomicks the disobedience of a Son may hinder the acts of a Parents exercising his jus naturale,