Sect. 1.
THus having finished my discourse upon this subject, as much as concernes his Corpus Politicum, I returne to examine his handling the same in his Leviathan, to see if the diversity of expression in this from the other doth adde any thing to the confirmation of his designe, Cap. 14. pag. 64. He defines the right of nature to be, the li∣berty every man hath to use his own power, as he will him∣self, for the preservation of his own nature.
This definition I except against, as not cut out even to the thing defined. First, it is too narrow, for this right of nature concernes not himself alone, but a man by right of nature hath right to many things which relate not to his owne life: Yea, if it have such a liberty which consisteth in, to do, or, not to doe (as he expound's it pre∣sently after) then it is a right of nature, to forbeare to use his owne power, for the preservation of his life, aswell as to use it; so that out of this regard his definition agree's not to every particular contained in the right of nature. Secondly, like an ill made garment, as it is too streight in one place, so it is too wide in another, the liberty a man hath to use his power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his owne life, is not a right of nature; for the right of nature, as I have shewed, is a result out of the law of Nature, which impower's him for that action; but the law of nature gives not a man leave to do what he will for the preservation, &c. (as I have shewed before) but