Lucretius his six books of epicurean philosophy and Manilius his five books containing a system of the ancient astronomy and astrology together with The philosophy of the Stoicks / both translated into English verse with notes by Mr. Tho. Creech; To which is added the several parts of Lucretius, English'd by Mr. Dryden.

p. 171. l. 14. Then Neighbours, &c.

Those that endeavour to disgrace Religion, usu∣ally represent it as a trick of State, and a Politick invention to keep the credulous in Awe; which how∣ever absurd and frivolous, yet is a strong argument against the Atheist, who cannot declare his Opinions, unless he be a Rebel, and a disturber of the Common∣wealth: The Cause of God, and his Caesar are the same, and no affront can be offered to one, but it reflects on both; and that the Epicurean Princi∣ples are pernicious to Societies, is evident from the account they give of the rise of them. First then we must imagine Men springing out of the Earth, as from the Teeth of Cadmus his Dragon, (fratres fungo∣rum, & tuberum, as Bias called the Athenians, who counted it a great glory to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,) and like those too, fierce, and cruel; but being softned by natural decay, and length of Time, grew mild; and weary of continual wars, made leagues, and combinations, for mutual defence and security; and invested some Person with power to overlook each mans actions, and to punish, or reward those that broke, or kept their Promises. Now if Societies be∣gan thus, 'tis evident that they are founded on In∣terest alone, and therefore self-preservation is the only thing that obliges Subjects to Duty; and when they are strong enough to live withou the

••rotection of their Prince, all the bonds to Obedience ••re cancelled, and Mutiny and Rebellion will necessa∣••ily break forth; for we all know, how ambitious ••very Man is of Rule, how passionately he de••ires it, ••nd eagerly follows, tho ten Thousand difficulties ••ttend the pursuit: What it he breaks his promise, ••ecalls his former consent, and acts against the Law ••hat was founded on it? Why need he be concer∣••ed, if he hath got the longest Sword, and is above the ••ear of Punishment; will not a prospect of a certain ••ofit lead him on to Villany? And why should his ••onscience startle at wickedness, that is attended ••ith pleasure? since all the Epicurean Vertues are ••othing but Fear, and Interest, and the former is ••emoved, and the latter invites. 'Tis true, as Lucre∣••us says, strange discoveries have been made, and Plu∣••arch gives us very memorable Instances: Plots have ••een defeated, but as many proved successful: And how ••eak that single pretence, how insufficient to secure ••overnment, is evident from the daily Plots, and ••ontrivances, Murders and Treasons, that disturb us; ••o all the Terrors of Religion joyn with these ••ears and endeavour to suppress them. And there∣••ore these Opinions are dangerous, and destructive of ••ocieties, and, as Origen says of his Purgatory fires, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ••thers tho pretending to better Principles than tho••e of ••picurus, yet are altogether as faulty in stating the rise

of Power; and more absurd: For his Opinion is agree∣able to his other Positions, but theirs contradict the Creation they assert, and the Providence they allow; I mean those that declare the People to be the spri•••• and fountain of Power, and that from their consen•• all the Authority of the Governour is derived: Su•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Men never considered the relation betwixt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and his Creatures; and what an absolute domi∣nion he hath over those to whom he first gave, and still continues Being. But let us look on Man un∣der that circumstance, and then how naked, how devested of all power will he appear? How unable to dispose of himself, and submit to the Laws of his fellow free Agent? unless he endeavours as muc•• as is possible to disown the Right of the Deity, and turns Rebel against the Author of his Being. For ho•• can any one submit himself to another, without the express permission of him that hath absolute domini•• over him? And where is that Permission? Is it founded on Reason or Scripture? Doth Benevolence, or Self-pre∣servation, the two proposed motives to Society, spea•• any such thing? And doth not Scripture expresly op∣pose this Opinion? Well then, all Power descends fro•• above; 'tis the gift of that Being to whom it Princi∣pally belongs, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Kings are fro•• God, is true both in the account of the sober H•••• then, and good Christian: And therefore every King that ever was, or is, whether he obtains the Crow•• by Succession, or Election, (except the Iewish must be acknowledged Absolute: Liberty and Prope•• of the Subjects depend on his Will, and his Pleasu•• is Law; for none can confine or limit that Po•••• which God bestows, but himself: And therefore •• prescribe Laws to the Governour, to choose or refu••

••im on certain conditions, is to invade the Preroga∣••ive of Heaven, and rebel against the Almighty. Thus when God design'd to limit the Power of the ••ewish Monarchy, he described Laws himself; but ••ince he hath not fixt any to other Princes, every King, as such, (for I do not respect their particular Grants to the People, which they are bound to ob∣••erve) is Absolute.

To free this from all exception, it must be consi∣••ered that the Discourse is concerning the Origine of Power, which is now settled in some Persons, ••nd by which Communities are govern'd. The Epi∣••ureans act very agreeably to their impious Princi∣••les, when they make fear and distrust the only mo∣••ives to Agreement, and the pacts to which the scat∣••er'd multitude agreed to be the foundation of the Power of the Prince: It being impossible for them, who had excluded Providence, to find any other O∣••iginal: But this Opinion as delivered by them, de∣••ending upon their other absurd and impious Phi∣••osophy must be weak and irrational; yet still this ••otion is embraced, tho not upon the same mo∣••ives; Faction and Ambition propagate that Error, which was nothing else but innocent Ignorance in the Antients: They considered Man as Single, unable to live with Security or Comfort, because his fel∣••ows, either out of Pride, Lust, or Covetousness, would endeavout to rob him of his Enjoyments, and ••his Life too, if it hindred them in the prosecution of their wishes: Thus they saw a necessity of Go∣vernment, and because it proceeded from Mans na∣tural Imperfections, they thought him, that by his Wisdom or his Strength was most fitted for the de∣fence and preservation of others, was as it were a

Lord by Nature, and Born a Sovereign: Thus Plu∣tarch, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 'Tis the first and most fundamental Law, that He that is able to protect, is a King by Nature to him that needs Protection: Thus Historians make the E∣lection of the first Kings to be for their Strength, their Wisdom or their Beauty: And Aristotle per∣emptorily determines that the Barbarians are slave•• by Nature to the Greeks: This was innocent e∣nough in them, but how can we be excus'd who have such perfect knowledge of a Creation, who hea•• Wisdom proclaim that by Her Kings Reign, who made it an Article in Edward the 6th's time, and now e∣very day in our Publick Prayers profess that God is the only Ruler of Princes? From whence 'tis neces∣sarily inferr'd that he only bestows the Power, for if it came from the multitude, what is more eviden•• than that they could make what Conditions they pleased, subject them to an High Court of Iustice, and call them to an account if th••y act contrary to their pleasure? It being certain, and confirmed by Common Practice that he that voluntarily parts from his right, may do it on what terms he thinks fit: Now if it is certain (and demonstration proves i••) that God is the alone giver of Power, if the Prince is, as Plutarch and Menander say, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a living Image of the Deity; if, as Pliny, qui vic•• Dei erga hominum Genus fungeretur, and every King whether Elective or Successive, Rules by the sam•• Authority, as 'tis certain they do, because Bo•••• have Power, and the People can give them none; then what is more certain than that all Kings which

••ay soever they are inthroned before they have ••ade any grants to their People, are Absolute? And ••at their Pleasure is Law, for otherwise there ••••uld be none, that Liberty and Property depend ••••on their Will.

Nam propriae Telluris herum ne{que} me, ne{que} illum, Nec quenquam statuit Natura—

••or doth Nature provide more Privileges for one ••an another: And if the Principles are true, and ••e inference naturally follows, as it doth, because ••e People that cannot bestow the Power have no ••ght to make conditions for its Exercise, and set li∣••its how far it shall extend, and make such and such ••greements for the admission of the Prince; what ••rm is there in this innocent Truth? For we discourse ••••ly of Kings as they first are, without any reference 〈◊〉〈◊〉 such and such particular Communities, where ••ey have been pleased to limit themselves; to grant ••iviledges to their Subjects, and settle Property; and ••nfirmed all this with Oa••hs, and engaged their ••oyal Word and Promise before God and Man for ••eir performance.

I suppose it is granted on all hands that the King ••supreme, that upon any pretence whatsoever it is ••eason to resist; and so there can be no fear of ••nishment, no tye upon the King but his own Con∣••ence; sufficit quod Deum expectet ultorem; yet ••o the Law cannot Punish, it can direct: Tho it is ••t a Master, it is a Guide, and such a one, as, be∣••use of his Oath, he is bound to follow: For tho ••e People cannot, He can limit himself; for being Rational ••reature, and intrusted with Power,

without any particular Rules for the Guidance of it; his Reason is to be his director, and theref••re according to the tempers and particular humors of the People, he may make Laws, settle Maxims of Government, and oblige himself to make those his measures, because his Reason assures him that this is the best Method for the preservation of the Society, the maintenance of Peace, and obtaining those ends for which he was intrusted with this Power.

And since Princes must die, and Government be∣ing necessary, Succession is equally so, and therefore it may seem that every Prince owing his Power on∣ly to the same Original from which the first deri∣ved it, is at liberty to confirm such and such Priviledges and immunities which his Prede∣cessors have granted; yet upon a serious view of the premised reason, no such consequence will fol∣low; for since the Predecessors have found these Laws agreeable to the tempers of the People, and the only way to preserve Peace, 'tis evident that those are Rational; and since he is to use his power accord∣ing to Right reason, there is an antecedent Obligati∣on on him to assent to those Laws; and make those the measures of his Government; unless some ex∣traordinary Case intervenes which requires an altera••••∣on of these Laws, and then that Method of abrogating old, and making new Ones is to be followed, whic•• constant experience hath found Rational: And since 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Prince cannot be bound by any tyes but those of C••∣science, this Opinion leaves all the Obligations po••∣sible upon him.