An abridgment of Mr. Locke's Essay concerning humane [sic] understanding

CHAP. XXVIII. Of other Relations.

ALL Simple Ideas, wherein are Parts or Degrees, afford an occasion of comparing the Subjects wherein they are to one another in respect of those Simple Ideas. As Whiter, Sweeter, More, Less, &c. These depending on the equality, and excess of the same simple Idea, in several Subjects may be called, Proportional Re∣lations.

Another occasion of comparing things is taken from the circumstances of their Origine, as Father, Son, Brother, &c. These may be called Natural Relations.

Sometimes the foundation of consi∣dering things, is some act whereby any one comes by a Moral Right, Power, or Obligation to do something: such are Ge∣neral, Captain, Burgher; these are Instituted, and Voluntary Relations, and may be di∣stinguished from the Natural, in that they are alterable and separable from the Persons to whom they sometimes belong∣ed,

thô neither of the Substances so Re∣lated be destroyed. But Natural Rela∣tions are not alterable, but are as lasting as their Subjects.

Another Relation is the conformity or disagreement of Mens voluntary Acti∣ons to a Rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of: These may be called Moral Relations. It is this Conformity or Disagreement of our acti∣ons to some Law (whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us from the Will and Power of the Law-maker, and is what we call Reward or Punishment) that ren∣ders our Actions Morally Good, or Evil.

Of these Moral Rules or Laws there seem to be three sorts with their diffe∣rent ensorcements. First, The Divine Law. Secondly, Civil Law. Thirdly, The Law of Opinion or Reputation. By their Rela∣tion to the First, our Actions are either Sins or Duties: To the Second, Criminal or Innocent: to the Third Vertues or Vi∣ces.

1st. By the Divine Law, I mean that Law which God has set to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the light of Nature, or the voice of Revelation.

That God has given a Law to Man∣kind, seems undeniable, since he has, First, A Right to do it, we are his Crea∣tures. Secondly, Goodness and Wisdom to direct our Actions to what is best. Thirdly, Power to enforce it by Reward, and Punishment of infinite Weight, and Duration. This is the only true Touch∣stone of Moral Rectitude, and by which Men judge of the most considerable Moral Good or Evil of their Actions: That is, Whether as Duties or Sins they are like to procure them Happiness or Misery from the Hands of the Almigh∣ty.

2^ly. The Civil Law, is the Rule set by the Common-wealth, to the Actions of those that belong to it. This Law no body over-looks; the Rewards and Punishments being ready at hand to en∣force it, extending to the protecting or taking away of Life, Liberty, and Estate of those who observe or disobey it.

3ly. The Law of Opinion or Reputa∣tion. Vertue and Vice are Names suppo∣sed every where, to stand for Actions in their own Nature, Right and Wrong. As far as they are really so applied, they so far are co-incident with the Divine

Law. But it is visible that these Names in the particular instances of their appli∣cation, through the several Nations and Societies of Men, are constantly attri∣buted only to such Actions as in each Countrey and Society, are in Reputati∣on or Discredit. So that the measure of what is every where called and esteem∣ed Vertue and Vice, is the approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a tacit Consent establishes it self in the Societies and Tribes of Men in the World; whereby several Actions come to find Credit or Disgrace amongst them, accord∣ing to the Judgment, Maxims or Fashi∣ons of the place.

That this is so, appears hence; That tho' that passes for Vertue in one place, which is elsewhere accounted Vice; yet every where Vertue and Praise, Vice and Blame go together; Vertue is every where that which is thought Praise-worthy: and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publick Esteem, is called Vertue. These have so close an Alliance, that they are often called by the same name.

'Tis true, Vertue and Vice. do in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, which the Laws of God have established; because the observation of these Laws visibly secures and advan∣ces the general Good of Mankind, and the neglect of them breeds Mischief and Confusion: and therefore Men without renouncing all Sense and Reason, and their own Interest, could not generally mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that side, that deserved it not.

They who think not Commendation and Disgrace sufficient motives to en∣gage Men to accommodate themselves to the Opinions and Rules of those with whom they converse, seem little skill'd in the History of Mankind. The great∣est part whereof govern themselves chief∣ly by this Law of Fashion.

The penalties that attend the breach of God's Laws are seldom seriously re∣flected on, and those that do reflect on them, entertain Thoughts of future re∣conciliation. And for the punishment due from the Laws of the Common-wealth, Men flatter themselves with the

hopes of Impunity: But no Man escapes Censure and Dislike who offends against Fashion; nor is there one of ten thousand stiff and insensible enough, to bear up under the constant dislike and condem∣nation of his own Club.

Morality then is nothing but a Relati∣on to these Laws or Rules; And these Rules being nothing but a collection of several simple Ideas; The conformity thereto is but so ordering the Action, that the Simple Ideas belonging to it, may correspond to those which the Law requires. By which we see how Moral Beings, and Notions are founded on, and terminated in the Simple Ideas of Sensa∣tion and Reflection. For example, Let us consider the Complex Idea signified by the word Murder. First from Reflection, we have the Ideas of Willing, Considering, Purposing, Malice, &c. Also of Life, Per∣ception, and Self-motion. Secondly from Sensation, we have the Ideas of Man, and of some Action whereby we put an end to that Perception, and Motion in the Man, all which Simple Ideas, are comprehended in the word Murder.

This collection of Simple Ideas being found to agree or disagree with the esteem of the Country I have been bred in, and to be held worthy of praise or blame, I call the Action Vertuous, or Vi∣cious. If I have the Will of a Supreme Invisible, Law-maker for my Rule, then, as I suppose the Action commanded or forbidden by God, I call it Good or Evil, Sin or Duty: If I compare it with the Civil-Law of my Country, I call it Law∣ful or Unlawful, a Crime or no Crime.

Moral Actions may be considered Two ways,

First, as they are in themselves a col∣lection of Simple Ideas, in which Sense they are positive absolute Ideas.

Secondly, As Good, or Bad, or Indiffe∣rent: in this respect they are Relative, it being their conformity or disagreement with some Rule, that makes them be so. We ought carefully to distinguish between the positive Idea of the Action, and the reference it has to a Rule: both which are commonly comprehended un∣der one name, which often occasions confusion, and misleads the Judgment.

It would be infinite to go over all sorts of Relations; I have here mention∣ed

some of the most considerable, and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our Ideas of Relations, and wherein they are founded.