An abridgment of Mr. Locke's Essay concerning humane [sic] understanding

CHAP. XXV. Of Relation.

THere is another Sett of Ideas which the Mind gets from the comparing of one thing with another. When the Mind so considers one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its view from one to the other, this is Relation or Respect: and the deno∣minations given to things intimating that Respect, are what we call Relatives. And the things so brought together Re∣lated. Thus when I call Cajus, Husband, or Whiter, I intimate some other Person, or Thing in both cases, with which I compare him. Any of our Ideas may be the foundation of Relation.

Where Languages have failed to give correlative Names, there the Relation is not so easily taken notice of: As in Con∣cubine, which is a Relative name, as well as Wife.

The Ideas of Relation may be the same, in those Men who have far different Ideas

of the things that are Related. Thus those who have different Ideas, of Man, may agree in that of a Father.

There is no Idea of any kind, which is not capable of an almost infinite num∣ber of Considerations, in reference to other things: and therefore this makes no small part of Men's Words, and Thoughts. Thus one single Man, may at once sustain the Relations of Father, Brother, Son, Husband, Friend, Subject, Gene∣ral, European, Englishman, Islander, Master, Servant, Bigger, Less, &c. to an almost infi∣nite number; he being capable of as ma∣ny Relations, as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things in any manner of Agreement, Disagreement, or Respect whatsoever.

The Ideas of Relations are much clear∣er and more distinct, than of the Things related; because the Knowledge of one Simple Idea, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a Relation: but to the knowing of any substantial Being, an accurate collection of sundry Ideas is necessary.