An abridgment of Mr. Locke's Essay concerning humane [sic] understanding

CHAP. XII. Of Complex Ideas.

IN the reception of Simple Ideas the Mind is only Passive, having no power to frame any to its self, but as these Simple Ideas do exist in several combinations united together, so the Mind may consider them as united, not only as they are really united in exter∣nal Objects, but as it self has joyned them. Ideas thus made up of several ones put together, I call Complex, as a Man, Army, Beauty, Gratitude, &c. By this faculty of repeating and joyning to∣gether its Ideas, the Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts. But it is still confin'd to those Simple Ideas which it received from the two Sources of Sen∣sation and Reflection. It can have no other Ideas of sensible Qualities, than what come from without by the Senses, nor any other Ideas of the Operations of a thinking Substance, than what it finds in

it self, but having once got these Sim∣ple Ideas, it can by its own power put them together and make new Complex ones, which it never received so uni∣ted.

Complex Ideas however compounded and decompounded, tho' their number be infinite, and their variety endless, may all be reduced under these three heads, First Modes, Secondly, Substances,

Thirdly, Relations.

Modes, I call such Complex Ideas which contain not the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are consider'd as de∣pendences on, and affections of Substan∣ces, as Triangle, Gratitude, Murder, &c. These Modes are of Two sorts, First Simple, which are but the combinations of the same Simple Idea as a Dozen, Score, &c. which are but the Ideas of so many distinct Unites put together. Se∣condly, Mix'd, which are compounded of Simple Ideas of several kinds, as Beau∣ty, which consists in a certain composi∣tion of Colour and Figure, causing de∣light in the Beholder.

Theft, which is the concealed change of the possession of any thing without the consent of the Proprietor. These visibly

contain a combination of several Ideas, of several kinds.

Secondly Substance, the Ideas of Sub∣stances are only such combinations of Simple Ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the confused Idea of Substance is always the chief. Thus a combination of the Ideas of a certain Figure, with the powers of Motion, Thought, and Reasoning joyn'd to Sub∣stance, make the ordinary Idea of Man.

These again are either of single Substan∣ces, as Man, Stone, or of collective, or seve∣ral put together, as Army, Heap: Ideas of several substances thus put together, are as much each of them one single Idea, as that of a Man, or an Unite.

Thirdly, Relations which consist in the consideration and comparing one Idea with another. Of these several kinds we shall Treat in their Order.