A memento treating of the rise, progress, and remedies of seditions with some historical reflections upon the series of our late troubles / by Roger L'Estrange.

A Disgression to the State of FRANCE.

Upon the Continent 'tis Otherwise; as in France, (for the Purpose) where though the King Entertains a Stand∣ing Army of 12000. and about Fourscore Regiments more, in Flanders, Italy, Catalogne, and Luxemburgh; (besides Stran∣gers) There's yet the Countenance of an Interest, and a Pru∣dential Ground for't: to Ballance the Power, or at least Check the Progress of his Ambitious Neighbour Spain. For (says the Duke of Rohan in his Interest of France) Il faut opposer La Force á la Force. Car ni les persuasions, ni la Iustice des armes, ne fera la loi à celui qui sera armè, tellement que la France doit se re∣trencher de toute autre despence moins utile, & estre tousiours pu∣issamment arme. [Force must meet Force, for 'tis the Sword that gives the Law to Equity, and Reason; wherefore let France rather be sparing in any other way, then in the Constant Entertain∣ment of a Puissunt Army]

It may be Argu'd too, that the Exercise of Armes, is the Profession of the French Nobility, and in Effect, 'tis only War abroad keeps them in Peace at home. Yet even in France it self, where the Necessity of a Standing-Army is bolster'd up with so many fair Appearances, the Effects are Dismal, how plausible soever the first Occasion seem'd.

Where it began, or what it was, not a rush matter, but, that by Gradual encroachments, from small and Temporary Pretenses, 'tis now grown to a Constant, and unlimited Excess, he that knows any thing of France, cannot be Ignorant.

They that fetch it from Guntran King of Orleans, 587. look too far back methinks, and entitle the Tyranny to too fair a President. His Case being This.

Guntran was the Surviver of Four Brothers; Sons of Clotaire the First; the other Three, being Cherebert, Chilperic, and Sigi∣bert. The Eldest of these, Dyed Childless, and the Other two were Murther'd by the Practises of Fredegonde, (first the Mi∣stris, and afterward the Wife of Chilperic.)

Sigibert, supinely indulging himself in the height of his Conquests, and Pleasures, was Stabb'd in his own Palace by a Couple of Souldiers, employ'd by Fredegonde, who did as much at last for her Husband Chilperic; having first Caused him to Murther his Son Clovis; to Divorce one Wife, and Strangle another. The Story is Short, and a little Curious.

Fredegonde had a Gallant, called, Landry de la Tour, by Her, Preferr'd to be Duke of France and Mayor of the Palace).

The King comes one Morning in his Hunting-Dress into the Queens Chamber, as she was busie about her Head, with her Hair over her Eyes; and (without a word speaking) tickles her on the Neck with the Twigg-end of his Riding∣wand, Ah Landry (says she) That's not Cavalier like, to come Behind. The King was as much surpriz'd with the Discovery, as Fredegonde with the Mistake; and went his way with the Thought of it in his Countenance. Landry is presently sent for by the Queen, They discourse the Accident, Debate the Consequences, and in the End, Complot to have Chilperic Mur∣thered as he returns from the Chase; which was Executed, with much Ease and Security, the King being only attended with a Single Page, who Dy'd with his Master, and the Murtherers escap'd.

This Chilperic had, by Fredegonde, Clotaire the Second, (but Four Moneths old at the Death of his Father) and the Regency of King and Kingdom was Committed to Guntran, (the young Kings Uncle by the Fathers side) The Regent, warn'd by the Miscarriage of his Brothers, and being enformed that the same Hand by which they fell, sought His Life also: Establishes

a Considerble Guard, constantly to attend his Person: which was both suitable to his Wisdom, and Dignity; as a Security, against not only the Stroke of Violence, but the very Thought of it, and a fit Circumstance of Majesty.

The Influence of This Force went not far, nor, in Truth, the Royalty of their first Race of Kings, much farther: whose ei∣ther Lenity or Aversness to Business of State, gave their Great Counsellours the means to Vsurp, and Transferr Their Authority, which Confidence they abused to the Supplanting of their Masters.

Complaints, Suits, References, Addresses, must be made, for∣sooth, to the Majors, not to the Kings: They undertake the Disposition of Monies, and Offices; the Menage of Treaties and Alliances: They Grant, Revoke at Pleasure: Briefly, from 632. to 750. France was rather under a Majoralty, then a Mo∣narchy: and Then, (Pope Zachary, having first Absolv'd the French of their Oath of Obedience) the Race of Chilperic is Laid By; Himself (the Fourth of that Name) formally Degra∣ded, and Cast into a Monastery, by Decree of Parliament; and Pepin Install'd in his Stead. Thus did the Son of the Last Great Subject make himself the First of the Second Race of Kings: of which, in requital for too much said upon the Former, I shall say nothing at all. Nor much more upon this Subject; save only that Charles the VII. and his Successour Lewis the XI. Laid the first firm Foundation of the Military Power; to which, Charles the VIII. Francis the I. &c. have since fur∣nish'd their Additionals, and Superstructures, to make the Ty∣ranny compleat.

'Tis Truth; the Splendor, and Profusion of the Court and Camp, is Dazling, and Prodigious; they swim in Pleasures and Plenty: but he that turns his Eye toward those Miserable Animals, the Peasants, that with their Blood, and Sweat, Feed and Support that Luxe, and Vanity (with hardly bread for their own Mouths,) will find it much a different Prospect; the great Enhansers of the Charge claiming Exemption from the burthen of it.

He that would see the Glory of the One Part, and the Sla∣very of the Other, needs only read L'EST AT de la FRANCE, of 1661. Treating of the Officers of the Crown, Honours, Governments, Taxes, Gabelles, &c. He shall there find the Ve∣nality of Officers, and Their Rates; the Privileges of the Nobi∣lity,

and Their Encrochments; Who are Exempt from Pay∣ments; or rather, that the Country-man Payes for All. To make an end, let him also observe the Power, and Partiallity of their Supereminent Parliament of Paris.

The Book I mention, is of undeniable Authority, where∣in Account is given of, at the least, Eight Millions (English) arising from Three Taxes only; and for the sole behoof and Entertainment of the Souldery (their Tailles, Taillon, and Subsistance) Beside their Aides; (an Imposition upon all sorts of Merchandise, Salt Excepted ) which must needs by a Vast Income: and their Gabelle upon Salt; that brings in near Two Millions more. Not to insist upon Casualties, and infinite other Inventions for squeezing, which they practise: The Plough maintains the Army. [Take notice that this Reflection was Calculated for the State of France in 1661.]

Give them their Due, their Noblesse are Brave and Ac∣complish'd Men, and the Brunt of all Hazzards lies totally upon Them; but scarce in Nature is there a more abject Com∣monalty: and to conclude; Such is their Condition, that without War, they cannot Live: if not Abroad, they are sure to have it at Home.

Let it be Noted too: the Taxes follow'd their Army, not their Army the Taxes; for 'tis One thing to Levy Money to Raise Guards, and Another thing to Levy Guards to Raise Money: the One appearing to be done by Consent, the Other by Force. (I use Guards and Army promiscuously, as only taking a Guard for a small Army, and an Army for a stron∣ger Guard.)

If a Standing Army subjects France to so many Inconveni∣ences, (whereof History is full) where the Strength lies in the Nobility; How much more Hazzardous was it to Eng∣land, where the Welfare of the whole, depended upon the Affections and Interest of the Middle-rated People: Especially under an Vsurper, that was driven to uphold himself upon the daily Consumption of the Nation: (and a Body that becomes every day Weaker than Other, must not expect to be long∣liv'd.

So much for the Inconvenience of Cromwell's Standing Army, as to the Situation of England, together with a View of the Effects of it in France. We'l now consider what Wel∣come

it was like to find upon the Point of Experience, or Custom.

Alteration of Customs, is a work of Hazzard, even in Bad Customs; but to change Customs under which a Nation has been happy, for Innovations, which upon Experience they have found Fatal to them, is matter of great Peril to the Vnder∣taker. But I look upon Oliver's Case, as I do upon a Proposi∣tion, of such or such a Mate at Chesse: where there are sever∣ral ways to come within One on't, and None to Hit it. The Devil and Fortune had a mind to Puzzle him. He Prefers his Pawns; Transposes, Shifts his Officers; but all will not do: He still wants either Men or Money; if he Disbands, he has too few of the One; if he holds up, he has too little of the Other. Such in Truth, was this Tyrants Exigence, that he was forc'd to That, which the Lawful Possessors of the Eng∣lish Crown would never venture upon: No, nor the Vsurpers neither, before our Blessed Reformers of 1641. But

—Where will those People stay, That thorough God, and Majesty, make way.

Our Saxon Kings contented themselves with a Law, What Arms every man of Estate should find, and a Mulct upon such as did Detractare Militiae.

Edmond Ironside after his Duel with Camillus the Dane; and a Composition, to divide the English and Danish Kingdoms be∣twixt them and their Heirs, kept no Army on foot to Guard the Agreement; Neither did the Danes (who after his Death, Treacherously Seiz'd the Kingdom) to maintain their Conquest.

William the Conquerour, that subdu'd both English and Danes, thought himself safe enough in creating Tenures by Knights-Service, and permitting Proprieties; though at that time under such Jealousies, that he took divers of his English Prisoners into Normandy with him, for fear of a Commotion in his Absence.

William Rufus, and after Him, his Brother Henry the First, (tho' the Vsurpers of the Senior Right of their Elder Brother Robert) set up his Rest upon the same Terms: And so did Henry the II, after a long Contest with King Stephen, and notwithstanding the unruliness of most of his Sons.

Henry III and then Edward I, after the Barons Warrs

Employ'd no Standing Army to secure themselves: neither did Edward or Richard the Second; notwithstanding a Po∣tent Faction of the Nobility bandying against the Latter of them.

Neither did the Henries IV, V, and VI, in the Grand Schism of York and Lancaster, ever approve of it. Nor Henry VII, (as Wise and Iealous as any of his Predeces∣sours.)

If any thing could have warranted the Adventure, me∣thinks the Topsie-turvy and Brouillery which Henry the VIII, Introduc'd, might have perswaded, or provok'd it. But neither There, nor in the following Toss and Tumble of Religion, from Edward VI, to Queen Mary, and then back again to Queen Elizabeth, was it put in Practice.

King James had no Temptation to it. King Charles the Martyr, was indeed charg'd with the Intention of it, and so he was with being Popishly affected; (In Truth, with what not?) and the One as true as the Other. But who were They that laid This to His Charge? Even Those very Persons (some of them that advised Oliver to keep a Standing Army of 10000 Horse, and 20000 Foot, to Awe and Scourge the Nation. A Course unknown to our Forefathers; and by the Best and Worst of Former Princes equally disallow'd; the Bad not judg∣ing it Safe, nor the Good, Expedient.

But other more Convenient, and as Effectual, means they had, either to Prevent Dangers, or Suppress Them, as their Custom of Friborges, or Frank-Pledges, Enquests, Oathes, and Penalties, Tenures by Knights-Service, Commis∣sions of Array, &c. Which being of approv'd Benefit, and Equality, were much more suitable to the Genius and Inte∣rest of the People, than a Standing Army; which to allow, had been no other than to deliver up the Strength of the Nation, into the hands of a Faction.

Now was it less against the Government, than against the Humour of the Nation. Put a Parliament over the Nation, and an Army over the Parliament, Who Governs? But all Oliver's Geese were Swans; and his Souldiers Saints. Did they not Take what they would; Give what they would; Raise and Pluck-down at Pleasure? Nay, Effectually, did ever any Standing-Army Other, if they had nothing Else to do? Had they not already got the trick of calling the people together,

to get money of them; and then sending them away like Buz∣zards, when they had gotten it; of Packing, and Qualifying; Engrossing of Powers and Offices; Cantonizing the Nation? Was it to be expected they should restore the Right Line again, when they had set up the Wrong? The King, when they had erected a General; The Law, when they had Master'd it by the Sword? They did not Tug so hard, for that they meant to part with Easily. What they got by Rebellion, was to be maintain'd by Tyranny; and Necessity was sure at Last to do the Work of Conscience.

I Think, more need not be said to Oliver's Standing Army. His Mony could not last always, and when he wanted That once; he was certain to find his Army as Dangerous an Enemy, as it had been a Faithfull Friend to him in his Prosperity.

Nay truly, 'bate his Vsurpation; his want of Faith and Honour,—But Rather then Prophane the Sacred Character of God's Vicegerant by joyning Majesty and Cromwell in the same Supposition; let us Imagine rather a Wise and Lawfull Prince in the place of that Vsurper: and yet it may be a Question, How far a Standing Army would have Consisted with the Interest, even of a Rightfull Monarch.

First; As the Nation was Poor, and in no Condition for the Charge of it. Next; as it was Impoverished by an Ar∣my; and therefore ill-persuaded of That Expedient. Thirdly; the Prince himself must have been Poor; (in Olivers Place) and what should a Poor Prince have done with a Standing Ar∣my, over a Poor and Discontented People?

The Interest of This world is Money. Subjects Rebell; Ar∣mies Divide; and Kingdoms fall to nothing, for want of it: That which Fools call Fortune, being (to men of clearer sight) only the Favourable Influence of Treasure. 'Tis That, which Carries Towns, Causes, and Armies; puts Knaves in Honest mens places; Corrupts Cousells, and Supplants Govern∣ments: the People wear their hearts at their purse-strings; and a General Oppression, is ever accompanied with a General Desire to Remove it. I speak of what they do, not what they ought to do; for all men are not of a Constitution to hang, and Starve for Conscience. In fine, where the State is Necessi∣tous, and a Faction Wealthy, That Prince (as is already hinted) that erects a Standing Force, in that condition, does but pro∣vide an Army for his Enemies. Not to insist upon the hazzards,

arising either from the People, if the Principal Officers have too little Power; or from the Officers Themselves, if they have too much; by which, not only the Publick Peace, but the Mo∣narchy it self, is Endanger'd: the Kings Crown depending up∣on the Revolt of a Province. What can be more perillous then This Conjuncture; where there is so great a Temptation, on the one hand, and so great a Provocation on the other; where the Multitude wait only for a Head, and the Ambitious for a Party?

But why do I discourse the Mischiefs of a Standing Army? They are too many, great and Obvious, to admit a Question. What are the Benefits of it Rather? Is it either safe to any Purpose, or usefull to the common and pretended end of it, even under a Lawfull and Hereditary Monarch?

It's true; a Prince may deal with his Dominions, as the Gentleman did with his Estate, that turn'd an Inheritance in∣to an Annuity, because he would rather have it Large, then Long, and That's the Fairest of a Forc'd Government; Suppose he save himself for his own time; what will become then of his Successour? But that we'll waive too; and Consider, what's the Fruit of it to himself?

Is he the Richer for't? Alas, the Contrary: the Nation bears a Double Burthen, and the Army Sucks the better half of the Advantage. Is he the Safer? Neither: for a Mutiny in his Army, is both more likely, and more dangerous, then a Tumult among his People. In fine; A Standing Army may promote a Faction, but 'tis the Law preserves the Publick, and conse∣quently the King.

That Monarch that Secures himself from Private Practises by a Choice, Full, and Honourable Guard, well Paid, and Dis∣ciplin'd, about his Royall Person; as to the Rest shall find the Strict and timely Execution of Good Laws the best Publick Se∣curity against Sedition.

'Tis a Cheap Remedy, and therefore Acceptable to the Ge∣nerality: A Legall one; so that the Delinquents Themselves cannot Complain of it; and Lastly, 'tis a Sure one: which if it be, what can be more advisable for any Prince and Peo∣ple? In Truth; so Sure it is, that I'm to seek ('bate only Mat∣ter of Claim) where ever any Setled Government was Em∣broyl'd, but either by the Interest of a Standing Force; or the Remissness of Authority, in the Execution of Establi'd Laws.

The Necessity of a Royall Guard is Evident; the Number must be suited to the differing Exigences of Times and Places: but with This General Regard: That it be not only sufficient to the Safety of a Prince; but Honorary likewise, and Accom∣modate to his Dignity; and Demonstrative rather of his Pow∣er then of his Danger.

But be the Body Great or Small; Nay, we'l suppose it e∣qual, to a Standing Army (but not Distributed (as That is) into County-Troops, and Provincial Governments) Call it a Guard still, for the very Name of the Other sounds like a Grie∣vance. The One, supposing only the Peoples Care of their So∣veraign; the Other intimating the Soveraigns Jealousie of his People. Let me not be understood as in allowance of This Over∣proportion: for such a Guard is but an Army in Disguise.

There may be Temporary Occasions indeed, for Temporary, and Extraordinary Levies, but the word Temporary, is com∣monly attended with such a Train of Reasons for Perpetuity; that if the Occasion be not very Manifest, the World is apt to doubt of the Necessity. Not that the Generality have any Right to judge of, or Debate the Grounds of a Change; but I suppose that Their Opinions, and After-feelings will not be de∣ny'd to have some Influence upon the Event of it.

To Conclude; That Pince is Great, Safe, and Happy, that Commands by his Armes, Abroad, and Governs by his Laws at Home. The Apprehension of Conspiracies and Plots, in my opinion, weighs not much; or if there be any danger; the failing is rather in the Constitution or Administration, then in the want of Power to keep the People quiet: Good Laws, and Good Officers, will do the Business, without an Army; and if the Instruments be bad, The Hazzard's Ten times greater with it.

It will be needful here, for the Clearing of the Question, to make a Particular Enquiry concerning Seditions; and that's the Point we'l handle in the Next Chapter; which, for Or∣der sake, we shall divide into Seven Sections, with their Sub∣divisions as occasion shall require.

Notes

• This was cal∣culated for 1662.
• It seems to be the Interest of France to maintain a Standing Ar∣my.
• A Guard both Sutable and necessary about the Person of a King.
• The Maries of France abus'd the Confidence of their Ma∣sters.
• Pepin, the Son of a Powerfull Subject, depo∣sed his Prince, and sets up Himself.
• The State of France.
• The effects of a Standing Ar∣my in France.
• A Standing Army more hazardous in England, than in France.
• Alterations of Customs dan∣gerous.
• Our Saxon Kings kept no Standing Army.
• Nor Edmond Ironside.
• Nor William the Conquerour.
• Nor William Rufus.
• Nor Hen. 3. Edw. 1. Edw. nor Ric. 2.
• Nor the Hen∣ries 4, 5, 6, & 7.
• Nor Hen. 8. Edw. 6. Queen Mary, nor Q. Eliz.
• Nor K. James, nor Charles the MAR∣TYR.
• Expedients to prevent or disappoint Dangers.
• A Standing Army destru∣ctive to the Government.
• An Army without Pay, is the most Dan∣gerous Enemy
• Money is the Interest of the World.
• What's the Benefit of a Standing Army.
• The mischief and danger of it.
• A Royal Guard neces∣sary and suffi∣cient.
• With the timely execu∣tion of good Laws.