A second part of The mixture of scholasticall divinity, with practical, in several tractates: wherein some of the most difficult knots in divinity are untyed, many dark places of Scripture cleared, sundry heresies and errors refuted ... Whereunto are annexed, several letters of the same author, and Dr. Jeremy Taylor, concerning Original Sin. Together with a reply unto Dr. Hammonds vindication of his grounds of uniformity from 1 Cor. 14.40. By Henry Jeanes, minister of Gods Word at Chedzoy in Somersetshire.

Ieanes.

It hath hitherto been a receiv'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉 amongst all Logicians; that in mixt que∣stions, the termes of which belong unto severall disciplines, we must for the ex∣plication of each terme, have recourse unto the discipline, unto which it 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and you can say nothing to disprove this rule: whether inclination to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be essentiall to man? is a mixt question; for inclination to evill or 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 terme, and essentiall, is a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 terme, and therefore, in taking it in a Metaphysicall sense, I have done nothing, but what Logick, and reason have prescribed me; and therefore I shall not feare your passionate, and irrationall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of me for it. To cleare this yet further by instancing in mixt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the like nature; an formale 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in genere sit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ali creaturae? an formale 〈◊〉〈◊〉 originalis sit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 originalis 〈◊〉〈◊〉? 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad malum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex principiis naturae integrae? an Sacramentum sit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉? an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sint 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Physicae gratiae?

Now if here you should be pleased to say, that in these questions to call for Me∣taphysicall significations, of privatio, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 respectivum, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, may proceed from an itch to quarrell, but not from that ingenuity, which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be our best ornament, you will bewray but little judgment, and lesse 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

2. If that, which you call essentiall in a morall, and large 〈◊〉〈◊〉, doe not ei∣ther constitute the essence, or necessarily flow therefrom, it will in the upshot prove to be but accidentall; and how then comes it that you oppose it unto accidentall? But you will, perhaps,, tell me, that I must take accidentall in a morall, and large sense, as well as essentiall; But, Sir, what is there in your words to guide me unto this sense of accidentall? I took accidentall for the concrete of accidens 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and so I believe have most Schollars that have read you; and why it should not be thus understood I thinke you can alledge no reason, but that, you know not otherwise to make any tolerable sense of your words: your discourse is Polemicall, and if therein you use Philosophicall termes, and I call for a Philosophicall signifi∣cation of the termes, with what forehead can you accuse me for being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 some, and disingenuous? if when you cannot defend what you say, according unto the pro∣per, and usuall signification of the words you use, you must have liberty to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 un∣to large and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 senses of them, you may say even what you please; for no man will be able to understand what you say, unlesse he hath a peculiar key unto your writings,

But let us inquire what can be here meant by accidentall in a morall and large sense: essentiall, you say, in a morall sense, is that which is not after our nature, but together with it; and, in conformity hereunto, accidentall in a morall sense must be that which is after our nature, and not together with it, and then I shall desire you to awake, and consider, whether your second reason be not coincident with your third; for your second reason, as you expound it, stands thus; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to evill is after our nature, and not together with it in reall being: And your third 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is this, inclination to evill is superinduc'd unto nature, and is after it, &c.